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PREFACE
This study began as the introductory portion of a crit
ical inquiry into the validity of the several modern symbol
isms of freedom.

It became obvious that such a study could

not be undertaken without a simple and clear idea of what
freedom really is.

Because freedom in the modern world is

an object of psychic fixation and partisan cant, the modern
imagination cannot offer a definitive understanding.

Antiq

uity affords an uncomplicated perspective which is able to
instruct critical judgment about our modern notions of free
dom.

That is why we have chosen the ancient period of ori

gins as the focus for inquiry.
This study of origins has learned that human freedom in
history is indeed a reality, but that in its unadulterated
meaning, it is never an independent reality. 'Freedom derives
from divine justice, and apart from divine justice, it has
only a sentimental and transcient importance.

By this under

standing, it is certain that the modern inflation of freedom
has extensively transported freedom from the range of the
real to that of the unreal.

The Marxian, the existential,

even some liberal notions of freedom implicate freedom in a
movement which Eric Voegelin has identified as gnosticism.
That is to say, freedom is no longer the redemptive conse
quence of the justice whose incision into history restores
enslaved lives and warring polities.

Instead, it is the

goal of a sometimes murderous struggle whose animating inspi
ration is the fantasy that historical existence can be so
transformed as to end the human encounter with evil.

If

this search for the New Jerusalem were truly a search for
the New Jerusalem, it would have to contend with the righ
teous justice of Yahweh as part and parcel of its search.
But since the search is for a secular equivalent to the New
Jerusalem, there is no such encounter, and the misunderstand
ing about freedom and the neglect of real justice continues.
In the humane disciplines of the twentieth century,
contemporaneity has become the dominating idol of the mind.
Thousands are busy researching and reporting one set or
another of contemporary events, institutions, personalities.
The end of this interest in contemporaneity is unclear; in
that it has no precedent in all of history, it seems an
obsessive, self-gratifying quest.

The inner spirit which

drives this pursuit finds expression in the

verse,

HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
HURRY UP PLEASE ITS TIME
One suspects that the greatest value of the idolatry of the
contemporary is that it helps people to pass the time.
The interest in archaic meanings is essentially dif
ferent from the interest in contemporaneity.

Plato teaches

that the domain of memory, not the domain of here and now,
is the source from which we receive certain knowledge about
who we are and what we ought to do.

Plato understood the

exercise of this memory to be the special talent of philoso
phy.

In our own time, we have not only a philosophic memory

but an historic memory as well.
man complement one another.

These two memories of modern

In this study, they work together

to inquire into the origins of freedom.

Historic fact in

spires reflection, and reflection in turn illumines historic
fact.

This interactive memory is not without its own con

temporary value and interest.

To remember the meaning of

freedom at the time of its origin is to stand against a
confusion which beclouds our understanding of freedom and so
weakens our ability to live as free people.

When we remember

in this way, we become mindful that freedom is the privilege
which we preserve only through submission to the mastery of
justice.
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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the material and symbolic events
of both ancient Israel and Greece as they pertain to the
formation of a European culture in which freedom is a guid
ing value.
Chapter one advances the thesis that history is the
domain of human severality, and by consequence, of fated un
freedom; as such, historical existence leads to doom.

This

is the political lesson of both the Iliad of Homer and the
Yahwist's story about the fall and exile of man from the
garden.

In the pre-historic life of man, unity is pervasive,

and thus there is no fate or unfreedom.

This is the polit

ical significance of Plato's Age of Cronos and the Yahwist's
portrait of Adam in the garden.

In both the sense of free

choice and of liberation from bondage, freedom in history
happens when severality is mitigated by the incursion of
unity into history; the consequence of this incursion is the
creative reversal of humanity's descent to fated doom.

The

Gospel of Luke's paradigm of the Neighbor illustrates this
last tenet.
Chapter two seeks an avenue to the origins of freedom
in high antiquity.

It examines the freedom teaching of the

later Stoa and the New Testament.

In the paradoxical uni

verse of the Stoa, "freedom" became a nominal value without
experiential ramification.

Thus the Stoic teaching is not

helpful concerning the search for origins.

In the New

Testament, however, Paul's letter to Philemon exemplifies
the meaning of freedom in a living community.

The Fourth

Gospel's freedom pericope (John 8.34-36) indicates that
freedom is a structured reality, involving the negation of
a faulty past and the repositioning of life unto a future
which is imbued with the restorative power of the unifying
logos.

This pericope also shows that the earliest clues

concerning the beginnings of freedom are to be found in the
J and E sagas of the household of Abram.
Chapters three, four, and five constitute the substan
tive bulk of the study.

They deal with the concrete origins

of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity in which a dead past
is negated, and life is repositioned unto a new and beingful
future.

These events include the positioning of Abram as

the chosen man of Yahweh, the liberative positioning of
Israel as a nation independent of Pharaonic slavery, the
positioning of Moses as prophet, and the eighth century
prophetic protest against the injustice and bondage wrought
by an urban, monarphial society as an offense against the
holy righteousness of Yahweh.

The parallel materials from

Greece consider Hesiod's invocation of the just and righteous
will of Zeus against his brother Perses' dishonest attempt
to reduce him to penury.

Later, and of decisive importance

for the history of Europe, is the Solonic liberation in
Athens.

Solon believed that the justice of Zeus mandated
vii

the end of class strife in Athens.

In service of that end,

he released the unfortunate from their servile bonds, and
repositioned the polis according to the principle of consti
tutional justice.

The unifying allegiance of Solon to jus

tice inspired Europe's seminal liberation.
Chapter six examines the plays of Aeschylus.

Aeschylus

concludes the period of origins, because in his drama, free
dom is understood at last in an overt, political fashion;
the same impulse which liberates the slave is seen to imply
universal political participation.

The study concludes that

five meanings obtain from the original appearances of free
dom.

(1) Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity under

stood theoretically as logos, practically as justice.

(2)

Freedom requires negation and position relative to the prin
ciple of unity.

(3) Freedom is essentially antinomian.

(4) Freedom is primarily economic.

(5) Freedom is complete

only with universal participation in political authority.

•

«

•

Vlll
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I.

HISTORY AND FREEDOM

Freedom is a concern which is proper to a short period
in human existence, but a period which is quintessentially
important.
mankind.

Freedom happens in the historical existence of
Outside of history there is neither freedom nor

concern for freedom.

Both the concern and the reality are

exponents of human existence in history.
lary requires explanation.

But this vocabu

What do we mean by "history"?

Why is there a felt need for freedom in history?

How— or by

what pattern— does freedom come into history?
In order to address these questions which introduce the
inquiry into the historical origins of freedom, we will ex
amine certain primary visions which have given meaning to
the life of European humanity.

In response to the question

as to the meaning of history and the need for freedom in
history, the Iliad of Homer is instructive.

In the Iliad we

behold a fallen mankind which is victim to its own history.
The demonic power of this history is so intense that we un
derstand the Iliad as a chronicle of the destruction of the
historical world, in history.

The Homeric testimonial to

the demonic power of history, as fate, was balanced later by
Plato's vision of a world of pre-historic innocence which
stands before and beyond history as a paradigmatic guide to
mankind in history.

This is the perfect Age of Cronos.

This vision of extra-historic perfection is vital to our

1
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understanding of human freedom, for were there no such vision
available as tutor to the human imagination, there could be
no freedom in history.

At last we will contemplate the

Yahwist's account of the creation and fall of man, for the
Yahwist's story brings together into a single narrative the
vision of pre-historic perfection and the vision of demonic
fate in history.
After we have examined these primary visions which sym
bolize both the predicament of unfreedom in history and of
perfection before history, we will turn to the problem of
the mediation of history.

By mediation we mean liberation,

the event by which mankind

is set free from the fated power

lessness whose consequence is always cruelty, slavery, death.
There are two approaches to the question of how history is
mediated.

One is that the process of history itself has a

propensity to self-mediation.
the documents which inform

This view finds no support in

us about the origins of freedom.

The other is that the demonic

course of history is mediated

when— and only when— human apperception becomes sufficiently
deepened as to imagine the vision of pre-historic perfection.
Consequent upon this divine imagining is the liberation of
the slave, the release of the captive, the feeding of the
orphan, and most importantly, the attempt to embody the vi
sion of perfection in a permanent structure of constitutional
order.

Countries that are just and free are the enduring

product of this powerful and true imagining which cuts into
history and makes of mortal existence a vessel for eternal
being.

3
1. History and Pre-History
Rachel Bespaloff says of Hector:

"What he fled from,

what he now confronts, is not the 'gigantic Achilles,' but
his own destiny; he meets the appointed hour when he will be
sent to pasture in H a d e s . L a t e r she interprets the fate
of Hector and the other characters in a reflection about
history.

She writes:

"For the Greeks, history is simply

the stage of the tragedies of force and the dramas of col
lective passion; it has no awareness of divine justice and
makes no appeal to it."

This understanding of history as

an existential domain of fated unfreedom seems strange to
us, for we are heirs to a culture which has learned to view •
history as somehow being the arena of God's saving march
through the world in time.

And so it is.

But this saving

project is not proper to history itself; it is opposed to
history, as history.

It moves against the demonic current

in history to individuation and fated doom.
The analogue in our own time to the Homeric view of
fate is the attitude of modern science to the issue of human
freedom.

The epistemology of modern sciences— especially

behavorial sciences— is in large measure the product of
Hume's thinking.

Of the possibility for freedom, Hume wrote:

We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, but
a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our
motives and character; and even where he cannot, he
■^Rachel Bespaloff, On the Iliad, tr. Mary McCarthy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 42.
^Bespaloff, On the Iliad, pp. 121-122.
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concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly
acquainted with every circumstance of our situation
and temper, and the most secret springs of our complex
ion and disposition. Now, this is the very essence of
necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.3
Hume is our key to Homer, for the spectator about whom he
speaks is essentially the same as the poet as far as freedom
is concerned.

Neither conceives that there is a possibility

for man to free himself in the sense of beginning anew
through repositioning his life against the past and toward
the future.

Each attempt at newness is seen as being quietly

but surely shaped by all that has gone before.

The hero of

our culture is Saul of Tarsus, blind in Damascus, almost
ready to see anew and thus to begin again as a person free
of the accumulated past.4

But to Hume and to Homer this

character is impossible, for they are the spokesmen for his
tory in its absolute form.
■^David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: J.
M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1962), II, 121. Compare the remarks
of a Homer scholar concerning the transformation of Achilles
from an ordinary prince to the extreme character whose pres
ence dominates the Iliad. "The steps by which Achilles comes
to this position show a causal complexity very characteristic
of Homer. Viewed from a later vantage point, the quarrel
between Agamemnon and Achilles appears completely inevitable,
but as Homer narrates it in Book I, it seems like a series of
merely unfortunate accidents." See Cedrick H. Whitman, Homer
and the Homeric Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1958), p. 183.
^Our culture is Judeo-Christian, and its primary docu
ment is the Bible. The Bible attitude to sacrality and the
problem of history is unique. The Bible teaches that sanc
tification happens within history, not in a sacred time and
space reserved apart from history.
(See Mircea Eliade, The
Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, tr. Willard
R. Trask TNew York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1959],
pp. 110-113.)
Thus, Paul's conversion took place not in the
sacred precinct of the synagogue, but on the road, which is
to say, in history.

Poetry and science are not the same, for they serve
different ends.

Poetry punctuates its chronicle of the

demonic by amplifying the moments of immortal beauty which
appear ephemerally in the pauses between successive gales.
Science conquers the material world and thus enhances human
existence by bringing knowledge and material comfort to man
in historical existence.

But with the peculiarly human con

cerns the attitude of poetry and science is the same.

This

is so because both the Iliad and the modern empirical human
sciences comprehend man in the same way.

That is, the meth

odology common to both interprets human existence as an
affair which is severely individual and particular.

It is

for this reason that they understand man's thought, word,
and deed either as fated or as effected.

When the pattern

of human life is synthesized by a spectatorial intelligence
in such a fashion as to make human existence commensurate to
the mechanical sequence of causes by which the individual
balls upon a billiard table act and react, then man's career
on earth will be understood as a fated affair.

Fate is noth

ing besides the totality of causes bearing upon a particular
person.

Only in poetry— not science— are we permitted to

behold in a single moment the cumulative effects of the ac
cumulated causes.

This is the moment of doom.

This attitude then which rests upon the assumption that
human existence is essentially particular must necessarily
deny the possibility of freedom, for as this study will show
freedom happens in response to the awareness that there is a

reality beyond the particular self which is superior to the
particular self and its individual history.

Only if there

is a whole reality which transcends the self is it possible
for the self to become estranged from the causes which pro
pel it in the direction of doom.

When this whole reality is

sought out as the ground for action, then the causal se
quence is interrupted.
is what we mean.

Whenever we use the word "free" this

Whether we speak of the liberation of

slaves or the exercise of free choice, we mean that there is
a breach between achieved history and the decisive present.
Aside from its merit as a seminal document of culture, the
Iliad is a work of genius for its conscious portrayal of a
world which is left to history alone, a world in which there
is no check upon the passionate force of particular ambition
other than the force of a counter ambition.

The political

lesson of the Iliad is that history, unmediated, leads to
world destruction.
The Iliad is not a story about sin and fall.

Rather,

it is a story about guilt and fallenness; it knows of no
prior state of innocence.

The Iliad is a poetic heightening

of the ongoing helplessness of mankind in historical exis
tence, and the tale of the Trojan war with its senseless
cruelty is the poet's medium for the deliverance of his anal
ysis of the lot of man in history.

To say that humanity is

fallen is to say that it is divided against itself, for di
vision leads to death.

The primary division of humanity is

the sexual polarity which sets male and female apart.

The

7
Iliad illustrates that the sexual division is parent to all
subsequent division in history.

For this to be clear it is

necessary to consider some information about the cause of
the Trojan war which the Iliad does not relate.

The archaic

deity Strife dropped a golden apple inscribed "For the Fair
est."

Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite all desired the apple,

but Zeus refused to decide amongst them.

Thus Hermes ap

pointed Paris, son of Priam, king of Troy, to make the award.
Aphrodite described to the youth the sexual gifts of Helen,
the wife of Menelaus of Sparta, and promised to make Helen
the lover of Paris if she should be chosen.

Paris gave

Aphrodite the apple, and she in turn expedited the theft of
Helen.

Agamemnon's expedition against Troy followed.^

The pattern here is as follows:

Strife, an aspect of

the primal Chaos which underlies all ordered reality, broke
forth as sexual lust (Aphrodite), which caused theft, adul
tery and insult, which in turn caused a war which caused
death for men, slavery for women and children, and the com
plete destruction of a country.
in Book I of the Iliad.

A similar sequence occurs

Agamemnon appropriates Achilles'

captive concubine, Briseis.

This theft causes the brooding

wrath to descend on Achilles, and this wrath, in turn, causes
all manner of outrage.

To us, it seems that at each crucial

step in either of these causal sequences a choice might have
been made which would have altered the result.

But the poet

^Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, II (New York:
Braziller, Inc., 1959), section 159, pp. 269-272.

George
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will not permit this to happen because his project is etio
logical in an almost scientific way.
great catastrophes happen.

He shows just how

That is, they happen when the

men who move events do not find the power which would free
them to choose life instead of death.

They do not have this

power because each is locked inside himself, unable to imag
ine some completion which would enable him to see keenly and
carefully, and so avoid disaster.
In the Iliad, the character who most visibly displays
this impotence is Achilles, the absolute lover of self.

If

there is an Homeric devil, it is neither Aphrodite nor Ares,
for they are but deifications of elemental forces in nature,
self, and culture.
ity, like Achilles.

The devil must be a developed personal
Like Achilles he must be paradoxical,

powerful and at the same time utterly unfree.

Achilles is

just this demonic super person in history, the hero whose
eroticism reaches not toward life but toward death.

Achilles

personifies an aspect of human leaning which we discover
both within self and beyond self, externalized in the world
according to the division of labor.

It is the leaning of

the killer who makes of the other a victim, of the captor
who makes of the other a slave, of the tyrant who makes of
all life a mad and lamentable experiment.

Achilles is a

special kind of culture hero, the prototype of those immor
tals of history whose project is wrought on the forge of
unmitigated individuation.

The individuation of Achilles is

not the moral individuation of the hero which liberates from

the embrace of the Female, at once nutritive, seductive, and
murderous.*’

It is instead the false individuation of the

totally fallen, totally historical self.
7
Bonaparte or Stalin, a moral solipsist.

Achilles is like
This character,

whenever he appears in history, sterilizes the earth.
**See e.g. the confrontation of Gilgamesh and Ishtar,
Epic of Gilgamesh, tablet VI, and Odysseus1 victory over
Circe, Odyssey, X. The whole Iliad is arrested within the
pre-moral zone of Female domination. While Zeus, the Father,
is neutral, Hera and Athena engineer the destruction of Troy.
Aphrodite protects her votary, Paris, and preserves the adul
tery which has caused the mess. Achilles himself is very
much a mother's boy. The concern and help which Thetis be
stows upon her son show him as something less than a mature
adult.
^Some classicists would find this comparison and con
clusion exceptionable, for they have learned to perceive
Achilles as he was perceived by the Greek audience which at
tended the rhapsodes' recitation of Homer. Their scholarly
studies of the Iliad are built upon this self-limiting per
spective. This perspective of the uncritical hearer is nar
rower, however, than the perspective of Homer; along with
the popular indulgence of the hero, Homer shows us attri
butes in Achilles that are clearly demonic, and they are
part and parcel of a syndrome which causes world destruction.
In dealing with this tendency in Achilles, one commen
tator has it that Achilles is an entirely worthy young
prince whose appalling truculence is the result of "acute
neurosis." The neurosis is caused by the wrongful loss of
Briseis and the consequent death of Patroclus, about which
Achilles has guilt feelings.
(See Andre Michalopoulos,
Homer [New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966], pp. 95
passim.)
This observation seems beyond dispute, but to em
ploy psychologistic terminology in an effort to exculpate
the hero is to evade the point of the whole story. Achilles
is neurotic because he is the most visible entity within a
powerless world. This world is powerless even to send a
stolen woman back to her husband. To attribute some final
importance to the neurotic consequences of Achilles' insulted
manhood is as romantically personal as would be an assess
ment of Bonaparte which places the conqueror's unhappy
childhood at the center.
"Neurotic" is a sub-heading within
a larger category. It is a synonym of "unfree" equally with
"slave" or "prisoner." Like those realities, its necessary
condition is the extreme individuation of man in historical
existence.
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Priam goes to the camp of Achilles to claim the body of
his son Hector, and Achilles refrains from killing him.

Is

it largesse that Achilles shrinks from killing Priam; is
there a flicker of the light of nobility in this otherwise
cinderous personality; is the sparing of Priam a free act?®
Beyond doubt the Greek audience understood Achilles' behavior
to be noble, and perhaps even free.

But we are in a position

to know more of freedom than they— or Homer— could know.

As

the parable of the Neighbor will show, the free act requires
more than an abatement of wrath; it must involve the giving
of something more than a corpse in exchange for ransom.

It

must involve the bestowal of life where survival is in doubt.
Priam is too old to fight, and he is beyond the child
producing years.
merciful.

For this saddened old king death would be

Like his father Priam, the boy Lycaon is unable

to fight, but his inability is the result of his youth.

He

is no threat to Achilles of the Achaeans, except inasmuch as
his young life holds the promise of a future for his house
and country.
of Lycaon.

Achilles is at his demonic best in the murder
Lycaon has begged Achilles for his life, and

Achilles answers him.
"So, friend, you die also. Why all this clamour about
it? Patroklos also is dead, who was better by far than

We will observe in the concluding section of this study
that Aeschylus considered a psychological explanation for the
terrified unfreedom of Orestes, and then rejected it as inade
quate to the magnitude of Orestes' guilt. The guilt was real,
and it required a real expiation, not an apology.
8See Iliad, XXIV, 138 ff.
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you are. Do you not see what a man I am, how huge, how
splendid and born of a great father, and the mother who
bore me immortal? Yet even I have also my death and my
strong destiny [moira krataie] , and there shall be a
dawn or an afternoon or a noontime when some man in the
fighting will take the life from me also either with a
spearcast or an arrow flown from the bowstrong."
So he spoke, and in the other the knees and the in
ward heart went slack. He let go of the spear and sat
back, spreading wide both hands; but Achilles drawing
his sharp sword struck him beside the neck and the col
larbone, and the double-edged sword plunged full length
inside. He dropped to the ground, face downward, and
lay at length, and the black blood flowed, and the
ground was soaked with it.9
Achilles' untroubled acceptance of his own death is the
product of a conscious nihilism which can only be the atti
tude of mankind in its radically individuated historical
aspect.

It has its match only in the saint's acceptance of

death.

Death for the saint is the gathering point of a per

fect completion; for the nihilist it is the event of perfect
fragmentation.
The murder of Lycaon shows compactly the central prob
lem of the Iliad.

The individual character of human life in

historical existence is accompanied by a vacuum of meaning,
and the consequence of this absence of meaning is powerless
ness, unfreedom.

All unfreedom in history happens according

^The Iliad of Homer, tr. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1954), XXI, 106-119.
^•®A classicist in sympathy with Achilles understands the
nihilism differently. Of Achilles he writes:
"Only after
abandoning all human hope does he at last, in the scene with
Priam, achieve his greatest communion with humanity."
(Whitman, Homer and the Homeric Tradition, p. 205.) This
same author (p. 160) finds Achilles' address to Lycaon as
"friend" as an indication of a sort of "communion" with
Lycaon. One is forced to wonder if "friend" once had a dif
ferent meaning than it has now.
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to the format of the episode involving Achilles and Lycaon.
There is one who is physically powerless to prevent his en
slavement or abuse, and there is another who is spiritually
powerless to understand why he should not satisfy himself in
some manner by appropriating the life of another.

Achilles

murders (or enslaves— brands— castrates— tortures— sells)
Lycaon because he understands no reason why he should not do
so.

The concrete life— like the life of Hector with his

family— is meaningless to this disconnected individual; his
own life and the lives of his fellow men become sublimated
unto an infinite project of immortal fame.

The quest for

immortal fame is itself a confession of the vacancy of his
torical existence, and both the vacancy and the infinite
quest are inherent in history itself.

Because of the mean

inglessness of the individuated life pattern which history
requires of its inhabitants, the infinite quest which de
volves from this emptiness propels history to self-destruc
tion.
If the self-destruction of peoples in history is to be
avoided, there must be some means by which individuation can
be retarded.

There must be some means of unifying histori

cal mankind in such a way that the inner unity can overcome
the exterior diversity.

In concrete terms this means that

the survival and prosperity of historical mankind is con
tingent upon the subordination of the human will to the di
vine will.

But the theology of the Iliad shows us the prob

lematical side of this matter also.

The world-destructive
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conflict has begun precisely because the intention of Paris
fell into accord with that of Aphrodite.

Pitiable Helen,

aflame with guilt and foreboding about the increasingly
barren future, identifies the problem more penetratingly
than any other character in her reproach of Aphrodite.

She

suggests that the goddess has no true claim to divinity:
"abandon the gods' way, turn your feet back never again to
the path of Olympos . . .

The point is that not just any

god or gods are capable of assuring the survival of histor
ical mankind.

As we will observe, only the true God, the

God whose content is righteousness, is capable of directing
mankind in history to life and to freedom.
Homer is like a "pure" scientist.

His analysis lays

bare the pattern which binds events into a story.
not his job to improve the pattern.

But it is

The poet is aware that

the radical problem to which the nihilism of Achilles and
the others is kindred is the inadequacy of divinity in the
face of the need of historical mankind for salvation.

In

compensation for the absence of salvation or even its pos
sibility, Homer urges his audience to the contemplation of
immortal beauty.

To be sure, this contemplation has been

edifying, and is perhaps Homer's most lasting gift, but it
has nothing to do with our inquiry into the origins of free
dom.

Freedom did not originate with beauties such as Helen

and Hector.

It gained substance within the wind-scorched

frames of herders and farmers.
11Iliad, III, 406-407.

Freedom arrives in the world

concomitant with the subordination of beauty before a real
ity more divine.

The gods of man in historical existence are of two
kinds.

We can witness this duality in our familiar Christian

religion.

There is the nutritive god who created the physi

cal world, who orders the seasons, and in general performs
those many necessary functions which maintain nutritive life
as a going concern.

Above this is the God who comes to the

soul in its longing for order and peace, a God whose command
and blessing reveal to man the way of righteousness.

Just

as the former deity is nutritive, the latter is divine; it
is God's reality for man as a being who is at once within
and beyond the nutritive environment.

It is this latter

aspect of divinity which is absent from the Iliad and above
all else it is this absence which makes of the Iliad an ab
solutely historical document.

The nihilism of individuated

mankind in history shows itself through this mankind's fix
ation with nutritive ends.

The unbridled lusts for sexual

gratification, for wealth, for domination, even for destruc
tion, are essentially nutritive impulses which have run wild
because they are not integrated within an organic structure
of self or of culture.

This is the symbolic significance of

Aphrodite's mischief in the Iliad.

The sexual impulse with

out which life cannot continue has become as particular and
as destructively isolate as the mortals who are its practi
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tioners.

The inadequacy of the Homeric Olympian pantheon to

the needs of a human society adumbrates the historical in
adequacy of Greece itself.^

^he anthropomorphic gods them

selves were particular fixtures Within a fallen history from
which there was no recourse.

It was against this inadequacy

that Hesiod's new theology would rise in a rebellion which
was only partially successful.
In Plato, the severest critic of Greek culture, we find
an anti-Homeric, anti-Olympian vision of God and man.
vision is pre-history.

This

It is the absolute ground which

Plato sets up against history so as to elevate the level of
life in history and thus to avoid destruction.

Plato leaves

no doubt that he is dealing in a concept of pre-history, for
he chooses as the name of the beatific epoch before our own
the "Age of Cronos."

In the old literature— especially in

Hesiod— Cronos, the father of Zeus, had been bad, and his
defeat at the hands of his son represented a moral advance.
Plato thus repudiates the symbolism of a whole culture.

The

"Age of Zeus" is coincidental with the historical period of
human existence, and to Plato, its righteousnesses are as
filthy rags.

The rehabilitation of Cronos is part of a

l^This is not to suggest that Greece was wholly defense
less against the kind of behavior which the Iliad chronicles.
In both the Homeric and anti-Homeric strains of the culture,
there is respect for the Apolline injunction in favor of
moderation, against rapacious outrage. But even the injunc
tion is an expression of inadequacy and uncertainty. The
experience of the culture with its heroes, both legendary
and historical, had taught it the value of caution.
"Moder
ation in all things" is at base a pragmatic rule which is
likely to get one through life with a minimum of difficulty
when there is no fuller vision to provide direction.
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larger attempt to introduce into the Greek imagination a
novel element whose purpose is to free the culture from its
tendency to partisan destructiveness.

"Freedom" is not an

explicit goal in the project of Plato, yet without recourse
to the vision of wholeness before or beyond history, of
which the Age of Cronos is representative, freedom within
history would be impossible.
Plato was heir to the philosophic monism of Parmenides,
and that reflective monism was itself a philosophic appro
priation of the very oldest strata of Mediterranean symbol
ism of the eternal condition of the world before history,
division, and falsehood.

That world is an absolute unity

and its earliest symbol is the euroboros, the snake which
clasps its tail in its mouth.

The euroboros is truly pre

historic because it is entirely pre-oppositional.

Neumann

writes:

It is man

"It slays, weds, and impregnates itself.

and woman, begetting and conceiving, devouring and giving
birth, active and passive, above and below, at once."13
13Eric Neumann, The Origins and History of Conscious
ness (New York: The Bollingen Foundation, Inc., 1954), p.
10. A more differentiated visual symbol which is also made
from the closed circle is the Taoist t'ai chi. That symbol
represents both pre-history and history, for while the perim
eter conveys the same meaning as the euroboros, the internal
division of yin from yang suggests the sexual polarity which
produces the "ten thousand things." In respect of this gen
erative capability, the internal contents of the symbol are
divisible into an infinitesimal number of smaller figures.
This possibility of infinite division within the universal
wholeness is fascinating because it seems to tell a story
about the relationship of history to pre-history which is
decidedly different from the Mediterranean and Western under
standing. For this understanding history occurs as a rup
ture of pre-history and of a radical dissociation from it
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Plato's description of life in the Age of Cronos is a highly
differentiated, mythical representation of the same undi
vided reality which is symbolized by the archaic visual sym
bol of the euroboros.

Plato's myth of the Age of Cronos

couples this reality to the cyclic understanding of time.
In the Statesman, Plato accounts for human evil and
political decline in terms of the cyclic pattern of the
Cosmos.

In one cosmic period, the Age of Cronos, God him

self directs the rotation of the cosmos.

When this period

has ended, then begins the Age of Zeus when the cosmos ro
tates in the opposite direction.

This opposite rotation is

the underlying condition .for the fallenness of world history.
But here, we are concerned for the God-governed age, for it
is Plato's vision of pre-history.
In that era God was the supreme governor in charge of
the actual rotation of the universe as a whole, but
divine also, and in like manner was the government of
its several regions, for these were all portioned out
to be provinces under the surveillance of tutelary
deities. Over every herd of living creatures through
out all their tribes was set a heavenly daemon to be
its shepherd. Each of them was all in all to his flock
— providing for the heeds of all his charges. So it
befell that savagery was nowhere to be found nor prey
ing of creature on creature, nor did war rage nor any
strife whatsoever. There were numberless consequences
of this divine ordering of the world, but we must leave
them all aside save those concerning man, for we must
go on to explain the origin of our traditions concern
ing man's life in that paradise. A god was their shep
herd and had charge of them and fed them even as men

which is repaired only with great difficulty. E.g., the Age
of Cronos ends and that of Zeus begins with a reversal in
the direction of the world's rotation. The t'ai chi however
bespeaks a life experience in which multiplicity xi~~inher
ently subordinated before the initial wholeness of all.
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now have charge of the other creatures inferior to them
— for men are closer to the divine than they. When God
was shepherd there were no political constitutions and
no taking of wives and begetting of children. For all
men rose up anew into life out of the earth, having no
memory of the former things.
Instead they had fruits
without stint from trees and bushes; these needed no
cultivation but sprang up of themselves out of the
ground without man's toil. For the most part they dis
ported themselves in the open needing neither clothing
nor couch, for the seasons were blended evenly so as to
work them no hurt, and the grass which sprang up out of
the earth in abundance made a soft bed for them. This
is the story, Socrates, of the life of men under the
government of Cronus.14
Abundance, peace, youth— these are the most visible endow
ments of life in this great time.

In this myth, unity is

present on three levels; there is no need for mediation in
this perfect world.

At the lowest level, most immediately

involving the affairs of life, we note that mankind is earthborn.

Man's sexual endowment has not yet become evident or

necessary; each human life is integral within the greater
unity of the world.

Only in history need the family assem

ble so as to mediate a manifest sexual polarity which bisects
humanity.

At the intermediate level, there is no government.

Inasmuch as politics becomes a mediatory necessity with the
rise of multipolarity of society, it also belongs to history.
At the highest level formal unity is expressed in Plato's
monotheism.

This unity is given content in the fact of God's

pastoral direction of human affairs.

For Plato— as for Micah

in an earlier period and another place— the reality of one
14Statesman, 271d-272b, tr. J. B. Skemp. All Plato quo
tations are from Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds.,
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters (New
York: The Bollingen Foundation, 1961).
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God implies world perfection.
The truth of world unity is seen incompletely in his
tory.

The fragmentary evidence of this truth in history

becomes intelligible only upon the complete witness of pre
history.
More explicitly than any other Greek writing, Plato's
Age of Cronos stands in opposition to the pattern of events
which pervades the Iliad.

It opposes pre-historic divinity,

concord, and peace against the Iliad's historical demonism,
discord, and war.

But with regard to our special concern,

in neither vision is there human freedom.

Freedom happens

in history only when the pre-historic vision of unity pene
trates history, and becomes both reason and justice for his
tory.

The philosopher ruler— who is the dominant interest

of the Statesman— is capable of rescuing history because of
his own assimilation unto the pre-historic reality of divine
harmony.

Even if Plato does not tell us as much, we know

from the other (and older) sources that when such a ruler
appears in the historic world, his rule brings not only jus
tice but freedom as well.

To oppose an eternal unity against

the causal particularity of the world in time is to set man
kind free from its slave past and to direct it to a more com
plete embodiment of being itself.

Because of his hope for a

beingful future, the liberator is likewise the constitution
maker.
The Yahwist's account of the creation, perfection, and
fall of man concludes our elaboration of the ideas of pre
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history and history.15

The Yahwist's story is especially

instructive for it incorporates the meanings of both the Age
of Cronos and the Wrath of Achilles into a single literary
structure which traces the course of the man, Adam, from
creation to exile.

In the Adam narrative there are four

themes which have relevance here.
history of man,

These are (1) the pre

(2) individuation as possession,

viduation as knowledge,

(3) indi

(4) the curse of historical exis

tence.
The pre-history man is comprehended within the symbol
of the man in the garden of Eden.

The man here is in union

with both God and nature; indeed, he is that union, since he
is a composite character, made of earth and inflated by the
divine breath.

The description of Adam in the garden cor

responds generally to the vision of the Age of Cronos.

The

vision is one of abundance, timeless repose, a.id complete
absence of sexual polarity at either the human or animal
levels of existence.

The reality of life in the garden is a

wholly relational reality.

In this world-garden there is not

an inch of the terrain of distance and impersonality from
which a causal order might take root and grow.
Then it occurred to the Creator that the man was alone,
and that he needed a helper.

Attendant upon the introduction

of the female was the fall from innocence.
Yahweh decide thus?

Why then did

This question cannot be answered within

the framework of myth, and if it is pursued, the myth and its
15Genesis 2.4-3.24.
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meaning collapse beneath the pressure of an enraged ration
ality.

The question of theodicy is an exponent of the in

tellect in history, and any answer to it will be the product
not of myth but ofprose discourse.
explanatory as etiological.

The myth is not

so much

The Adam story gives an account

of the origin of individuation and strife in history from a
more permanent world reality which is before all history and
all misfortune.
Bible religion is accustomed to view the "fall of man"
as happening coincidentally with Eve's yielding to tempta
tion.

This interpretation corresponds with the understand

ing of the Yahwist

narrator himself. But that hardly ex

hausts the matter.

The myth shows us that the "fall of man"

occurs in two sequential steps.

The first of these steps is

taken when Adam awakens from his sleep and finds that the
unity of the garden has been interrupted by the introduction
of the sexual principle.
This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh;
She shall be called Woman because she was taken out of
Man.16
This triumphal claim of possession is the first swaying move
ment of the calamitous fall; it marks the instant when his
tory b e g i n s . T h e passage records neither murder nor enl^Genesis 2.23. All Bible quotations are from the
Revised Standard Version.
■^The first sentence of Rousseau's Third Discourse is
the secular parallel to the speech which the Yahwist attrib
utes to Adam:
"The first man who, having enclosed a piece
of ground, bethought himself as saying, 'This is mine,' and
found people simple enough to believe him, was the real
founder of civil society." This is a seminal inspiration of
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slavement, but we know that both will follow soon.

The pos

sessive speech of the man thus exhibits a formal similarity
within the Yahwist narrative to the murder of Lycaon in the
Iliad.

Both Adam and Achilles show themselves as particles

set in contrast against some other.

The creature asserts

his partiality against the unity of the Creator and the in
tended wholeness of the creation.
This assertion of the man shows something further about
the condition of division and misery that occurs in history.
History as the slave form of being human is not given in the
sheer fact of multiplicity, or even of human power in the
world.

The man in the garden " . . .

gave names to all cat

tle, and to the birds of the air, and to every beast of the
field . . ."18

But this man with the great power of naming

is not the fallen, historical creature whom we behold a mo
ment later, for even in the act of naming, he has not yet

modern leftism, and its understanding of the predicament of
man in history makes explicit a truth which was not yet ap
parent to Homer or the Yahwist, i.e., that the most patent
source of historical misery is inequality itself. From in
equality derives slavery, the absolute condition of powerlessness, an imposed non-being.
In both Israel and Greece
the connection of fallenness to inequality became understood
sometime between the eighth and sixth centuries. Modern left
ism is the heir to this discovery, and its understanding of
freedom is thus a more nearly authentic understanding than is
the conservative attitude which esteems tradition, even evil
tradition, and couples freedom to the assertion of individual
proclivity.
The quotation above is from "A Discourse on the Origin
of Inequality," in The Social Contract and Discourses, tr.
G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1947),
p. 192.
18

Genesis 2.20.
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discovered his own individuality and the claim of possesion
which follows upon it.

The man who names the animals is

still the lesser partner who lives in unity with the God and
the garden.^

Only with his comprehension of his otherness

from the female does his individuation articulate itself, to
self, through the act of possessing another.

As historical

materialism correctly understood, the possession of a woman
in history amounts to a division of labor in which slavery
•^Buber's reflection on these concerns explains the
radical distinction between Adam, the integrated namer, and
Adam, the disintegrated possessor. He writes:
Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their
natural and proper effect so long as they are linked
with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation.
There is no evil impulse till the impulse has been
separated from the being; the impulse which is bound
up with, and defined by, the being is the living stuff
of communal life, that which is detached is its dis
integration.
(Martin Buber, 1^ and Thou, tr. Ronald
Gregor Smith [New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons,
1958], p. 48.)
Buber's term "relation" means the same as this study's term
"unity." That is, when one meets another as Thou (not as He
or It), both exit from history. To relate with another is
to enter into a supra-personal unity. Because in unity there
is no severality, there can likewise be nocausality, no fate.
To relate is thus to be free.
Beyond this thetic identity, our purpose in this study
is different from that of Buber. In 1^ and Thou, Buber called
on twentieth century man to come out of history, out of his
world of the finite It, whose several predicates amount to
nothing. This study which seeks the origins of freedom in
history is primarily a political study because freedom is
primarily a political reality. A political study can never
— even for an instant— exclude the rt world from its gaze.
Prom the political vantage point, the relational possibility
in man's humanity is a possibility for the world of It.
Will the world in history be worse or better? The answer
depends on how fully political reality in history has come
to embrace as its orient the presence of a Thou whose ulti
mate being is before history.
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is incipient.
The second step, individuation as knowledge, follows
upon the first.

The text shows that possession is come by

in innocence; the shattering of the world of pre-history ob
tains as the individual discovers himself through the mode
of possession.
ent.

But the quest of knowledge is quite differ

It follows from the initial experience of individua

tion.

Like the unlimited drive of Achilles for conquest and

vengeance, it is an assertion of the projected infinity of
the individual.

As such it is an enlarged form of possession

by which the individual aspires to possess all that is
through the power of cognition.
And the woman said to the serpent, "We may eat of the
fruit of the trees of the garden; but God said, 'You
shall not eat of the fruit of the tree which is in the
midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest
you die.'" But the serpent said to the woman, "You will
not die. For God knows that when you eat of it your
eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing
good and evil."21
For this passage to become intelligible, it is first neces
sary to explain the usage "good and evil."
idiom with the sense of "all things."
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It is a Hebrew

The first couple has

been promised an omniscience which will in turn bestow immor
tality.

But the serpent has lied to the woman, and his lie

is the lie of historical humanity to itself, for as mankind
2®See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ide
ology, Parts I and III (New York: International Publishers
Co., Inc., 1947), pp. 9 and 21.
^Genesis 3.2-5.
22Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, tr. John H.
Marks (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1961), p. 98.
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increases its exercise of cognition, the severality of exis
tent things becomes increasingly apparent to consciousness.
The consciousness which knows (in the Occidental sense of
knowing finite things) is a consciousness which sensitized to
the fact of its own impending terminus in defeat and death.
This is hardly to be like God.
These accomplishments, the discovery of self in posses
sion of persons and things and the amplification of individ
ual selfhood in intellection are the material and ideal modes
of historicization.

Their consequence is the accursed burden

of history.
To the woman he said,
"I will greatly multiply your pain in childbearing;
in pain you shall bring forth children,
yet your desire shall be for your husband,
and he shall rule over you."
And to Adam he said,
"Because you have listened to the voice of your wife,
and have eaten of the tree of which I commanded you,
'You shall not eat of it,'
cursed is the ground because of you;
in toil shall you eat of it all the days of your life;
thorns and thistles it shall bring forth to you
and you shall eat the plants of the field.
In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread
till you return to the ground,
for out of it you were taken;
you are dust, and to dust you shall return." J
In both the Greek and Hebrew foundations of our European
culture we witness a recognition of the same facts about his
torical existence.

That is, human existence in history is

particular, and subject to a dominating misery which particu
lar persons serve, as agents of cause, and encounter, as re
cipients of effect.

In the end there is death, at once the

23cenesis 3.16-19.
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cessation of historical man's project of particular finitude
and the exposure of the false infinity to which this man pre
tends.

Historical man is unfree because he is ensnared within

a series of causes which move him through a career of misery
to his death.

It is for this reason that the mediation of

history in both Israel and Greece— and in the European cul
ture which grew from their union— is the discovery of freedom.
The symbols which this study will examine make it plain
that in its broadest possible meaning, freedom is the tri
umph of life over death.

If we speak of a free person or of

a free polity, the ultimate meaning of our words is that the
history of that person or polity has been so mediated that
its intentions and actions enhance all life, and thus deny
death its claim to a share in reality.

Pre-history is life

eternal, and freedom in history is the epiphany of life eter
nal in time.
2. The Mediation of History
In seeking the origins of freedom in Mediterranean
antiquity, the substance of this study will address the ques
tion of mediation.

In this introductory discussion, we iden

tify the two types of approach to the problem of mediation.
These are, in turn, the gnostic and the thymic or cardiac,
the intellectual and the spiritual.

The former attempt at

mediation appears first in late antiquity and it is the prod
uct of a burgeoning intellectualism combined with profound
dissatisfaction over existential circumstance.

The ideolo
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gies of modern experience are heir to this combination.

They

share with it a scientism which promises release from the
misery of historical existence.

To illustrate this kind of

thinking, we will examine Kant's essay on universal history.
Of much higher antiquity is the mediative tendency which
relies on the power of the heart to reach out for union with
God and man.

This tropism is pre-intellectual; it is the

passion of passions.

Its goal is no set of finite objects,

but an embrace of life in its wholeness.

To illustrate this

truly archaic mode of mediation, we have chosen the paradigm
of the Neighbor which appears in the Gospel according to
Luke.

The Neighbor is like the liberators to whose life-

making activity our own history is the continuing witness.
The gnostic liberation from historical bondage is sci
ence-dependent.

It understands human misery to be the result

of causality, and it imagines a private knowledge (gndsis)
about the pattern of causes.

This knowledge will facilitate

the knower's deliverance from historical existence and its
unhappiness.

In its ancient form, gnosticism became associ

ated with the Ptolemaic innovation in astronomy.

Professor

Burkitt wrote that before the Ptolemaic system became cur
rent, Near Eastern peoples had conceived the universe as a
tent with the earth as its floor.

For the new astronomy the

planets moved regularly around the earth in concentric
spheres.

Because of their regularity, they determined human

life astrologically.

The cosmos was thus a prison of sorts.

The gnostic who knew the mysteries could pass through these
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life-determining spheres and reach the good God who dwelled
beyond the spheres, and thus beyond all created existence in
time.

In this way he achieved a blissful freedom from experi

ential reality.^
Modern ideology replicates in form and spirit the gnos
ticism of late antiquity and it is no less troublesome than
its ancestor.

It appropriates both the general notion of

science, causality, and also the specific understanding of
whatever science is contemporaneously ascendant.

Notions of

mechanism and evolution are such specific ideas.

Kant's

"Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose"
is the initial effort in this genre.

25

It applies the con-

^ S e e F. C. Burkitt, Church and Gnosis: A Study of
Christian Thought and Speculation in the Second Century
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), pp. 30-33.
25That Kant's essay is the first of this type of pro
gressive theory of history is the observation of R. G.
Collingwood. The identification of the theory as ideology
and as gnosis is our own. In this assessment, we follow the
guideline which Voegelin established for judging political
literature. That is, Kant's essay expects the eschatological
event to occur in history.
See R. G. Collingwood, The Idea
of History (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1948), pp. 100-101,
and Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1952), chapter IV, sections 3
and 4.
Since this study refers several times to Voegelin's
theory of political gnosis, some comment is necessary.
Voegelin taught that modern ideological movements replicate
the broad movement in late antiquity known as gnosticism.
They expect a qualitative change in the terms of historical
existence, an essential modification of what Voegelin calls
"the structure of reality." Accordingly, the eschaton of
orthodox Christianity is moved within history by this gnosis,
and given a secular, political coloration. From Puritanism
to Maoism, this general pattern is evident.
Due to an interest in precision, we need to observe here
that Voegelin's use of "gnosis" is based on an analogy. An
cient gnosticism and modern ideology are analogous in that
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cept of mechanism to the problem of history.

Ego derivative

strife, like gravitation in nature, is conceived as the force
which is leading history to its eventual perfection.

This

reliance on mechanism as the motor of human progress is cur
ious, for it is the production of the author of the Second
Critique, the most penetrating of the modern discussions of
freedom.
Kant's essay understands by "history" the same range of
evils which we have observed in the Iliad and in the fall of
man from the perfection of the world-garden.

Man's partial,

historical qualities separate him from the life of concord
which he would enjoy in their absence.

But the evil of man's

self-seeking activities is not complete unto itself.

This

evil has a beneficent underside in that it is the cause of
all advances in both material and moral culture.

Kant be

lieved that the particularity of mankind in historical exis
tence is in truth a subsidiary part of a greater process
which is incrementally bringing universal peace, justice,

they expect and pursue a permanent end to the evil of exis
tence in history; they attempt to re-enter the One of myth
and womb. There are important differences, however. Ancient
gnosticism was elitist and rigidly dualistic; modern ideology
is democratic and monistic. Modern ideologues overcome the
elitist-dualist tendency of the gnostic form by re-educating
or killing those who are unable to participate in it. In
this way, the lower level of the dual reality is eliminated.
Because of this monistic transformation, modern ideology can
be progressivist, unlike its ancestor. Finally, ancient
gnosis was more spiritual than political. The politiciza
tion of gnosticism is symptomatic of an even deeper trans
formation which has taken place in modern symbolism and
thought.
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lawfulness, and an international constitutional order.26
Thus, like the gnostic cosmos, the Kantian world of histori
cal existence is ostensibly a dungeon of torment.

But Kant,

like the gnostics, knows that all is not as it seems.

In

truth there is a secret staircase about whose location Kant—
and those initiates who are privy to his syntactical myster
ies— are knowledgable.
Proposition Eight is the crux of the essay.
The history of the human race as a whole can be
regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature
to bring about internally— and for this purpose also ex
ternally— a perfect political constitution as the only
possible state within which all natural capacities of
mankind can be developed completely.
We can see that philosophy too may have its chiliastic
expectations; but they are of such a kind that their
fulfilment can be hastened, if only indirectly, by a
knowledge of the idea they are based on, so that they are
anything but over-fanciful. The real test is whether
experience can discover anything to indicate a purpose
ful natural process of this kind.
. . . [H]uman nature is such that it cannot be indif
ferent even to the most remote epoch which may even
tually affect our species, so long as this epoch can be
expected with certainty. And in the present case, it is
especially hard to be indifferent, for it appears that,
we might by our own rational projects accelerate the
coming of this period which will be so welcome to our
descendants.27
^^See especially Proposition Four, "Idea for a Universal
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," in Kant's Political
Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1970), p. 45. This appears to be a secularization of
the Stoic-Augustinian theodicy which has it that the cosmos,
or God, tolerates evil as a tributary force in the making of
an ultimate good. The crucial difference between Kant and
his predecessors is that Kant held that the ultimate beati
tude would become manifest in history, through the "natural"
workings of the historical process itself.
27Rant1s Political Writings, p. 50.
the text.

Italics are from
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The meaning is simple, even banal:

Intellectuals should

learn to know the formula of the process so that they will be
able to hasten its realization.
In his innocence, this gentle and erudite contemporary
of Mozart bids his reader to put the theory to the test of
experience.

Experience has shown that the practitioners of

this kind of gnosis were not patient men like Kant.

They

were indeed convinced chiliasts whose notions about the sci
ence of racial types or of economic laws— analogous to Kant's
mechanism— inspired their adherents to entirely un-Kantian
behavior.

Kant's "Universal History" is a very minor article

within the philosopher's total effort.

For those who took

the progressive science of history so seriously as to make it
the dominant theme of their lives, the effort to force his
tory to display its latent perfection bore fruit which was
quite different from Kant's imagined "perfect political con
stitution."

In pursuit of this vision of historical fulfil

ment, the pursuers became less like Kant and more like
Achilles.

Rather than lead the world to beatitude, they made

death more real than life.

If experience is the test of the

progressive theory, then the theory is false.

The attempt

to assist the historical process to its destined conclusion
is diabolical.

The consequence of chiliasm is not heaven in

time, but an interminable last judgment of the damned.
The reason that the gnostic solution to the liberation
of mankind from historical bondage has failed consistently
is that there is no self-mediating process to be known— no

"hidden plan of nature"— in history.

The most archaic docu

ments of our culture inform us that history as history is a
slave dominion wherein the particularity of mastery mandates
a particularity of submission.

The truth which obtains from

a reflection on the origins of freedom in history is that
this particularity causes mediation only inasmuch as wrong
causes a perceived need for right.

This is not to say that

wrong is in some dialectical way a part of the right which
responds against it, for wrong is— as the Anaximander frag
ment implies— a part of nature proper, while right is divine.
Bondage causes liberation in the same way that a burn causes
therapy.
a burn.

If we are sane, we would never predicate "good" of
We would predicate "good" of the healthy condition

of the flesh before the burn, or of the healed condition of
the flesh after the burn.

If this is not understood, then

it will seem that the mediation of history, liberation from
bondage and abuse, is somehow automatic, and hence that human
responsibility for the condition of the world is an option.
Just as some burns are not treated and do not heal, but in
volve the host in infection, pain, and death, so it is with
the assertion of the particular self in history.

If this

particular assertion is not curbed by the power of a good
will whose freedom is the condition of its determination by
universal Reason, then the human project is left to history
alone.

Whenever this has happened, the generation of Lycaon

is beckoned to Sheol in the flower of its youth.
The study of the origins of freedom show that history
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is mediated according to no inevitable process.

Liberation

occurs only when one appears who participates in the worldcreative power which is the essence of divinity.

This re

sponsible creature opposes history without regard to personal
safety or fortune, and in his opposition inheres the power to
make free.

Nowhere is this truth revealed with keener poign

ancy than in the parable of the Samaritan, or more aptly,
the parable of the Neighbor.

This parable is the perfect

vision of freedom for it shows its twofold nature.

The

Neighbor is free to turn outside of his own biography, and
because of his turning, he is able to perform in history as
redeemer, as savior, as liberator.
OO

oo

^°The redeemer symbol xs from Israel, the savxor from
Greece. Each reflects the experience of its culture with
the threat of unfreedom and the event of liberation. Our
European culture was constructed during the Roman period
from the materials of these two Mediterranean cultures. Of
the several documents which those cultures produced, none
are more authoritative than the Synoptic gospels and the
dialogues of Plato. The remarkable characteristic which
these documents share is their nearly complete silence about
freedom. Yet, when we read them, we recognize in them the
trait which we identify at once as freedom. The parables of
Jesus display this lesson consistently: negate the past,
begin anew. For our gestalt and its vocabulary, the newness
of this commitment to the Kingdom is freedom itself, and
indeed, Saint Paul taught us to understand it as such. Much
the same is true of the Socratic understanding of the "Know
thyself." To experience oneself as microcosmos is to become
free of an ignorant and guilty past.
Why then the silence about freedom? Quite possibly it
is because— as we will observe in the following chapter—
"freedom" lends itself readily to a nominalization which sun
ders connection with experienced reality. Moreover, the pop
ular preoccupation with freedom tends to detract from the
awesome weight of responsibility which freedom in its true
meaning imposes. The identification of freedom with indi
vidual whimsy is a consequence of popular fixation with indi
viduation, the form of freedom, to the exclusion of the righ
teousness which is freedom's empowering content. In view of
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This is the parable of the Neighbor:
"A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho,
and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by
chance a priest was going down that road; and when he
saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a
Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed
by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed,
came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had com
passion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pour
ing on oil and wine; then he set him on his own beast
and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And
the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to
the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of him; and whatever
more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.'
Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to
the man who fell among the robbers?" He said, "The one
who showed mercy on him." And Jesus said to him, "Go
and do likewise."29
The parable is a story about history and its mediation.
Each of the characters in the story is a particular entity
in his own history, going from one definite place to another,
pursuing some finite goal.

Inevitably, someone is injured

as particular ambition is gratified.

But there appears one

who, upon beholding the injury, forgets in an eternal moment
his own historicity.

This forgetting of one's finite his

torical past and its projected future in the blessed moment
is the primary event of liberation, for it is the moment in

these hazards, our most authoritative texts decline to name
the reality to whose presence they point.
In the Synoptics, the one important usage which our
translations render as "liberty" is a quotation by Jesus from
Trito Isaiah (Luke 4.8).
It is significant that the Greek
term here is an inflection of aphesis, not eleutheria, the
standard term for "freedom" whose connotations in the Helle
nistic vocabulary were as numerous as those of our own word.
Aphesis is more restrictive; it has the sense of release
from bondage following upon the forgiveness of debt or crime.
29Luke 10.30-37.
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which man remembers— in the Platonic sense of remembering—
the wholeness which is his permanent being.

This is the

moment in which the liberator is himself created, and
pursuant upon his own creation follows his recreation of the
historical world.

The Neighbor within history is the ana

logue of God before history.
We recognize Moses and Solon as liberators because of
the obviously liberative character of their accomplishments,
but it is important to understand that beneath the practical
ity of any liberation there dwells an empowering mass which
is primarily ontic.

The Samaritan is neither traveller nor

rescuer nor healer, nor even "good."
the Samaritan i£ Neighbor.

In a substantive sense

It is because of the amplitude

of this symbol that we have chosen this parable to introduce
the liberative mediation of history.

A neighbor is no iso

late particle in a fated progression; he is instead the
cosmos in completion for his fellow men.
of fate.

He is the adversary

Because he is Neighbor, the Samaritan obtains both

inclination and power to act against the demonic current of
history.

Like Adam in the world-garden, the Samaritan as

Neighbor is opaque to himself.

His finite identity and am

bition have fallen away; he interrupts his journey.

Like

Adam, the powerful namer, the Neighbor shows his power as
restorer.
There remains one consideration about the symbolism of
the parable of the Neighbor.
tense to a false beatitude.

In this story there is no pre
There is no chiliasm.

The en
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tire narrative takes place within history.

The Samaritan

does not take the victim of the robbers to heaven; he takes
him to a hotel.

He does not place him in the charge of

angels; he pays money to the innkeeper for services rendered.
For an inquiry which is concerned with the origins of free
dom and the archaic meaning of the concept of freedom, this
imagery is extremely significant.

The documents which in

struct us about the origins of freedom make it plain that
freedom is a reality which requires an improvement of the
structures of the object world in time.

The Marcionite wish

to transport the meaning of life away from its concrete em
bodiment in the structures of created existence is the most
menacing of all heresies.30

To succumb to this wish is to

leave the world to the mercy of tyrants and slave merchants.
This study of the origins of freedom reveals that the concern
from which all of our ideas about freedom would grow is a
charitable concern about the miserable condition of man in
history.

The neighborly response to this concern was not to

redefine meanings so as to conceal the inevitability of his

30The revival of this attitude has been one achievement
of the existential movement. Consider this passage from
Berdyaev:
"God is certainly not the constructor of the
world order, or an administrator of the whole world. God is
the meaning of human existence."
(See Nicolai Berdyaev,
Slavery and Freedom, tr. R. M. French [New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1948], p. 87.) The ancients believed that
God was the meaning of existence because of his involvement
as constructor (Israel) or as administrator (Greece) of the
world in time. Freedom came into history as a viable, pal
pable consequence of this belief; it has no concrete mean
ing apart from the belief that existence in time is in some
sense a vessel for divine reality.

torical existence.

It was instead to remember the whole

meaning of life which historical man had forgotten.

To

remember is to enter into the truth which makes man free.

II.
1.

THE STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM

Two Articulations of Freedom

This study is an exercise in looking backward to a time
of origins.

For this reason, the materials which this chap

ter examines are of passing interest.

That is to say, we

must pass them on the way to the origins of freedom, and we
must cognize them as we pass them, for there is no way to get
to the origins of freedom in history without passing through
the Hellenistic period of late antiquity.

The Hellenistic

age is the great intersection which couples modern life and
thought with its true and firm moorings in high antiquity.
The age effects this coupling, usually not with deep in
sights of its own, but rather through the articulation of a
conventional vocabulary which associates the later life and
thought of Europe with the early, seminal insights of Israel
and Greece.

Terms such as "law of nature" and "right reason"

become conventional in this period.

The symbol "freedom,"

as a basic goal of life, is also conventionalized in this
period.
As the Hellenistic age emptied itself into the new, Ro
man age, two competing understandings of freedom were artic
ulated.

One of these is the Stoic position.

The freedom

teaching of the Stoa is properly Hellenistic; it is "indige
nous" to its time, an ideology of sorts.

As such, it afforded

philosophic foundation for caesarism, and also, as we will
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show, a formula for the criticism of imperial tyranny.'*'

The

other understanding is that of the Christian New Testament.
It is basically anti-Hellenistic.

Both survive in European

thought.
The freedom which the Stoa advocates is "nominal" free
dom.

The Stoa reveres the term "freedom," but it has little

interest in the affairs which common sense always identifies
with freedom, i.e., affairs of real and daily human life.
Beyond a strict personal regimen which is called freedom, the
Stoa does not identify freedom with physical well being or
with economic independence or with a permanent and powerful
involvement in the life of one's civic community.

The most

immediate and pervasive explanation for the Stoa's subjec
tivist understanding of freedom is its intense mentalism.
The Stoa did not embrace the Hellenistic dualism of mind (or
soul) and body until the teaching of Poseidonius appeared in
2
the first century B.C.
But it seems that such a develop
ment was inevitable, given the emphasis on mental control of
all life which is central to the Stoa.

If we identify the

truly beingful part of humanity as its mind, and if we imag
ine concomitantly that the body is essentially a stranger to
the mind, then freedom will seem to be an affair which has
little to do with one's visible existence in the world.

In-

^For the Stoic foundation of the Augustan design of em
pire, see Moses Hadas, Hellenistic Civilization: Fusion and
Diffusion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp.
251 ff. and 284 ff.
o
J. M. Hist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), pp. 211-218.
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The Stoa uses the word "freedom," but it departs grossly
from the concrete and palpable meaning which this word held
for the period in antiquity in which freedom emerged.

From

Stoic freedom to Gnostic bliss there is not too long a step,
since both have ceased to respect the body as the objective
and visible vessel of human life.

In this chapter we exam

ine the Stoic position on freedom as it appears in Philo (20
B.C.-50 A.D.) and Epictetus (50 A.D.-135 A.D.).^

The atti

tude of these two writers regarding the meaning of freedom
is much the same.

They are especially pertinent in this

chapter since they occupy the same period in which the New
Testament "structure of freedom" was propounded.
S to ic

freedom

is

n o m in al,

but C h ristian

freedom

is

real.

^Philo Judaesus, Every Good Man Is Free, 108.
^Philo is not usually considered to be a Stoic. The
great task of his life was to assimilate the Hebrew Scrip
tures to the vocabulary and mentality of the Hellenistic
world view. He belongs in this discussion however because
his freedom treatise is essentially Stoic. F. H. Colson,
the translator and editor of the complete Philo .collection,
identifies the treatise as an argument in support of the
Stoic paradox.
See F. H. Colson, tr. Philo, IX (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1940),2.
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The freedom teaching of the New Testament is the authentic
link which connects the modern appreciation of freedom with
the origins of freedom in Greek and Israelite antiquity.
New Testament freedom is real because its freedom is a visi
ble, daily affair; it is more than a venerable name, more
even than a disposition of the mind.

Freedom in the New Tes

tament is real in the sense that it integrates mind and body
in a program of action which seeks to accomplish the salva
tion of person and world.

The New Testament Christianity

then is at base anti-Hellenistic.
with the ministry of Jesus.

It begins in Palestine

Near the beginning of that min

istry, the earliest of the Synoptic gospels establishes that
the forgiveness of sins— an internal rectification— is not
1
by itself a complete restoration of the person. The body is
5
to be healed as well.
The Apostles Creed's insistence on
the resurrection of the body is anti-Hellenistic in the ex
treme.

Christian freedom, moreover, is not individual.

Like

the freedom which was first emergent in earlier antiquity it
is freedom which obtains in an organized community, the
church.

The church is neither a nation in the Israelite

sense, nor is it a Greek polis.

But it is nonetheless a

real community which imparts a substantive identity to the
members who participate in it.

Freedom is the modality by

which this participation becomes possible.
The New Testament teaching of freedom is articulated
in the writings of Paul and the Fourth Evangelist.
5Mark 2.3-12.

Paul under-
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the Fourth Evangelist remembers clearly the early meaning of
freedom, and preserves this meaning for the European future.
2.

Nominal Freedom in Philo and Epictetus

In the following passage from his treatise on freedom,
Philo describes an event which took place in his home city,
Alexandria:
A short time ago, when some players were acting a trag
edy, and reciting those lines of Euripides,
The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much,
I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm
that they stood upright to their full height, and rais
ing their voices above the actors, burst into shout af
ter shout of applause combining praise of the maxim
with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only free
dom for what it does, but even its name.®
It is clear from this description that by the time in which
Philo writes, the noun "freedom" has begun to command a kind
of totem
with

power, not only with philosophers and poets, but

the Hellenized audience as well.^

It is possible that

the power of the name increases in proportion to the loss of
real freedom that an historical community has suffered.

If

this is the case, the emotive response to the name "freedom"
conveys a deep and largely unconscious feeling of opposition
to unfree circumstances.
This inflation of the name "freedom" is familiar to us,
^Philo Judaeus, Every Good Man Is Free, tr. F. H. Col
son, Vol. IX (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 194 0),
141.
7
Concerning the nominalization of "freedom" at the on
set of the Hellenistic age, see Max Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek
Life and Thought, tr. Carl Lofmark (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 106-107.
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for modern symbolization parallels to some extent the Helle
nistic increment in audibility of the term, "freedom."

That

is to say, real freedom is historically rooted in the life of
an independent community.

When great empires arise and de

stroy the autonomy of communities, as in late antiquity, or
when centralizing economic and political structures supplant
the old, liberal pattern of human organization, as in moder
nity, there is a concomitant loss of real freedom.

But the

loss of the material basis of the free life of a community
does not entail that the symbol lose its power.

In Helle

nistic, as in modern times, the symbol retains and even in
creases in power.

If political reality is implacably obstrep

erous in its resistance to the exercise of real freedom in
the community, then the symbol lodges its power in the im
material endowment of the human person.

The mind or the soul

becomes the dwelling place for freedom, and the bodily real
ity is consigned to insignificance and disgrace.

This ex

plains why in Stoicism and Gnosticism in antiquity, and in
existentialism in modernity, freedom takes an intensely perO

sonal configuration.
native.

In certain times there is no alter

The symbol can be kept warm and vital only if it is

^Thus, R. M. Grant speculates that Gnosticism does not
originate simply from the Hellenistic world view with its
dualism. Rather, he believes that its primary spring is from
Jewish apocalyptic.
In Roman Palestine during the early em
pire, there were several insurrections against Rome which
were inspired by the apocalyptic vision that God was about
to restore autonomy to the Jewish nation. These insurrec
tions were crushed with great carnage. When it became evi
dent that the apocalyptic vision would not achieve material
success, that vision was followed by a Gnostic retreat into
the self. See R. M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christian
ity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 27 ff.

45
held close against the bosom.

That the meaning of the sym

bol is distorted is an unfortunate, but necessary, consequence
of its subjectivization.
The Stoic paradox about freedom shows the extent of the
personalist distortion of freedom.
several ways.

The paradox is stated in

Philo's title conveys one formulation:

Good Man is Free."

"Every

Several centuries earlier, Zeno, who had

been influenced by the paradigmatic lives of Socrates and
the Cynics, Diogenes and Crates, had originally formulated
the paradox in terms of wisdom; the wise man alone has both
Q

virtue and freedom.

In either formulation, it is undeniable

that there is an authentic historical thread, since the early
records of freedom show that the men who are most free are
indeed good and wise, and that they are conspicuously better
and wiser than the common run of men.

If we know nothing

else of Solon, we know that he was good and wise, and that
his goodness and wisdom influenced his work.

But the Stoic

formulations are nonetheless paradoxical because the Stoic
doctrine insists that it is only those who are good and wise
who are free.

This idea is in conflict with experiential

reality, for in that reality, there are some men who are
wicked or stupid, or both, and who are likewise free and per
haps even wealthy and powerful.

Likewise, there are some

men who are good and wise who are slaves, chattels of men
who are quite possibly inferior to themselves in terms of

^Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Book
VII, 121.
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goodness and wisdom.

The intention of the Stoa in asserting

this paradox is to accuse men who are materially free, but
who are wicked as well, and thus to convert them from wicked
ness to goodness.

Likewise, the paradox tends to encourage

people of low station who are good to continue in their good
ness, by assuring them that they are free despite their ma
terial circumstances.

The most manifest accomplishment of

the Stoic paradox however is to make "freedom" a purely nom
inal term which lacks existential relevance.
There are two main forces which prompt the Stoic nominalization of freedom.

One is the rise of cosmopolitan em

pires and the consequent dwarfment of the old communities in
which freedom took form.
this.

The other is closely related to

It is that the immorality of slavery had become trans

parent while slavery remained a necessity for the maintenance
of an advanced, highly differentiated historical existence.
With the reduction of old national and political boundaries
to inconsequentiality before imperial authority, it became
difficult to maintain a theory of natural slavery.

If all

are subject to Rome, then it is hard to convince oneself that
one's own people are inherently superior to all other peoples
and that they can be rightfully enslaved.

Already in the

writing of Aristotle, when the cosmopolitan age was dawning,
natural slavery was an idea that could be asserted only with
caution and much stipulation.11

The Stoa had to comprehend

l^See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp.
112-114.
11See Aristotle, Politics, 1253b-1255b.
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the historical fact that Diogenes, one of its early models,
had in fact been enslaved.
When the evil of slavery has become transparent, three
remedies present themselves.

The first is abolition.

of antiquity, only one group advocated this solution.
was the Jewish Essene sect in Palestine.1"*

In all
This

It is symptomatic

that the Essenes lived a simple, pious, community life which
showed a much lower degree of historical development and differentation than did the ambient world.

Like more recent

forms of egalitarian communalism, this group approximated
the Unitarian pattern of the pre-historic Age of Cronos or
world-garden, and was thus empowered to resist the slave in
stitution which is consequent upon historical variegation.
A second remedy is that chosen by Christianity.

For present

purposes, it is enough to say that Christianity weakened
slavery as an institution without demanding its abolition.
The third remedy was that of the Stoa.

By defining reality

in terms of paradox, it was possible to tolerate virtually
any practise by establishing a mental distance which makes
the world of daily conduct seem small and minor.

This de-

Laertius' reproduction of Aristotle's will is authentic, It
seems that Aristotle was ambivalent about the institution
which his Politics defends as a natural, and mutually bene
ficial relationship between master and slave. The will
orders the manumission of Aristotle's slaves upon his death.
See Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book V, 15.
l^Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.
13William L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and
Roman Antiquity (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1955), p. 117.
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tachment could even lead to a sort of establishmentarian cal
lousness.

Diogenes Laertius tells us that Chrysippus taught

as follows about Zeno and his disciples in respect of their
wisdom and freedom:
. . . the wise are infallible, not being.liable to er
ror. They are also without offence; for they do no
hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they
are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they
never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since in
dulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are
marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place
of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too se
vere.
This is an example of the cultivated apathy of the Stoic.
The Stoic understood "pathos" not simply as suffering, but
as disease itself, and the disease is a condition inhering
in the sensory manifold which is at base an endowment of the
human body.

15

To be without the disease of compassion is

thus as desirable as to be without the disease of lust.

This

uncharitable mien becomes possible whenever the inner life
becomes radically detached from the career of the body in
the world.

Even the slave who subscribes to this philosophy

can view with detachment what happens to his body in the
world, because he does not believe that what happens to that
body is really happening to himself.
The Stoa's paradoxical use of the name "freedom" leads
the Stoa to an absurdist travesty of commonly experienced
reality.

Within this absurdity however there is a genuine,

l ^ D i o g e n e s
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, tr.
R. D. Hicks, Vol. II, Book VII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 123.

1!*Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 72-73.
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political opposition, a negation of present political evil,
and thus, incipiently, an understanding of true freedom.
Beneath both absurdity and opposition there dwells a memory
of the real freedom of old.

This memory is not even conver

sant with the twisting of freedom which the paradox has
accomplished.

It is a pure memory.

We must now examine in

turn these three aspects of the Stoic freedom teaching:

its

absurdity, its oppositional force, its memory.
In developing his main theme that to be good (or some
times Philo says "wise") is to be free, Philo argues that to
be sold does not make one a slave.1®

If a member of a fam

ily is kidnapped and is subsequently ransomed by the family,
the fact of his having been ransomed does not make him a
slave to the family.

If a person kidnapped or taken captive

in war is sold to a master, this does not make him a slave
if he is really a free ( = good) person.

Beautiful young

girls in this situation are often able to turn the master
into their own "slave."

(It is hard to see how this con

nects with the thesis that the good are inherently free.
Furthermore, Philo withholds comment on what alternatives
lie for those who are no longer young and beautiful; the way
in which their goodness stays enslavement remains problem
atic.)

This argument concludes with the following passage:

If selling constitutes slavery we should have to assert
that a person who had bought some lions is master of
the lions, whereas if the beasts do but turn menacing
eyes upon him, the poor man will learn at once by ex
perience the cruel and ferocious lordship of those whom
iGphilo, Every Good Man Is Free, 37-40.
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he has purchased. Well then must we not suppose that
if lions cannot, still less can the wise man be enslaved,
who has in his free and unscathed soul a greater power
of resistance to the yoke than any he could make with
the naturally slavish body and all the vigour of its
physical strength?17
If Philo had ever seen a lion pacing from wall to wall in a
cage, the power of his convictions must have led him to sup
pose that the cat had resolved, as an act of will, to take
exercise.

The image of the captive lion, and the implicit

contrast of this animal with the same beast in its natural
setting, show the extent of the Stoic paradox's deviation
from the standards which are established in visible reality.
The imputation of invisible qualities as compensation for
visible imperfection is a symptom of powerlessness and decay.
Visibly, the caged lion is not free.

The caged lion can be

free only if the term "lion" is understood as an exact syn
onym for "free."

In this event, verbal representation has

ceased to admit any binding connection to visible reality.
Such absurdities are frequent in Epictetus, and in their
political implications they approach satire.
In his long discourse, "On the Calling of the Cynic,"
Epictetus places the following words in the mouth of the
Cynic whom he holds up as a model for all men:
Look at me, I have no house or city, property or slave:
I sleep on the ground, I have no wife or children, no
miserable palace, but only earth and sky and one poor
cloak. Yet what do I lack? Am I not quit of pain and
fear, am I not free?1®
■^Philo, Every Good Man Is Free, 40.
18Epictetus, Discourses, in The Stoic and Epicurean
Philosophers, ed. Whitney J. Oates, III, XXII (New York:
Random House, 1940), 380.

Now the early cynics of whom Epictetus was thinking as h e .
spoke thus were rather like a Callicles who had been converted
19
to philosophy.
They were fierce ascetics who despised the
ordinary customs, pleasures, and status distinctions of set
tled life.

In this passage from Epictetus, however, we are

not concerned about its historical model of early cynicism,
but about its understanding of freedom.

The speaker asks,

rhetorically, about one who has ho house, city, property,
family, wardrobe, "Am I not quit of pain and fear, am I not
free?"
ire.

Epictetus is entirely serious here; this is not sat
But from a common sense point of view, it is absurd.

The attributes which Epictetus has summed up as "free" are
more commonly understood as the attributes of a slave.

The

Genesis story of Hagar and her son, which we will examine in
the following chapter, shows a far more primitive and non
intellectual approach to the visible life circumstance of
one who has no property or tribal identity.

She is not "quit

of pain and fear" because of these attributes.

On the con

trary, pain and fear are the salient facts of experience for
her.

Finally, Hagar has incurred the attributes of homeless-

19

In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles savagely advances the
sophistic argument that nature is at odds with social con
vention and law. He thus rejects Socrates and all that Plato
understood the paradigmatic life of Socrates to imply. Cyn
icism later embraced the paradigmatic life of Socrates, but
maintained also the ascendancy of nature over convention.
Cynicism's use of this sophistic concept resulted in a doc
trine of human equality which rejects conventional distinc
tions amongst men. One consequence of this must obviously
be to cast suspicion upon slavery. See Plato, Gorgias, 482e484c; Diogenes Laertius, Lives, Book VI, 38; Hadas, Hellen
istic Culture, pp. 13-16.
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ness, etc., because she is a slave and is therefore powerless
to avoid them.

20

The contrast of the Hagar who has been cast

out of the household to the Cynic through whom Epictetus
speaks shows in the most pronounced way the contrast between
the old understanding of freedom and slavery and its late,
subjectivist distortion.

In Epictetus, there is a veritable

"transvaluation of values" by which the visible marks of slav
ery are transformed into badges of virtue and of freedom as
well.
There is more than this, however, in the absurdities
of Epictetus.

We behold a real power and bravery in the way

in which Epictetus reduces the common goals of life to absurd'
ity.

One suspects that in the philosopher's heart, it is

not the common goals that are wrong, but rather that in his
time and place, they become wrong because one must seek them
within the world tyranny of Caesar.

In his discourse "On

Freedom," Epictetus details the career of the slave who is
set f r e e . T h e

slave imagines that all will be well when he

is set free, but his yearning for freedom is only the begin
ning of his troubles.
mission.

He will have to pay a tax on his manu

The slave believes that his status hampers him, and

that freedom will mean equality, self mastery, freedom of
movement.

But actually he will get hungry after he is freed,

and then he will have to enter prostitution or be reduced to
a state of free labor even more menial than was his lot as a
^®See Genesis 21.14-16.
^Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I.

slave.

Or he may become rich, and then he will fall in

with a slave girl who will make him miserable.
to be a slave again.

He will

love
wish

To make his freedom tolerable, he will

enter the military and work his way up in it.

"Lastly, when

he gets the crown to his career and is made a senator, once
more he becomes a slave again as he goes to the senate;
he enjoys the noblest, and sleekest slavery of all."

then

22

This argument continues that the highest stage of slav
ery is to be Caesar's friend, for to do this one must become
a flatterer.

A flatterer must speak and act against his own

will, and thus he is in truth a slave.

In the course of ad

vocating the Stoic, personalist conception of the free will,
the choice of materials which Epictetus uses to illustrate
the thesis allows him to accuse the whole political system.
The conceptual absurdity that the slave is free and the free
man slave is employed to expose an existential absurdity in
which to be great amongst men entails the loss of honesty
and self mastery.
The idea that the friend of the emperor is in truth a
slave is a satire whose intensity can hardly be grasped within
a world in which chattel slavery has been abandoned.

This

satire has become possible because the name "freedom" is sep
arated from the historical circumstances in which freedom
came to flourish.

Freedom for the Stoa is not the commonly

shared characteristic of the non-slave males of a community.
Rather, it is a personal and subjective ability to will the
22

Epictetus, Discourses, IV, I, 408.
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good and to prohibit the body from interfering with the will.
For this reason, Stoic freedom enlarges the personal realm
at the expense of the public, common realm.

The Stoic idea

of freedom maintains a connection to the political sphere,
however, through its opposition to political evil.

Opposition

is articulated in characteristically Hellenistic terms.

One

opposes the tyrant by maintaining the integrity of the soul.
The integrity of the soul is maintained by the forfeiture of
the body.
Philo believes that many people who are free will pre
fer death and dismemberment to enslavemeht.

He recites a

list of individuals and peoples) b6th mythical and histori
cal, who went willingly to death rather than accept tyranny
and

e n s l a v e m e n t . ^

logue.

Epictetus engages the tyrant in a dia

(Is he thinking of Domitian?)

contempt eludes paraphrase.

The eloquence of his

He speaks thus to the tyrant:

For who pays regard to you as a man? Show me. Who
wishes to become like you? Who regards you as one like
Socrates to admire and follow?
"But I can behead you."
Well said. I forgot, of course, one ought to pay
you worship as if you were fever orcholera,
and raise
an altar to you, like the altar toFeverin Rome.
What is it then which disturbs and confounds the
multitude? Is it the tyrant and his guards? Nay, God
forbid! It is impossible for that which is free by
nature to be disturbed or hindered by anything but it
self. It is a man's own judgments which disturb him.
For when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your
leg," he that values his leg says, "Nay, have mercy,"
but he that values his will says, "If it seems more
profitable to you, chain it."
"Do you pay no heed?"
No, I pay no heed.
"I will show you that I am master."
2 3 p h ilo ,

Every Good Man Is Free, 105-120.
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How can you? Zeus gave me my freedom. Or do you
think that he was likely to let his own son be enslaved?
You are master of my dead body, take it.
"Do you mean that when you approach me, you pay no
respect to me?"
No, I only pay respect to myself; if you wish me to
say
thatI pay respect to you too, I tell you that I do
so, but only as I pay respect to my water pot.24
This impiety toward one who rules the world and is wor
shipped as a deity is shocking.

It bespeaks an opposition

which approaches real negativity, for while neither Philo nor
Epictetus promulgates a doctrine of negative freedom, the
ingredients of the understanding are present here.

The re

spect of tyrants is a result of wrong opinions, and wrong
opinions are the result of letting one's disposition toward
life be influenced by forces other than one's own will.25
The free

willof the free person thus stands solid against

the material might of the tyrant, and inasmuchas it is

given

to immaterial resolve to negate material force, Stoic free
dom does negate tyranny.

That it must negate the tyrant's

venom by annihilating the body may seem to be foreign to any
discussion in which "freedom" can be intelligible, but this
is not the case.

While the Stoa deprecated the body, Judaism

and Christianity respected it, but all were required at this
period in history to render up the body in order to avoid
imperial contamination of the most sacred things.
Furthermore, one must consider the alternative to this
Stoic forfeiture of the body.

Stoic negativity remains polit-

24Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 257.
25Epictetus, Discourses, I, XIX, 259.
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ical; it does not become cosmic.

Although the Stoa rids the

soul of its earlier, intimate ties to the material world,
the separation is not absolute.

The Stoa continues to show

concern for right political order in the world, although the
concrete means for making this concern effectual have van
ished.

The Stoa does not push the anthropological dualism

of soul and body to its cosmic conclusion.
come Gnosticism!

It does not be

Even in the transvalued world in which

Stoic freedom takes form, the world itself is not damnable.
Instead, the world is providential.
the world, but the tyrant.

The Stoa negates not

Political evil occurs, as in old

Greece, as a function of ignorance, misorientation to the
true pattern.

When the world is viewed thus, it is still

important to show political concern.

The new, personal free

dom of the Stoa thus retains a limited connection to polit
ical reality.

This connection obtains as a personal nega

tivity against tyranny.
The political gradient of Stoic freedom is negative.
It is problematical whether there is anything in this phi
losophy that can be identified as positive freedom.

The

commitment of the Stoic "free" will to duty is well known,
but this is a determined commitment.

9£

There is no "if"

here; there is no dialogue within the soul over the question
of openness or closure.

Indeed, in the old Stoa, and again

in Epictetus, there is a conscious refusal to accept the
soul as a multi-tropic composite which may act reasonably or
2^See Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, 136137.
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unreasonably, freely or unfreely, according to the particular
element which has come to dominance.

Instead, the soul is a

unitary structure which sometimes commands but always con
sents to events; thus it is necessarily "free."

For the

Stoic then, the great lesson in life is to follow, lest one
be dragged.
the will.

In either case, nothing truly happens against
All is in some sense voluntary.^7

inasmuch as

the unitary, subjective will is a subsidiary part of world
reason, there can be no real freedom.

The Stoa is quite

right in its understanding that freedom consists in willing
and doing good, but its assumption that the will is always
inclined to the good is at odds with experience.

Just as

the Stoic paradox denies the physical reality of slavery,
the doctrine of the free and good will denies the metaphys
ical reality of slavery.

That is to say, it minimizes the

reality and power of evil in man and the world.

The Stoic

position then is not a doctrine of freedom which is won
through struggle against physical bondage and base inclina
tion.

Instead, it is ideal determination.

This ideal de

terminism approximates to a theory of mechanism which be
comes reminiscent of the gnostic ideologies of modernity.
Epictetus tells us that the calling of the citizen is to be
totally absorbed in the process, to be like a hand or foot
which, if it had reason, would subordinate every impulse to
the pattern of the whole body.

This thought concludes:

That is why it is well said by philosophers that "if
^ S e e Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp. 42-44 and 127-132.
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the good man knew coming events beforehand he would help
on nature, even if it meant working with disease, death
and maiming," for he would realize that by the ordering
of the universe this task is allotted him, and that the
whole is more commanding than the part and the city
than the citizen.
"But seeing that we do not know be
forehand, it is appropriate that we should hold fast to
the things that are by nature more fit to be chosen;
for indeed we are born for this."28
As in his negativity, Epictetus stops short of gnosis in his
positivity.
did . . .

We do not know the entire pattern, but if we
There can be no doubt that this statement and

others like it display a positive attunement to right reason,
the metaphysical core of reality.

But they have nothing to

do with freedom, except perhaps in an undilutedly nominal
sense.29
^Epictetus, Discourses, II, X, 29.
29it is significant that when Paul uses this same meta
phor of the church as a composite body in I Corinthians,
chapters 12-14, the problem of the body's proper coordination
is not viewed as a problem involving knowledge of a pattern.
Knowledge is singled out for demotion in importance.
In
stead it is a problem of love. If one has love, then one
will function in harmony with the other members of the body.
If we reduce this Pauline treatment to Stoic language, the
problem which Paul poses is: "Is your will free? Have you
been moved by love?" For the Stoa, the issue remains:
"Your
will is free. Are you wise enough to manifest this freedom?"
The Pauline treatment, rather than the Stoic, suggests the
tension of freedom and unfreedom within the core of the self,
i.e., the part that loves, the part out of which free posi
tivity proceeds. True positive freedom comes then as a pos
itive answer to the question:
"Who are you?", not "What do
you know?" Professor Rist's remarks about the early Stoa
shed light on this matter. He writes:
If the reason of the virtuous man is wholly "consis
tent," then all his acts will be morally good, as the
Stoics held, and he will not make any real choice be
tween good and evil. It is probably not accidental
that the early Stoics avoid the Aristotelian word for
choice [proairesis], both when talking about external
goods and when observing that virtue is to be chosen
for its own sake. For in any ordinary sense of choice

The reason why this ethical positivity has nothing to
do with freedom cannot be identified satisfactorily at the
level of Stoic metaphysics or anthropology.

Instead, a de

scent to the political arena is necessary.

In this quotation

from Epictetus, it is ironic that Epictetus has seen fit to
mention the relationship of the city and the citizen.

This

is an intrusion from an older, more primitive mentality that
is not manifestly a concern of the Stoa.

In this passage it

amounts to little more than a figure of speech, for to the
Stoa, man is a citizen of the cosmos.
translate this term?

Now how should we

Should we say "world" or "universe"?

We must say both, for the Stoa intends both.

What the Stoa

explicitly does not mean by cosmos is "city" or "nation" or
"people."

Where positive freedom occurred in antiquity, it

occurred as a liberation, followed by a positioning— or
rather, a re-positioning— of life stations and experiences
within a community.
cosmos.

That community was a cosmion, a micro

It was not and could not be the cosmos itself, for

such a reality would be too large and too dissociative to
support action.

Identity with the whole would not be real,

but imaginary, and a re-positioning of life would likewise

the good man does not choose virtue; he simply is virtuous.
Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p. 15. See also Pohlenz, Freedom in
Greek Life and Thought, pp. 120-121 and 134. For a discussion which emphasizes human sinfulness as the salient dis
tinction between Stoic and Pauline conceptions of personal
ity, see Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Con
temporary Setting, tr. R. H. Fuller (New York: Meridian
Books, 1956), pp. 143-144.
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be imaginary.

This is one way of understanding the Stoa's

indifference to slavery.

On the nominal level the Stoa does

liberate slaves, but a real liberation and a new beginning
for one's fellow cosmic "citizens" was not possible.
the lack of interest in the matter.

Hence

Only with the establish

ment of a community, the church, is the re-positioning of
life able to recur.

It is such a re-positioning that we will

see articulated in Paul's letter to Philemon.
The negativity with which Philo and Epictetus assert
real freedom against the tyrant is accompanied by sparse, but
solid evidence that these thinkers who embraced the Stoic
paradox did have a memory of what freedom had meant in the
earlier period when it first emerged in history.
Philo's "memory" can be found in his profuse praise of
the Palestinian Essene community with which he was contemporary.

30

Despite this contemporaneity, we are dealing here in

the domain of memory because Philo chooses this community
above all others in the world at his time to illustrate the
concrete meaning of freedom.

Such a selection must be in

structed by a memory of an earlier pattern of human order
which remained visible amongst the Essenes.

Philo tells us

that the Essenes are a devout, rural people; some farm and
others practise crafts; they are not acquisitive beyond life's
necessities and thus they are content; they have nothing to
do with the making or use of armaments, nor will they become
involved in commerce; they seriously study the divinely in30Philo, 75-87.
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least for the moment, the disparity between words and reality.
The Essenes are good and they are free, but not only because
of an interior disposition; their freedom is concrete to the
point that it has become absolutely opposed to the practise
of slavery.

They occupy a living space in which the name

"freedom" has become real.

This space is no cosmopolis; in

stead,.^ is a God-community.
In one discourse, Epictetus also shows memory of the real
and concrete integration of life in the time before.

This

discourse is a spirited diatribe against sceptics and Epicureans.
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Epictetus detects a nihilism at the base of these

doctrines, and he is especially concerned about their effects
upon the young.

This is most interesting because the inten

sity of Epictetus' desire to refute the sceptic leads him,
for the duration of this discourse, completely away from the
hard dualism of mind and body and into a concrete monism of
self and community.

Epictetus asserts nothing less than the

reality of reality.

In this, he forsakes all paradox, all

convolution of meaning.

He speaks like one who opposes the

scepticism and nominalism of modern science because of its
anomic implication to human life.
is a slave to a sceptic.

Epictetus imagines that he

The master demands:

"Give me gruel here." I would fill a dish with
vinegar sauce and bring it to him.
"Did I not ask for gruel?"
Yes, master, this is gruel.
"Is not this vinegar sauce?"
How is it more that than gruel?
"Take it and smell, take it and taste."
33Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX.
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How can you know if the senses play us false? If I
had three or four fellow slaves who shared ray mind I
should give him such a dressing that he would hang him
self, or change his opinion. Such men trifle with us;
they take advantage of all the gifts of nature, while in
theory they do away with them.3*
In his mockery of Epicurus, the Stoic paradox about free
dom disappears in a defense of the more common understanding
of antiquity about freedom, slavery, the city.
Bravo, philosopher! Stick to your task, persuade
our young men, that we may have more to agree with you
and share your views. These, no doubt, are the arguments
which have brought well-governed cities to greatness,
these are the arguments which made Lacedaemon, these are
the convictions which Lycurgus wrought into the Spartans
by his laws and training: that slavery is no more shame
ful than noble, and freedom no more noble than shameful!
For these beliefs no doubt those who died at Thermopylae
died!35
The arguments which are mentioned here are standard Epicurean
fare:

atheism, repudiation of the natural sociability of man

kind, hedonism.

What seems most revealing about Epictetus'

response to these arguments is that he does not refute them
philosophically.

Instead, he echoes Herodotus in pointing out

that the men of Greece would not have died to stop the Per
sians had their lives held no more meaning for them than ori
ental tyranny or Epicurean dogma is able to offer.

The anomic

vision of the world is always available, and with the accel
eration of world historicity, as in imperial antiquity, it
becomes proportionately more available.

But this view, with

its argumentative distortion of dommonly apprehended meanings,
is unable to support an integrated human life.
•^Epictetus,

Discourses, II, XX, 327-328.

OC

Epictetus, Discourses, II, XX, 327.
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We can only wonder if Epictetus ever understood that
the Stoic nominalization of freedom is similarly argumenta
tive, similarly at odds with the real, archaic understanding
of freedom.

A part of the implication of the Stoic paradox

must be that "slavery is no more shameful than noble, and
freedom no more noble than shameful!"
In both Philo and Epictetus there is a basic confusion.
There is a frail memory of what freedom had meant in the time
of its emergence in history.
anny.

There is an opposition to tyr

But concomitantly there is a detachment of the name

"freedom" from free circumstance.
freedom.

This detachment distorts

It elevates it as a symbol which no longer symbol

izes a substantive power, and thus risks both idolatry and a
consequent sublimation of opposition.

The dissociation of

the symbol from its referent life circumstance occurs in a
historical world which has lost vital connection with its
past.

For the inhabitants of such a world, there is no firm,

historical past with traditions and institutions which can
anchor a present and assure a future by providing a positive
orientation to the real affairs of life.

Furthermore, there'

is but a muted and intellectual memory of the pre-historic
content and power which created and organized the world, the
community, the human self.
metaphor.

For the Stoa, "Zeus" is only a

The divine name means logos or world reason, of

which the individual subjective will is a small part.

When

the pre-historic reality has been thus intellectualized, one
participates in this transformed prehistory, not primarily by

acting in history, but by detaching the soul from history.
Such a detached soul does perform in history, but it does so
from a somber concern for duty, and not from a free givenness
in the goods of life.

Dutiful behavior is not wholly free.

It is a calculated response to the manifest need for ethical
conduct as the necessary condition for human survival.

As

such, it is pragmatic, dictated by an almost physical neces
sity.

Duty does not partake of the free, world-creative spon

taneity which characterizes human practise in its most endur
ing presentations.
The detached soul is able to do its duty because the
Stoa has given it a "free will."

It is this very dogmatic

assertion that is the source of confusion for the Stoa and
for later philosophy as well.

The Stoic doctrine of free

will plucks some imaginary, composite human out of his home,
his community, his climate, and places him against the imme
diate backdrop of the whole universe and asserts:
son is free.

This per

In so doing, this doctrine forges a hard dis

tinction between "man" and "economic man" or "political man."
Whatever may be the "philosophic" merits of such abstract
speculation about freedom understood as an independent will,
history shows that freedom appeared and became meaningful in
material and symbolic reality in the finite space of a living
community.

In Greece, the name "free" referred to concrete

realities in the household and city.

We infer thus that the

primary meaning of the term is a political meaning.

The Stoic

memory of this older freedom shows us that the political mean
ing of freedom has not been lost, but rather that its primacy
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has been lost.

This memory, along with the dutiful commitment

to ethical conduct, instructs the Stoa's opposition to tyr
anny.

But the ascendancy of freedom of will over political

freedom in the Stoic hierarchy of interests makes the Stoa im
potent to pose a real, political alternative to the prevail
ing evil.

In the Stoic treatment of freedom then there is no

complete structure of freedom.

Two rudiments of the structure

are present, at least in a formal sense.

There are the real

negativity toward the tyrant, and the world reason which per
forms as the pre-historic ordering principle for history.
The positive ingredient, the victory of the positive power
within the soul over the forces of concupiscence and destruc
tion, is absent.

The free impetus to recreate, to re-position

life, is absent.

An ideally determined duty is advocated in

place of freedom.
In the Christian New Testament we find a fuller appre
ciation of freedom than the Stoa can show.

The letters of

Paul treat freedom in a way that is reminiscent of Herodotus;
they contrast two opposed life patterns, the free and the unfree.

The Fourth Evangelist articulates a structure of free

dom which points the modern consciousness of freedom to its
origins in Mediterranean antiquity.
3. The Structure of Freedom in the New Testament
Freedom is first an experience which occurs within hisi

tory as the positioning, or placing, or making to stand of
certain persons in a special way.

Later, "freedom" occurs as

a name which expresses in language the way in which those
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who have experienced freedom have come to stand in historical
reality.

As we have seen in the discussion of the Stoic par

adox, the use of names is hazardous because names can become
symbols which are dissociated from the primary experience out
of which they grew.

In the earliest understandings about

freedom in both Israel and Greece there is in fact no noun in
those languages which would translate as "freedom," or even
as "freeman."

At the early period, the experience which we

comprehend by the name, "freedom," was articulated negatively
by reference to the existential misfortune of the slave.

Ho

mer tells us that a slave has only half the powers and esteem
of a

m a n

.-*6

Only later did the predicate "free" appear in

reference to the man who is not a slave.

By the time that

the freedom vocabulary reaches the Stoa, it is no longer not
being a slave that is the trait of,the free person, but rather
being wise or good is the trait of the free person.

Second

ary aspects of the free person have replaced the primary as
pect because of the erosive process of historical forgetting.
The primary experiential instance of freedom as a notable
property of a people in history occurs in Egypt with the lib
eration of the People of Yahweh from the power of Pharaoh.

A

similar event occurs in Greece with the Solonic rectification.
Both involve a repositioning of life, a "positive freedom" as
it were.

These events in history are great events.

They are

great in the sense that they convey to us a feeling of large360dyssey, XVII, 322. For commentary on the relevant
Homeric vocabulary see Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and
Thought, pp. 4-5.
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ness and of power which accompanies something that is pri
mary and enduring.

The symbols of freedom which we find in

the Christian New Testament give us access to these earlier
events that have been so decisive for European history.

The

New Testament is able to do this, not because it is a divine
book, and not mainly because it is a recipient of the cul
tures of Moses and Solon.

The N6w Testament symbols are

able to make the primary experience of political freedom
open to us for two other reasons.

One is that the New Tes

tament canon took form in a world in which the vocabulary of
freedom was developed and conventional.

But second, and of

crucial importance, is that the New Testament was written in
response to a great event.

That event was the work of Jesus.

The ministry of repentance, forgiveness and healing, of
atonement, was a great event.

Considered as a whole, it

amounted to a repositioning of life.

It was a primary event

which Europe has understood as the beginning of a new time.
It can hardly be surprising that Paul and the author who is
known to us as John would comprehend this great event in
terms of freedom.
The New Testament symbolic structure of freedom is not
important to this study in a "cultural" sense.

That is to

say, we do not imagine that New Testament freedom is nothing
besides a concept whose meaning obtains from a mixing of Hel
lenistic ideas and terms with a Hebraic-Christian heritage.
If it were only such a mixture, it could be reduced to its
"cultural" ingredients, and in this way afford access to the
earlier experiences of freedom.

The New Testament is unable
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to do this.

Bultmann has shown that the Pauline understand

ing of freedom is very different from the mature Greek under
standing, and also that Paul's understanding of the Old Tes
tament itself is a theological interpretation rather than an
historically faithful representation.
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This means that there

is novelty in the New Testament's teaching about freedom, and
thus, that from a "cultural" point of view, the New Testament
compounds ingredients from East and West and makes of them
something new.

It is of such novelties that culture consists,

for the term "culture" becomes meaningful when contrast be
tween differing patterns of life is intended.

The New Testa

ment surpasses an old culture and begins a new one, and its
teaching about freedom is a part of the new culture.

We be

hold the old culture of freedom, for example, when Antigone
acts freely as she decides within herself to obey the higher
law.

We see the new when Saul of Tarsus becomes free as he

is changed to Paul on the road to Damascus.
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The difference

between the two understandings about freedom is immense, and
each typifies the attitude of its respective culture.
A study which seeks the origins of freedom in Mediterra
nean antiquity will not be concerned with the New Testament
position on freedom unless that teaching serves in some way
37

'Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Contem
porary Setting, pp. 181-184. See also Irwin Edman, The Mind
of Paul (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1935), pp. 72-74.
See also Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 172173.
3®Sophocles, Antigone, 70-80, 440-470.
Galatians 1.13-20.

Acts 9.1-9 and

to make these origins intelligible to us.

The New Testament

does indeed serve this purpose, but not by giving us clues to
the thought peculiarities of people who had lived earlier.
If all of the old Greek texts and the Old Testament had been
lost, the information which the New Testament affords would
not make a reliable historical reconstruction of Greek or Is
raelite culture possible.

The New Testament can shed some

direct historical light on the earlier cultures, but this
light is dim and it is focused with too great specificity.
The New Testament helps us to comprehend the origins of free
dom, not in respect of attitudes, such as that of Antigone,
which are culturally peculiar, but rather in respect of real
ities which are general.

Our interest in the New Testament

freedom teaching is directed thus at a level which is before
culture and below culture.

When we ask, what i£ freedom?,

this is a little like asking, what is a house?

We do not re

ply by saying that it is a building made of stones which are
joined by mortar, but rather we say that it is a dwelling
constructed from available materials which serves certain
general purposes.

To assay what it is, we look to its orig

inal functions, and then to its later deviations which are
contingent upon cultural peculiarity.
Although one would prefer a less pretentious word, it is
an archetypal understanding of freedom that the New Testament
is able to offer, because the New Testament shows freedom at
a time of beginnings, just as do the earlier episodes which
are the main interest of this study.

By "archetype" we mean

that a certain kind of event in history is productive of free-
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dom, much as a birth is productive of joy and a death of sor
row.

When, as in the ministry of Jesus, historical life is

turned from its false direction to its true orient, the pres
ence and will of the Father, the reality of freedom will be
incipient in this turning.

One who has turned is no longer

a slave, no longer a half-person.

One is that which his Cre

ator has intended that he be, and his being thus makes him
free within the community which shares the true orientation.
This turning is a turning away from history, from one's slave
past in which the world is divided and fallen.

It is a turn

ing toward one's true identity, the self who one would be,
the self who dwells in concord before history with the Cre
ator.

Finally, it is a turning back to history, but to a new

and heightened history which is more beingful than one's for
mer history.
This process of turning evinces the structure of freedom
which lies below culture.

Antigone turns herself away from

the false alternative of compliance with the king's decree.
Saul of Tarsus is turned by God from a false ambition.

But

despite the agency by which the turning comes, both turn, and
this is freedom.

In both there is a before and an after, an

old and a new, a negation and a position.

Along with Seneca and Epictetus* the Apostle Paul inhab
ited the troubled, early period of the Roman Empire.

But

Paul differed from these Stoic luminaries in that he did not
consider himself a citizen of the universe, or a philosopher
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for the universe, but rather as a minister to the Christian
church.

Paul's writings, a collection of letters to Chris

tian congregations, became canonical as letters to the entire
church.

We are not directly concerned with the theology of

these letters, or about the development of Paul's attitude
as he began to anticipate a prolonged wait for the return of
Christ.

We are interested specifically in the freedom mes

sage of these letters.
The letters of Paul address problems which had arisen
in Christian congregations.

These problems included both

doctrinal and practical matters.

As Paul advises about how

. the congregations are to resolve these oftentimes schismatic
problems, there appears a common motif of exhortation which
runs throughout his letters.

It can be digested as follows:

"Remember always, you are no longer the persons who you once
were; your old condition is a thing of the past.

Through

the work of the Spirit, you— both as individuals and as a
corporate body— have been given a new life in Christ Jesus.
Live not your old life but your new life."

Paul understood

his own biography in terms of such a contrast between old and
new, past and present.

In order to exemplify for his audi

ence just what this contrast means, Paul uses a number of im
ages.

The image which is of concern to us is the contrast

between the slave and the free person.39

One's former con

dition, the condition before he came into the church of
Christ, was that of a slave.

His latter condition in the

3^See especially Galatians 4 and Romans 6.
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church is that of a free person.

If one does not live freely

by spontaneously practising the virtues of love and forbear
ance, then he regresses to the old condition.

He is re-en

slaved .
There are five senses in which Paul uses the term,
"slave" (doulos).

Four of these usages are closely related,

and their meanings overlap; the fifth is independent.
need to dispense first with this fifth meaning.

We

Paul says

that Christians are "slaves of righteousness" and "slaves of
God."
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This use of "slave" is not related to the other uses

of the term, and its implication is troublesome.

The usage

is troublesome not because it reduces the Christian to a con
dition of servile bondage before a despot-god.

This is not

what Paul or the Old Testament means when they use the term
thus.

It is troublesome because it is an atavism in Paul's

thought.

This preacher who so zealously developed the dis

tinction between law and gospel, and by consequence, between
Old Testament and New, failed in this passage from Romans to
advance beyond the Old Testament symbolization of the divinehuman relationship.

For this reason, the Fourth Evangelist

explicitly repudiates this Old Testament and Pauline under
standing of the believer's relationship to God.4^
The four other usages of "slave" deal with the life of
the person before he has come to have righteousness through

4®Romans 6.18 and 22.
4^John 15.14.

faith.

In our old selves, we were "enslaved to sin."42

The

child of the household, as a person before maturity and masA O

tery, is "no better than a slave."

Such children "were

slaves to the elemental spirits of the universe" (stoicheia).44

Finally, those who persist in Jewish legalism, the

covenant from Mount Sinai, are the children of Hagar, and
A C

"she is in slavery with her children." J

These four uses of

"slave" can be comprehended within two categories.
these is general, and the other cultural.

One of

That is, when Paul

speaks of slavery to sin, and of the slave-like condition of
the child, he is discussing a general human predicament.

One

who sins does other than he truly would do, had he the power
to be the greater self whom his soul projects for him.

Thus,

he is like the child who awaits maturity, the age of power
over one's own life.

When Paul associates slavery with the

elemental spirits and with the covenant from Sinai, he is
dealing in materials drawn from the cultures of early Gnos
ticism and Judaism.
archons.

46

The elemental spirits are the Gnostic

They enslave the self by impeding the advance of

the self to reunion with God.

In this statement then, Paul

suggests that the congregation at Antioch had at some time
fallen under the Gnostic influence, as well as the Judaizing
42Romans 6.6.
43Galatians 4.1.
44Galatians 4.3.
45Galatians 4.25.
4^Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 190.
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influence.

The association of the covenant of Sinai with the

enslavement of Hagar is an irony, a deliberate blasphemy
against the principles of first century Jewish legalism.

It

means that to seek salvation in law, which was given on Si
nai, is to move away from freedom, into the domain of slavery.
Paul's statements about slavery begin to reveal, by a
series of negations, what freedom is.

Freedom is not wrong

doing; it is not personal immaturity; it is not astral or
chthonian superstition; it is not even persistent obedience
to law.

This last understanding is especially important, for

it shows that Paul's grasp of the matter is truly primal.
Paul's understanding is more basic than even the understand
ing of Herodotus, who was the world's first great celebrant
of freedom.

Both Herodotus and Pericles after him believed

freedom to occur in accordance with lawfulness, understood in
terms of constitutionalism.^7

Paul, who is nearer to a great

event than they, realizes that thi£ is not the case.

Freedom

^Herodotus, Persian Wars, VII, 104. Thucydides, Pel
oponnesian War, Book II, chapter 4.
The first extant uninflected usage of eleutheria occurs
in conjunction with this "constitutional fallacy." It is
found in Pindar, 1^ Pythian, 61-62. There the poet associates
freedom with the laws of a well founded city. As we will
observe in chapter five, Solon avoided this fallacy some two
generations before Pindar, identifying freedom as a conse
quence of divine justice, not law.
It is not the task of this study to address in detail
the complex question of freedom and law, for that question
does not arise during the period of origins, or to an appre
ciable extent, even in the classical period. The question
becomes important in Roman times with the rise of a legalis
tic political outlook. A historian of the natural law tra
dition writes of Ulpian's view, "that the jus gentium falls
short of natural law and that in its provisions regulating
slavery it was contrary to. the law of nature, 'for by the
law of nature all men were born free.'"
(Paul E. Sigmund,
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occurs as the consequence of an eruption of the divine into
history.

Rules of law and lawful conduct are but a remote

echo of this divine epiphany.
free righteousness.

The immediate consequence is

"For freedom Christ has set us free;

stand fast therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of
slavery.

Now I, Paul, say to you that if you receive circum48
cision, Christ will be of no advantage to you."
For the
Judaism from which Paul has departed, circumcision is the
sign of dedication to the law.

For gentiles to be circum

cised is to be re-enslaved; gentile Christians must "stand
fast" in their freedom and avoid submission to law.

The

meaning of this standing fast does not proceed to the obser
vance of established rules.

Instead, it implies the conduct

of life according to the ever-enduring inspiration of love.48
Paul's understanding of freedom shows us that in its
primary presentation, freedom is antinomian.

When the divine

vision is still vivid, righteous conduct pours forth, not as
calculated obedience— duty— but as spontaneous affection.

Natural Law in Political Thought [Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop
Publishers, Inc., 1971], p. 25.)
This distinction between two,kinds of jus successfully
corrects the fallacy of deriving freedom from any particular
set of laws. Unfortunately however its provision that men
are "born free" is the seed of the equally erroneous liberal
fallacy which came to prominence in modern Europe. Our in
vestigation of the symbols of pre-history conduces to the
judgment that men are born whole, not free. The quest for
freedom in history is an effort to achieve a partial recovery
of the initial wholeness. What is at stake here is the po
litical distinction between organic society and society based
on contract.
48Galatians 5.1-2.
4^i Corinthians 13.8-13.

To a consciousness so permeated by love, even heartfelt de
votion to law— such as that of the Pharisees— is not per
ceived as freedom, but as slavery.

Only when the vision be

comes remote and hardened does freedom become associated with
obedience to hallowed rules and precepts.
Despite the vibrance of Paul's exultation in Christian
freedom, there is a serious question about the relevance of
his understanding of freedom in this discussion.

If Christ

has freed the faithful from slavery to sin, childish power
lessness, Gnostic demons and sumptuary law, how does this
understanding of slavery and freedom differ from the Stoic
understanding?

More specifically, is not this view of free

dom nominal and personal in the same way that Stoic freedom
is nominal?

Does it not simply repeat the Hellenistic fal

lacy of confusing personal goodness and some species of sub
jective certitude with real freedom?

Does it not therefore

forget what freedom had meant at the time of its emergence
in earlier antiquity?

In truth, each of these questions must

be answered affirmatively, but the affirmation is most highly
conditional.

Pauline freedom is metaphorical, just as is

the freedom of the Stoic paradox, to the extent that it does
not entail as a necessary condition the release of slaves
from actual, legal slavery.

But there are realizations pres

ent in Paul's understanding which point in the direction of
real freedom.

These realizations concern Paul's view of the

human personality and his teaching about the proper form of
relationships within the Christian church.
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We recall that for the Stoa, the human personality is
not a divided and dynamic melange of powers, but that in
stead it is a solitary structure which consents to the events
of life.

It is thus definitionally free, since the will is

a mechanism of consent.

Paul's understanding of the person

ality is completely different from this.

It is suggestive

of the older, Platonic view, in which the contending forces
within the person compete for supremacy.

Consider the fol

lowing passages:
For I know that nothing good dwells within me, that is,
in my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do
it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do
not want is what I do. Now if I do what I do not want,
it is no longer I that do it, but the sin which dwells
within m e .
For those who live according to the flesh set their
minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live
according to the spirit set their minds on the things
of the spirit.50
This personality is not definitionally free.
susceptible of either freedom or bondage.

Instead, it is

That is to say,

it can become free, different, more whole than it was before.
Through the help of the Spirit, the Pauline personality
negates a dead past and posits a living future.

This Pau

line future is not informed by Hellenic wisdom, which makes
consent a process of higher consciousness, but by faith,
hope, and love, which make a real repositioning of life pos
sible.

For Paul, this repositioning becomes visible in the

Christian church.

The church then is the vessel of real

freedom in a world which is subject to Caesar.
5°Romans 7.18-20 and 8.5.

It is not within the power of the apostle to bring an
end to slavery in the empire, nor his desire to do so.

The

empire is not of concern to Paul, for beside the church, an
eschatological community of those who have come to share in
God's redemptive act, the empire has only a utilitarian im
portance.

Within this church, however, the status arrange

ments of the secular world are to be disregarded.

Paul has

advised the church that Christ has set its members free.
Therefore he says:

"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there

is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female;
for you are all one in Christ Jesus."
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Toward the end of

his ministry, the apostle again commands:
Here there cannot be Greek and Jew, circumcised and un
circumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave, free man, but
Christ is all, and in all. Put on then, as God's
chosen ones, holy and beloved, compassion, kindness,
lowliness, meekness, and patience, forbearing one an
other and, if one has a complaint against another, for
giving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you
must also forgive. And above all these put on iove.
which binds everything together in perfect harmony.52
It is this unifying love, emanating from Christ, which
makes of the church a community of the free.

As the subse

quent chapters will explain, this unifying and liberating
love has as its analogue the unifying sonship of Israel at
the time of the Exodus and the unifying reverence for divine
justice in the Aeschylean drama.
Paul's sincerity in this conviction that unity in
Christ puts an end to the distinction between free and slave
^Galatians 3.28.
^2Colossians 3.11-14.
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is attested by the survival of a very personal letter of
Paul to one Philemon, in whose house the church at Colossae
met.

Philemon's slave, Onesimus, had run away and had some

how become acquainted with Paul in Rome.

There he accepted

Christianity, and for a time served the apostle during his
imprisonment.

The letter to Philemon concerns Paul's return

of Onesimus to his master.

Nowhere in the letter does Paul

direct that Philemon should manumit the slave; legal title
is insignificant to him.

Instead of manumission, Paul speaks

to Philemon of brotherhood.
Perhaps this is why he was parted from you for a
while, that you might have him back forever, no longer
as a slave but more than a slave, as a beloved brother,
especially to me but how much more to you, both in the
flesh and in the Lord. So if you consider me your
partner, receive him as you would receive me. If he
has wronged you at all, or owes you anything, charge
that to my account. I, Paul, write this with my own
hand, I will repay it— to say nothing of your owing me
even your own self. Yes, brother, I want some benefit
[onaimen]* from you in the Lord. Refresh my heart in
Christ.53
The letter to Philemon is of central importance to us,
for it indicates the reason why New Testament freedom may be
called real, while the Stoic interest in freedom is nominal.
Both Epictetus and Paul shrink from attacking slavery as a
legal institution, but Paul goes much further than Epictetus
in that he does nonetheless attack it at a more basic, prelegal level.

Within the household of Philemon, within the

church at Colossae, Onesimus is no longer slave, but is in
stead beloved brother.

To infer from this that he is free

53Philemon, 15-20. *This is a play on the name "Onesimus," which means "useful" or "beneficial."

is almost a redundancy.

This Onesimus is entirely different

from a slave who, possessing wisdom and virtue, is mentally
free.

If such a slave really knows himself as a free person,

this means that his self-knowledge has become solely an in
ternally generated knowledge, and thus that he has ceased to
experience communion with his fellow humans who know him not
as free, but as slave.

It means at last that he has cut away

the primary trait which gives him humanity, the ability to
enter into communion with his fellows.

The Stoic defense of

suicide bears implications beyond the physical domain; it
reaches into the life of the soul as well.

None of this is

the case however with Paul's "child," Onesimus.

In the

church, the community which for him is salient, Onesimus
will be known as beloved brother.

His self-knowledge will

be informed by his community's identification, and for this
reason he will be no longer slave, but free.

With this free

dom in the community comes virtue, and perhaps wisdom as
well.

Moral improvement and moral freedom are consubstan-

tial in the structure of freedom.

This structure of freedom

becomes intelligible for us as a conceptual schema in the
Fourth Gospel of the New Testament.

The Fourth Evangelist, along with Paul, understands hu
man freedom to be a consequence of the ministry of Jesus.
Paul's letters and the Acts of the Apostles provide a sum of
of information about Paul which is adequate to the recon

struction of a portrait of the man and his work.

Unlike

Paul, very little is known about the Fourth Evangelist.

His

biography of Jesus establishes him as one of the most influ✓

ential masters of antiquity, but this same biography is the
sole source of reliable information about its author.

Be

cause the Fourth Gospel is a biography of Jesus, and not of
its own author, it suggests questions about its author and
his purposes without providing certain answers to these ques
tions.

Here are some of the questions which the Fourth Gos

pel suggests:

Is the logos which is discussed in the pro

logue related closely to the various forms of logos which
appear in the narrative body of the gospel?

Has the author

of the gospel taken over a gospel about John the Baptist,
converting it to a gospel about Jesus?

Is the author a

Christian Gnostic whose work has been subjected to Catholic
redaction, or is he a Catholic whose work has been corrupted
with a Gnostic overlay?

Does the author anticipate a return

of Jesus, or does he embrace the position known as "realized
eschatology"?

Is it possible that

have been written earlier than

the Fourth Gospel could

the letters of Paul and the

Synoptic gospels, or does the intense hostility toward Juda
ism establish with certainty its place amongst the latest
writings in the New Testament?

Is the author of the Fourth

Gospel the author of the threeepistles which

church tradi

tion ascribes to John?
These are serious questions, and the answers which are
forthcoming in response to them determine our understanding
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of the intention of the Fourth Evangelist.

And although the

specific concern of this study is the Fourth Gospel's free
dom message, it is necessary to have some general idea of
the Fourth Evangelist's broader purpose in writing about
Christ.

The questions which have been posed about this book

testify to its complexity and to its interior mystery.

If

anyone is to be able to get this book to speak to him in a
cogent way, he must first venture some minimal set of assump
tions about it.
This study will proceed on the basis of these assump
tions:

The Fourth Gospel is not fundamentally heretical.

That is to say, first, it is not preponderantly an allegory
about a celestial figure whom its author calls logos-lightSon-Christ, who opposes the archon(s) who govern the world.
Instead, it is primarily a response to the ministry in Pal
estine of the same historical Jesus who is the main character
of the Synoptic gospels.

Second, the gospel is primarily

orthodox and Biblical, and only secondarily Gnostic.

This

means that we would attach great weight to the following
passage:
For God so loved the world that he gave his only
Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but
have eternal life. For God sent the Son into the world,
not to condemn the world, but that the world might be
saved through him.54
We would find less importance in the following:
The true light that enlightens every man was com
ing into the world. He was in the world, and the world

54John 3.16-17.

was made through him# yet the world knew [egno] him
not.55
The former passage reflects the orthodox position that Jesus
was the Christ, the anointed Son of God who had been sent to
save the world— i.e., created existence in time— from its
own sins.

The Iranian symbolism of the latter passage sug

gests the Gnostic belief that created existence in time is
inherently ignorant and thus, irredeemably evil.
That we perform such a ranking of themes is absolutely
necessary.

If the Fourth Gospel is primarily Gnostic, then

it follows that its treatment of freedom will amount to an
55John 1.9-10. Why did the world not know the light?
Possibly because the world, which this evangelist suggests
(John 12.31) has had the devil for its ruler (archon), was
incapable of seeing the light; possibly because the logoslight came from the Father in disguise so as to avoid inter
ference from the archon(s) during his descent. This book
does not answer such questions. Why then does it employ
with such great frequency this indisputably Gnostic imagery
and terminology? Bultmann's famous argument that post-Pauline Christianity appropriated a full blown Gnostic redeemer
myth to articulate the life of Jesus cannot be accepted
here. The existence of such a developed myth, prior to the
beginning of Christianity, remains speculative; moreover,
Bultmann's own excellent explanation of the gross differ
ences between Christianity and Gnosticism tends to weaken
the plausibility of the Gnostic redeemer thesis. Professors
Colwell and Titus suggest a more tenable answer. They point
out that although there are inflections of gnosis scattered
abundantly throughout the text, never is gnosis used in its
uninflected form. This would seem to indicate a sort of
homeopathy; i.e., the Fourth Evangelist couches a gospel
whose main drift is Catholic within a Gnostic form. In this
way it would be possible to combat the patent heresy of
Christian Gnosticism by use of a Gnostic Christian instru
ment which is essentially orthodox. This is manifestly the
reason why the epistle known as I John employs Gnostic ter
minology throughout. See Ernest Cadman Colwell and Eric
Lane Titus, The Gospel of the Spirit; A Study of the Fourth
Gospel (New York; Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 155-157.
See also Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, pp. 175177, and Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, pp. 196 ff.

oriental escape from the damnable world, accomplished through
knowledge of secrets which are available to a small, elect
group.

If, instead, it is Catholic, drawing its main inspi

ration from the Old Testament whose God is the good CreatorFather, then its freedom will have to do with a life in this
world which is animated by belief or faith in the Son whom
God has sent into the world as an act of love.

To say that

we make these assumptions about the book is to say no more
than that we understand this book to say what Christianity
understood it to say from the defeat of Gnosticism, until the
rise of the higher criticism.

The orthodox understanding of

the Fourth Gospel makes its freedom message illuminate the
original occurrences of freedom in Mediterranean antiquity.
The Gnostic interpretation leads not to freedom as an histor
ical reality, but to an extra-historical bliss.
Our third assumption is that in the Fourth Gospel the
dominant theme is participation in the life of God through
belief in Jesus, the Son of God.

Those who believe in the

Son will come to know the Father, and to share in his time
less glory.

This theme is the Fourth Evangelist's analogue

to the motif of the old and the new in the writing of Paul.
Those who so participate are given "eternal life," and "eter
nal life" in the Fourth Gospel means much the same thing as
"Kingdom of God" in the Synoptic gospels.^

The following

passage expresses this participatory concern:
When Jesus had spoken these words, he lifted up his
eyes to heaven and said, "Father, the hour has come;
56Colwell and Titus, Gospel of the Spirit, p. 172.

glorify thy Son that the Son may glorify thee, since
thou hast given him power over all flesh, to give eter
nal life to all whom thou hast given him. And this is
eternal life, that they know thee the only true God,
and Jesus Christ whom thou hast s e n t . 57
Although the Fourth Evangelist does not speak of the "church,
it is clear that he understands this participation to happen
in the church.

This church is an organic entity in which

human severality is submerged through consecration in truth.
As a consecrate unity, the church is distinguishable from
the world into which it is sent.5®

To say that believers

have eternal life is to say that human participation in the
eternal life of God is a prehistoric participation since it
does not have historic time as its limit.

Instead, eternal

life limits and transforms historical existence.

Historic

individuation is attenuated as human existence is subsumed
within the timeless truth of God's being.

As we have recog

nized earlier, it is this subsumption of individuation and
strife which puts an end to the selfish exploitativeness and
cruelty which makes slavery the consequence of history.

The

Fourth Evangelist is less a preacher of ethics than even
Paul.

In his consciousness, the antinomian strain is pure.

The Fourth Gospel does not even discuss the law.5®

Those

who believe in the Son have unity and life because they re
ceive and reflect the love of

G o d .

50

it £s within the con-

57John 17.1-3.
58John 17.18-21.
5^An understanding of the Pauline treatment of law is
suggested in John 1.17; this does not however become a major
topic in the Fourth Gospel.
SOjohn 15.4-17.
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text of this unifying, divine love that the symbol of the
free disciple becomes intelligible for us.
Participation in the eternal life of the Father through
knowledge of the Son is the main theme of the Fourth Gospel.
Freedom is a minor consideration which contributes to the
Fourth Evangelist's exposition of participation.

The effort

of this book would not be greatly impaired had the short
pericope which discusses freedom not been transmitted to us.
But if that were the case, our knowledge of freedom would re
main incomplete.

The Fourth Evangelist uses the word "free”

in such a way as to identify for us the place of freedom in
human reality and in the being of all.

Although this author

writes after the possibility of political community has been
lost for the world, his understanding of freedom and its
participatory implication makes it possible for us to under
stand the primary events which made freedom a concern for
Europe.

It is not too much to aver that beneath the Fourth

Gospel's freedom pericope, there can be discerned a "struc
ture of freedom" whose terms will be present wherever free
dom is experienced in history.
The Fourth Gospel speaks as follows about freedom:
Jesus then said to the Jews who had believed in
him, "If you continue in my word [logo], you are truly
my disciples, and you will know the truth, and the
truth will make you free." They answered him, "We are
descendants of Abraham, and have never been in bondage
to anyone. How is it that you say, 'You will be made
free'?"
Jesus answered them, "Truly, truly, I say to you,
everyone who commits [poiSn] sin is a slave to sin.
The slave does not contxnue in the house for ever; the
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son continues for ever. So if the Son makes you free,
you will be free indeed [ontos] .1161
Before we examine this passage with respect to its struc
ture, it is necessary to comment on the vocabulary which con
stitutes the structure.

Three terms require attention.

In

English, these are "free," "indeed," and "word."
In the Fourth Gospel, "free" has the same quasi-metaphorical sense that is has for Paul; it is a condition of
not sinning.

But beneath this meaning, the Fourth Evange

list displays, through his own comment on the imagery, the
basic understanding of antiquity about the matter.
is not free, and the free person is not slave.

The slave

This is be

cause the free person has a permanent tenure in the house
hold.

The slave can be separated from the household with no

affront to law or convention.

The implication is clearly

that the slave is less a person than the free for this rea
son.

There is then no hint of the Stoic paradox in this

text's use of "slave" and "free."
The word which both the King James and Revised Standard
Version translators have curiously rendered, "indeed," is of
vital importance in understanding this text.
the whole passage its orient.
you will be."

The term gives

The text says, "ontos free

This ontSs has nothing to do with deeds, and

it is not simply a random expletive.

The Fourth Evangelist

uses words consideredly, as is shown by the play on the word
"son"; Jesus, the Son of the Father, is associated by impli

61John 8.31-36.
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cation with Isaac, the son of Abraham, within the "household,"
i.e., Israel.
on.

Ontos is an adverb made from the participle

An exact English equivalent would be "beingly," or more

loosely, "really."

The true sense of this passage is, "If

then the son freed you, you will be free to partake of a gen
uine reality."

This one word then tells us what the entire

passage is about.
being.

It is about being, and freedom relates to

There is the true being of "my word."

false being of "making [goion] sin."
former.

There is the

Freedom attaches to the

This is not to suggest that the Fourth Evangelist

is a Platonist, for he is not.

There is of course a parallel

between the two, but it obtains only because two men who wrote
in a language generally the same apprehended a higher reality
which inevitably accuses of profanity and falsehood the lower
reality of historical existence.
Participation in genuine reality involves that "you con
tinue in my word [logo]."

This usage necessarily suggests

the broader question about the meaning of logos in the Fourth
Gospel.

In the passage considered here, is the logos in

which one is to continue the same as the world-creative logos
of the prologue?
tell us.

We do not know, for the author does not

One thing seems certain; that is that if in this

freedom discussion the author intended nothing more than the
English noun "word" conveys, he probably would have used
hrema instead of logos.62

Freedom is contingent upon one's

62This is the usage in John 3.34: "For he whom God has
sent utters the words [hremata] of god . . . "
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continuing in the logos, but the text does not explain this.
In order to understand the sense of this passage, we need to
examine the several meanings of logos itself.

Professor

Goodenough, who objects to its translation as "word," iden
tifies three meanings in the Hellenistic period.
Logos means primarily the formulation and expression of
thought in speech, but from this it took on a variety
of associated meanings. For example, it could mean the
formula by which a thing is constituted, like a formula
in chemistry; so Aristotle most commonly used it. It
could mean a phrase or speech of almost any kind or
length, even an oration, but never a single word. And
it could be turned back upon the process by which utter
ance was formulated in thought, and so come to mean rea
son. In this sense study of logos as reason is logic,
the science of formulation of thought.®3
In each of these meanings the function which logos performs
is similar.

The logos of speech is an instrument of ordering

and unifying, and therefore it does have a creative aspect,
since for the ancient consciousness creation was more an af
fair of ordering substance than of making it from nothing.
By the time the Fourth Evangelist speaks of logos, it
has been an important term for centuries.

It was introduced

in reflective thought by Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C.,
and the basic, Heraclitean understanding remained with the
term despite its later appropriation by contending schools.
For Heraclitus, logos was the "unifying formula," the "pro
portionate arrangement" of things within a world which ap
pears to contain only polarity and flow; beyond that, it was
also an "actual constituent of things," much like the primary
®3Erwin R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), p. 135.

(\A

element, fire. *

Heidegger's thoughtful language conveys

amply the meaning of this actual constituency of the logos.
The Heraclitean logos is "the original collecting collected
ness which is in itself permanently dominant."®5

Heraclitus'

interest in the logos is not that of a disinterested phys
icist; his purpose in discovering the logos is to make his
fellows aware of it, for it is relevant to the conduct of
their lives.

Its unifying work is instructive to mankind,

and the fragments of Heraclitus convey a negative judgment of
those who will not heed its instruction.

For example:

"Therefore it is necessary to follow the common; but although
the Logos is common the many live as though they had a pri
vate understanding."®®

In this concern about the heedless-,

ness of the many whom he has informed about the logos, Hera
clitus is not essentially different from the Fourth Evange
list five or six centuries later.
The purpose of this mention of the seminal, Heraclitean
meaning of logos is to explain that the logos of the freedom
pericope is not necessarily Platonic, Stoic, Philonic, or
even Johannine (in the sense in which logos is used in the
prologue of the gospel).

Instead, it is simply the logos,

about which the author believed that no more need be said,
64

G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philoso
phers : A Critical History with a Selection of Texts (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 188.
65Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, tr.
Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p.
128.
5®Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Frag
ment 198.
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except that it is of the Son.

The great understandings are

always simple, and perhaps a little nebulous.

At their best,

they are stated in the picture language of metaphor.
the vine, you are the branches."
branches if not their logos?

67

"I am

What is the vine to the

The participatory organicism

of this symbol of the grape, the fig, the olive plant shows
us what it means to "continue" in the logos.
of life and being itself.

It is an affair

Another figuration of the logos

is the door.

"I am the door; if any one enters by me, he
68
will be saved . . . "
The passage through the door is a
passage from history to prehistory, from polarity to the
unity which undergirds polarity, from individual moribundity
to life eternal.®9

One who passes through the door is able

to participate in the logos; he becomes one with the logos
in the same sense that branches are one with the vine.

The

logos then is the realissimum; it imparts to life knowledge
of truth and thus, being.
We need to observe finally that in this text there is
a parallel between continuing in the logos and continuing in
®^John 15.5.
68John 10.9.
69The door, the gate, the narrow passage constitute an
archetype which connotes transcendence of fallen, variegated,
polar existence. One goes between the two sides so as to
enter into that which is not two, and hence, many, but one.
For example, in the proem of Parmenides' "Way of Truth," the
poet is taken through gates and doors. After his passage,
the goddess reveals to him the One. For an extensive dis
cussion of this symbol which draws upon many literatures,
see Joseph Campbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (New
York: World Publishing Co., 1956), Chapter I, part 5, and
Chapter II, part 1.

the household.

This is not simply a verbal happenstance.

As the subsequent chapter will explain, the Presence of Yahweh is for Israel the salient reality which gives human ex
istence its meaning and purpose.

As such, this Presence is

generally equivalent to the emergent experience of Being in
Greece.

The Heraclitean logos is one configuration of Being.

In the Penteteuch, the Presence first became manifest in the
household of Abram.

There is then an intimate symbolic cor

respondence between continuing in the logos and continuing
in the household, for both symbols connote participation in
a reality which is radically distinguishable from profane
existence.
The great breakthrough of the Fourth Gospel is that it
comprehends the logos of the Son not only as the realissimum,
the core power of being, but as the power of liberation as
well.

It is because of this new insight that the Fourth Gos

pel is able to instruct us about the structure of the reality
in which freedom first appeared in Mediterranean antiquity.
In the history of the cultures which became constitutive of
Europe, the deepening experience of being was accompanied by
both a material and an affective increment in freedom.

In

the historical development of this freedom, there is a prac
tical term which embodies the beingful reality and stands be
tween it and freedom.

That term is justice.

The divine will

is that justice be done, and freedom is a consequence.

The

Fourth Evangelist has by-passed the intervening practical
term, and in so doing, shows freedom as the direct conse-
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quence of being.
only.

Justice is present here by implication

Continuing in the logos by avoiding sin is the prac

tical righteousness for which the truth which frees is the
cognitive correspondent.
In eliciting the structure of freedom in the Fourth Gos
pel, we employ the terminology which Kant used in his anal
ysis of freedom.

That is, the morally uninformed condition

of mankind in which man acts from self-love in seeking pri
vate happiness is a "pathological" condition, an affair of
the "lower desires."7®

This pathological condition corre

sponds to the New Testament idea of sin.

Human independence

of the pathological condition is "freedom in the negative
sense," or negative freedom, since it involves the negation
of the lower desires.

Conformity with "pure, practical rea

son," the Kantian analogue of the logos, is "freedom in the
positive sense," or positive freedom.

71

We use this Kantian

terminology because it is both familiar and meaningful.
This is not to imply however that the Fourth Evangelist was
proto-Kantian.

It is to say only that the formal rudiments

of the modern understanding of freedom have come together
for the first time in the freedom pericope of the Fourth
Gospel.
The structure of freedom then has three distinguishable
component elements.

First is the affirmation of a present

7®Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Practical Reason, III,
Theorem II, Remark I.
71Kant, VIII, Theorem IV.

in which the pathological condition of humanity is ascendant
this is a condition of sickness and suffering, a condition
of hopelessness and existential negativity.

In both mate

rial and metaphorical senses, it is the slave condition.

In

regard to both it is a slave condition because it is a con
dition of powerlessness.

The slave is powerless to obtain

manumission, and thus he comprehends his own being as that
of one who is blemished, who as a person is intrinsically
inferior.

Likewise the slave keeper is powerless to manumit

and raise the slave to the mark of full humanity because he
is himself the slave of a self-love which denies to him the
power to regard the slave as neighbor, brother, friend.

The

Fourth Evangelist acknowledges this negative present with
the symbol of sin which embraces slavery.

"Truly, truly I

say to you, everyone who commits [poion = making] sin is a
slave to sin.
ever . . . "

The slave does not continue in the house for
The verb here conveys the implication of an

erection, a creation, of an anti-reality in which slavery,
not freedom, is the mode of participation.

This false real

ity of slavery is necessarily impermanent.

It leads to de

struction, to non-being.

The slave cannot continue in the

house (of Abram) because it is in that house that God has
established his Presence.

The slave cannot remain there be

cause his presence is a false, pathological presence which
threatens to subvert the divine Presence and to negate its
purposes.

To avoid this, in Genesis, the slave is cast out

into the wilderness.

But the true seed of the Fourth Evan
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gelist's message is not Genesis with its banishment of the
slave; instead, it is the liberation of Exodus.

In the sub

sequent chapters we will see that the texts which deal with
the liberation of the slave nation, Israel, and with the
debt slaves of Athens begin with an acknowledgment of the
pathology— the existential negativity of a society which is
fallen into slavery.
The second element of the structure of freedom involves
movement.

The movement is away from slavery and its impetus

is a real, divine power which has not been affected by the
negativity of the slave present.

In the texts which we will

consider, it is clear that neither Moses nor Solon has been
contaminated by the slave experience; they are thus suited
to be agents for the divine mandate of liberation.
Fourth Gospel, this divine agent is the Son.

"So if the Son

makes you free, you will be free indeed [ontos]."
movement of liberation is a negative freedom.

In the

This

The Son is a

part of the household, and thus he holds the power of lib
eration.
existence.

He has the power to negate the negativity of slave
This negative movement of liberation is neces

sarily an ascendant movement.
high level of real being:

It raises the freed to the

"ont5s free you will be."

The

liberation thus terminates an old, historical present, and
broaches a new present in which history is mediated.
The ontos of the movement of negation points to the
positive theme of discipleship in the logos with which the
pericope began.

This mediated present is the condition of
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discipleship with the collecting power which attenuates the
selfish, destructive inclination which is constitutive of
slavery.

Discipleship in the creative, unifying power rei
i

positions life; discipleship responds with free affirmation
to that which is divine, and thus, most real.
is positive freedom itself.

Discipleship

The lives of those who are en

meshed in slavery are finite, moribund.

The new life of

participation in the ordering power is an eternal life.
In the Fourth Gospel, those who have become positioned
as disciples of the Son are called friends.
friends if you do what I command you.

"You are my

No longer do I call

you servants [doulous], for the servant [doulos] does not
not know what his master is doing; but I have called you
friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have
made known to you."7^

If this symbol of friends of the Son

resembles the Kantian symbol of the Kingdom of Ends, that
should not be surprising.

Such an understanding is implicit

in the idea of positive freedom.

Those who participate in

the beingful reality are themselves more real than those
whose lives are victim of the pathological condition.
The Fourth Evangelist shared with the later Stoa a
caesar-ridden political reality which made a legal re-posi
tioning of life impossible.

Thus his freedom teaching shares

with the Stoic teaching an intensely spiritual character.
But like the letters of Paul, the Fourth Gospel is a book to
guide the church.

In the church are the disciples and they

72John 15.14-15.
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are free in respect of their discipleship.

Unlike the Stoic

teaching, the themes that the Fourth Evangelist employs in
his teaching about freedom make it possible to adduce a sym
bolic structure of freedom whose components illumine the
interpenetration of divine power and human need which are
attendant upon the seminal instances of liberation.

Finally,

the historical content of the freedom pericope is instruc
tive concerning the time and place into which one who seeks
the origins of freedom in Europe must inquire.

It is nec

essary to look to the book of Genesis to learn the position
of both the son and the slave in the household of Abram.

III.

REDEMPTIVE LIBERATION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Exodus of Israel from Egypt was more than a migra
tion of a congeries of coreligionists from the Nile valley
out to the desert.

The Bible historians treat it as the lib

eration of a people from the abuse and degradation of slav
ery.

Their understanding that Yahweh,

the God of the Bible,

delivered his chosen people from slavery has made that event
the symbolic foundation of the European concern for freedom.
Human freedom first received divine sanction with the Exodus.
For that reason, the Exodus is the central interest of
this chapter.

We approach the Exodus symbolism through a

retrograde movement.

Our fitst area of focus is the late

story of creation, with its picture of man as themost esti
mable of the Creator's achievements.

This man of the poet's

vision directs attention to history, with its real first
man, Abram.

That historical man suffers confusion and sad-

■^To say that the Exodus is the symbolic foundation of
the European concern for freedom is not to suggest that it
is the historical basis for the formal, philosophic state
ments about freedom. The direct ancestors of Western philos
ophy are the philosophic movements of Greek and Roman antiq
uity, and the philosophy of freedom is their progeny. The
phrase, "European concern for freedom" is deliberately am
biguous; "concern" is more inclusive than "philosophy."
Freedom is an enduring concern, not only for philosophers
but for European peoples generally. This concern begins with
the Exodus of Israel and is perpetuated wherever Bible cul
ture persists. It is true, moreover, that the Exodus is re
lated by both form and meaning to the historical events which
made a formal philosophy of freedom possible. These events
are the Solonic liberation and the defeat of Persia.
Inas
much as this is a real relationship, the Exodus is related
even to the philosophy of freedom, not so much as grandpar
ent, but more as great uncle.
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ness because of the slave presence within his household.

The

symbolism of slavery in the Abram saga opens then onto the
sorrow of Israel when that people is enslaved in Egypt.

The

Exodus as formative event for both Israel and Europe occa
sions three meditations.

First involves the methodological

problem suggested by the revelation of the divine name; sec
ond is the property of world creation which is inherent in
divine liberation; third is Moses as prototype of free human
ity.
The chapter which follows discusses the prophets of the
eighth century.

It was not simply the Exodus which taught

Europe about freedom, but more especially it was the proph
ets' comprehension of the Exodus that has made the event per
manently important.

There are two opposed understandings

about the prophets.

One is that the prophets were radical

innovators, and the other is that the prophets were radical
rememberers.

We follow the latter position.

The differen

tiated vocabulary of the prophets remembers the meaning of
the early events and compact utterances.

To say that Euro

pean humanity is free is to say that it is recipient of the
Exodus, and more, that it is participant in the prophetic
memory of that beginning of freedom.
In the Old Testament, liberation obtains as redemption
from bondage.

Yahweh redeems his people because bondage is

repugnant to two attributes which are proper to his divine
presence.

These are his justice and his faithful love.

Both of these interests are inchoate in the Exodus from
Egypt, and the prophetic memory makes of the Exodus an ongo
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ing affair which commands that each do the justice that will
result in freedom for the oppressed.
1.

The Image of God

The most impressive confession of faith in the Old Tes
tament is the chapter which stands at the beginning of that
book.

"In the beginning God created the heavens and the

earth."

In this account, with each successive step in the

creation, the narrator relates that God saw that the creation
was good.

We understand this as a confession of faith be

cause it is the creation narrative of the Priestly Code (P),
by far the latest of the documentary sources of the Penta2
teuch.
This narrative did not take form during the exhil
arating days of Israel's conquest of Canaan or the later dy
nastic monarchies.

It was given expression much later, af

ter the great catastrophes had befallen the chosen people,
after the two kingdoms had been eaten away by military con
quest and the people of Yahweh had been humiliated before
the nations.

Thus the historical setting of the Priestly

2
The Pentateuchal documentary sources in this chapter
are taken from Walter Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Tes
tament (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964),
pp. 487-492. The four Pentateuchal sources are dated as
follows:
The Yahwist's historical epic (J), 1000-910 B.C.
The Elohist's historical epic (E) , 900-750
The Deuteronomist writings (D) 750-586
The Priestly code (P), 586-538
See also Martin Noth, A History of Pentateuchal Traditions,
tr. Bernard W. Anderson (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1972), pp. 17-19, 28-32, 35-36, 262-276. Of special
importance is Noth's imputation of a common source, G
(Grundlage), for the materials which appear in both J and
E narratives. See pp. 38-41.

creation is crucial to its meaning.

This is not simply a

Mediterranean cosmogony in which an anthropomorphic divinity
subdues primal elements and so creates the world.

Rather,

the P creation is a statement of faith in the providential
lordship of God in the world.

To be sure, this is a cos

mogony, but it is more than that alone; it is a creed as
well.

It confesses that in the ultimate reckoning of the

totality of human experience, the world— and human life with
it— is good by divine plan.

Destruction, exile and captivity

have served to deepen and to clarify the Priestly faith.
These misfortunes have made such an ultimate reckoning of
purpose both necessary and possible.

The P author announces

that in the ultimate reckoning for Israel, the fundamental
goodness of the divine work will not be negated by human de
fection or historical calamity, for it is the work of the
one God who has made the world, man, and history, in order
to achieve his own good purpose.
It is appropriate that our Old Testament should begin
as it does, for the Priestly account of the origin of things
is given from the vantage point of maturity.

The Priestly

author is positioned so as to be able to survey events as
they have unfolded in the past of the world, and thus to as
say their meaning.
Bible.

Genesis 1 is in truth a prologue to the

It is like a preface written for a late edition of a

profound book; it compresses the content of the book so as
to elicit its most permanently salient meaning.

We are con

cerned with what this prologue has to say about man and his
status in creation.
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If we are to understand the Priestly creation narrative's
message about man and his position in the world, it is first
necessary to recognize that this narrative is not a myth.

It

is not simply that the discussion displays a more intense
reflective and conceptual capability than that which would
appear in a myth.

The message itself is non-mythical.

Myth

ical materials appear briefly, i.e., the pre-existent matter,
the chaotic earth which was without form, void.

But this

matter is without its characteristic demonic power; it is
noted without comment.

Von Rad explains,

It is amazing to see how sharply little Israel demar
cated herself from an apparently overpowering environ
ment of cosmological and theogonic myths. Here the sub
ject is not a primeval mystery of procreation from which
the divinity arose, nor of a 'creative' struggle of
mythically personified powers from which the cosmos
arose, but rather the one who is neither warrior nor
procreator, who alone is worthy of the predicate, Cre
ator.3
The P author is no theolpgian.
trine of creation ex nihilo.

He knows nothing of a doc
But that later doctrine faith

fully expresses the greater substance of the Priestly narra
tive's intention.

For P, the important event is the Cre

ator’s work with the primal elements; to emphasize the old
mythic materials would be to suggest competition between the
Creator and his medium.
This understanding about the non-mythic quality of the
P creation suggests that for P, and for the Bible to which
the P creation is prologue, the temporal dimension which is

3Gerhard von Rad, Genesis:

A Commentary, p. 47.
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of concern to man and God is history.

Indeed, the P creation

is a narration of the events of the first week of world his
tory.

But for P, this history is not the domain of experi

ential misery which is set in contrast to the dream-like in
nocence of mythic prehistory.

There is no flaming sword

which separates mankind from Eden, no Pandora's box whose
inhabitants become permanent evils in historical existence.
Instead, P places the beatific and pacific content of life,
which might in other accounts be reserved to pre-history,
within the stream of history itself.
ation was good.

God saw that the cre

This dictum, that the creation is presently

and always a good creation, approaches the core reality to
which the Old Testament is witness.

This is not the whim of

a chronic optimist; it is the profoundest expression of Is
rael's total experience, national destruction notwithstand
ing.

Beyond disappointment and loss, historical existence

is good because it is existence which takes place within the
divine presence of the Creator.
thus a hallowed existence.

Historical existence is

For this reason, Professor Irwin

insisted that the modern theological conception of God as a
being "wholly other" from man is foreign to the Old Testa
ment.^

Only in historical circumstances which are wholly

fallen, wholly profane, will God be wholly other from man.
For the Priestly author, God is not wholly other from man.
Instead, he is the world creator who has imparted to man his
^William A. Irwin, "The Hebrews," The Intellectual Ad
venture of Ancient Man, ed. Henri Frankfort (Chicago: UnTversity of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 263.
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own image.

This is to say that in some sense, man is not

other from, but same with, the Creator of all being.
The divine creation is depicted as an hierarchical un
dertaking of creation and ordering which is accomplished
during

a period of six days.

by theCreator and
for rest.

The seventh day is hallowed

set aside from the

other days as a time

Buber understood the inner beauty and compassion

of the ancient institution of Sabbath.

Just as our concern

is with man's character as image, Buber's was with the con
verse interest, i.e., with God's character as leader.

In

respect of God's leadership and the institution of Sabbath,
Buber wrote of the Sabbath passage,
.
. . "for in six days YHVH made the heaven and the
earth, and on the seventh day He rested and drew breath."
The crass anthropomorphism binds together the deity and
the tired, exhausted slave, and with words arousing the
soul calls the attention of the free man's indolent
heart to the slave; but at the same time it sets up be
fore the community the loftiest sense of following the
leader. Everyone that belongs to the essence of Israel
— and the servants, the sojourners included, belong to
it— shall be able to imitate YHVH without hindrance.5
This compassionate concern which

produced the Sabbath is the

veritable heart of the Bible message, and its contemplation
would end speculation as to whether the Book of the Covenant
is better or worse than other ancient legislative texts if
reason prevailed in the world.

Even Buber's treatment does

not exhaust the matter.We recall Jesus' defense of
ing on the Sabbath:"What man of you, if he
and it falls into a

heal

has one sheep

pit on the sabbath, will not lay hold of

5Martin Buber,
The Prophetic Faith, tr. Carlyle WittonDavies (New York: Harper and Row, I960), p. 54.
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it and lift it out?"*’ Ostensibly, the meaning is that one
will rightfully protect his property on the Sabbath, but
that interpretation is wrong.

One must see the sheep, its

wool matted with dirt, bleating and thrashing in terror.
That is why one will lift it out.

The ancient code commands,

"Six days shall you do your work, but on the seventh day you
shall rest, that your ox and your ass may have rest, and
the son of your bondmaid . . .

Not only slaves (or the

countless workers from whom the secular world has withdrawn
this protection), but even brutes are the beneficiaries of
this God's compassionate command.

The Sabbath is truly the

day of God, not only for its later pietistic associations,
but more importantly because it raises life above the plane
of human necessity.

To transcend necessity is to broach the

threshold of freedom.
If in the hierarchy of days the day of God is ultimate,
then the day of man is penultimate, for man was created on
the day before God's day.

Man is the blossom of creation;

he has been preceded by the inanimate and then the animate
creation.

Man is the final wonder of the word by which God

has spoken his will, for unlike his predecessors in creation,
man is cast in the "image of God."

To be created in the im

age of God is to be given a share in the being of God.

The

text of Genesis 1 understands God and man in a sort of part
nership relationship, with God being the greater and man the
^Matthew 12.11.
^Exodus 23.12.
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lesser partner.

Their enterprise in creation is a joint en

terprise; God instigates creation and man superintends the
divine accomplishment.
An appreciation of man's sharing in the "image" of God
is vital to an understanding of man as a character who is
capable of freedom.

If Genesis 1 were in fact a myth, then

the "image of God" construction would lack value for an elu
cidation of freedom or for any other concern, save for its
testimonial to man's persistent ability to create gods.
That is to say, if the account under consideration'were a
myth, then for man to be created in the image of God would
mean that man recognized in himself the physical attributes
of some concrete form, some idol, which had been shapen in
an impenetrable antiquity, and which had from time immemorial
been worshipped as a god.

Under those circumstances we would

be caught in a circular anthropomorphism.

In truth there

would be no God, or else the true God would indeed be wholly
other from man.

Man would be at last the image of man.

But

just as the Old Testament breaks from the myth, it likewise
separates itself from the ambient world in which divinity
appears as image graven by the hand of man.
The experience of human freedom to which Europe became
heir occurs first as a human response to the command of the
God whose self-revelation is attested in the Old Testament.
The symbol of man as the image of God is the most elevated
strata of meaning which applies to understanding of man as a
potentially free being.

The Priestly narrator tells us what
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it means for man to be created in the image of God.

As he

looks back across the expanse of a millenium, the narrator
captures the immensity of the Yahwist breakage of the old
forms:

Man, the image of God, is the accomplishment of the

command of God's word.

God has made man like God, that is,

with the power of command in the world.

"Then God said,

'Let

us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds
of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and
over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth."'8
In that he has been created by God, man is given worth
in the totality of things; in the bestowal of "dominion,"
man is given possession and power in the world.

Possession,

power and worth are the aspirations of man in historical ex
istence.

The philosopher Paul Ricoeur examines in depth

historical man's quest for honor, possession and power.

Al

though his remarks are not intended as Biblical exegesis,
they seem invaluable in cognizing the Priestly author's des
ignation of man as a being made after God's image.

Ricoeur

writes thus of man's quest for commanding power in history:
. . . although we only know these fundamental quests
empirically through their hideous and disfigured vis
ages, in the form of greed and the passions of power
and vanity, we understand these passions in their es
sence only as a perversion of . . . . We must say that
what we understand at first are the primordial modali
ties of human desire which are constitutive with re
spect to man's humanity; and it is only later that we
understand the 'passions' as departure, deviation, down
fall, in relation to those primordial quests.8
8Genesis 1.26.
8Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, tr. Charles Kelbley (Chi-
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In light of this understanding about the constitutive modal
ities of man's humanity, we repeat, the Priestly author is
not a dogmatic optimist, nor is he one who is uninformed
about the "fall of man" with its attendant condition of hu
man-historical evil.

Indeed, the creation of man in the im

age of God not only bequeaths to man dominion, but it like
wise imposes limits upon human action:

"Whoever sheds the

blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made
man in his own image."1®
This passage from the Priestly code, dear to those who
find Biblical sanction for capital punishment, bears a latent
implication which is far more important than the overt, ju
ridical decree concerning the punishment of murders.

That

is to say, it tells us the nature of the dominion which man,
the image of God, is to enjoy in the world.

It is a domin

ion over the earth and its non-human residents.

But because

man is the image of God, God is the sovereign of man.

For

one man to kill another is a trespass of the divine domain,
and this requires not so much a simple retribution for mur
der as an elimination from the community of man of the one
who has committed the greatest sacrilege, the defilement and
destruction of God's own image.

The Priestly author writes

after the end of the long monarchial spasm in which the sin
gular dominion of God over man, his image, has been system-

cago: Henry Regnery Co., 1967), p. 170.
the text.
•^Genesis 9.6P.

Italics are from
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atically and calculatedly subverted by men of worldly ambi
tion.

Yet this writer perceives clearly the inner sense of

the old Yahwist confederacy of early Israel.

There, man did

not dominate man; instead, God claimed sole dominion over
his own image.^
ure.

This great author then is a connecting fig

His symbol of the image of God comprehends amply both

the early Israelite experience of direct rule by Yahweh and
the new preaching of the Kingdom which was to come later.
Both the seminal utterance, "Israel is my first born son"
and " . . .

the Kingdom of God is in the midst of you" are

intelligible to the Priestly symbol of the image of God.-*-2
The symbol of man as God's image, responding directly
to the divine command, explains then why the Priestly cre
ation cannot be a theogony.

Its purpose is not to provide

cosmic support for a human king who acts as a divine ana
logue.

Rather, it is a confession of faith in the continu

ing lordship of God for all the world.

The Priestly creed

■^Professor Mendenhall argues that the true importance
of the Bible for all of history can be understood only in
the light of the formation of Israel at the beginning of the
Iron Age from the ruins of the Late Bronze Age in the East
ern Mediterranean region.
In respect of this thesis, he con
cludes that Yahwism (the direct rule of the one God and the
primacy of ethics over power and economics) arose as a re
sponse to the failure of divinized kingship in the Late
Bronze Age to fulfil human need. This historical thesis is
consistent with Mendenhall's philosophic view that the Bible
of early Yahwism, the prophets, and Jesus, places an absolute
priority on the thing known to moderns as "religion," and
implies by consequence an absolute judgment against power
politics. See George E. Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation:
The Origins of the Biblical Tradition (Baltimore: John Hopkings University Press, 1973), pp. 223-226.
■^Exodus 4.22 and Luke 17.21.
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is that beneath the gross and visible human propensity to
evil which has brought Israel and the nations to destruction,
there resides a real nucleus of human purpose and human ca
pability which is a divine gift.

The Priestly Code with its

"and God saw that it was good" informs us that in the first
and final figuration of the world, the dominion and honor
which man seeks in history are available by divine command
and that ultimately they are sanctid; they have a source and
a purpose beyond the oftentimes squalid conditions in which
they are sought and won.

The Priestly anthropology thus

casts a divine imprimature upon man as an active character
in history.

In this approval of man's dominion over the

world of which God has predicated "good" inheres the nascent
idea of human freedom.
The Priestly symbol of man as the image of God prefaces
the Old Testament record with the assertion that in the ex
perience which is recorded there, man shares in the creative
stature of God.

This study draws from this symbolization

the inference that the Old Testament comprehends man as po
tentially free.
ficulty.

This inference however is not without dif

In his discussion of the Pauline treatment of free

dom in the New Testament, Bultmann stresses that the Old Tes
tament is completely lacking in a conception of freedom, and
for this reason, that the New Testament takes the concept
from Greece, via the Hellenistic vocabulary that was current
in the New Testament period.
13

13

It is true that one of the

Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, p. 186.

See also
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puzzling problems of the Old Testament is the absence of re
flection on the matter of human freedom.

This is puzzling

because the narrative imagery of the Old Testament shows
with consistency a portrait of mankind whose existence has
been lent direction and dignity by divine sanction.

This is

the case from the beginning with regard to the chosen people,
and at a later time, the divine concern broadens to include
the nations.

That mankind is invested with practical dis

cretion and with dignity is basic to our understanding of
freedom.

That the Old Testament is devoid of a single con

cept to communicate this meaning does not entail therefore
that freedom as a pattern of experience is missing from the
Old Testament record.

With the aid of the express concept

which comes to us first from Greek reflection, we are able
to identify a most ponderable body of materials in the Old
Testament which involves human freedom in an integral manner.
The most elemental, and thus, the most memorable episode
in the Old Testament which involves human freedom is the Ex
odus of Israel from Egypt and the subsequent formation of
the Covenant.

This is the great event in the Old Testament,

and it is the main interest of this chapter.

It is a truly

archetypal situation which is productive of freedom.

But in

order to clarify the difficulty which obtains as a result of
the absence of a "freedom" concept in the Old Testament, it
is desirable at this point to indicate how several Old Tes-

Rudolf Bultmann, History and Escatology: The Presence of
Eternity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 97.
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tament understandings about human life and its correct order
entail the reality which we know as freedom.

These include

the position of man and society in relation to the Law, and
the "rights" of persons which place limitations upon polit
ical authority.
When the Priestly author reflects on the experience of
Israel and the purpose of the creation, he comprehends man's
position in creation as that of the image of God.

This sym

bol means many things, but in the experience of Israel, it
must mean primarily that man is the recipient of divine com
mand.

There are a number of commands in the Old Testament,

beginning with Yahweh's command to Abram.

For the nation,

the most enduring form of the divine command is the Law of
God.

With reference to the Law of God, the experience of Is

rael is not essentially different from the experience of
Greece with the law of the city.14

In both instances, law

is the defining link, the constitutive tie which compasses
the aggregation and makes of it a unity.

But in its unify

ing purpose, the Law of God and the customary law of the city
are not at all akin to primitive taboos which enclose life
within an euroboric circle and so conceal consciousness within
14See Walter Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, tr. K.
and R. Gregor Smith (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1951), pp. 917. It is necessary to explain here that we do not mean by
Law of God the same thing that "the law" meant in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism or the New Testament. We are speaking of
the very ancient contents of the Book of the Covenant, Exo
dus 20-23 E. This Law of God is not the handbook of a re
ligion, but the constitution of a theopolitical community
whose allegiance was to the God, its direct and constitu
tional sovereign.
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a collective pattern of imagination and response to events.
Rather, from the time of the Book of the Covenant, men are
individually responsible before the Law for their behavior.
Individual accountability for action rather than collective
responsibility of family or clan is basic to an understand
ing of man as capable of freedom.
has an overtly liberating function.

This Law of God moreover
Professor Eichrodt

writes of the Law's "Thou Shalt" that it is experienced "not
as a heavy yoke, but as a necessary and blessed form of life,
as liberation from chaotic self, destruction."^®

For man to

share in the image of God entails that his existence be cre
ative in the profoundest way, that his life shun chaos for
the greater sake of order.
For Israel, the command of God instructs man, the image
of God.

But the command which instructs man and so elevates

him to participation in the life of God is a command which
proceeds from a structure which has at once divine and human
components.

This structure is the Covenant.

It binds man

to allegiance and obedience to the nation's God, and like
wise its God binds himself to faithfulness to his chosen peo
ple.

This experience of God as a sort of "heavenly consti

tutional monarch" exerts a permanent influence on the whole
life pattern of the Israelite nation and thus sets them apart
15por prophetic development of individual accountabil
ity, see Jeremiah 31.29 and Ezekiel 18.2-4. Concerning the
Aeschylean parallel to this Biblical attitude about respon
sibility, see Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, p. 132.
■*-®Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 17.

from neighboring peoples.17

Beginning with Moses, the com

mands of God are delivered by the early and later prophets.
The prophet is no surrogate deity; he is the medium by which
the divine command is promulgated.

For this reason the com

manding relationship of God to the people is direct.

Because

of this direct connection of God and the nation, monarchy
was always something of an alien institution in Israel.18
Unlike surrounding oriental monarchies, the king is himself
limited by both divine command and the constitutional con
ventions of the Israelite nation.

If Israel's God is limited

by the Covenant, the structure of command, so also must the
arbitrary puissance of kings be hemmed in.

With the Deuter-

onomist reform, these limitations are ultimately detailed in
written form late in the monarchial period.18

From this de

sign of direct relationship of the people to Yahweh, and the
consequent reservations attaching to monarchial authority,
it follows that the people enjoy in some degree a divinely
countenanced "right" to "life, liberty and property."

While

this language, taken from British constitutional experience
and natural rights theory can be misleading because of its
blurring of historical contexts, it is not excessive insofar
17

This divine constitutionalism contributes to a fur
ther aspect of the uniqueness of Bible culture which embraces
both the earlier Yahwism and the later Judaism, i.e., the
orientation to history rather than nature. See Salo Wittmayer Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews, I
(New York; Columbia University Press, 1952), 48 passim.
1®See Hosea 9.15.
18Deuteronomy 17.14-20.
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as it indicates the intensity of popular feeling and pro
phetic utterance.2®

The plain historical fact is that in

addition to individual accountability for conduct before the
Law of God, it was commonly considered to be right that the
chosen people be free from the arbitrary exercise of author
ity.

That this is the case is made certain by the intensity

of prophetic reaction to the abusive use of authority.

The

case of Naboth's vineyard is the most memorable such contro
versy .
Then the word of the Lord [YHWH] came to Elijah
the Tishbite, saying, "Arise, go down to meet Ahab king
of Israel, who is in Samaria; behold, he is in the vine
yard of Naboth, where he has gone to take possession.
And you shall say to him, 'Thus says the Lord, "Have
you killed, and also taken possession?"1 And you shall
say to him, 'Thus says the Lord; "In the place where
dogs licked up the blood of Naboth shall dogs lick your
own blood.""'23.
In this limitation upon royal authority in deference to the
20In the strict sense, there are no "rights" in Israel;
there are only obligations. There are however the obliga
tions of an holy people, i.e., a people who have been sepa
rated from others, and hallowed down to the last and least
by a direct covenant with the holy God. This distributed
holiness " . . . meant that the value of a person was not a
function of his particular role in society. It furnished
everyone with a basis for self-respect, a self-valuation
which seems to be necessary for personal freedom and integ
rity." Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, p. 207.
21I Kings 21.17-19. While there is a limited similar
ity, it must be observed that the position of Elijah to the
house of Omri is not fully analogous to that of John Locke
to the Stuart monarchy. Lockean rights inhere in the "nat
ural" endowment of the human person. The "rights" of Israel
obtain between God, an overlord, and the several elements of
the nation who hold property as fiefs from God. Thus, Ahab
is not simply murderer and thief, culpable before human con
vention for "crimes against humanity." More significantly
he is the violator of a covenant between God and his chosen
people, of whom Naboth is here the representative member.

"rights” of the people of God there inhere both the manifest
experience of freedom and at least in a latent fashion, of
human equality as well.
The Priestly author who symbolizes human life as being
in the image of God writes at the end of Israel's existence
as an independent political entity.

His symbol comprehends

a great range of experience enacted within the presence of
the God of Israel.

The writer who stands at the end looks

back over the whole to the beginnings.

In the beginning of

Israel's experience the symbol of man as the image of God
applies to that first man who became recipient of the divine
command and promise, to Abram.

We must examine the saga of

Abram with respect to its symbols of freedom and slavery.
2.

The Disgrace of Slavery

The slave histories contain passages like the following
A Neo-Babylonian document relates a characteristic and
common occurrence. A man gave his pregnant slave as
security for one-third of a shekel of silver. When he
failed to redeem her, the creditor sold her with her
baby for twenty shekels, making a profit of nineteen
and two-thirds shekels of silver.22
The historian's report of this mortgage foreclosure employs
the same verbal forms that our newspapers might use to de
scribe something so ordinary as a modern corporation's pas
sage into receivership.

But this report does not affect us

as an ordinary thing affects us; instead, we are affected
with revulsion and sorrow— and rightly so— for we learn that

22Isaac Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East
(New York; Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 52.
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a woman and an unborn child have been shuffled about over
the earth with no regard for justice.

And yet this trans

action which strikes us as so extraordinary is a very ordi
nary event in our human past, and for this reason it belongs
to us in a remote but permanent way.

It appears monstrous

to us because we are separated from it by a definite series
of events and utterances which define it for us as monstrous.
It is defined as monstrous whenever the general connected
ness of all humanity has become transparent through the in
tervening haze of class, caste, and tribe.
The advent of this transparency can be dated with rel
ative precision.

In regard of its position concerning the

absolute separation of the divine from the monstrous, the
Bible message achieves total completion as early as the
eighth century, "in the days of Uzziah king of Judah and in
the days of Jeroboam the son of Joash, king of Israel . .
The electric utterances of Amos, chapters one and two, are
the great dividing line in the moral history of the world:
"The Lord roars from Zion."

The God of Israel is no paro

chial divinity, no merely national God.

He is the lord of

mankind who will punish all of the cruelties, all of the in
justices which men heap upon men.

The core issue of the

Amos prophecy is not "man's inhumanity to man."

That vul

garism is a latterday dilution of the prophetic message, for
the transparency of human connectedness is contingent upon
the appreciation of the oneness of God.

The prophet pro

nounces a judgment rather upon man's indivinity to man.

The

.
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Priestly symbol of man— all mankind, not only Israel— in the
image of God is a positive development grounded upon this
prophetic judgment against human monstrosity.
For an inquiry into the Mediterranean origins of the
European concern for freedom, Amos is the end of the begin
ning.

His prophecy articulates the position toward which

Yahwism had been moving from the first.

Just as the pro

phetic outcry against monstrosity in human conduct completes
the Bible position, the Abram saga of Genesis begins it.

In

the Abram saga, we behold the initial attitude about the
slave.

It is not a disposition of sympathy or generosity to

one who has suffered misfortune; instead, it is more a sen
timent of fear and loathing toward that which is base.

The

Yahwist author who commits the Abram saga to writing under
stands that in some futuristic sense "by you [Abram] all the
families of the earth will bless themselves," but he cannot
determine any way in which that blessing might apply to the
slave figures within the immediate household of Abram.23
They are not blessed but threatening figures, and both the J
and E authors view them with a degree of hostility.
in the house of Abram is a disgrace unto Israel.

Slavery

This dis

grace in the biography of the patriarch is not suppressed,
for J and E, the world's first historians, were honest his
torians; they reported events as they were known to them.
It was their understanding that both freedom and slavery
were resident in the household— nay, the person— of Abram,
2^Genesis 12.3.
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and that the God of the Bible cast his weight on the side of
freedom.
If one reads the Bible with an interest in its teaching
about the rightful ordering of human relationships, it will
appear that after the patriarchal histories, much of the
Bible message is concerned with the removal of the disgrace
of the servile and the humble, and with their rehabilitation
as persons worthy of divine and human esteem.

With the be

atitudes of the New Testament, this attitude becomes a per
manent reproach to the exploiters and the power seekers of
European civilization.

For this magnanimity to become mani

fest, however, it was first necessary to delineate clearly
between the spheres of the great and the humble; only when
that had been accomplished could the humble be raised up
into the light.

The Abram saga undertakes just this delin

eation.
The Yahwist (J) narrator begins his biography of Abram
in Genesis 12.

According to the development of world events

as given in the J text, Abram must be considered not only
the ancestor of Israel, the people of Yahweh, but like Adam
he is in a sense the universal first man.

That is, Abram is

the first "normal” man of the kind we know ourselves to be.
Abram appears in the J document immediately after the dis
persion of the postdiluvian mankind who had congregated at
the tower of Babel.

The dispersal of the Babel congregation

marks the end of the heroic pre-peoples and their age.

With

Abram's appearance in the J document, a reasonably settled
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life is indicated; men pay attention to the mundane affairs
of economy and survival while displaying concern also for
the more ultimate purpose of life in a "normal" world which
is characterized by the finitude of existence.

The later

Elohist (E) story of the life of Abram imputes "spiritual"
meaning of majestic breadth to the encounters of Abram with
his God; the most notable of these is the story of Abram's
near sacrifice of Isaac at God's command.24

While the spir

itually momentous encounters of Abram in E serve to deepen
the God-consciousness of Yahwism, Judaism and Christianity,
they tend initially to obscure the more commonplace existence
of the J document's man, Abram, with the God who has extended
his providence to the man.

The following is characteristic

of the relationship of Yahweh with Abram in J:
Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, Go . . ."

"Now the

"So Abram went as the

Lord had told him . . . "
Like the P document the Deuteronomist source (D) is
late.

It dates from the period after Israel's end and the

decline of Judah relative to the power of her neighbors.

De

24Genesis 22.15-18. The old tradition which the Elo
hist has received is given a spiritual interpretation in
this story. In its original form, the story is aetiological; i.e., it explains how the substitution of animal sac
rifice for child sacrifice came about. Although this theme
is identifiable in the present Biblical account, that is
hardly the reason why the E document includes it. There it
witnesses to the intensity of Abram's faith and the provi
dential grace of Abram's God. In respect of the story's
bearing on the man-God relationship, Buber treats the story
as an explication of the early prophetic teaching about sac
rifice. That is, the intention which underlies sacrifice is
important, while the actual article of sacrifice is not.
See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 114-115.
Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 91-92.
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spite this, it contains certain materials of high antiquity.
Among these materials are several creedal statements which
articulate the history of God's people and the meaning of
that history in terms of the purpose of the theopolitical
community.

These creeds are of significance for us because

they indicate in compact form the materials toward which our
attention should be drawn in an effort to understand the im
plications to freedom of the Abram saga.

One of these

creeds follows:
. . . We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt, and the Lord
brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand; and the
Lord showed signs and wonders, great and grievous,
against Egypt and against Pharaoh and all his household,
before our eyes; and he brought us out from there, that
he might bring us in and give us the land which he
swore to give to our fathers. And the Lord commanded
us to do all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God,
for our good always, that he might preserve us alive,
as at this day.25
"We were slaves."

The creed begins with this admission

of existential disgrace.

The urgency of freedom in the New

Testament, and in Europe, has as its impetus this experi
ence of the chosen people of Yahweh.

The importance of the

slave experience of the chosen people cannot be understated
in its bearing upon the theology and anthropology of the Old
or the New Testament.

It is by no means an accidental con

catenation in the life of symbols that our emphasis upon
freedom as the integral value in the Christian age has come
to us primarily via the Bible, rather than through classical
25Deuteronomy 6.21-14. See Von Rad, Genesis, pp. 13-15
for a discussion of the significance of the creeds. For
creeds similar to the one above, see Deuteronomy 26.5-9 and
Joshua 24.2-13.
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philosophy.

Philosophy may explicate the idea of freedom

with greater clarity than does the Old Testament, but the
archaic experience which funded Greek thought was not ac
quainted with national slavery as the basal condition of per
sonal or civilizational identity.

Rather, Aristotle could

say, "Hellenes do not like to call Hellenes slaves, but con
fine the term to barbarians.”2®

To be sure, Pohlenz is cor

rect when he explains that freedom in Greek thought is in
structed by the presence of slavery in the community, but
there is no common reservoir of experience which would prompt
a Greek to confess, "We were slaves."2^
the Liberator prevented that.

They were not.

Zeus

The liberation performed by

Yahweh was not prophylactic as was that of Zeus at Marathon;
it was remedial and redemptive.

Because of the historical

reality of slavery for Israel, the slave image occurs repeat
edly as the symbol of negativity in being.

"The slave does

not continue in the house forever" of the Fourth Gospel is
the best example of this employment of the slave symbol.
Beyond the recollection of the enslavement, the mention
of the land promised to the fathers in the creed serves to
introduce the figure of Abram.

Our concern with Abram in

volves the promise and its relationship to slavery and to
freedom.

The creedal confession, "and he brought us out

from there, that he might bring us in and give us the land
which he swore to give our fathers," refers back to the be2®Politics, 1255a24.
2^Pohlenz, Freedom in Greek Life and Thought, pp. 3 ff.
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ginning of the J biography of Abram in Genesis 12.

We have

observed the primal character of Abram's manhood in respect
of its existential dynamics; but Abram is a primal figure in
a more important, a more essentially human and universal way.
The first historians viewed Abram as the first normal man to
hear and to heed the voice of the true God.

J tells us that

Abram had ancestors, but they are thoroughly insignificant;
it was Abram who received the divine word.
Now the Lord [YHWH] said to Abram, "Go from your
country and your kindred and your father's house to the
land that I will show you. And I will make of you a
great nation, and I will bless you, and make your name
great, so that you will be a blessing.
I will bless
those who bless you, and him who curses you I will
curse; and by you all the families of the earth will
bless themselves."
So Abram went, as the Lord had told him . . .
The first notable consideration about this introductory
speech of Yahweh is its futuristic inclination.

There is

nothing conspicuously wrong with Abram, yet his life is to
be modified in a momentous way.
given.

Promises of greatness are

If Abram is to enrich our knowledge of freedom, then

we must attempt to reconstruct the character of this Abram
who hears the command and the promise.

The command and prom

ise themselves can amount to little if we do not recognize
the human situation in which they occurred as a radical in
cision.

Abram's existence is not wrong; the text suggests

in no way that he is given in evil, nor does it suggest that
he is in any need.

Why then should Abram, a nomad, receive

land, or why should this man become the father of a nation,
2®Genesis 12.1-4a.
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or what is there about him which would convey a universal
blessing?

There is nothing about the man Abram which would

answer any of these questions, for he is quite ordinary.
Indeed, the several texts recording his deceit over the mar
ital status of his wife and travelling companion, Sarah,
show him to be something of a "pragmatist."

Clearly, Abram

is not a slave, but he is nevertheless to be "liberated"
from his present circumstances by the God who has spoken to
him.

He is not to be liberated from sin, and certainly not

from "non-being," but from commonplace finite existence.
While Abram's erstwhile existence is hardly characterized by
negativity in the volitional sense of sin which is present
to the mature and robust moral consciousness, it is none the
less negative.

Abram's negativity is like the lazy and form

less negativity of the cave dwellers in Republic VII.

Abram

is ordinary man who has not yet been awakened to his status
as a being who dwells within the clear, bright luminescence
of God's command and promise.

So God's call to this Abram

is in truth an act of divine liberation.

Yahweh frees Abram

from the delusion that this place, this family, this national
grouping is definitive of anything which a person should
value ultimately.

The positivity of this liberation is given

in its futuristic presentation? the things which will be made
to happen are contingent upon the divine volition, and the
passage to this completion consists in obedience to the di
vine command; only the command is in the present:

"Go."

command is the connective link between that other Abram as

The
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he was in passive negativity— in unfreedom— and the Abram
who becomes free to participate in God's promise of being.
Abram's obedience makes him free; it re-positions his life.
Although the word "freedom" is unfamiliar to the Yahwist,
the formal pattern of the narrative in Genesis 12 is the
earliest articulation of the structure of freedom.
It is necessary that we comprehend these parameters of
Abram's erstwhile negative existence with his country, his
kindred, his father's house, for the "old Abram" who can be
found within and beneath the story of the J document is much
like the "old man" of Pauline theology.

He is not yet— only

now— becoming a free man in the presence of the true God.
The old Abram's negative existence and his response to Yahweh's positive command and promise serve moreover to associ
ate the father of the chosen people in the paradigmatic
plight of that people, i.e., in the negativity of slave ex
istence, in divine liberation, in freedom before God.

The

divine command that God's people get up and leave the land
of Egypt is adumbrated in Yahweh's command that their father
Abram leave the negatively supporting environs of his youth.
Now Abram is a freeman in the conventional sense of be
ing in bondage to none, and in the sense just explained, i.e.,
of having been positioned in the esteem of his God.

Yet

i

Abram is a normal man, and his life does not go untouched by
slavery.

Slavery penetrates Abram's life in a most intricate

way, a way which intertwines slavery in the material sense
with slavery in its metaphysical dress as an influence which
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corrupts the soul.

Abram's life will be finally saddened

by its slave affection; he will lose his dear son Ishmael,
for Ishmael is the child of a slave woman, and therefore he
is unfit to remain in the house of Abram.
mael to leave?

But why had Ish

To our ancestors the answer was obvious:

slavery is disgrace.

The J and E authors' mutual revulsion

for the young Ishmael and for his mother is apparent in the
text.

The slave lineage of Abram's eldest son surely sug

gests to them the slave existence of Israel in Egypt, and
both narrators take care to demonstrate that the slave ex
istence of Abram's issue in Egypt was not inherent in the
nature of his people.
not slave but free.

The people's patriarchal heritage was
Both texts (E less harshly than J) take

satisfaction in the exit of Hagar and her son.
The slave condition is a disgrace— a defilement of the
exterior person which convinces the beholder that the servile
condition is inherent in character— that the slave is slav
ish.

The slave is not fully a person? he shares in the ap

pearance of the freeman, but the circumstantial blemish is
imputed to his soul.
human type.

Thus he is’ by nature an inferior, half

Historical materialism expedites our apprecia

tion of the negative evaluation which attaches to the slave
with its understanding that the primal alienation of man
from the world occurs— not in respect of a deficit of spiri
tual autonomy— but in respect of man's world-building labor.
The world which the slave erects is not a world for him; it
is the world for others, a world in which the slave is at
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once an alien and yet a despised and embarrassing necessity.
The alien status of the slave is the source of the disgrace
and the evidence of the impediment within the soul of the
slave.

Concerning the blemished condition of the slave as

person, it matters none whether we have reference to gang
slavery with its cruelty or to household slavery with its
genteel condescension.

29

In the language of Arendt, the

slave embodies the "privation" of life— its confinement away
from the sphere of public objectification in durable works.
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In the language which the study has employed, the slave is
the visible incarnation of negativity in being.

He is a

creature evocative of both our pity and our hatred, for in
the slave we witness that half-person who we might have been
in less fortunate circumstances, and indeed that soiled and
2^This is not to suggest that there are no important
differences between these two forms of slavery.
Indeed,
Mendelsohn has explained that the distinction between house
hold slavery which employs only a few slaves and the massive
use of slaves in latifundia and mining is a distinction be
tween class and caste. In the ancient Near East, slavery
tended to follow the pattern of household service, and thence,
status assignation on the basis of class.
(See Mendelsohn,
Slavery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 42 and 121 f.) The
slave themes in the Genesis saga of Abram seem entirely con
sistent with this Near Eastern model. Thus there is no sug
gestion that Ishmael, the son of a slave woman and a free
man, is viewed as a slave. In keeping with typical class
stratification practices, he accedes to a higher social rung
than that occupied by his slave parent. By way of contrast,
the Exodus narrative of the employment of Hebrew slaves in
public works seems to indicate a caste arrangement reminis
cent of European employment of Negroes in the Americas. With
either the class or the caste pattern of slavery, the slave
is inferior, a blemished type. In the former, there are de
vices for removing the blemish in exceptional circumstances.
■^Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 53 ff.
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servile creature who in part we be.

The symbolism of slav

ery as a moral failure of the internal character has as its
experiential root the privation, the visible baseness, of
the one whose external person is the property of another.
In the Abram saga the bi-level theme of slavery as an
external condition, threatening to taint the internal accord
of God and his chosen man occurs first in the J text.
But Abram said, "0 Lord God [YHWH Elohim], what wilt
thou give me, for I continue childless, and the heir of
my house is Eliezer of Damascus?" And Abram said, "Be
hold, thou hast given me no offspring; and a slave born
in my house will be my heir." And behold, the word of
the Lord came, to him, "This man shall not be your heir;
your own son shall be your heir."3i
Von Rad remarks that the sagas of the Hexateuch differ from
those of all other religious traditions in that they make
no effort to cloak the human failings of the principal char
acters.^2

This short splice of J within the E narrative of

Genesis 15 is a parade instance of this trait of the Bible
histories.

The "old Abram" surfaces shamelessly in this

passage; in recession is Yahweh's free man, trusting his God
to make good the promise of nationhood.

Abram reduces him

self to the slavishness of negativity; he despairs of Yahweh's ability or willingness to fulfil his promise.

The

slavishness of his behavior is given substance in the possi
bility that a real slave will become heir to his household.
Had the God of Abram— El Shaddai, or whomever— been a God
without mercy, forbearance and ambition, he could have per•^Genesis 15.2-5.
■*2Von Rad, Genesis, p. 34.
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mitted Abram's fears to be realized ,with complete justice.33
Abram's slavish deportment, his blasphemous mistrust, mer
ited an equally slavish denouement which would accord with
the established legal custom; Abram's manservant would have
become his heir, and that would be the end of the matter.3^
But God will not have it that way; he has called Abram to be
his, and he will use Abram to achieve his purpose in history.
Thus God answers that a slave will not be the heir, and that
the heir will be Abram's own son.

To affirm the solemnity

with which God's promise is given, the E text of Genesis
15.7-11 describes a primitive covenant ritual which God per
formed in the presence of Abram.

Abram's positivity unto

his God is restored; J says, ". . . h e believed the Lord
[YHWH], and he reckoned it to him as righteousness."3^

Again

Abram is a free man in the esteem of his God; his household
is spared the disgrace of slave receivership.
33Although the J text uses the name Yahweh [YHWH = LORD)
from its beginning in Genesis, chapter two, as the name of
the God of Adam, Noah, and the patriarchs, this usage is
probably inaccurate historically. Both E (Exodus 3.15) and
P (Exodus 6.2-3) indicate that the name "YHWH" was not known
before the sojourn of Israel in Egypt, and that the God of
the patriarchs was known by another name(s). "El Shaddai"
is the name by which the P text designates the God of the
fathers.
3^Von Rad explains the legal situation of the time which
has prompted Abram's fears. He writes, " . . . in the socalled Nuzi texts (fifteenth century B.C., east of the Ti
gris) there are several contracts, according to which in the
event of childlessness slaves were- adopted; their duty was
to give the testator a proper burial." Genesis, p. 178.
See also Mendelsohn's discussion of adoption practices, Slav
ery in the Ancient Near East, pp. 20-22 and 58.
35Genesis 15.6.
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The dialectic of freedom and slavery in the Abram saga
is only begun in this descent and restoration of Abram in
Genesis 15.

True to the fashion which will become charac

teristic of the chosen people in the history which is to be,
Abram and his household will descend even deeper into the
disgrace and defilement of slave existence; the entire fu
ture will be jeopardized, and the cleansing of the household
will be a painful and ugly affair.

J and E give separate

accounts of Hagar and her son, and we shall observe both.
In the blasphemous doubt of his utterance in Genesis 15,
Abram has adumbrated his later complete descent into the
slavish behavior which gives the lie to his existence before
God as a free creature and partner; the form and content of
Abram's misgivings— slavishness and slavery— likewise fore
shadow the post-patriarchal enslavement of the chosen people
in Egypt.

The J text tells the story of this descent and

misfortune.3®

In this text, no sooner has Abram's belief

been reckoned as righteousness than the following episode
occurs.
Now Sarai, Abram's wife, bore him no children. She
had an Egyptian maid whose name was Hagar; and Sarai
said to Abram, "Behold now, the Lord [YHWH] has pre
vented me from bearing children; go in to my maid; it
may be that I shall obtain children by her." And Abram
hearkened to the voice of Sarai.
(So after Abram had
dwelt ten years in the land of Canaan, Sarai, Abram's
wife, took Hagar the Egyptian her maid, and gave her to
Abram her husband as a wife.) And he went in to Hagar,
and she conceived; and when she saw that she had con
ceived, she looked with contempt upon her mistress. And
Sarai said to Abram, "May the wrong done to me be on
J Genesis 16.1-2 and 4-14.
from the P document.

Genesis 16.3 is an insertion
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you! I gave my maid to your embrace, and when she saw
that she had conceived, she looked on me with contempt.
May the Lord judge between you and me!" But Abram said
to Sarai, "Behold, your maid is in your power; do to
her as you please." Then Sarai dealt harshly with her,
and she fled from her.
In the ancient Near East, legal custom provided that a
barren wife could provide a legitimate heir to the household
if she would bring to her husband her personal maidservant.
The maidservant would bear the child of the husband upon the
wife's knees, and the child could thus be considered the
wife's own.

37

It was in this way that Sarah contrived to

provide her unhappy husband with an heir.

The story is

brief, but it is not difficult to imagine the details which
are missing.

The aging Abram appears here, not as his God's

free man displaying mastery over household and world, but
rather as a pawn caught up in the intrigues of the women in
his household.

Sarah is considerably less impressed with

the God and his promises than is Abram, and this episode
shows her as a more complete "pragmatist" than ever her hus38

band has been.JO

she is a temptress; her husband has re

cently been restored to righteousness, and she now rekindles
his doubts, reinforces his latent negativity toward the God
and his command and promise.

In Sarah's design, Abram, who

has previously feared that a slave unrelated to himself will
be his heir, is now to enter into carnal relations with a
slave, and of this slave, to beget a son who will become
•*^Von Rad, Genesis, p. 186.
•*®See Genesis 18 J.

133
heir to him.

Abram, God's chosen man, appears in this story

as the most slavish of all the lot; like the mute Adam of
Genesis 3, Abram stupidly does as the woman has told him.
Like a slave, Abram has permitted hegemony over his life and
his household to pass to another, to the conniving Sarah.
As this other dominates, Abram is reduced to moral and polit
ical vacancy.

When he goes in to the slave woman, to Hagar,

he has become as thoroughly slavish as she, and Ishmael, the
child of their union— the "son according to the flesh"— is
ironically not even made of an act which bears the savor of
lustful delight.

The boy's parents behave simply as brood

animals who fulfil the projections of their keeper.
But the plan redounds on the schemer who has minted it.
The slave woman Hagar is not one to neglect the main chance;
it is she after all who carries the master's child, and not
the mistress of the household.

She makes known to Sarah

her intention to keep the master's child as her own, and
quite possibly, to usurp the aging female's favored position
as wife.

OQ

A sordid family row follows— more appropriate in

39

This potential difficulty is inherent in a servantconcubine situation, and social stability requires that it be
forbidden. Thus the Hammurabi Code requires branding as the
punishment for a presumptuous servant-concubine:
When a seignior married a hierodule and she gave a fe
male slave to her husband and she has then borne child
ren, if later that female slave has claimed equality
with her mistress because she bore children, her mis
tress may not sell her; she may mark her with the slavemark and count her among the slaves.
Hammurabi Code, paragraph 146, tr. Theophile J. Meek, in
James B. Pritchard, The Ancient Near East; An Anthology of
Texts and Pictures (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1958).

Zola than in the patriarchal history of Israel— and the be
fuddled Abram, bereft of divine guidance, can find counsel
in none other than the perfidious wife who is herself the
cause of the trouble.

Sarah hastens to dismiss her rival,

and the hapless slave woman departs into the wilderness car
rying Abram's unborn child.
It seems as if the blemish upon the soul of this slave
woman has.spread like a germ throughout Abram's household,
infecting all of the principals, draining them of the capac
ity for free action.

Sarah is tempted by the presence of

one within her home whose labor— whose body— whose progeny
cannot be her own because she is in bondage.

In the se

quence which derives, almost by design, from this initial
perception on the part of Sarah, we behold the truth of the
understanding that slavery enslaves the slaver as well as
the slave.

Sarah's temptation to employ the body of her

maidservant for a function of which her own is incapable
leads her to tempt her husband to improve upon the promise
of his God, to get an heir by a slave woman rather than his
wife.

In his complicity in this scheme, Abram renounces

the free righteousness which was his in belief, and he de
liberately sullies the projected lineage of his household,
his nation and the God's, by getting it through concourse
with a slave.

Had Abram succeeded in this rebellious plan,

his nation would have been suited aetiologically to the
slavery in Egypt; there would have been no grounds for God
to rescue a blemished people; their enslavement would have
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occurred as fulfilment of an inherent propensity rather
than as the wicked reversal of a preordained destiny.
The episode concludes in the J text with Hagar's escape
into the wilderness, her encounter with Yahweh, who advises
her to return and submit to her mistress, and Yahweh's proph
ecy regarding the child who has yet to be born.

Of this

forecast we will have more to say.
The E account of this same affair is given as follows:
And the child grew, and was weaned: and Abraham
made a great feast on the day that Isaac was weaned.
But Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian whom she
had borne to Abraham, playing with her son Isaac.
So
she said to Abraham, "Cast out this slave woman with
her son; for the son of this slave woman shall not be
heir with my son Isaac." And the thing was very dis
pleasing to Abraham on account of his son. But God
[Elohim] said to Abraham, "Be not displeased because of
the lad and because of your slave woman; whatever Sarah
says to you, do as she tells you, for through Isaac
shall your descendants be named. And I will make a
nation of the son of the slave woman also, because he
is your offspring." So Abraham rose early in the morn
ing, and took bread and a skin of water, and gave it to
Hagar, putting it on her shoulder, along with the child,
and sent her away. And she departed, and wandered in
the wilderness of Beersheba.^0
The E story is quite different from that in J, a fact which
explains its preservation in a book which favors the J his
tory.

Here Ishmael is a lad— his age is uncertain— and

Isaac the son of Sarah a toddler.

In the E document the

trouble in the household occurs not because of conflict
amongst the women, but directly because of Ishmael's pres
ence.

One must infer from the account that Ishmael has been

legitimized according to the custom, and that he is consid^Genesis 21.8-14.
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ered the elder son of Abram, the established heir of the
household.
As in the J story the peripetia is forced by Sarah's
jealous outrage.

The old female looks upon the son of the

slave, a son whom her husband loves dearly, and she per
ceives that the presence of this son jeopardizes the future
of her own child within the household.

In this account,

however, Abram is prepared to resist the shrewish meddling
of his wife.

Suddenly Sarah gains a powerful ally whose

weight in the matter is decisive; God instructs Abram to
follow the counsel of his wife.

The E account of the expul

sion of Ishmael thus suggests a problem which is missing in
J.

That is, when E casts God as the ally of the faithless

Sarah, he necessarily implicates the God of Abram as accom
plice in the selfish scheming of the woman.

There are two

possible explanations for this ostensibly un-divine coalition
of interests.

One is the theological explanation that the

divine plan employs human baseness to achieve its ends.

This

explanation is plausible for this episode, since the Penta
teuch is not unfamiliar with instances in which human chica
nery and straying figure as lesser moments within a divine
project.
haustive.

But such a theological explanation cannot be ex
On a more elemental level it must be acknowledged

that the alliance of Sarah and the God of Abram against the
pitiable son of the slave woman bespeaks a period in the Yahwist faith before the time when "the great in height will be
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brought low."

There is an inexpiable disgrace which clings

to the son of the slave woman.

Thus, both Sarah and the

God of Abram fear the presence of Ishmael, and both are
concerned for the future of the young Isaac.

The free child

in this story is not merely the son of Sarah; in truth,
Isaac is the God's child, given through Sarah in her senes
cence to be a blessing unto all the earth.

In this story

from E, Sarah fears that a child other than her own may be
come heir in the household of her husband, but God is con
cerned to shelter the future which he has begun in Abram
from the blemish of slave corruption.

It seems certain that

this is how the Elohist understood the matter; the enslave
ment of Israel in Egypt came as perversion rather than ful
filment, and God reversed that perversion in his act of de
liverance.

The elevation of Isaac over Ishmael in the Abram

saga establishes that freedom before God is the destined
condition of Abram and his nation.
With regard to the divine promise in both J and E to
make a nation of Ishmael, there is no symbolic substance.
This promise is simply an aetiological statement which ex
plains the origin of the Ishmaelite people.
The future of the free son Isaac is well known.

He

became the father of Israel, whom the historians identify
as the father of the tribes of Yahweh's chosen nation.
Through the free son Isaac, the God of Abram carried out his
saving history.

But with Ishmael, the son of the slave,

41lsaiah 10.33.
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there is not the most meager hint of future positivity; in
stead this son is destined to wrath.

J tells his fate:

"He

shall be a wild ass of a man, his hand against every man and
every man's hand against him; and he shall dwell over against
all his k i n s m e n . T h e mother a slave, the son a brigand.
With the narrative of Isaac and Ishmael, we observe a
separation of the divine from the demonic as discernible
provinces of human reality.

In respect of this separation,

it is important that the demonic, the unjust, the profane,
proceed from that which is unfree.

Contrariwise, the divine,

the just, the redemptive follow from the free.

This connec

tion which appears symbolically in the Isaac-Ishmael narra
tive becomes developed for Israel and for Christianity
through prophecy.

In Greece the same mature understanding

will appear with drama and philosophy.

In both cultures,

there is a discrete, historical event which facilitates the
reflective development of the early, compact symbolism.

For

Israel, this event is the Exodus.
3. The Exodus
As is the case with almost every concern in ancient his
tory, the Exodus of the Hebrews from Egypt has occasioned
profuse scholarly attention and debate.

Its cause, its time,
A O

its size, indeed its actual occurrence, are controversial.
^ Genesis 16.22.
4^For a moderating treatment of the events of the Exodus
which does justice to the several reasonable possibilities,
see Adolphe Lods, Israel from Its Beginnings to the Middle
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Such questions of historical facticity are of marginal im
portance to this study.

Of greater moment is the record as

it stands, for the record shows us how the Bible historians
understood the Exodus, and it is their understanding of this
event which has proved decisive for the accumulated history
to which our own generation is heir.

Professor Snaith cau

tions against a too keen interest in origins because of that
interest's detriment to a complete understanding of the Bi
ble and its unique contents.

He writes:

We ought never to have permitted our evolutionary zeal
to make us forget that lesson which Aristotle himself
taught— namely, that the subsequent stages of growth
are at least as important for the understanding of the
nature of an organism as are its beginnings.
It is the
oak that shall be which makes the acorn what it is, and
not the acorn the oak.44
This spirit of attending to ends instructs our examination
of the freedom content of the Exodus.

The Exodus as we read

of it is such an end; it is the finished work of the histo
rians and the Redactor, all of whom understood the Exodus to
have been an event of divine liberation.

In the text as it

stands there are three themes which must be examined in turn
in order to elicit this episode's character as the most fun
damental pylon of European freedom.
vealed divinity,
Moses.

These themes are (1) re

(2) world creation, and (3) the person of

The first of these themes suggests the problem of

of the Eighth Century, tr. S. H. Hooke (London:
and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1932), pp. 151-190.

Routledge

44Norman H. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old
Testament (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 14.
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Revealed Divinity
In the E text of Exodus 3.14-15, the divine name is
revealed in two statements from the burning bush.

The RSV

translates this passage as follows:
God [Elohim] said to Moses, "I AM WHO I AM [Ehyeh Aser
Ehyeh]." And he said, "Say this to the people of Is
rael, 'I AM [Ehyeh] has sent me to you."' God said
also to Moses, "Say this to the people of Israel, 'The
Lord [YHWH], the God of your fathers, the God of Abra
ham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent
me to you': this is my name for ever, and thus I am
to be remembered throughout all generations."
The second of these names of God is the tetragrammaton
(YHWH), the standard usage of the Yahwist for the deity who
is the central power within his narrative.
ragrammaton 's first appearance in E.

This is the tet

The first rendition

of the divine name is peculiar to the Elohist.

It is a

dense and mysterious utterance, Ehyeh Aser Ehyeh.

There are

several translations of the name, and all of them are sup
ported by evidence and argumentation.
Buber's rendition:

This study adopts

I AM PRESENT.45

45Various translations of the divine name are given in
Harrelson, Interpreting the Old Testament, pp. 78-79. In
addition to the sense of "being there" or "being present"
which we have employed, other translations include:
"I am
who I am," "I will be what I will be," "I cause to be what I
cause to be," "I cause to be what is, what occurs," and "I
am who it am." The last is preferred by Harrelson.
Noth advocates the standard "I am who I am." The phi
lological speculation which underlies his preference is
worth considering. Noth writes, "The giving of the name
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The revelation of the divine name, and with this name,
of divinity itself, poses a problem for the serious reader
of the Exodus narrative.

The birth of human freedom follows

upon this self-revelation of the God, but we are hardly pre
pared by experience to embrace the reality from which free-

follows in w . 14 f., first and foremost through the mysterious sentence ehyeh aser ehveh, 'I am who I am' from which
the catchword ehyeh 'I am' is taken as the name of the God
who appeared to .Moses. This name unmistakably hints at the
divine name Yahweh in so far as the Israelite ear could im
mediately understand the transition from ehyeh to yahweh
merely as a transition from the first to the third person,
so that the name Yahweh would be understood to mean 'he is.'
Verse 15 explicitly puts forward this connection by insert
ing the name Yahweh for the ehyeh of v. 14."
(Martin Noth,
Exodus: A Commentary [Philadelphia: The Westminister Press,
1962], p. 43.) Noth1s translation and its philological
foundation is significant because of its latent ontologizing
tendency. Buber's emphasis on divine presence as the form
of relationship between God and Israel rejects this ontolo
gizing possibility of the name. This study follows Buber—
not for philological reasons, for they are beyond its com
petence— but because Buber's translation best elicits the
historical character of the divine reality in the Old Testa
ment.
(See Exodus 3.12 E in support of Buber's position.)
This is not to say that this project's orientation is
to reject ontology as a creditable figuration of the divine;
certainly this project has had recourse to ontology in its
effort to discern a "structure of freedom" in the Bible.
It
is necessary to affirm however that ontology is a thought
dimension which we bring from philosophy to revelation. In
the Old Testament revelation, there is no "being" in the
pure, ontic sense. The Old Testament is simply too down to
earth for such a construction to occur. It is we who ontologize the Old Testament revelation when we recognize in it
symbolic structures which parallel those of philosophy.
Such recognition is synthetic; that it goes beyond simple
elucidation of the text must be acknowledged. Buber's ren
dition of the name has no interest in such synthesis; Bu
ber's concern was to uncover as much truth as possible about
the historical Moses and his experience. For this reason,
we accept the historical and theological reliability of
Buber's rendition of the divine name. When, in 1^ and Thou,
Buber explicates his relational category of the Present in
terms of "being," it is clear that this "being" which is cen
tral to Buber's philosophy has nothing in common with being
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dom follows.

The problem then is one involving reality it

self; the erotic human center strains to apprehend the great
and primary reality whose force makes life intelligible, but
our own degenerate reality interposes itself— a genuine,
historical veil of Maya— making the true reality dim and for
the most part unreal.

Thus, if we put the question, What's

in a name?, this I AM PRESENT can open little of its content
to us, perhaps none at all.

The Presence into which Moses

and Israel were drawn is of a wholly different sort from the
presence of our own experience.
When we attempt to assay the presence which gives tex
ture to modern experience, we can hardly distinguish its
component parts as discrete and individual counters; instead
there is the blur.

All around are even surfaces machined to

as to on, or with such terms as physis, ousia, phaino,
histemi, which express the Greek experience of being. Of
these latter, Heidegger has written, "Limit and end are that
wherewith the essent [das Seierid] begins to b e ." (Introduc
tion to Metaphysics, p. 60.) Contrast the following verse
from Buber:
"So long as the heaven of Thou is spread out
over me the winds of causality cower at my heels, and the
whirlpool of fate stays its course." Greek ontology— which
grew from natural philosophy— emphasizes the sanctity of
causality and of fate in the sense of achieved ends, i.e.,
stasis. The Hebrew sense of Yahweh's dynamic being there as
person is actually a supra-ontic comprehension of reality.
See 1^ and Thou, pp. 9-13 and 51.
Buber's translation moreover is not without critical
evidence on its side. The only similar usage of the ehyeh
in the Old Testament is Hosea 1.9: "And the Lord said,
'Call his name Not my people, for you are not my people and
I am not ehyeh for you.'"
(The RSV translates this ehyeh
as "your God.")
In this usage, Buber's "being present"
makes sense, whereas Noth's usage, "I am," is less than sat
isfactory. See Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the
Covenant (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 52-53. See
also Buber, Prophetic Faith, pp. 26-29.
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standard tolerances, Euclidean abstractions become firm and
animate and, in one sense, real.

If one were to hold still

for a time so as to stop the blur and make it static, the
blur would be a collage made up of these even surfaces, im
posed one upon the other in infinite regress.

Our homes,

offices, factories, roads, even our clothing, all share in
this quality of forced evenness.

This collage is itself the

cumulative presence which is the setting for modern exis
tence.

It is a totalitarian presence, for within this blur

of even surfaces there is no power which can truly stand
forth as an entity wholly distinct from the geometric blur
which is the ubiquitous presence for human existence from
birth to death.

Were we to utter a parallel formulation

from our own experience to the name which is revealed in the
E document, we could say only, "It is present."

The "it"

character of the setting which is present for the modern
imagination obscures, almost hopelessly, our apperception of
the world as it is.
For Moses there were no geometric abstractions forced
to be real, but there was the craggy surface of Horeb, the
firmament, the sky, the sun, the white clump bunchings of
the sheep which he tended.

When Moses approached the burn

ing bush he was prepared to hear and to see.
There are no theophanies in the world of lines and cor
ners, for this world blocks out the great and true realities
which have bestowed meaning on existence.

This world con

duces to an apperception at once limited and misleading.
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Rather than the great and true, this world apprehends the
banal and false, for when historical process becomes greatly
accelerated, true origins are deprecated and ideology sup
plants reality as the ground for thought and action.

In an

tiquity, such movements as sophism and gnosticism anticipate
in turn the banality and the falsehood of modern ideology.
For modern man, the banal form of ideology is scientism
which "corrects" apperception in Protagorean fashion by truncatinig the range of reality to which the human eros may fas
ten i t s e l f . T h e patently false form of ideology is the
gradient taken by post-Puritan chiliasm in both its liber
tine and despotic arrangements.

These two forms of ideology,

the banal and the false, converge most obviously in the
teaching of Auguste Comte.

That teaching has become the

logos of our world, the world of collage and blur.

Our rec

ognition of its tenets will help to identify the difficulty
which the burning bush and the revelation of the name pose
for us.
Comte interpreted history according to the well known
law of the three stages.

Humanity has progressed from the

theological to the metaphysical to the positive stage, in
which empiricism and mechanism couple so as to end the pa
thetic character of human existence in history.47

The the-

4®See Theatetus, 166-168, for the first recorded artic
ulation of the "enlightened" world view.
^ S e e Harald Hoffding, A History of Modern Philosophy,
tr. B. E. Meyer (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955),
II, 320-360.
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tory as it is recorded teaches that God revealed his name to
Moses from the burning bush and that history's first great
liberation followed in consequence upon this revelation.
Our own historical identities begin with this liberation.
But the positivist method dictates that the theophany must
be an exercise in the fantasy life of the child-like first
stage, or that it is only an heuristic event in the progres
sive maturation of the human intellect.
This study has adopted as its most basic attitude that
history is the fallen domain where human severality engen
ders strife, injustice, slavery.

The free act punctuates

history and elevates it by revealing the wholeness which is
the underlying, eternal reality of all.

By this standard,

ideology constitutes the most thoroughgoing servitude possi
ble because it separates itself in principle from the inner
unity— the true logos— which frees.

The ideologue thus is

lost in history like a man in the heavy shadows who cannot
see the sun's movement from east to west.

The self--revela

tion of Yahweh at the burning bush is an act of divine free
dom which in turn made a free human response possible.

This

theophany then coupled to historical existence a new dimen
sion, the dimension of the sacred.

Israel is the mother of

freedom in the world because its experience as the chosen
people established that historical existence would be recon
ciled with sacred being.
sacred history.

Thus for Israel, there could be

No longer were the sacred and the histori

cal antinomous dominions.

Elsewhere in Near East, these
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spheres had been kept apart, with sacred places, times and
events separated from the historical conduct of life.

For

Israel, however, Yahweh was an unrelenting Presence who
prompted the response of free righteousness.

AQ

In the modern world where abstractions are made con
crete, this Presence is not within the range of customary
experience, especially the experience of the intellect.

In-

tellectualism is consumed by history for it lacks any abid
ing sense of the beginning and of the ultimate finitude and
falsehood of history.

If men, caught deep in the passage

ways of history, are to know, they must first believe.

The

Anselmian motto is the only formula which can assure under
standing.

It is not so much that one should believe in God,

or in burning bushes and the like.

Before an acquaintance

with those is possible, one must believe in reality, unseen
but residually present in all culture.

From this belief in

reality follows the apperception of the unreal as other from
the real, the transcient as other from the permanent, the
many as other from the one, the servile as other from the
free.

If belief cannot heal the inherent malady of histor

ical mankind's divided apperception, it can at the least cor
rect its focus by heightening its selectivity.

With the pos

itivist rubric which continues to be the world-dominant pat^8This, of course, was the prophetic notion of life in
pre-monarchial Israel, whose historical validity modern
scholarship has tended to discount as an idyllic vision of
the golden age. The great value of Professor Mendenhall's
book, The Tenth Generation, is that he argues on the basis
of the most recent evidence that the prophetic view was cor
rect .
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tern for the interpretation of experience, there is no felt
need for rescue from the blurred and spiritless presence of
the "it."

The I AM PRESENT revealed to Moses becomes at

best a poem, at worst a fraud.

If the Presence is false, so

also is freedom and all knowledge about it.

In that event,

our attachment to freedom is sentimental and thus, uncertain.

The ensuing discussion of the Exodus from Egypt will
examine certain materials from the text of Exodus, chapters
1-14.

This passage contains an account of the enslavement

of Israel in Egypt, G o d ’s call to Moses, Moses1 directive
to the Pharaoh, the plagues, the Passover, the Exodus from
Egypt, and finally, the destruction of the army of Egypt in
the sea.

In order to elicit the paradigmatic value of the

liberation performed in the Exodus, it might seem desirable
to terminate the discussion with a consideration of the giv
ing of the Law at Sinai, the holy mountain of God.

This

study has decided against this course for two reasons.

The

first is that the connection of the giving of the Law and
the Exodus of Israel from Egypt is more probably the result
of later redaction than of actual historical events.

The

two episodes are initially unconnected, being happenings
which affected different constituent groups in the Israelite
confederacy.
49

49

The second is that while the Sinai pericope

The initial separation of these events is indicated
by the absence of any mention of the Law in the early creeds
of Deuteronomy 6.21-24, 25.5-9, and Joshua 24.2-13.
See
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furnishes a pleasing denouement to the events of the Exodus,
it is not integral to the paradigmatic meaning of that af
fair.

The narrative of Exodus 1-14 is sufficient to estab

lish the significance of the events which occurred, without
requiring further reference to any later developments.

In

that narrative, the removal of Israel from Egypt is sought
in order that the people of Yahweh may serve their God away
from the Pharaonic domain.

There is no suggestion that the

purpose involves a dispensation of law.

When we recall the

pure Pauline consciousness of freedom, we are reminded that
in its initial, exuberant moment, the free vision is wholly
antinomian.

Only when the vision of spontaneous beinghood

begins to grow dim does a set of rules become necessary in
order to preserve in tact as much of the great epiphany as
is possible.

Hence the persistent symbolism of the divine

origin of the laws, both in Israel and in Greece.

In truth,

the laws are divine only as means to the participation in a
reality which is intrinsically foreign to law.

The Bible

has more to teach us about the origin of freedom than does
Greece, for in both the Old and New Testaments, we find epi
sodes in which the holy, antinomian moment of freedom is ar
rested and preserved for us.

The divine liberation text of

Exodus is the first and greatest of these.
In this text two themes will illumine the divine lib-

Martin Noth, The History of Israel (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1958), pp. 131 ff. See also Noth, History of the
Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 59-62.
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eration.

These themes may be designated as follows:

(1) the

spectacle of world creation, and (2) Moses the liberator.
By way of introduction to these themes, it will be necessary
to recognize the centrality of the structure of freedom
within the paradigmatic narrative of Exodus 1-14.
Liberation as World Creation
The tripartite structure of freedom achieves maximum
clarity in the teaching of John 8.

This structure includes

the avowal of the negativity of slave existence, the negation
of negativity through divine liberation, the repositioning
of existence as participation in the life of God.

Such a

repositioning elevates existence to the high level of being.
This is to say then that a liberation is nothing less than
a creation.
non-being.

Presence supplants vacancy; being supplants
When the liberation involves a whole city, a

whole nation, it achieves the force of world creation.

The

world is new and good for those who have become free.
Although the Exodus does not display the conceptual re
finement of John 8, the several elements of the structure of
freedom occur unmistakably throughout the passage which we
have indicated as our field of reference.

Yahweh acknowl

edges the misery of the slaves; he frees the slaves; he re
positions Israelite life as an enduring directedness toward
the divine Presence.

Half a millenium later a rather simi

lar pattern emerges in the thought and work of Solon.

The

Exodus text is rich in its symbolization of the experience
of slavery and liberation, for the Redactor has included
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substantial portions of J, E, and P so as to present the
fullest possible account of the events and their meaning.
Chapter three of Exodus contains both the J and E state
ments of God's recognition of the disgrace and suffering of
the people in Egyptian enslavement.

In J, Yahweh says,

I have seen the affliction of my people who are in
Egypt, and have heard their cry because of their task
masters; I know their sufferings, and I have come down
to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians, and
to bring them up out of that land to a good and broad
land, a land flowing with milk and honey . . .50
In E, God says to Moses:
And now, behold, the cry of the people of Israel has
come to me, and I have seen the oppression with which
the Egyptians oppress them. Come, I will send you to
Pharaoh that you may bring forth my people, the sons of
Israel, out of Egypt.51
Both of these dicta convey divine awareness of the negativ
ity of slave existence.

The divine word is then a vocation

of the first element of the structure of freedom.

This God

has revealed himself to Moses as the God of the patriarchs,
and as such, he is concerned that the promise to the fathers
of Israel has reached a terminus— not in fulfilment of free
nationhood— but in the enslavement of the people whom he has
promised to exalt.

Thus, both of the texts reveal Yahweh's

intention to liberate his people through a concrete histor
ical act; he will negate the negativity of his people's
slave existence.

In this obtains the second, dynamic moment

in the structure of freedom.
^Exodus 3.7-8.
^ Exodus 3.9-10.
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For a political science which attempts to comprehend
the witness of archaic experience to the meaning of slavery
and freedom, it is vitally important that the expression of
concern over the enslavement of the people Israel occurs
not in the mouth of man but of God.

One ought not read the

Exodus without bearing in mind the callousness which moder
nity has brought to the issue of human exploitation through
the writing of Nietzsche, Calhoun, and the capitalist and
fascist ideologues.

For man to lament his own condition as

slave is an exercise in egoism, and it is easy to see how
this can be construed as a function of the human meanness
which writing of that genre imputes to the majority of man
kind.

But for God to decry the enslavement of a people is

a fundamentally different proposition; before God, the en
slavement appears as a political deviation from the plan of
creation, and therefore it ultimately becomes a divine pro
ject to reverse the negativity of existence, first for the
chosen people Israel, and then for all mankind through a
positive act of liberation and redemption.
will not be a slave.

The image of God

Upon this stipulation, human freedom

can no longer be understood as one of several alternative
types of political organization.

Freedom is not merely the

ascendant trait of life in "free" countries where the owner
ship of people is forbidden and random behavior is tolerated.
Freedom before God becomes anthropocosmic in its implication.
The Exodus liberation links human freedom to the divine pur
pose underlying all creation.

It follows then that in poli-
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ties where freedom is obstructed by the ruling directorate,
or in polities where freedom is misused by the populace,
there obtains a visible lacuna between existence and being.
Such polities are turned toward destruction rather than cre
ation, toward death instead of life.

Egypt was such a pol

ity.
The third element of the structure of freedom, the step
of positive participation in the truth of divine being, is
the purpose, the final cause, of God's act of liberation.
It is this purpose which brings the God of Israel into con
flict with the very constitution of the Egyptian regime.
The conflict involves the rupture of the old constitution
and the establishment of a new Order.

This epic subjugation

of the old and unjust before the new and righteous likens
the Exodus to a world creation.52

in the amalgamative JE

text of Exodus 5, the positive purpose of the liberation is
figured in the intended feast to Yahweh in the wilderness;
the world creation conflict is adumbrated in Pharaoh's reply
to the proposal of Israel's retreat and worship.
Afterward Moses and Aaron went to the Pharaoh and said,
"Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God [Elohim] of Israel,
'Let my people go, that they may hold a feast to me in
the wilderness.'" But Pharaoh said, "Who is the Lord,
that I should heed his voice and let Israel go? I do
not know the Lord, and moreover I will not let Israel
go."53
^concerning the similarities between the Exodus and
various articles of creation literature, see Harrelson, In
terpreting the Old Testament, pp. 80 ff.
S^Exodus 5.1-2.
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The projected feast in the wilderness in this passage paral
lels in both form and content the Johannine "continuance in
the logos" and "true discipleship."

That is to say, liber

ation, the act which makes free, is teleological in a divine
sense; it does not occur on mere humanitarian grounds.

There

would be no reason in Yahweh's plan to liberate this people
from Pharaonic service if there were no higher service in
tended for the people.

The worship festival in the wilder

ness symbolizes the alternate course which lies in the fu
ture for the people Israel; as such, it adumbrates the sal
vation in the desert and the fulfilment of the promise first
given to Abram, i.e., the promise of nationhood and land.
On a paradigmatic level, the formation of the Covenant and
the giving of the Law is wholly consistent with the worship
festival, and it is for exactly that reason that the sources
maintain that the giving of the Law was the historical de
nouement of the whole liberation.

It was their understand

ing that the new constitution supplanted the old.

The lib

eration thus has a transcendent bearing; it involves the
restoration of divine sonship for the people of Yahweh
through popular obedience to divine command.
It is possible to infer from the passages dealing with
the feast in the wilderness a trick to deceive the Pharaoh
into letting the people slip away from their stations and
tasks.

This explanation is not satisfying.

The feast to

Yahweh must be held out of the boundaries of Egypt because
Egypt is contaminated with the presence of a counter deity,
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the Pharaoh himself.

The depth of this conflict begins to

emerge with Pharaoh's own reply to the command of Yahweh
which Moses has conveyed.

The Pharaoh responds— loosely—

"Who is this Yahweh that I should obey him . . . ?"

Appar

ently this reply displays the same sneering cynicism which
Stalin exhibited in his famous query as to how many divisions
are at the disposal of the pope, and inasmuch as both were
slave masters of renown, it is kindred with that later ques
tion.

But the Pharaoh's response is more straightforward

than that of Stalin for he is not only the king of Egypt but
its god as well.

He knows of no other deity whose authority

should countermand his own.

Nor is he— a god— likely to be

convinced otherwise by entreaties and threats.

It is for

this reason that the last of the Biblical exercises in world
creation ensues.

The sequence of events which begins in Exo

dus 5.2 with the Pharaoh's refusal to heed the command of
Yahweh includes the several plagues and achieves completion
with the destruction of the army of Egypt in the sea.
The "world creation" of Exodus 5-14 is generically dif
ferent from the P creation account of Genesis 1, and the J
creation account of Genesis 2.

It has greater similarity to

the "creation" stories of the flood and of the appearance of
Abram after the dispersal of the Babel community, but it is
different from these also.

The two statements of creation

in the first two chapters of Genesis deal primarily in the
creation of the world and man in time; moreover, the manifest
theme in these accounts is God's creation of world reality
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out of a pre-existent emptiness, an emptiness which parallels
the primal chaos of other literatures.

The "creations" fol

lowing upon the flood and upon the Babel dispersion have
nothing to do with the establishment of time.

In these, time

is given and constant; novelty occurs pursuant to God’s de
structive acts because these world-destructive acts serve to
introduce new epochs within time and hence, recreations of
the world.

Pre-historic time is thus divided epochally

through great destructions and recreations amongst the heroic
pre-peoples.

But the Exodus account of world creation is

fundamentally different from these epochal destruction-creation events in that it does not consist of but another "oc
casion" by which time can be divided.

Rather, it is world

creation by which the saving history of Yahweh begins with
the assembling of Israel as a free people, responsible before
its God.

In the great upheavals of the Exodus, history be

comes differentiated from time, reckoned in terms of creation-destruction cycles.
There may be objection to the employment of the term
"world creation" in description of the events of the Exodus.
This objection can be maintained only if it is held that
"world" means physical reality.

The "world," as the symbol

occurs in philosophy in reference to the ambient reality
which is synthesized for consciousness by a subjective, his
torical humanity, is a world erected upon the suppressed
ruins of an archaic, unfree, pre-individuated, unconscious
world.

Inasmuch as the Exodus destroyed that world, to in
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troduce in its place a world of new celestial, political and
psychic configurations, the Exodus amounts to a world cre
ation.

The Old Testament documentary sources (all of whom

labored without the instruction of Hegel and Jung), are su
perlatively cognizant of the division which the Exodus im
posed in the existence of man upon the earth.

For them, the

Exodus created a world in which man lived in free service to
the God who had sanctified history with his saving Presence.
Godliness in history is pre-figured in Abram's removal from
the existence of his land, his kindred, his father's house;
in the Exodus, patriarchal history is reenacted as national
history through the escape of Israel from the encompassing
greyness of its slave existence in Egypt.

The Exodus drama

must thus be understood as world creation, for there could
be no world which serves as object for consciousness had the
liberation of Israel from Egyptian slavery not occurred.

In

the old world, men and gods are jointly integral with the
natural world as pattern; hence the impossibility of subjec
tivity; hence magic in place of action.

The preternatural

God of the new world is free; he is not the exponent of pat
tern, but the creator of
54

a c t i o n .

^4

Mankind which enters

Snaith explains that in the Hebrew language there is
no verb which conveys "being" in the static sense that is
possible in the Greek language.
Instead, there is only "be
coming" (hayah). (Hence Buber's rendition of ehyeh as "be
ing there"— i.e., as a continually self^-manifesting presence.
The consonantal pattern of the words is the same, vowels be
ing at the linguist's option.)
Frpm this understanding
Snaith develops one of the distinctive ideas with which his
study is concerned. The God of Israel (or later, the Holy
One of Israel) couples in his character the Semitic traits
of an EL (the greatest of gods) who is holy (qodosh) in the
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into partnership with this God is mankind which is recreated
for action i. The new mankind which is emergent from the Exo
dus is mankind become capable of subjectivity, of conscious
ness, of freedom within the Presence of the author of free
action.

The Exodus of Israel from Egypt is nothing less

than the creation of the free world of history.
The Exodus is world creation in the symbolic and mythi
cal sense also.

That is to say, the character of the events

by which the liberation of the chosen people was won is
clearly suggestive of the ancient Near Eastern mythical en
counters by which the primordial chaos is subdued and world
order is installed.

We must hasten to add, again, that the

Exodus is different from these in that it creates the world
as history, in contrast to the myths in which the world is
created as a repetitive cycle of decay and renewal.

Despite

this basic difference, the Exodus displays a motif which is
common to the theogonic myth.

Like Marduk in the East and

sense of R. Otto^s "the Numinous," with the relentless sense
of action which is conveyed in the Hebrew version of the
verb substantive, hayah. (See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of
the Old Testament, pp. 47-48.)
It is this peculiar juxta
position in the character of Yahweh of an awful holiness with
a worldview in which stasis is incomprehensible that has
given to Europe history as we know it, i.e., as real movement
in which action is never merely efficient, but is itself an
expression of, or deviation from, the real content which un
dergirds all. When history expresses this real content, we
say that it is free. It is for this reason that the intense
political monism of both the historians and prophets is ab
solutely at odds with the monism of recent totalitarianism.
Totalitarianism seeks rest in a return to the unconscious
world of magic and bull sacrifice. The Bible quite literally
has no understanding of rest. In action there is freedom,
while in stasis there is the spurious perfection of universal
bondage.

Zeus in the West, Yahweh accomplishes an incremental defeat
of the older generation of deity which has lost the power of
order and has become itself the agent of chaos.

In the Exo

dus struggle, Yahweh becomes the new ordering deity and Pha
raoh the dragon, the monster-god who dominates the world of
the dead.

The triumph of Yahweh over Egypt is the triumph

of history over death.

Egypt left great tombs, while Israel

and its daughter faiths live on as sacred history into the
modern age.

The Exodus creation directed Egypt and the an

cient Near East to death and Israel to life.
Life is the end of creation, and creation involves the
replacement of nothing with something, of disorder with or
der, of injustice with justice.

The nothing, the disorderly,

the unjust, are symbolic expressions of the residual, life
destroying evil which is pushed into abeyance by the worldcreative act.

In the later Bible consciousness, this evil

reality is personified by the devil, a personage who is ab
solutely other from Yahweh, the one true God.

In the pre-

Biblical symbolizations of the world-creative struggle
against the demonic reality, the monotheistic principle is
partially or wholly absent.

In this situation, the struggle

occurs between older gods who have exchanged their divinity
for demonism and new gods who have taken up the task of in
stituting and policing divine order.

The Exodus struggle is

of this sort, for it is a combat to the death between Yahweh,
the righteous God of Israel, and Pharaoh, the slave-master
god of Egypt.

The theopolitical boundary of the Exodus then
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is not monotheism but

h e n o t h e i s m .

^5

It is important that

the god character of the Pharaoh be recognized, for if it is
not, the larger significance of the Exodus will evade our
understanding.

We will be unable to perceive the Exodus as

the creation of a veritably new world of justice and free
dom.
The challenge of the new deity to the old is given in
the declaration:

"Thus says the Lord [YHWH]

..."

and it

CC

Henotheism is the worship of one god without denial
of the existence of others, and there are suggestions in the
Old Testament that until quite late, henotheism was the form
of godliness amongst the chosen people.
Irwin argued that
Amos was the first monotheist, and the internal evidence of
the Amos prophecy supports the claim that Amos was very
near to that position, even though he does not say so di
rectly.
(See Irwin, "The Hebrews," p. 227.)
Professor
Albright believed that the historical Moses was a monotheist,
but he went on to stipulate that there was no need for Is
rael to deny the existence of gods other than Yahweh; it was
necessary only to deny their power.
(See William Foxwell
Albright, From Stone Age to Christianity: Monotheism and
the Historical Process, 2nd ed. [Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1957], pp. 271 and 327-328.)
Lods offers
the most complete overview of the matter in his argument
that monotheism becomes doctrinal only with the climactic
prophecy of Deutero-Isaiah. This doctrinization of Yahweh's
sole hegemony, Lods explains, is anticipated in the express
teaching of Amos, and is implicit in compact form in the
early documents from the Mosaic age.
(See Adolphe Lods, The
Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, tr. S. H. Hooke [London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1937], p. 60.)
In any event,
if consistent monotheism is imputed to the earlier Bible
text, the greater contest of the prophet Elijah with the
priests of the Canaanite Baal (I Kings 18) cannot make much
sense. The issue here is not the existence of the Baal, but
of his power.
In connection with this question of henotheism and mono
theism, it should be recognized that gnosticism in both its
authentic historical form and in the modernist analogue which
Voegelin identified embraces a retreat from monotheism back
to henotheism. Thus the gnostic supercession of Yahweh (or
Ialdabaoth) by Christ, and analogously, the supercession of
the metaphysician by the sociologist, of the bourgeoisie by
the proletariat, and so on. In no instance is the reality
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is accepted by the Pharaoh in his reply, "Who is the Lord
that I should heed his voice . . . ?"

Upon the rejoinder,

there ensues a series of divinely initiated natural catas
trophes which are of world-destructive proportions.

By the

plagues, Yahweh destroys the Egyptian order step by step,
rendering life within the Pharaonic theopolity so hateful
that at last the god-king, driven by desperation at the death
of the first-born of all Egypt, acquiesces in the will of
Yahweh and releases Israel to serve its God.

For his part,

the Pharaoh has attempted to retain his sovereignty, agree
ing to release Israel in order to obtain relief from the
plagues, and with the cessation of each plague, reneging on
his word.

In the P document, Pharaoh's duplicity is indeed

part of the divine plan of Yahweh; Yahweh will "multiply"
his signs and wonders through hardening the heart of the
king, thereby heightening the effect of the demonstration of
his superiority to the g o d - k i n g . A l t h o u g h JE does not go
so far in rationalizing this theme, the same implication is
present in the text.
. . . Thus says the Lord [YHWH], the God of the Hebrews,
"Let my people go, that they may serve me. For this
time I will send all my plagues upon your heart, and
upon your servants and your people, that you may know
that there is none like me in all the earth. For by
now I could have put forth my hand and struck you and
your people with pestilence, and you would have been
cut off from the earth; but for this purpose have I let
you live, to show you my power, so that my name may be

of the hated divinity or its analogue denied, but only its
power.
^Exodus 7.3-5.
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declared throughout all the earth. You are still
exalting yourself against my people and will not let
them go . . ."57
In creating Israel as the new People of the world, Yahweh
has proceeded slowly in humbling the moribund world of di
vinized monarchs, astral deities, magic, and human enslave
ment before chthonian spirits.

There is one final encounter

with the Pharaoh after the Exodus from Egypt; the king again
attempts to assert hegemony over God's people, and he is
destroyed along with the Egyptian army, which the Bible his
torians understood to be the primary symbol of the negative
power of political domination.

With the destruction of the

god-king and his armed might the divine liberation of Israel
is complete.

Israel is no longer to serve the Pharaoh in

bondage; Israel is to serve Yahweh in freedom, for before
Yahweh Israel is not a subject people; instead, Israel is
the son of God.
The sonship relation between the people and their God
is the cardinal achievement of the world creation accom
plished in the Exodus.

The theme of divine sonship for Is

rael illumines both the future history of Yahweh and his
people and the past of the now decadent Egyptian theopolity.
From the vantage point of divine command, the purpose of the
Exodus has been for Israel to serve its God away from the
Egyptian Pharaonic contamination, but from the vantage point
of divine dispensation of grace unto that people who is to
serve, sonship is the gift which is to be bestowed upon the
^ E x o d u s 9.13-17.

issue of God's first man, Abram.

The positivity of Yahweh's

approach to Israel in bondage is formally the same as the
positivity of Yahweh's approach to Abram in the environment
of his youth.

It consists of a command and a promise.

The

command is given in the "serve me" and God's promise concern
ing the future history is adumbrated in the "Israel is my
son."

Even before Moses had approached the king demanding

release of Israel, Yahweh has said, "And you shall say to
Pharaoh, 'Thus says the Lord, Israel is my first-born son,
and I say to you, "Let my son go that he may serve me"; if
you refuse to let him go, behold, I will slay your first
born son.'"58

The symbol of divine sonship for Israel thus

has a double ramification.

It is the Exodus equivalent of

the blessed nationhood promised to Abram upon his departure
from the land of his youth.

Within the setting of Pharaonic

Egypt, the symbol suggests a spiritual treason against the
established order.

Voegelin was the first to recognize the

extent and the depth of this treason within the decadent
world which antedated the world of sacred history.

He writes

The conflict between the Yahwist experience and the
pharaonic order is brought on a formula as simple as it
is perfect. We remember the Pyramid Text in which the
Pharaoh is greeted by the gods:
This is my son, my first born;
and we find now opposed to it in [Exodus] 4.22 the new
formula:
My son, my first-born, is Israel.59
S^Exodus 4.22^-23.

See also Hosea 11.1.

S^Eric Voegelin, Order and History, I (Baton Rouge:
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The great events which we have recognized as being worlddestructive and world-creative are here developed in the
fullest degree.

A massive substitution has occurred; no

longer is only one amongst men the son of the gods; with
Yahweh's liberating action in history, an entire people has
been elected to sonship.
It is commonly understood that the European interest
in constitutionalism was instructed by the republican ex
periences of classical antiquity.

But the Exodus creation-

liberation event was no less important to constitutionalism
than classical republicanism, for the demotion of an arbi
trary king from divine to mortal status, coupled with the
elevation of an entire people from the status of slaves to
sons of God is a distributed bestowal of esteem which cul
minates in uniform rules, duties, and rights.

This is the

conclusion which the historian E transmitted to Europe
through the inclusion of the Book of the Covenant within his
Exodus narrative.
Sonship for Israel is the teleological aspect of the
Exodus drama of world creation; that is to say, election of
the people Israel to sonship is the purpose of the projected
service to God in the wilderness; the command has substance
only in relation to the promise.

The connection of service

with sonship establishes the second sense in which the elec-

Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 390. For the later
royalist heresy which seeks a complete reversal of the na
tional sonship symbolism, see Psalm 2.6-7. Propaganda is an
ancient art.
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tion has cast light upon the liberation; the people has ex
changed masters.

Yahweh has become suzerain and Israel has

become vassal.®^

The relationship of suzerain to vassal is

hardly akin to the relationship of owner to slave, for the
former is a constitutional arrangement and the latter is
not.

But Israel's service to its creator-liberator is con

stitutional in a more profound sense than the language of
feudal organization can show.

The provision of divine son!

ship qualifies the nature of the service; a life in service
to the father-God is essentially different from a life worn
fine in service to the Pharaoh, or even to a good human
overlord.

Service of son to father is service rendered in

an atmosphere of mutual love and duty; it is a morally de
velopmental service, a service which is propadeutic unto
free selfhood for the person and independent nationhood for
the collective.

The service of a chattel to its keeper is

exploitative and morally destructive; it is service which
finally wearies the soul, drying to nothing the latent seed
from which the free, legislative self might otherwise grow.
Sonship in service to God is the core anthropological sym
bolism of the Bible; more certainly than any other of that
book's contents,1it establishes freedom as the destined con
dition of man before God.

The God of Israel is the true God

6®See Mendenhall, The Tenth Generation, pp. 14-15.
Mendenhall explains that suzerainty agreements of this re
gion and period frequently use the father-son terminology.
Mendenhall points out also that the father-son relationship
continues to be the dominant theme of divine-human relation
ship in the Bible until the writing of the Fourth Evangelist
in John 15.14-15:
"You are my friends . . . "
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for just that reason:

Within his Presence, mankind partic

ipated more consciously in the truth of being than had been
the case before the election of Israel to sonship.

The

Fourth Evangelist later synthesized these participatory sym
bols of son and servant in the New Testament symbol of positivity in being:

the free disciple.

A community of these

persons is the end of creation.

It is possible now to contemplate the several symbols
which we have considered of man in free positivity before
God.

In the order of their appearance in the Bible sources

they include the portrait symbol of Abram who in the J nar
rative quits his surroundings in response to the command and
promise of his God; nex.t is the free son, Isaac; then comes
the plural son of God who in the Exodus is freed from Phar
aonic slavery to serve the true God in the wilderness; after
this is the image of God in the P creation whose properties
in the esteem of God are possession, power and worth; last
is the disciple of the Fourth Gospel whose freedom is deriv
ative from participation in the truth of the mediatory logos.
In the New Testament disciple symbol, the overt identifi
cation of freedom as the condition of positivity before God
has led our analysis to develop freedom as the latent inten
tion of positivity in the earlier symbols.

In so doing we

have not imputed to the text a construction which it will
not support.

In the slave difficulty of Abram, in the Is-
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raelite liberation from slavery, in the divine commission to
man, the image of God, the meaning is unmistakable:

the

slave condition is fraught with existential negativity, while
freedom within God's Presence is a condition charged with
ontic positivity.

The underside of each of these symbols

of free humanity is the slave condition.

Both are possibil

ities, and either may be manifested in the person and in the
greater affiliation which is the extension of personhood.
In respect of these opposing gradients of the human
character, several observations follow.

First is that the

capacities which reside within the human character are like
wise the projectible capacities for order in the world ex
ternal to self.

In Republic VIII Plato has shown that the

order of the soul is constitutive of public order.

By this

understanding, the conclusion follows that an aggregation
comprised of free and positive characters will be a commu
nity which is pledged to live its collective existence in
free service to positive ends.

An inspection of the symbols

of the prophetic critique and of free political life in
Athens will illustrate this public aspect of freedom as pos
itivity in being.
The second consideration pertains more directly to the
Biblical symbols which have been examined.

We should recog

nize that from the portrait symbol of Abram to the concept
symbol of the disciple, we are dealing in pre-Augustinian
materials.

None of our narrators is acquainted with a doc

trine of original sin.

While original sin, Augustine's
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"blemished nature," gathers in summary form so much of the
truth of archaic symbolism, it does so in such a fashion as
to harden that experience and to empty it of the dynamic
tension in which it is natively couched.

After Augustine,

the primary propensity of man is to slavery, to negativity,
to sin.

This conceptual turn occurred mainly because

Augustine wedded sin to pride.

To Augustine, the inherent

negativity of man lies in that man conceives himself to be
a source of being and order, and in so conceiving himself,
man erects himself as a power in competition with the God
who has created him.

Except for the Adam story, there is

little in the historical portion of the Old Testament to
support the anthropology which makes original sin the pri
mary fact of life for

m a n . ^ l

The Abram saga is more repre

sentative of the Bible portrait of man than is the Adam
®^It is important that in City of God, Book XXXI, chap
ter 3, Augustine bases the argument of original sin on the
historicity of Adam and his transgression.
Once the mythi
cal character of this episode has become transparent, it be
comes impossible to maintain the doctrine in its traditional
form. No longer can all be held to be guilty because of de
scent from corrupted ancestors. On the paradigmatic level,
however, Augustine's reading cannot be gainsaid. Eve's re
ceptivity to the serpent's invitation to know all things
does indicate pride, human over-stepping of boundaries and
competition with divinity.
If pride is the generic type of
negativity within which all other negativity may be gathered,
then the advocates of original sin as a trait of human nature
are correct. The preponderant teaching of the Bible will not
support such an anthropology though. There is an irreconcil
able variance between the fallen mankind of Genesis 3 and the
"image of God" in Genesis 1, and to imagine that with Adam's
fall, man has lost the divine image is simply to apply a
cosmetic screen which cannot be effective in the postWellhausean world. P is much later than J, and it is clear
that he did not agree with J about the salient property of
human nature. J has preserved for us a Biblicized version

story.

In the character of Abram there dwells a range of

possibilities which extends from the slavishness of despair
to free trust in God's promise and free obedience to God's
command.

Negativity in the Abram story does not grow from

a prideful design; it grows rather from mistrust, from
straying, from forgetting.

It is the behavior of a wayward

son, not the conspiracy of a would-be god.

Only by means

of the most assiduous intellectualization of the facts can
it become possible to impute pride to Abram.

It may be true

that prideful hubris against God and man becomes an audible
dissonance in later times, after the beginning of the mon
archies and the vertically stratified societies which were
their adjunct.

But in the early historical period the char

acters are too naive, too insufficient in depth, for them
to be capable of a genuinely Pelagian pride.

Even of the

Pharaoh, the hated god-king, P finds it necessary to tell us
that God hardened his heart.

Apparently there would have

been a more muted conflict had he been left to his own re
sources .
While it is true that the most patent negativity of
which man is capable is pride, it is important to recognize
that the Biblical symbols which this study has examined do
not exhibit that dress.

It is likewise necessary to observe

that in respect of these various symbols— negativity, slav-

of a tale whose heathen provenance is scarcely concealed.
The occurrence of this atavism in the Yahwist canon is quite
possibly the most fateful accident in the entire history of
Western civilization.

ishness, sin— are not the sole, or even the primary gradients
of the human character.

The case is quite the contrary; free

positivity before God is the condition of desire and destiny.
The descent to slavery occurs as a function of human impo
tence, but not as the design of a maliced nature.

To be

sure, free positivity is not realized in a world-immanent
frame of activity; in each instance it is God the Savior who
makes free and thus draws nearer to completion the nature
which God the Creator has intended for man.

In an objective

assessment, liberation from slavery is a divine action by
which man is saved from a negative condition for which he
is not ultimately responsible.

In the Bible, slavery to

Egypt or slavery to sin is a happening which ensnares man
from without, and so corrupts the essentially free and pos
itive character that man is.

The inherency of negativity

in the human character as radical evil is the consequence
of man's own affective avowal of responsibility for his
slave condition;

"I have sinned."

In that confession the

person claims volitional involvement in the circumstances
of his negativity and thus involves his own volitional cen
ter in the restoration of positivity.

Inasmuch as the "I"

partakes of a more generalized human nature and condition,
the "I" who confesses sin imputes the slave condition not
only to the particular self, but to the broader humanity of
which the "I" is one particular instance.

It is at this

affective point of the avowal of personal culpability for
sin that the Augustian claim of inherency becomes viable,
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and not before.®^
Mankind, according to the symbolic configurations which
we have beheld, can follow one of two opposing paths.

Man

is destined for free partnership in the venture of divine
creation; his nature as person is open to the universe as
being.

But this same nature is vulnerable to closure and

to impotence.

In this dual proclivity can be found both

man as he is and the fallen character who he has become.
This fallen character, the slave,' is the person to- whose
hapless condition God bears witness, who is liberated by
God, and who is elevated to a new creaturehood which par
ticipates in the world-creative process itself.

In order

of ascending antiquity, this liberated character is the dis
ciple, the image, the son of God.
From Voegelin we have learned that "To establish a
government is an essay in world creation."

But the Exodus

62The following excerpts from Paul Ricoeur explain this
more fully:
. . . even if evil came to man from another source
which contaminates him, this other source would still
be accessible to us only through its relation to us,
only through the state of temptation, aberration, or
blindness whereby we would be affected. In all hypoth
eses, evil manifests itself in man's humanity.
The choice of the center of perspective is already the
declaration of a freedom which admits its responsibil
ity, which vows to look upon evil as evil committed,
and avows its responsibility to see that it is not com
mitted.
It is this avowal that links evil to man, not
merely as its place of manifestation, but as its author.
Fallible Man, pp. xxiv-xxv.
^Voegelin, Order and History, I, 16.
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of Israel from Egypt teaches something more than this.

That

is, a creation is likewise a liberation, for it frees man to
be the self who he really is.

In its initial impulse, every

revolution is such a creation, for the revolutionary inten
tion is to rectify and to free.

This intention is given in

the very attempt to reposition life on a new and higher level
than that which went before.
Moses
The transferral of divine sonship from the Pharaoh to
Israel through Yahweh's act of liberation suggests Hegel's
consideration that while in imperial China, only one was
free, in modern Europe, all are free.

Hegel was unprepared

to admit that long before his age the freedom of a whole
people had been accomplished in completion, for such an ad
mission would have upset the developmental thesis which
Hegel advanced.

Hence the rather unfriendly treatment of
C.A

Israel in The Philosophy of History.°

It is true that the

freedom of Israel pursuant to the Exodus was not character^^Consider the following accusation against Israel:
We observe among this people a severe religious
ceremonial, expressing a relation to pure Thought. The
individual as concrete does not become free, because
the Absolute itself is not comprehended as concrete
Spirit; since Spirit still appears posited as non
spiritual— destitute of its proper characteristics.
It
is true that subjective feeling is manifest— the pure
heart, repentance, devotion; but the particular con
crete individuality has not become objective to itself
in the Absolute.
G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, tr. J. Sibree
(New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1956), pp. 196-197.
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ized by highly differentiated individuality; that develop
ment would occur first in Greece.

Freedom for Israel within

the divine Presence bestowed both moral and ontic power upon
the chosen people, as a whole, in a way unprecedented in
history.

Israelite freedom did not encourage the sort of

resplendent individuality which culminated in athletic prow
ess, aesthetic virtuosity, and in science.

But if these

achievements of Greece are considered to constitute the
greater virtue, they must be taken along with the terrible
underside of Greek humanism, i.e., the preordained verdict
of form and fate which propels the human project to gory de
struction.^^

There is nothing like this in Israel, for

within the Presence, redemption is the enduring response to
repentance for both the individual and the nation.

This

abiding belief in the possibility of a real turning away
from death toward life is the most concrete showing of the
reality of freedom in Israel.

The forum for redemption, for

change which makes life abundant, is the nation.

This pat

tern holds from the Exodus to the return of the Remnant.
Unlike the more extreme manifestations of freedom in Greece,
the Israelite hope began and remained as group freedom, real-

What this means is that the Israelites were not Greeks,
and especially that they were not Greek humanists. Hegel is
complaining that the God of Israel remained transcendent.
The difficulty with this criticism is that the same charge
must lie against the best of the Greeks.
G^Thus Collingwood identifies not Herodotus, but
Thucydides with his "substantialism" as the historian who
most faithfully follows the anti-historical bias of Greek
culture. See R. G. Collingwood, Idea of History, pp. 29 ff.
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ized in response to, or reaction against, the affairs of the
nation.

Only in the vision of Aeschylus would Greece ap

proach this high mark of Israelite freedom.
To say that the freedom of the Israelite nation is
group freedom is to say that the God who gives the nation
identity is the force who supports action.

Thus, when great

individuals appear— and by great individuals we do not mean
kings— it is not because ambition has driven them into prom
inence .

From Abram through the later prophets, great men

become great in obedience— sometimes reluctant obedience— to
divine command.

According to our text, Moses, the liberator

and legislator, was such a man.
Moses and Pharaoh— and to a much lesser extent Aaron—
are the only significant human characters in the portion of
the Exodus narrative which we have discussed.

Our concern

here is not to explore in detail the historical person and
doings of Moses.

The so-called "fossil text" of Exodus 5.3

and 5.5-19 J suggests the possibility that the most basic
strata of the Exodus tradition is pre-Mosaic, and that the
centrality of Moses in the received text is the result of
later synthesis with other Moses traditions.

Whatever the

case may be with the history of the Exodus narrative, in a
paradigmatic sense the Moses of the Exodus text develops our
understanding of divine liberation and human freedom as a
condition of positivity before God and the world.

Like Abram

6^See Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 7071 and 156 ff.
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in Genesis, Moses is God's man.

Like Abram, Moses is of the

type, first man; he resembles those figures whom the Greeks
would call archon.

That is to say, Moses is the first

clearly discernible human who is emergent in the world cre
ation of Exodus.

As first man, Moses is suited to partner

ship with the Creator and to leadership of the chosen people.
Moses is prototypical of free humanity, and if we are to
comprehend the meaning of freedom in its original- showing,
we must attend to this model figure.
The concern for Moses as both product and agent of lib
eration is necessitated by this project's interest in the
modernist misunderstanding and frequent deprecation of cul
tural origins.

This is serious, especially where the inter

ests of a whole order of life are concerned.

A man who be

lieves that he began in Naples, when in fact he began in
Rome, will believe that he has come to Rome when he arrives
in Venice.

That man will drown.

In the Genealogy of Morals,

Nietzsche contrived a colorful explanation for the origin of
morality, uniformly binding on all men.

In brief, morality

is held to be the product of a mean and sinister conspiracy
by which conniving slaves infect masters with their own con
genital weakness and thereby subvert the innocent, pre-moral
hegemony of masters over the world.

67

By and large, it is

as if geese should persuade swans that it is evil for the
latter to be masters of the pond, and so reduce swans to the
fi 7

See especially Genealogy of Morals, aphorism 7, and
Beyond Good and Evil, aphorism 195.
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ignominious stature of geese.

In Nietzsche's view, the con

tagion of moral conscience was such that the world was per
verted and its former grandeur was lost.

On a factual level,

the historicity of Nietzsche's thesis is dubious, and an
inspection of the character of Moses, the liberator, shows
that on a paradigmatic level it is completely false.
Nietzsche could not come to the truth of transcendence, and
thus he rendered himself incapable of understanding the real
truth which attaches to the liberation of the slaves.

The

Exodus text depicts a Moses who, after his ordination as
liberator, displayed none of the meanness, the hatefulness,
the duplicitousness which Nietzsche imputed to the slave
mentality.

Instead, our text shows Moses as a fairly simple

man, not entirely unlike Nietzsche imagined the primeval
masters to have been.

He obeyed the God who had spoken to

him from the burning bush, going before the king (the first
prophet to do so), bearing the authority of God's word, dis
playing no regard for personal safety or worldly fortune.
His only fear was that people would not listen to him.
The origins of Moses in the JE text of Exodus 2 are
legendary:

Moses was born into the priestly tribe of Levi;

he was placed in a basket by the river's shore, where the
daughter of the Pharaoh discovered him and took him to be
her son.

Exodus 2.10 gives a Hebrew etymology of the name

"Moses," but the Old Testament scholars agree that the ety
mology is mistaken.

The name "Moses" is an Egyptian name,

and it is possible that the historical Moses was born an

Egyptian.^®

Why then the legendary account of the nativity

and upbringing of Moses?

Buber explains the legend in terms

of Moses' function as liberator.
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The legend of Moses'

Levite parenthood provides an organic connection of Moses
with the slave people Israel, but the account of his expo
sure and royal adoption spares Moses the experience of en
slavement.

This is important, for one who had been a slave

would have been unsuited by origin to become the human agent
of divine liberation.

The Exodus treatment of the origin

of Moses in the Old Testament is formally similar to the
virgin birth of Christ in the New Testament.

The Exodus

legend of the nativity of Moses thus attests to the blemish
of slavery in much the same way as the Genesis account of
the expulsion of Ishmael.

That is to say, Ishmael— born of

a slave— was unfit to become the ancestor of Yahweh's holy
nation; Moses, spared enslavement and rehabilitated from his
slave nativity by a royal adoption, was by nature suited to
become God's agent in the liberation.

In all of this the

text seems actually to anticipate the charge that a petty
self-interest was clandestinely at work in the freeing of
the slaves and the consequent formation of a morality bind
ing on all.

In both history and legend, Moses, the human by

whose agency the freedom of the slaves was won, was never a
slave; he was by experience a member of the master caste; he
could not be the exponent of a "slave mentality."

Exactly

68see Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, p. 159.
^Buber, Moses, p. 35.
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the same is true of Solon in Greece.
Despite the text's depiction of Moses as one who has
been spared the blemish of slavery, the slave mentality is
suggested in the didactic story about the young Moses' mur
der and flight.
One day, when Moses had grown up, he went out to
his people and looked on their burdens; and he saw an
Egyptian beating a Hebrew, one of his people. He
looked this way and that, and seeing no one he killed
the Egyptian and hid him in the sand. When he went out
the next day, behold, two Hebrews were struggling to
gether; and he said to the man that did the wrong, "Why
do you strike your fellow?" He answered, "Who made you
a prince and a judge over us? Do you mean to kill me
as you killed the Egyptian?" Then Moses was afraid,
and thought, "Surely the thing is known." When Pharaoh
heard of it, he sought to kill M o s e s . 70
In the European imagination, good government entails
the coupling of constitutionalism with popular freedom.
t

Europe learned to value this union from its discoverers, Is
rael and Greece.

Good teachers are first students, and the

episode narrated above is from the period of the teacher's
own student passage.

Moses, the teacher of Israel, learns

the futility of ego-derivative solutions to the problem of
injustice amongst men.

It is altogether possible that this

tale with a rather "Kantian" lesson is historically accurate.
Moses murdered the Egyptian because the latter was abusing
"one of his people."

But the rectification of human injus

tice by an act of human injustice is not productive of jus
tice.

Instead, it marks Moses as a murderer in the esteem

of the slave people and renders him impotent to become a
70Exodus 2.11-15.
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moral force amongst them.

Moses becomes a common fugitive

from the established justice of the land.
The account of Moses' crime, his failure as a judge
amongst men, his flight from prosecution, has much to teach
about the slave mentality and the morality attendant upon
it.

If the aspiration to end injustice amongst men consists

in nothing more than a design to elevate one's own status in
the world— or the status of one's kindred— through devices
such as crime, deceit, connivance, the project is necessar
ily aborted in its beginning, fbr it serves only to compound
the extant injustice, working a net increment in the suffer
ing and guilt of mankind.

The author of this text under

stands the reality known to us as transcendence, and he pro
ceeds to illustrate its centrality in Yahweh's saving act of
justice, the liberation of his people from slavery.

The

great historian J displays no sympathy for Moses and for his
crime done in stealth.

J will not acquiesce in slave moral

ity— a morality borne of mere resentment of even "humanist"
altruism; he will have nothing to do with the overturning of
the master caste by means of demonic descent.

It is signif

icant moreover that the criminal figure in this account is
Moses himself; the failure and disgrace which accrue to
Moses in this murder are vital to the education of God's
chosen liberator.

If a slave mentality of the sort de

scribed by Nietzsche had been operative here, the text would
certainly suppress Moses' loss of influence amongst his kin
dred.

It might even lionize Moses for his bravura pose in
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this episode.

That it shrinks from doing so conveys the

condemnatory attitude of Yahwism toward slavish solutions to
the misfortunes of the slave.
From one point of view, the murder which Moses commit
ted is a function of the slave morality for it bespeaks self
ish rebellion against those who exercise mastery.

But from

another perspective, it is the expression of an incipient
will to mastery, rather similar to the murderous acts of
those who articulate themselves as the Folk or the People.
The Yahwist will acquiesce in neither of these opposed de
signs, for both lead to murder.

At the very base of the

Bible, before the Decalogue with its statutory "Thou shalt
not kill," stands the principle that human life— Egyptian or
otherwise— must be inviolate, and that the homicide estranges himself from the human community.

71

The existence

of one human community is thus axiomatic in the Bible, and
the ultimate implication of this axiom is egalitarian.

Nei

ther service nor mastery can be countenanced if their inten
sity is such as to deny the common humanity of all.

It is

for this reason that the caste society which Solomon created
evoked the curse of the prophets.

A society which is so

structured as to deny the common humanity of its inhabitants
must likewise repudiate divine authority, for in such a so
ciety the dominant element will itself exercise uncondi
tional authority over the lesser.

The Biblical insistence

upon the ultimate equality of mankind before God has nothing
7^See Genesis 4.8-16, 34.25-31, 49.5-7.
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to do then with a slave morality; it has rather to do with
the prevention of apostasy, and consequentially, of murder.
The Bible is opposed to a morality skewed to the interests
of masters or of slaves; right is prior, and material con
siderations are posterior.

The Moses whom we see in this

text is a man who is forced to reckon with this priority of
right.

He learns that even a reformer cannot kill with im

punity.

The murder and its consequences for Moses of dis

grace, fear, and flight, serve to extricate Moses from the
slave morality, and thus to prepare him for the task of lib
eration to which he will be appointed.
Finally we must reckon with the portrait of Moses that
appears in the text of Exodus 4 J.

Here are the key pas

sages:
Then Moses answered, "But behold, they will not
believe me or listen to my voice, for they will say
’The Lord [YHWH] did not appear to you.'"
But Moses said to the Lord, "Oh my Lord, I am not
eloquent, either heretofore or since thou hast spoken
to thy servant; but I am slow of speech and of tongue."
But he said, "Oh, my Lord, send, I pray, some
other person."
So Moses took his wife and his sons and set them on an
ass, and went back to the land of Egypt; and in his
hand Moses took the rod of G o d . 7 2
This Moses after the escape from Egypt is no enthusi
ast, no abolitionist.

For him the sweetness of family life

in Midian is satisfying, and he prefers to remain dormant
rather than enter into struggle with the god-king of Egypt.
^ E x o d u s 4.1, 10, 13, 20.
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In the understanding of J, the Exodus is not the work of man
but of God.

It could not be the work of man because for man

existential negativity is at once the source of satisfaction
and paralysis.

For Moses the retirement in Midian, and for

Israel the security of Pharaonic servitude with its fleshpots appear to be life as it truly is and as it was intended
to be.

The dim satisfaction of this life is suggestive of

the settled and vacant negativity of Abram in the land of
his kindred.

Unlike Abram, Moses is loath to go, and Yahweh

must command, cajole, and finally offer concessions before
Moses will obey.

Does this seem undivine of Yahweh?

It

seems so only if we think of divinity as being somehow
vainly royal.

Before Yahweh is king he is creator.

he creates Israel, he creates its liberator.

Before

He takes this

backward Moses, and in the language of Buber, makes of him
a "person."73
None of this accords with the Nietzschean format by
which slaves initiate the thoughts and deeds which weaken
their masters' rule.

In the Exodus, it is man who is pas

sive and recalcitrant, and God who is the motor of activity.
It could hardly be otherwise, for right order within the
world is the function of creation and creation is divine.
With Moses, with the Pharaoh, with Israel itself, the events
73Buber explains the dialogue between Yahweh and
Jeremiah in respect to personhood.
(Prophetic Faith, pp.
164-165.)
In the dialogue, God becomes person and so makes
man person also. This person has .the power to carry the
word. This formation of a person takes place also in the J
story of Moses.
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of the Exodus detail the liberating redemption of the cre
ator God in establishing this people as the center of the
new history of man.

The divine liberation and re-creation

of man is accomplished in spite of man himself.
The understanding that man must be overcome was no
stranger to the Exodus historians.

Their biography of Moses,

the leader of the people, shows just how the overcoming of
man takes place.

Its residual feature is not power but ser

vice; Moses serves Yahweh as he serves the people.

The sev

eral terms which imply freedom— servant, disciple, friend of
God— bespeak a disposition of the person which is not coiled
up and bound within its own purposes.
comes so isolated, freedom ends.

When human life be

With the end of freedom

through selfish isolation came the beginning of the pro
phetic critique.

IV.

PROPHETIC FREEDOM

This study has undertaken the almost embarassing task
of arguing that the root origins of European freedom are to
be found in the formative event of a culture which had no
clearly articulated concept of freedom.

For this reason,

awareness of the history of freedom tends to stop short in
Greece, where eleutheria translates into Latin as libertas,
and into the North European languages as a series of nouns
built upon the stem frei.

That freedom in some fashion as

sociates man with divinity we know from Greece.
Liberator; Zeus is also Savior.
figurations is insunderable.

Zeus is

The connection of the two

The agent who saves from dom

ination by enemies is likewise the agent who makes free.^
In the testament of Israel, it is true, there is no
clear symbolization of Yahweh as Liberator.

There is how

ever a moving symbolism which has as its heart the convic
tion that Yahweh is Redeemer and thus, Savior.

This symbol

ization appears in its consummate form in the prophecy of
the nameless author who is known to us as Deutero Isaiah.
Like the Priestly author, Deutero Isaiah has beheld the ful
ness of human catastrophe and despair.
time of threat and vengeance is past.

For this writer, the
His message of repair

comes suddenly in the Isaiah text, like rain which ends the
long drought.
•^See Martin P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion,
tr. F. J. Fielden (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1964),
pp. 127-128.
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Comfort, comfort my people, says your God.
Speak tenderly to Jerusalem, and cry to her
that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is par
doned, that she has received from the Lord's hand
double for all her s i n s . 2
This passage establishes the tenor of the whole text which
taught Israel to recognize Yahweh as Redeemer.

The message

of Deutero Isaiah is unmistakably a message of freedom.

It

is this because the term gaol ("redeemer"— "avenger") is not
an heavenly concept which Deutero Isaiah has minted to con
vey a "religious" notion.

Instead, it is a noun which is

vital in the culture of its origin.

The gaol is a senior

member of the family whose function is to keep mortgaged
property from leaving the family and, above all, to redeem
family members who have fallen into

b o n d s e r v i t u d e .^

it

seems obvious then that the symbolization of Yahweh as Re
deemer in Deutero Isaiah brings us near in thought not only
to the Exodus, but also to the historical reality of Athens
in the time of Solon.

That is to say, in Deutero Isaiah, we

comprehend yet another moment in the origin of freedom.

It

is the moment when received history has become transparent.
Deutero Isaiah wrote in the late sixth century, after
the end of his nation's history as an independent political
entity; his message is synthetic in the same sense as is the
writing of those who became prominent in Athens after its
defeat.

Deutero Isaiah is the high spire of the prophetic

church; all below moves determinedly to the high message of
^Isaiah 40.1-2.
3Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 207.

redemption, of comfort out of bondage.

The four corners of

his foundation are those eighth century ecstatics who are
the first "writing" prophets:

Amos, Hosea, Micah, Isaiah.

These are utterly unshakable men for they are totally taken
in the cause of their God.

They are simple men, and direct;

even in the seizure of vision their discourse employs the
images of daily human experience.

Of the four, three have

the dirt of the field beneath their nails.

More even than

Parmenides and Heraclitus, these prophets are the hewers of
European mankind.

They make European humanity capable of

freedom because they impart to Europe an accusatory con
science.

These prophets direct man to an awful depth in

their attack upon cult and ritual, for concomitant with this
attack is an unconditional demand for rectitude of intention.
Thus, while the act is not insignificant, it is subordinate
to intent.

In the pure prophetic understanding there is no

set of sutras which, by inculcating right habit, can somehow
work right mindedness.

There is instead what amounts to a
4
demand for pure freedom— freedom to decide rightly.
With the prophets, the Bible's freedom content has be
come overtly political, for the prophets cross at will the
line which delineates the authoritative allocation of values
from the society which is at once the matrix and recipient

of authority.

The prophetic perception of the disparity be-

^Thus, Buber sees the prophetic mentality at work even
in the Adam narrative. Adam has the power to decide; this
is a given, beyond question. The sole question is: How
will he decide?
(See Prophetic Faith, p. 103.)
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tween act and intention is indeed awakened by political af
fairs.

Buber sagaciously calls attention to the dedicatory

address of Solomon.

The king's fulsome claims of reverence

for Yahweh are a screen of piety which conceals the infinite
concupiscence of the tyrant, a lust whose consequence in
history is always heartbreak, famine, death— non-being.

The

king's hypocritical speech is symptomatic of the general
state of affairs which will prevail in the monarchial cen
turies and against which Yahweh will direct his prophets to
rise and speak truly.

Monarchial misfeasance, alliances of

questionable value, social and economic imbalance, the im
propriety and cruelty of the agricultural cults, these are
wrong actions which the popular mentality believes can be
compensatorily balanced and cancelled by a certain kind of
right action, i.e., by sacrifice to the Yahweh whom Solomon
has promulgated as a heavenly deity.

This is the delusion

of high antiquity which the prophets strip away.6

Action,

whether correct or incorrect, is the derivative concern.
The disposition of the heart is of commanding importance.
If the heart is open to Yahweh, then no question about action
will remain.

It is for this reason that these prophets,

most notably Isaiah, opposed alliance politics.

The pro

phetic conviction is not hostility to foreign alliances per
se.

It is rather that the king attempts to do the impossi5

I Kings 8.12 f.

Buber, Prophetic Faith, p. 83 f.

Concerning the radical uniqueness of the prophetic re
jection of sacrifice, see Lods, Prophets and the Rise of
Judaism, p. 68.
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ble, i.e., to find a middle ground that will embrace with
satisfaction both the sacred and the profane.

In any such

effort, profane actions are bound to prevail over wistfully
sacred sentiments.
1. The Prophetic Memory of Unity
In our attempt to comprehend.the greatest possible do
main in which freedom can have meaning, we have adopted the
Platonic understanding that the slippage of man into slavery
occurs through a process of historical forgetting.

If the

initial, pre-historic figuration of reality consists in a
perfect unity of God, man and the world, then the secondary,
historical reality obtains in a forgetful shattering of this
real unity.

From the New Testament paradigm of the Neighbor,

we have adduced that freedom happens as a restorative incur
sion into the brokenness of history of the divine unity
which undergirds history.

It is just this latent— sometimes

manifest— possibility that has made Europe the arena of free
dom.
The prophetic struggle lends figure and substance to
this mental schematization, for the pattern of events in the
post-Solomonic centuries amounts to a deliberate forgetting
of the initial oneness of Yahweh with his chosen people.
Consequent upon this forgetting come the specific maladies
against which the prophets complain:

the chasm between rich

and poor, the oppression of the poor, the cult of the baals,
the baalization of Yahwism, the reduction of "orthodox"
Yahwism to a religion, power politics and its apologetic ac-
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complice, court prophecy.

Above all else then, the pro

phetic preaching of the disparity between act and intention
is a call to end forgetfulness, a call to remember:

"Did

you bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in
the wilderness, 0 house of Israel?"7

Couched within this

rhetorical question is an injunction that Israel remember
who

it has been and so discover who it truly is.

It is a

call to remember a time when divine intention instructed hu
man intention and thus shaped the course of human practise.
The prophets are able to arouse memory because they claim to
be spokesmen for Yahweh, and thus to be the real authorities
within the human culture of which Yahweh is author.
tably, they are the nation's memory.

Veri

Buber wrote:

The exposition of the prophets is not a basic action
but a reaction to the fact that the people and kings
did not in their lives and deeds realize the goal im
plicit in the nature of the kingdom. The prophecy of
the early writing prophets, of Amos and Hosea, marks
the maturity of the protest.
It is not a beginning, it
remembers the beginning and pleads with the generation
concerning what was intended there.8
If we are to understand the prophetic contribution to
freedom, their claim must be taken at face value.
7

To deny

Amos 5.25.

8Prophetic Faith, p. 67. Of the literature which this
study has consulted, Buber's work on prophecy is entirely
the most perspicacious in its grasp of the subject. There
is a simple reason for this. The faith of the prophets was
likewise Buber's faith; both accepted uncritically the real
ity of culture. Thus both were able to apply critical tal
ent in the area of true need, i.e., to declare where, in a
world suffused with pretense, the real, living pulse of cul
ture is to be found. From Buber then we have learned to
hear the prophets as the authentic spokesmen of a real mem
ory, the memory of divine liberation. To lack faith in this
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the cultural authenticity of the writing prophets and to
imagine that they are an entirely novel phenomenon is not
only to repudiate their own self-understanding, it is also
to reject the contiguity of culture itself.

Doubtlessly the

writing prophets temper and sharpen the nouns and narratives
which constitute the Israelite memory, but in this their
work is more clarification than innovation.

What the proph

ets must clarify is the true nature of the relationship of
Yahweh to his people.

It is for this reason that they find

instruction in a special kind of "pre-history," i.e., in
their own national past before the fall into monarchial de
viation.
The prophets are the guardians of the true Bible cul
ture, the culture of Yahweh in union with his people.

They

are the enemies of received history, for that history has
fragmented life.
a number of ways.

Under the monarchy life has been cleft in
Divinity is divided, with Yahweh becoming

a Near Eastern cosmic deity and the king a reigning deity,
not unlike the Pharaoh.

The nation itself is divided into

separate kingdoms with antagonistic monarchies.

Society is

stratified according to the conventional arrangement of a
court-centered elite which preys upon the hard working poor.
Worst of all, there is a pronounced separation of secular
life from institutionalized religion.

The loss of the sa-

matter is to treat the prophets as "basic action," as "beginning." Such an historical empiricism is incapable of
synthesizing a cogent vision of history.
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cred character which attaches to all endeavor is to be seen
most prominently in the conduct of politics.

There, expedi-

g

ency supplants inspiration.

Into this pathetic situation

the prophets inject, in differing ways, the principle of
unity.

The writing prophets no less than Heraclitus under

stood the first principle of order:

that unity must be as

cendant within diversity for the preservation of life in the
world.
Probably the most directly comprehensible teaching of
this unity can be found in the symbol which Hosea employs.
Yahweh is husband; Israel is wife.'*-®

This is a symbol of

peculiarly wide ramification, for it comprehends both hea
then and Biblical experience, and for that reason, it was
perfectly suited to the purpose of Hosea's ministry.

Snaith

detects a missionary cleverness in this symbol of Hosea.

11

What better way was there to subvert the old time religion
of fertility rites and cult prostitution than to substitute
Yahweh for the Canaanite deities as the sower of semen and
guarantor of harvest?

An apt symbol means many things at

once, and this no doubt is one use of the Hoseanic symbol.
Beyond this specific meaning which obtains from the immediate
conditions of the symbol's employment, there are implications
of more permanent importance.

Below the agricultural pas-

q

See especially Isaiah 7.1-12.

10Hosea 2.16-23.
•^Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, pp.
111-113.
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sage of human concern, the enduring significance of the husband-wife symbolism is the implication of unity.

In con

jugal union the partners overcome the division and polarity
of temporal existence and approach in some sense the time
less unity of being, whole unto itself.

Above the level of

fertility interests the husband-wife symbolism suggests the
permanent loving-faithfulness (chesed) of the marriage part
ners for one another.

This love surpasses sexual interests

and at last transcends them entirely.

Only this burning and

pure love would prompt a husband to buy a wife from the
brothel and take her to his home.

Hosea teaches that it is

through such divine love that Yahweh seeks reunion with Is
rael.

Is redemption from service in the brothel essentially

different from redemption from bondservitude?

Both forms

are disgraceful and demeaning, and from both, release can
only be edifying.

In the symbolism of Hosea, we behold al

ready in the eighth century the complete pattern of pro
phetic freedom:
God.

unity of man achieved through reunion with

The return from Egypt, from the brothel, from Babylon,

all are events of divine liberation.
Liberation is divine, intrinsically and emphatically.
This understanding is basic in both Israel and Greece, the
cultures which have made freedom a possibility for us.

When

ever anyone, anywhere achieves the release of the unfortu
nate and so opens to the unfortunate the possibility of
fuller participation in the real goods of life, a divine ac
tion has been accomplished.

The liberator partakes of the
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world-creative intent and power of God himself.

Because of

this circumstance which attaches to liberation it is under
standable that those who are its exponents are permitted a
more complete vision of divinity and its purposes than are
the general run of mankind.

Thus, the ecstatic vision of

the prophet corresponds to the revelation of the name at the
burning bush.

With the revelation of the name, Yahweh's

singular Presence as God of Israel is promulgated.

In the

cosmopolitan environment of the writing prophets, a related
development is necessary.

In Amos.there is a burgeoning

monotheism of rebuke and command which terminates in the
doctrinal monotheism of Deutero Isaiah.

12

The introduction

of monotheism is the most radical of the changes performed
by the writing prophets, and is perhaps the only prophetic
effort which could qualify as an absolute innovation.

Even

here though the path is made straight for monotheism by the
peculiar terms of Israel's henotheistic past; the God who
has been Present for Israel is not like the other gods.
When the diplomatic exigencies of two small nations and
eventual foreign exile present overwhelming danger to the
special relationship of Israel to the God who has been Pres
ent with Israel, then it is necessary for prophecy to draw
upon the fund of meaning which has been implicit in the spe
cial terms of Israel's henotheistic heritage.

There is one

God, Yahweh, the maker and mover of all, to whom all peoples
are accountable.
12

Israel is his instrument in the world, his

See Amos, chapters 1, 2, and 9.

Isaiah, chapter 45.
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special servant.
Our interest here is no more with the development of
theology than with the social psychology of Hebrew marriage.
Monotheism is introduced in the prophetic message for one
reason.

It is a term which commands an end to the fragmen

tation of existential endeavor and of ultimate allegiances.
The oneness of God, even when it is rudimentarily understood,
imposes at least a tendentious unity upon mankind, for it
clarifies the legitimate province of human intention and
thus proscribes the most blatantly destructive kinds of ac
tion.

One who has internalized the oneness of God would

suffer bad conscience if he carried into exile a whole peo
ple (one should recall Himmler's plans for the Dutch and the
sort of Wagnerian national theology which encouraged such
planning); if he ripped open pregnant women so as to in
crease his territory; if he sold poor people so as to buy
new shoes.13

He would suffer bad conscience if he conspired

at night to take another's land in the morning; if he were a
judge who took a bribe; if he attempted to placate God by
sacrificing his first-born child to him.

14

With those who

protest that bad conscience is not enough, one can agree.
Bad conscience is the primal positive force however, and in
the twentieth century we have lost monotheism, and seemingly,
bad conscience with it.

The prophetic arrival at monotheism

is in a sense a metaphysical breakthrough, but as such, it
13Amos 1.6, 1.13, 2.6.
■^Micah 2.2, 3.11, 6.6-8.
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is hardly a heavenly affair, for metaphysics— theistic or
otherwise— is the science of putting into order even the
least particle of the universe.

When all has been so or

dered, no longer can it be said that there are particles;
all things belong to some more cogent whole.

To belong is

to be obligated, and from obligation springs conscience.
The metaphysical understanding that God is one is a
formal understanding, not peculiar to Israel.

Of itself,

this understanding implies a formal imperative which tends
to proscribe the most destructive kinds of practise, and
thus, it constitutes a beginning of freedom in both person
and polity.

Proscriptive conscience is the impetus to neg

ative freedom, for it decrees that we must not abuse and en
slave others at will, for all are the people of the one God.
This much is given in the form of monotheism itself.

Mono

theism, however, is but the barest scaffold for the pro
phetic vision of God.

The Yahweh who is revealed in the

prophets is no mere Stoic deity.

He is a personality with

a real content which bears directly on the issue of freedom.
2.

The Holy Righteousness of Yahweh

The initial figure amongst the eighth century prophets
is Amos of Tekoa.
the nature of God.

Amos teaches that justice is integral to
But there is something incomplete about

the vision of Amos, a missing term which one feels is some
how present, but remains unarticulated.

There is something

which the prophet has experienced which has made him fear
less and absolutely certain of his task.

If formal prophecy
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had stopped with Amos, readers would be forced to puzzle
over the hidden, half-spoken character of Amos' God who
roars like a fearsome lion.

If this had been the case, then

it would be hard for scholarship to establish in just what
sense the justice of Yahweh differs from the Dike of Zeus.
It would be clear that there is a profound difference, for
the Olympian pantheon was inadequate to the strains imposed
by Greek culture; hence the beginnings of natural science,
not in Israel, but in Greece.

Yahweh remained ample to the

needs of Israel, but the Tekoan peasant with his vision of
Yahweh's righteous justice does not tell us why.
Isaiah of Jerusalem reveals to his audience the term
which oriented the prophetic experience from its beginning
in Moses to its resumption in Amos.

God is holy.

In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord
[adonai] sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up;
and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the
seraphim; each had six wings: with two he covered his
face, and with two he covered his feet, and with two
he flew. And one called to another and said:
"Holy, holy, holy is the Lord [YHWH] of hosts;
the whole earth is full of his glory."
And the foundations of the thresholds shook at the
voice of him who called, and the house was filled with
smoke. And I said: "Woe is me! For I am lost; for I
am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of
a people of unclean lips; for my eyes have seen the
King, the Lord of hosts!"
Then flew one of the seraphim to me, having in his
hand a burning coal which he had taken with tongs from
the altar. And he touched my mouth, and said: "Be
hold, this has touched your lips; your guilt is taken
away, and your sin forgiven." And I heard the voice of
the Lord saying, "Whom shall I send, and who will go
for us?" Then I said, "Here I am! Send me."l5
Monotheism is but the hull of this prophetic vision of God.
•^Isaiah 6.1-8.
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The overpowering holiness of Yahweh is such that there can
be none other like him.
Early in the twentieth century, Professor Rudolf Otto
published a revolutionary work in the study of religion.
Its English title is The Idea of the Holy.
which Otto employed was Kantian.

The methodology

The holy thing-in-itself,

which Otto called the numen, is "wholly other" from man,
ultimately unknowable, as itself.

Otto proceeded in Kantian

fashion to categorize the typical modes of human response to
the holy.

This response to the holy thing outside the self

ranges, argued Otto, from a kind of frenetic terror, such as
the terror evoked by Pan, to the sacred, ethically charged
vision of Isaiah.

Thus, the experience of holiness under

goes development.

Otto wrote:

The venerable religion of Moses marks the beginning of
a process which from that point onward proceeds with
ever increasing momentum, by which "the numinous" is
throughout rationalized and moralized, i.e., charged
with ethical import, until it becomes "the holy" in the
fullest sense of the word. The culmination of the pro
cess is found in the Prophets and the Gospels. And it
is in this that the special nobility of the religion
revealed to us by the Bible is to be found, which, when
the stage represented by the deutero-Isaiah is reached,
justifies its claim to be a universal world-religion.
Here is to be found its manifest superiority over, e.g.,
Islam, in which Allah is mere "numen", and is in fact
precisely Yahweh in his pre-Mosaic form and upon a
larger scale.16
One hopes not to disparage the genius of a great and cre
ative scholar in speculating that Otto's Kantian methodology
contributed to a fundamental error.

Not the Bible, but the

*^Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, tr. John W.
Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77-78.
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enlightened, empiricist critique of knowledge provoked Kant's
agnosticism concerning exterior reality as it is in itself.
In the Old Testament, it is given to some at least to have
knowledge of God, and Isaiah of Jerusalem is one of this
number.

To be sure, this knowledge is communicated symbol

ically, but the symbols connect (not separate) those who be
hold them to the reality of deity in itself.

We digress

upon this matter so as to offer the consideration that the
presence of the holy ought not be imputed to all experiences
in which the presentiment of an incorporeal substance— a
numen— causes a "creature feeling" of quaking and apprehen17

sion in the subject.

Most certainly, holiness is much

besides ethics, is greater than ethics, but is not infi
nitely beyond or before ethics.

The predicates "good" and

"just" stick with the true God, along with the more substan
tive predicate "holy."

Such local demons as Pan are indeed

numinous, but they are not holy.

It is impossible to affirm

this however on the strength of a set of Kantian assumptions.
Faith in God is the real bridge between subjectivity and the
intelligibles, just as is "animal faith" between subjectiv
ity and nature.
Professor N. H. Snaith's careful linguistic study of
the major terms of the prophetic vocabulary corrects Otto's
position.
17

Snaith is not a philosopher, as was Otto, but an

Without mentioning Otto by name, Buber wrote thus
about Otto's methodological assumption and its consequences:
" . . . the absolute relation (which gathers up into reality
all those that are relative, and is no more a part, as these
are, but is the whole that completes and unifies them all),

historian.

Snaith does not deny that the holy (qodesh) un

derwent development, for indeed, the term's development
within the eighth century alone was momentous.
more in Isaiah than in Amos.

"Holy” means

Snaith insists however that

Otto was misled in his supposition that the holy could ever
be pre-ethical, since even in its pre-Israelite, Semitic
formation, a thing which is qodesh had danger and taboo as
sociated with it.
experience of sin.

Coexistent with these was the embryonic
18

As Otto understood, the full ethical

implication of holiness was articulated for the first time
in Isaiah's account of his vision in the temple.

When Isaiah

apprehends the awful holiness of God, he experiences a kind
of dizzying revulsion for himself and for his people.

At

the instant in which this bottomless lacuna between divinity
and humanity becomes apparent, God's justice becomes subsumed
within his greater holiness.

We are not yet ready however

to inquire about this justice, for the symbolic contents of
Isaiah's vision of Yahweh's holiness have direct implications
to our interest in prophetic freedom.
If freedom is a human concern, then we must attend to
the dominant human symbol in the vision of Isaiah.
the figure of the unclean lips.

This is

Again, it is important that

a symbol carries multiple implications.

Biblical symbols

xn being reduced to the status of an isolated and limited
feeling, is made into a relative psychological matter."
U
and Thou, p. 81.)
^■8Snaith, Distinctive Ideas, pp. 31-32.
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often have both historical provenance and poetic ramifica
tion.

Hosea*s personal experience with a wayward wife en

larges symbolically as the experience of Yahweh with Israel.
On the level of poetic representation, the unclean lips
amounts to a truly primitive fear of defilement which is
revenant in the disorder called Lady Macbeth trauma, in
which feelings of guilt are expressed as concern about im
purity.

Ricoeur has in mind the call of Isaiah when he

writes of this symbolism,
The representation of defilement dwells in the halflight of a quasi-physical infection that points toward
a quasi-moral unworthiness. This ambiguity is not ex
pressed conceptually, but is experienced intentionally
in the very quality of the half-physical, half-ethical
fear that clings to the representation of the impure . ^
Stripped of its historical implication then, Isaiah employs
this primitive symbolism so as to contrast the grotesquely
physical— and thus most visibly corruptible— property of man
against the pristine holiness of God.

Isaiah and his soci

ety are the bearers of "infection," and in this infection
lies the conviction of guiltiness before the holy.

The pu

rification by burning is a decidedly moral and political
event of liberation.

In the woeful avowal of negativity, in

the liberatory cleansing, in the repositioning of Isaiah as
prophet, the entire structure of freedom is evident.
this cleansing, Isaiah is free to be a prophet.

After

The vision

has emptied all confusion from the domain of intention; of
one mind with his God, Isaiah is himself a participant in
19Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, tr. Emerson
Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 19"^) , p. 35.
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holiness.

Thus he is able to act.

It is this same freedom

to act which Isaiah attempts to impart to Ahaz at the res
ervoir.

The king resists.

He has not experienced himself

as the receptacle of infection.

Thus he is satisfied with

his own entirely pragmatic decision.2®
From Samuel through Jeremiah, the monarchy is the pre
cipitating fixture within the prophetic milieu.

The king is

the focal point of the society, its incarnate representation.
Because he is both mirror and mover of society, the prophet
addresses himself to the problem of the king.

Because the

prophet is himself representative, not of society in its syn
chronous fixity, but of its God and its history, the prophet
finds himself placed in opposition to the king.

This is no

less the case with Isaiah than with his predecessors.
Isaiah is no republican; his is a loyal opposition.
sion of the divine regime is monarchial:
have seen the King, Yahweh of hosts."

Yet,
His vi

". . . m y eyes

The vision of Isaiah's

call suggests a picture of total reality which in its didac
tic intent is similar to that adduced by Plato in the dis
cussion of the divided line; true reality stands against its
O '!

spurxous analogue.

Isaiah's comprehension of the great

division is expressed not in mathematical but in political
terms.

This is made clear by Buber's brilliant insight into

the structure of the narrative and of the specific histori20lsaiah 7.12.
^ Republic 510 passim.
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cal derivation of the symbol, unclean lips.22

Isaiah's ac

count of his call is the product of reflection, written many
years after its occurrence.

It begins not with the vision

of Yahweh's awful holiness, but with the mention of King
Uz ziah's death.
Uzziah died a leper123
Here then we behold the prophetic division of the world.
On the one side of the canvas we see the king, representative
of profane human endeavor, disfigured, dying.

The flesh

rots upon his frame as still he draws breath.

Above all

else we witness the corruption of his lips, the human part
with which he vocalizes allegiance and desire.

The repre

sentative of society is the symbol of moribundity itself,
the end consequence of all confusion and false directedness.
Opposed to the putrescent king is Yahweh, God of the nation,
holy.

The structure of the account itself amounts then to a

compact expression of the prophetic alternative:
ness or holiness?

Death or life?

Unclean

Bondage or freedom?

The

presence of the leprous king in Isaiah's own account of his
initiatory vision implicates not just one, but all of soci
ety— and eventually, all the world— in the profanity which
is infinitely offensive to the one God.

The infinite of-;

fense of itself awakens consciousness to the infinite de
mand, a demand which subjects both personal conduct and po
litical authority to an exhaustive ethical critique.
77

Prophetic Faith, p. 126-128.

23II Kings 15.

II Chronicles 26.
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For Israel, the infinite holiness of Yahweh is the
source of ethics.

This understanding leaves open however

the question of the weight which should be assigned to pro
phetic ethics.

Ricoeur explains ethics as

. . the slack

ening of an impulse that is fundamentally hyperethical."24
The vision of Isaiah shows that the hyperethical moment is
the moment in which consciousness is seized with the holi
ness of God.

When Ricoeur speaks of ethics as a "slacken

ing" he has in mind especially the onset of Judaism as a re
ligion which reverences the "finite command" of the ethical
codes as the embodiment of the prophetic "infinite demand."
Ricoeur comprehends Bible ethics pursuant to the early pro
phetic message as "slackening," as "finite command" for rea
sons that are only remotely acquainted with the initial pro
phetic revelation of the ethical demands.

That is to say,

Ricoeur is a philosophical exponent of the Pauline anthro
pology which puts "the law" along with the psyche and the
flesh on the side of death.

25

Justification presumably

draws up the "slackness" which has been the consequence of
legal ethics; it makes one wholly righteous before God.
We enter this thicket of Christian paradox reluctantly,
for it introduces a note of complication amidst meanings
that are simple.

Ricoeur's claim that ethics is the slack

ening of a hyperethical impulse is a half truth, but a very
important one, for it is the quintessential expression of
2^Symbolism of Evil, p. 55.
25Symbolism of Evil, Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4.
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the Christian understanding of the Old Testament.

In terms

of that view, the appearance of the Christ is the new moment
of holy tension before which "the law" must be consigned in
disgrace to the stature of a propadeutic means.26
Christian understanding of "the law" is correct.

This
"The law"

of the Judaism to which Paul had belonged is a slackening
of the prophetic infinite demand.

But considerations which

equate prophetic ethics with "the law" embrace only the pos
terior half of the truth about prophetic ethics.
The slackening of the vision of holiness which issues
in codified ordinances ("the law") about conduct is clearly
a descendant movement.

The chronology of eighth century

prophetic declaration reveals something quite different
which likewise involves ethics.

That is that the ethical

concern is also present as the prophetic consciousness as
cends to the vision of God's holiness.

In the clear, high

air of the eighth century, the central ethical-political
term arrives not in a moment of slackening, but in the mo
ment that the prophetic awareness tensions itself in prep
aration for the vision of God as holy.

Isaiah makes both

Amos and Hosea intelligible for us; God's righteousness and
his loving-faithfulness are aspects of his being that are
inherent in his holiness.
make Isaiah possible.

But no less do Amos and Hosea

The terms "righteousness" and "lov

ing-faithfulness" intervene on both the ascendant and the
descendant sides of holiness.
26Galatians 3.24.

The holiness of Yahweh. has a
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content that is known before its own articulation as holi
ness!
The episode at the burning bush is the formative event
in which the divine righteousness and faithfulness appear
unseparated in union with the spectral holiness of the jeal
ous God.

The prophets of the eighth century sort out the

ingredient qualities of this divinity and they first iden
tify not holiness, but the intervening terms righteous jus
tice and loving-faithfulness.

These are ethical terms, and

they are not the product of a slackening; only the codes
represent slackening.

These terms are real, resident qual

ities of the divine nature which commend it to human nature
as guide.

In both their ascendant and descendant movements,

these intervening terms make ethics a possibility, for they
translate holiness into the human vocabulary, and thus make
its practical realization possible in some limited measure.
That the prophets themselves provided this translation
is sufficient evidence that they sought not only a total
commitment to Yahweh, but also an incremental improvement in
the conduct of life.

The finite command was related to the

infinite demand, not as antithesis, but as consequent.

To

imagine that the infinity of demand in the prophets and the
Sermon on the Mount has only a soteriological value is an
intellectualist reduction to which protestantism is especially inclined.

27

One can go to eschatological salvation

2^0nly in a world in which each person had the in
tensely spiritual inclination of St. Paul would it be safe
to admit the efficacy of the Pauline relegation of ethics to

directly from creature-guilt borne of one's own existential
profanity without ever stopping on the way to repent of
one's specific injustice or deficit of mercy toward one's
fellows.

This approach can and does serve the needs of in

dividual religiosity.

The eighth century prophets however

care neither for eschatological salvation nor for religion
nor for individuals as such.

Theirs is a global critique of

the intent— the whole disposition toward worldly existence—
of two national societies.

It is because of this socio

political concern that the prophetic message is rife with
specific charges about actions which have shown imperfect
intent.

Even Amos, the fiercest of the eighth century

prophets and the most bleakly condemnatory, "operational
izes" the grounds of his complaint.

He recites the prevail

ing injustices and condemns the society which perpetuates
them.

Implicit in this condemnation is an exhortation to

repent and to change, to replace human injustice with divine

the spontaneous response of those who are saved.
In the
world of experience, it is necessary to maintain directly
the divine decree of righteousness without intervening mys
teries which becloud the pragmatic domain. Thus it was nec
essary for Bonhoeffer to address his fellow German protestants in terms more prophetic than "Christian" in order to
help them decide (in 1937!) what to do about Nazism. Expe
rience in the United States is similarly instructive. The
Joe McCarthy aberration (not to mention the Watergate or
deal) was viewed less critically by Biblicist protestants
than others. The conclusion is warranted that persons who
have a firm grasp on the doctrine of salvation by grace of
ten view justice in the world as more an option than obli
gation. In terms of the eighth century "Bible," that as
sumption, not "the law," is the way to bondage and death.
(See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, tr. R.
H. Fuller [New York: Macmillan Co., 1963], especially chap
ter 1, "Costly Grace.")
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justice.

The demand is ethical to be sure, but taken wholly
oo

or specifically, it is not the result of slackening.

To

treat it in that fashion is to make of Amos a Pharisee, sub
ject not to his God, but to "the law."

Paul's entirely cor

rect rejection of "the law" has nothing to do with the eth
ical demand to which Amos gave utterance.
In truth Paul was somewhat more like the prophets than
like himself!

Beyond the theology of "the law" and its in

adequacy to justification are Paul's frequent and plain pas
toral communications to his congregations.

These communi

cations are the same as the directives of the writing proph
ets.

Their source is the vision of God and their form is

the infinite demand made human as finite command.

Most prom

inent is the repeated exhortation that Christians practise
agape; this is no different from Hosea's teaching of the di
vine chesed which is binding on man.

Just as the monotheism

2®Von Rad, whose prosaic inquiry into these matters
knows nothing of an "infinite demand," sheds some light on
the prophets' ethical accusations. He writes of Amos' re
monstrances:
"This is . . . the first occasion when 'law'
in the proper sense of the term was preached." Von Rad goes
on to stipulate that he does not mean that Amos was a legal
ist; rather, he was the first person to take the Book of the
Covenant at face value. While there are many (including
Amos) who will disagree with this statement's tacit argument
about the life of early Israel, the statement helps to clar
ify our immediate problem. Each of the prophets believed
that his utterances were consonant with national tradition.
Central to that tradition was the belief that ethics was an
ineluctable element in the nature of the nation's God, as
that nature had been revealed in the great days of the na
tion's formative past. This is why (except for Isaiah who
works from the David-Zion tradition) the eighth century
prophets point to the Exodus, sojourn, and conquest of Canaan
as the ground for their own visions of God and world. See
Gerhard Von Rad, The Message of the Prophets, tr. D. M. G.
Stalker (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 148 ff.
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of the writing prophets, the Pauline dialectic of law and
grace is the formal structure which supports the real, liv
ing content of the pastoral decree.
Tsedagah is the prophetic term which is translated as
God's righteousness.

Tsedagah is used in close connection

with mishpat, an intimately related, but more juridical con
cept.

English translations render the former as "righ

teousness" and the latter as "justice."

It should be borne

in mind that this is justice with a view to the settlement
of a specific controversy.

For this reason, the King James

Version's occasional translation of mishpat as "judgement"
is more nearly adequate than the RSV's consistent "justice."
A bribed judge would render a faulty judgement, and so trans
gress God's broader demand for tsedagah— righteousness or
justice— in the world.

The Septuagint, a production from

the Hellenistic period, translated tsedagah as dikaiosyne♦
Hence, the intimate association in the European mind of the
Biblical and Greek concerns for righteousness.

Hence also

the confusion and controversy in the early Christian church
as to whether its teaching should favor the forms of the Old
Testament or of classical Greece.2®

We must speculate here

that a more authentic translation would have used simply
dike, for dikaiosyne connotes the reflective exploration of
29

See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament,
p. 74 f.
20See Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament,
Chapter 3, section 3, and Chapter 8, section 1. See also
Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cam
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 28 ff.
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the initial symbol, and its systematization as a virtue.
The dik5 of Hesiod and Solon is nearer in usage to the
tsedagah of the eighth century than is the dikaiosynS of
Plato or Aristotle.

Whatever the merits of this thought,

the passion for Yahweh's tsedagah which pervades the proph
ecy of Amos brings us nigh to one of the cardinal points
which this study must repeat in each separate context about
the origins of freedom in Mediterranean antiguity.
Justice is inevitably divine, and freedom is inevitably
contingent upon j u s t i c e . p ut differently, in the original
comprehension of the formative truth of Europe, justicerighteousness is a divine impulse which touches mankind.
Its by-product is freedom.

We are able to verify this claim

as regards both Israel and Greece, the true and permanent
homelands.

In neither of these homelands is there a liberal

imagination at work during the period of origins.

In re

spect of both, the mentality expressed in "liberty and jusJ It may be objected that in John 8, our paradigmatic
teaching about the structure of freedom, freedom is contin
gent upon logos, not justice. For the most part, the dif
ference is specious. Logos is a term from the metaphysical
sphere, while justice comes from the language of political
and personal ethics. In their respective domains, their
purpose is similar; both are principles of harmonious order
ing. That is why the statesman, whose immediate concern is
justice, must have orthos logos, upright reason, a sort of
epistemic hold upon the true metaphysical realities.
In respect of the syncretistic sense in which it is
used here, "divine" also reguires explanation.
"Divine" may
be predicated of Yahweh or of Zeus, as a generic property
common to both. There is of course a profound difference
between the two. The divinity of Zeus exhausts itself in
ethics, while for Yahweh, ethics is part of a greater holi
ness. The absence of such an holiness in Greek divinity is
the cause of the poignant search of Aeschylus for founda
tions of order.

tice for all" is wrong.

It reverses priorities, suggesting

that the liberated individual somehow finds within his own
self a reservoir of justice.

The record of the ancients, a

testament compiled before the onset of intellectualism,
teaches that man learns justice from the divine paradigm, and
that one consequence of his learning is freedom.

In both

Amos and Hesiod, there is a consuming concern for justice.
Neither speaks of freedom.

When we "discover" freedom in

their utterances, it is because we have learned the word from
later teachers.

The imputation of freedom to their meanings

is no falsification, but it is useful only to the extent that
it clarifies for us the full effect of justice and of the im
portance of the divinity whose being warrants justice.

The

testimony of the ancients cuts freedom to its proper size and
in so doing enhances its value for us.

Upon hearing the an

cient witness, we are able to recognize freedom as a lesser,
but nonetheless real, character in the drama of the divine
ministry to man.

A small thing which is real is worth more

than a large thing which is unreal.

We will examine Amos

with a view to such recognition.
This consideration of the eighth century prophets fol
lows the discussion of the Exodus because the implications
of the Exodus to the European freedom consciousness are not
complete without reflection upon the prophetic understanding
of the formative event.

In the prophets, the righteous jus

tice of Yahweh becomes the dominant principle of correct or
der in society.

Its complement is Yahweh's loving-faithful-
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ness, which he expects his chosen people to exhibit in their
dealings with one another.

Together or separately, there

are clearly unifying and ordering configurations of the One
which must be ascendant over the severality of persons and
things in history if life is to continue.

Their presence

attentuates the ravage of history? when they are practised,
life becomes good. ^

This metaphysical insight into the un

derlying terms of worldly existence is discernible in the
prophets no less certainly than in Heraclitus and Parmenides.
Symbolism is in phrt the property of culture, but truth is
transcendant of culture.
The most basic form of the prophetic alternative is
33
the injunction: Choose life or death.
Beyond this, the
entire prophetic effort can be seen as an attempt to influ
ence the hearer to choose life.

In service to this end, both

revelation and history are used in support of the prophetic
argument.

Amos draws upon his revelation and his knowledge

of history when he utters the prescription which expresses
his central interest:
I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no de
light in your solemn assemblies.
Even though you offer me your burnt offerings and
cereal offerings, I will not accept them, and the peace
offerings of your fatted beasts I will not look upon.
Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the
melody of your harps I will not listen.
But let justice [mishpat] roll down like waters,
.
and righteousness [tsedeq] like an ever-flowing stream.
•*2See especially Micah 6.8.
33see Amos, chapter 5.
•^Amos 5.21-24.
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We must note how the content of Amos' revelation, Yahweh's
righteous justice, coalesces with the prophet's understand
ing of national history.

The question which follows immedi

ately upon the passage above makes this plain:

"Did you

bring to me sacrifices and offerings the forty years in the
wilderness, 0 house of Israel?"33

The rhetorical question

about the sojourn in the wilderness must be associated with
the beginning of the prophet's address to the people of Is
rael :
Hear this word that the Lord [YHWH] has spoken
against you, 0 people of Israel, against the whole fam
ily which I brought up out of the land of Egypt:
"You only have I known of all the families of the
earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniq
uities. "36
By now the essentials of Amos' view are in place.
us put it in simple prose:

Let

"You people have turned me,

Yahweh, into an oriental, astral god with your cultic ritu
als.

You even confuse me with other gods.

I oppose this be

cause it causes you to forget my true nature.

I am the God

of righteousness who demands that you, my people, deal justly
with one another.

Your ancestors, whom I led from Egypt and

governed in the wilderness, knew that I was the God of righ
teousness, but you have gone away from me and have forgotten
this.

Your forgetfulness will bring punishment and death

upon you."

In this account, we have added only one conclu

sion that is not already given in the texts, i.e., that the
33Amos 5.15.
3^Ajnos 3.1-2.

See also 2.10.
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God of the Exodus and wilderness sojourn was also the God of
righteous justice.

Why does Amos not say this for us?

This

study concludes that the association was axiomatic for Amos;
as the bearer of the national memory, the prophet remembers
that Yahweh led Israel from Egypt because he was righteous.37
To conclude differently would be to imagine that Yahweh had
been an itinerant god who was roving in search of a people,
a house, a fragrant and noisy cult, all the things which be
stow status upon a god.

Amos* contrary understanding expands

the basic thesis of this study:

The Exodus, which made Is

rael free, was an exercise in divine righteousness which had
existential justice as its goal.

The "Serve me as my son"

which constituted the positive moment in the Exodus narrative
is now seen to have meant, "Serve me in righteousness by do
ing justice amongst yourselves."
The intricate questions of Bible criticism are beyond
this study's competence.

It does seem however that there is

little intricacy involved in this matter.

The J document was

written before the onset of formal prophecy, and unlike the
E, is without appreciable prophetic influence.

It says,

Then the Lord [YHWH] said, "I have seen the afflic
tion of my people who are in Egypt, and have heard
their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their
sufferings, and I have come down to deliver them out of
the hand of the Egyptians, and to bring them up out of
that land to a good and broad land, a land flowing with
milk and honey . . ."38
3 7 isa ia h
y ard ,

m akes t h i s

5.1-7.
S^Exodus 3.7-8a.

e x p lic it

in

th e

Song of t h e V i n e 
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To be sure, neither the words for righteousness nor lovingfaithfulness are to be found in this text, but the intent
which the prophets will later verbalize is wholly and abun
dantly here.

Amos builds weightily upon received founda

tions and proves their strength to support the increased
strain.

Above all others, it is Amos who first shows us the

complete meaning of liberation in service to Yahweh.

Its

intent is justice in the world.
There can be no mistake about this, for the range of
concerns to which Amos applies the righteous justice of God
corresponds exactly to the concern expressed by Yahweh in
the passage from the J document:
Seek the Lord and live, lest he break out like
fire in the house of Joseph, and devour it, with none
to quench it for Bethel,
0 you who turn justice to wormwood, and cast down
righteousness to the earth!39
How does one go about turning justice bitter and casting
down righteousness?

The answer comes shortly in the proph

et's commentary on his own imprudence.

We recall the "af

fliction" and the "suffering" in the J account of life in
Egypt.
They hate him who reproves in the gate, and they
abhor him who speaks the truth.
Therefore because you trample upon the poor and
take from him exactions of wheat, you have built houses
of hewn stone, but you shall not dwell in them; you
have planted pleasant vineyards, but you shall not
drink their wine.
For I know how many are your transgressions, and
how great are your sins— you who afflict the righteous,
who take a bribe, and turn aside the needy in the gate.
•^Amos 5.6-7.
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Therefore he who is prudent will keep silent in
such a time; for it is an evil t i m e . 4 0
The verbs which animate this prophet's metaphors have a pe
culiar impact in the picture of the negativity they convey.
The diseased lips of the human king and his society have
their parallel in the picture of the trampling upon (not
setting upright/ in place)/ in taking away (not creating
something which was not there before)/ in afflicting (not
healing), in turning aside (not bringing within).

These are

verbs which capture the damnable hurt of history which has
lost its way in a process of shattering and profanation.

To

the shattered history of Israel, Amos opposes as restorative
his knowledge that the very nature of Yahweh is his righ
teousness.

Implicit in the prophet's discourse is the un

derstanding that this righteousness is an ethical property
which is funded by the divine power of world creativity.

It

is this source which makes justice the one effective foe
against the destructive inclination of human history.
On the practical level of interest, freedom is the up
shot of the Amos prophecy as surely as it is the consequence
of the Exodus.

This conclusion holds not only concerning

the loftier view of freedom as the repositioning of life to
ward true and enduring ends, but even more prominently in
the negative, common-sense understanding of the term.

Shep

herds and peasants, the indentured, men and women defense
less against military conquest, beggars, recipients of un40Amos 5.10-13.
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fair justice— in one word, the oppressed— these are the pop
ulation of the prophet's vision.
setting.

We must see them in their

The land is seldom fertile; rain is seldom suffi

cient; mineral wealth is negligible.

Despite these circum

stances, the powerless ones who toil and sweat in the mid
day heat are used to support not only a fat native elite,
but to provide the materials for the tributes which flow to
the surrounding great powers as the price of protection.

It

is not surprising that their Yahwism is corrupted.
The dictum, "Israel is my son" cannot have meaning in
these circumstances.

The injustice of the prevailing allo

cation of values amounts to a design of unfreedom as well.
For the many who are its victims, life is no better in the
prophetic present than for the Israelite slave in the Egyp
tian past.

The prophecy of God's righteousness which demands

human justice is inevitably a prophecy of freedom against
servitude.
In the modern world, first laissez faire liberalism,
and then with greater emphasis, socialism, have asserted the
primacy of economic freedom over other species of free en
deavor.

The reasoning which underlies this economic primacy

is quite simple.

A person can be touched and eventually

^ I t was no accident that Martin Luther King, Jr., drew
the basic symbolism for his 1963 speech at the Washington
Monument from the prophecy of Amos. The speech advocated
the replacement of injustice with justice, and ended with
the lines from the spiritual:
"Free at last! Free at last!
Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!" Freedom follows
justice as corollary.
See Annals of America, volume 18, se
lection 30.
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dominated through external influence over the nutritive means
of existence more easily and more completely than through
influence of any other sort.

The righteousness teaching of

the prophets confirms this understanding about economic pri
macy.

The unfree poor, ground into the earth by the expo

nents of an evil allocation of wealth and power, are the
prophets' continual concern.

The freedom of free political

participation is a luxury to which Israel does not aspire,
and to which Athens attains only at long last, after passing
through a state of economic rectification.

Prophetic free

dom is not arrested at the economic plane, however, for the
free individual conscience— a pre-requisite to political
freedom— is one accomplishment of the prophetic ministry.
We will discuss this later.

Where the prophetic demand for

righteous judgment is rendered in the eighth century, how
ever, the hardship— the unfreedom— of the oppressed is the
critical issue which provokes the prophet to fling Yahweh's
righteousness against man's injustice.
The full implication of this prophetic teaching is then
that justice makes freedom, and for this reason, justice is
of special importance to the downtrodden.
understand this association?

But how are we to

Should we suppose, with

Nietzsche, that the likes of the shepherd Amos and the farmer
Hesiod have conspired to establish an exalted principle whose
true purpose is to legitimize the hatred of slave for master?
There is no absolute proof against this supposition, although
a careful inspection of the historical events and symbols in
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the actual genealogy of morals does tend to weaken the the
sis.

The Nietzschean claim, along with the corresponding

Marxian analysis which makes of symbols of authority an ideo
logical production, must be rejected because both reduce to
gibberish the whole vocabulary of human order.

If we begin

with the basic alternative, life or death, it is certain
that the option for life necessitates the rejection of posi
tions which impute an ultimate meaninglessness to the endur
ing concerns of life.

Understanding of the liberation con

tent of justice is enlarged more by attention to the real
and lively meanings of history and language than to the in
tellectual facility of the nineteenth century.
Professor Eichrodt is thinking not only of righteous
ness but of the whole prophetic message when he explains the
prophetic concern for the poor and downtrodden in historical
terms.

Those who have grown rich and powerful under the

monarchy through the employment of violent and unscrupulous
means have set themselves apart from the covenant.
have not done so.

The poor

For that reason, the latter are partici

pants in the nation's real history.

Eichrodt is speaking of

these persons in this passage.
It is they who are exalted as the real core of the di
vine community, above those who live in thoughtless
riches and enjoyment of every kind, and are made the
heirs of the promised divine glory. It is therefore
with these that the higher spiritual and moral life of
community with God reaches its full reality, while
those who are richly blessed with all life's goods have
in reality lost their life.42
42Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 48.
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What seems most notable about this analysis is that its au
thor employs the prophetic symbol, life.

The rich have lost

their life, but the poor have retained theirs.

This pro

phetic symbol of life is more than a metaphor, since it draws
together the covenant and the farming and herding heritage
of the nation in the egalitarian days of the confederacy.
The rural folk are the direct supporters of life.

Of the

four eighth century prophets, three are recruited from the
rural poor.

It is amongst these groups that both the nutri

tive life and the spiritual life of the nation have been pre
served.

Appropriately, Isaiah, the synthesizer, is a Jeru

salemite man of affairs.

But his contribution in no way de

tracts from the teaching of the poor men from the country
side.

Instead, he uses their symbols as a reproach from

within against the moribund pragmatism of the metropolis
elite.

Isaiah the urbanite, naked and barefoot for three

years, cannot be unacquainted with the nakedness of the
poor.

43

For him as for the others, the poor are the vessels

of God's special concern.

44

Professor Snaith's assiduous linguistic inquiry illu
mines even further the association between God's righteous
ness and the servile.

Snaith found that etymologically,

tsedaqah is not associated with words that mean strict jus
tice.

Rather, the Aramaic and Urdu equivalents of the term
43See Isaiah 20.2-3.
44See Isaiah 3.13-15; 10.1-3.

convey benevolence and mercy.45

Upon this understanding,

the prophetic application of God's righteousness to the
plight of the helpless is kindred to the teaching of the
loving-faithfulness of God whose overt consequence is divine
mercy.

The overlapping of these prophetic concepts brings

into the light a quality which is implicit in the greater
righteousness which is the tutor of human justice.

This un

derstanding of justice— derived from the classical period—
is an intellectualized fixture which sets justice over
against mercy.

Perhaps this is a result of Plato's paradig

matic depiction of justice (dikaiosyne) through the model of
a human society which is so organized as to be in no need of
mercy.
ing.

This analysis was not mistaken, but it was mislead
Justice, excerpted from its historical ramifications,

is not unlike the "pure" tones produced by modern electronic
musical instruments, tones made without the accompanying vibrances which mechanical production always generates.

There

is error in this way of comprehending either the infinite
righteousness or the finite justice, for in the societies of
human experience, the concern for justice and the need for
mercy are coemergent from the actuality of historical evil.
The symbolism of justice is ascendant over that of mercy be
cause the just act is inherently also the merciful act; the
former subsumes the latter.

This is so because the victims

of injustice are powerless to rectify the situation in which
45Snaith, Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, pp.
71 ff.
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they are victim.

When authority acts with a view toward

justice, mercy obtains as well as freedom.

This understand

ing is given in the historical criticism of the prophets and
it achieves historical concretion in the Solonic reform in
Athens.

Jaeger's discussion of the linguistic properties
A C

of dike lead to a similar observation. °

while the etymol

ogy of dike is unclear, its early usage came to have the im
plication of rectification of the condition of the poor who
are oppressed by the rich.

It would be hard not to find

mercy along with this understanding of justice.

One must

remember that in Israel and in Greece we are considering the
course of action which will be right according to the divine
will.

Divinity wills justice, and that is to say, it op

poses the injustice of divided, exploitative human history.
In this opposition to injustice obtains the merciful concern
of the prophets for the poor, as well as their teaching of
liberation.
None of this is to imply that all the terms of the pro
phetic vocabulary mean the same.

They do not.

It is simply

to explain that when we enter the early, pre-intellectual
domain of human awareness, there is a fluidity of meanings
which will not permit precise edging and cornering.

In the

prophets, holiness became the governing symbol for righteous
ness, with mercy unto freedom as a practical consequence for
those who have been wronged by the corrupt rulers of society.
46

Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture,
tr. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press,
1939), I, 99-100.
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Below the strata of these interpenetrating concept symbols
of immanent holiness, righteous justice, loving-faithfulness,
lies the great, undifferentiated picture of history and fu
turity.
The utterances of Micah are the most conceptually naive
of the prophetic statements from the eighth century.

Their

picturesque compactness conveys the essence of the prophetic
complaint and of the vision of divine completion which is
anticipated as restorative.

The following is the orienting

vision of Micah; it appears in the text following a recita
tion of grievances which amount to charges of injustice and
apostasy which merit the punishment of Yahweh.

Opposed to

human evil and the divine wrath which it has earned are the
prospects of Yahweh's gathering and leadership.
I will surely gather all of you, 0 Jacob,
I will gather the remnant of Israel; I will set them
together like a sheep in a fold, like a flock in its
pasture, a noisy multitude of men.
He who opens the breach will go up before them;
they will break through and pass the gate, going out
by it. Their king will pass on before them,
the Lord [YHWH] at their h e a d . 47
This imagery of Yahweh as pastor to the robust, active, mov
ing flock is the pure and perfect expression of prophetic
organicism.

It is in no need of the great concept symbols

of the eighth century, for the picture of divine leadership
obviates the need for mention of Yahweh's specific excellen
ces.

The picture shows these along with the human response.

In place of brigandage paved over with the rubric of estab47Micah 2.12-13.
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lishment justice, in place of the mortal falsehood of human
religiosity is the gathering of mankind, its re-creation as
a "flock" which follows the leadership of Yahweh.
3. Freedom and Individuation
Our modern idea of freedom entails the understanding
that where freedom is present, the individual will be dis
tinguishable from society.

In its British form, this abso

lute distinction of the individual is viewed as one of the
major goals of political endeavor.

Like whole justice or

teleological happiness in a time before, individual liberty
is the end of human existence in the double sense of being
the result of historical progression and the cause of future
progress.

This doctrine was put forward most emphatically

in John Stuart Mill1s essay On Liberty.
proach has been more moderate.

The continental ap

Rousseau, Kant and Hegel be

lieved that the individual should be liberated from igno- •
ranee, poverty, and the caprice of the tyrant.

This ambition

is accompanied however by the sure knowledge that the indi
vidual— as such— has only a relative value.

This is why the

term "positive freedom" comes from the continent.

For lib

eration of the individual from servility of any sort to have
lasting importance, individual life must be reintegrated on
a higher plane with the Reason which is conversant with the
wholeness of being.
The implication of the prophets to freedom is more con
sonant with the continental understanding than with the
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British.48

This is so because freedom, the unspoken term,

is dependant upon and subordinate to the spoken terms, righ
teousness, loving-faithfulness, holiness.

In each of these,

the configuration of wholeness is ascendant over individual
ity.

Individual freedom is part and parcel of the prophetic

experience, but it is a freedom which always looks toward
the moment of its own overcoming.

The hope of the prophets

is for that absolute, unconditional freedom which annuls the
individuality of human isolation.
As we have observed, individual liberty is almost to
tally absent in the liberation narrative of the Exodus.
could explain this absence in one of two ways.

One

The most ob

vious explanation would be the one which is most frequently
employed in modern intellection to explain the several con
ditions of mankind as they occur at various times, i.e., the
theory of development.

According to notions about develop

ment, the absence of individual freedom in the Exodus would
obtain as the result of a traditional pattern of life in
which the norms of the community are of sufficient power to
prevent the full articulation of the. individual.

In keeping

with this view then, the social arid political variegation of
the later monarchial societies would represent an advance to
a higher level of development, as would the appearance of
48There is no possibility of accomodating prophetic
freedom to empirical liberalism, even on the grounds that
liberalism, like prophecy, is desirous to supervise action
so as to guarantee good social order.
Intent, not action,
is basic to both. Liberalism advocates absolute freedom of
thought. Prophecy teaches that only certain "thoughts," not
others, are admissible.
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the prophetic "ideology."

49

Such an application might in

deed suffice to explain the actual development— the increas
ing complexity— of Israelite society, considered in terms of
sheer mechanics.

To adopt this view with respect to our

concern, freedom, would lead to a fascinating conclusion,
i.e., that the prophets were a function of a developmental
situation, much as Franklin Roosevelt's innovative presi
dency was the function of a developing economic and social
situation.

Indeed, that conclusion has a certain specious

truthfulness to it, for it is the development of material
conditions which has provoked the prophetic outburst.

Ac

cording to this schematization, we would be able to recog
nize the prophets as the first of a type— harbingers of a
great tradition of individualism.
Such an explanation of prophetic freedom is not without
its own elegance, but it is wrong for it misses the point of
the entire history of which the prophets are spokesmen.

It

refuses to consider the meaning of the Exodus as that mean
ing is recorded in J, E, and P, and it likewise refuses to
grant the authenticity of the prophets' own self-understand
ing.

It is possible that the prophets were themselves the

world's first developmental theorists, but they differed
from the developmental theorists of the Christian age in one
49If the Little Brown Series in Comparative Politics
were to prepare a volume dealing with pre-exilic Israel and
Judah, the above would constitute a precis of the approach
used. See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Com
parative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1966), chapter 3.
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central respect.

They did not imagine that their own place

and time had the character of an accomplished end.

Their

understanding was entirely contrary to such an assumption,
for the development to which the prophets were witness was
a degenerative development.

The high point of culture had

been the Exodus and sojourn, and their own time was a time,
not of fulfillment, but of perversion.

This prophetic un

derstanding of historical development thus explains the ab
sence of individual .freedom in the Exodus episode.
Present."

"Israel is my son."

"I am

These are the dominant sym

bols of the Exodus, and they are symbols of liberation.
They are symbols which overcome the severalness— the indi
vidual partition— of the human aggregation, and so make of
it a purposive community.

In the Exodus then we behold the

consummate symbolism of human organization.

As the consum

mate form, the Exodus paradigm corresponds to the real, abid
ing, unifying freedom that is the ethos of such concepts as
"general will" and "kingdom of ends."

The prophets under

stand it as a time when divine will and human impulse are
coupled in harmony.
In our contemporary English language, compound nouns
like "personal liberty" and "individual freedom" are common.
These are words of camouflage in that they hide from critical
inspection a truth about existence that is deeper than the
superficial truth which they reveal.

"Individual freedom"

is the expression of a culture which tends to equate indi
viduality with freedom.

It is a misleading expression be-
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cause it diverts attention from the fact that in the total
of human experience, individuality and freedom do not often
come together.
stances:

This is apparent in the most mundane circum

Should we say of the contemporary peasant who is

separated from the village to find himself of a sudden in
Stuttgart or Bogata that he is a free individual?

There can

be no doubt that he has become an individual, but if we are
\

willing to predicate "free" of this lost character, then we
are likewise willing to throw the entire content of the word
out upon the swirling waters of historical directionless
ness.

If a history of individuality is ever undertaken, it

will doubtlessly devote more space to the uprooted people
than to "individual freedom."
This problem of forced individuality and its implica-r
tions to the realm of moral concern was an immediate inter
est of the prophets.

Isaiah threatens:

"Woe to those who

join house to house, who add field to field, until there is
no more room, and you are made to dwell alone in the midst
of the land."^®
the peasantry.

He is talking about the expropriation of
Not freedom, but aloneness, is the conse

quence of this species of individuality.

The eighth century

prophets make it clear that they are inhabitants of an age
of individualism.

The individuated appetites of the elite

are fulfilled at the expense of the many.

This causes a dis

ruption of national life which severs people from the organ
ic ism of family and community, reducing them to the indi
^ I s a i a h 5.8.
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viduality of the debt slave or the loneliness of the beggar.
Bible history is no different from "secular" history in this
regard.

Slavery to appetite is the most prominent fact

about the individuation of humanity.

Before the machine age,

this servitude of the powerful to desire issued inevitably
into a physical servitude for the powerless.
Despite its too frequent use, "individual freedom" is
not meaningless; the prophets are the first of its limited
number of practitioners.

The prophets show us just how in

dividual freedom is distinguishable from the individuality
of domination, or its symbiotic companion, the individuality
of bondage.

There is a transcript of the first encounter in

which this true individual freedom showed itself in the
eighth century.

Amaziah is the chief priest at Bethel, the

central shrine of the northern kingdom's cult.
And Amaziah said to Amos, "0 seer, go, flee away
to the land of Judah, and eat bread
there, andproph
esy there; but never again prophesy
at
Bethel,for it
is the king's sanctuary and it is a temple of the king
dom. "
Then Amos answered Amaziah, "I am no prophet, nor
a prophet's son; but I am a herdsman, and a dresser of
sycamore trees, and the Lord [YHWH] took me from fol
lowing the flock, and the Lord said to me, 'Go, proph
esy to my people Israel.'"51
The speech of Amaziah has the following meaning:
sible man, Amos, like the rest of us.

"Be a sen

Go back home to Judah

and put your obvious ecstatic gifts on the marketplace where
they will bring you a material reward." To this suggestion
Amos replies, "I am no prophet."
S^Amos 7.12-15.

With thisdenial,

Amos
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sets himself apart from the ambitious individuality of the
age.

His denial means that he is not a court prophet who

will lend a veneer of religious legitimacy to power politics
and social injustice.

Instead, he is the agent of Yahweh,

who is implacably opposed to the whole set of institutions
with which the priest has bidden Amos to associate himself.
In this exchange we behold two essentially opposed patterns
of individuality.

The one is the individuality which has as

its purpose the eating of b r e a d . T h e other is that which
has as its guiding impulse the knowledge that its practition
er has been taken by a power that is greater and nobler
than himself.

It is to the latter and rarer of these kinds

of individuality that we may without hesitation attach the
name "freedom," for along with its audible negativity against
the injustice of present conduct there dwells in silence the
seed of positivity toward the future.

This seed is the de

cision against death, for life.
Have we drawn the lines between the individuality of
servitude and the individuality of freedom so sharply as to
exclude that middle range within person and polity where
these propensities come together in contest and accomodation?
Quite possibly we have overstated the case, denying to the
conventional "individual freedom" a worth which is its due.
It is important though that if we have been wrong, it is be
cause the prophets have made us wrong.

There can be no doubt

52Cf. Hosea 2.5, where the eating of bread is a reward
for harlotry.
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that the prophets are the authors of a great tradition of
free individuality which places allegiance to higher author
ity above concerns about material reward or even material
danger.

To some degree, this prophetic allegiance is mani

fest in the daily life of countries which permit free indi
viduality.

But in the instant that we recognize this pio

neering aspect of the prophetic movement, we must acknowledge
that from the perspective of prophetic intention, this is the
unintended— the almost shameful— consequence of prophetic
endeavor.

Sociology would call it a "latent function" of

the prophetic ministry.

On prophetic terms, the establish

ment of a line of individuals who must go on through history,
opposing right against wrong, is evidence of failure.

The

prophets failed to restore human life to the condition of
wholeness that had been its property in the season of plant
ing.53

From this failure of the total project grew individ

ual freedom as the realization of partial success.

Wherever

the truly free person is to be found, there is also found
the prophetic memory along with the prophetic projection of
the future with its imperative verb:

"Turn!"

"Turn around

and find your destiny in your own beginnings of oneness with
53This is not to suggest that the extreme vision of
pastoral happiness which is especially prominent in Micah is
the only form of eighth century prophetic hope and expecta
tion. We believe however that this is its definitive form.
We do not understand this vision as an eschaton. That noun
comes from a culture which reckoned time in terms of the
world cycle. These prophets had no acquaintance with an
"end of the age." They wanted to restore beginnings, not to
accomplish an end.
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your God."5^
This ultimate failure of the prophetic quest was inher
ent in the form of the movement itself.

The ascendancy of

individuality over the sought organicism can be identified
in three separate regards.

The first and most obvious of

these has to do with the personal prominence of the prophets
themselves.

Like Abram, they are called out of the commu

nity, away from familiar circumstances, called to be indi
viduals in witness against society.

In this latter respect

they are essentially different from Abram, for he is called
with a view to formation, while the prophets are called for
the purpose of reformation.

Abram is before the Yahwist

community, its benign (and harmless) ancestor, while the
prophets are against the established norms of the post-Yahwist society, and thus in one regard its enemy.
prophets are in fact more like Moses than Abram.

The writing
They stand

out as individuals against the corruption of divinized mon
archy and against the human society which is passively ac
quiescent in its error.

This is possibly the reason for the

silence about Moses in the eighth century prophets.

55

In

54we have argued in chapter one that this is the univer
sal form of the ethical inclination in history, i.e., a liberative recovery of the divine-human unity which precedes all
severality and strife. What is unique about the prophetic
employment of this form is that the prophets could cite a
real, historical past as the sacred ground for future his
tory. They did not, as did Plato, find it necessary to res
cue fallen history through the "remembrance” of a mythical
pre-history as the sacred ground for history.
S^Micah 6.3, whose authorship is uncertain, is the only
direct reference to Moses in the eighth century prophets.
Hosea 12.13 seems to refer to Moses.
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terms of the ultimate intent of the prophetic endeavor— the
restoration of the nation to the leadership of Yahweh— the
individual prominence of Moses ih the liberation event is no
less an embarrassment than the individual prominence of the
prophets in the reformation.

The visibility of the men who

are its bearers detracts from the content of the message and
the God who is its author.

It is also possible that the

Exodus tradition with which these prophets were familiar
knew nothing about
sion is warranted.

M o s e s .

^6

In either case, the same conclu

The prophets wanted to direct attention

to the authority of Yahweh, for they saw that authority as
the cause of the liberative-formative event.

Their own in

dividual prominence as representatives of authority became
enduringly important in a way that they neither foresaw nor
desired.
There is a second sense in which the prophets encouraged
a burgeoning individuality.

The individual freedom of the

prophets was necessarily contagious.

Eichrodt writes that

the prophet "asks of the individual a conscious decision
against the constraint of the collective will and against
the pressure of a cultural development encouraged by the
whole external situation."57

Here again the writer's choice

^Concerning the problem of the Moses tradition, see
Noth, History of Pentateuchal Traditions, pp. 156-174.
S^Eichrodt, Man in the Old Testament, p. 21. We should
report that Eichrodt tends to understand the general direc
tion of the Old Testament as a movement toward morally re
sponsible individualism, not entirely different in intent
and result from the similar developments in Greece. For this
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of words is revealing.

The prophetic preaching cannot but

sensitize its audience to a new and deepened apperception.
The new consciousness is required to synthesize an "external
situation," and with it no doubt to become awakened to one's
own personal disposition as a critical, internal power set
against all externality.

Here we behold the same hiatus

which we have identified as the dichotomy of act and inten
tion.

Whenever the owl of Minerva takes flight, the hour of

dusk is at hand, if not for a whole culture, then at least
for the individuals within it to whom life has become re
flective.
the flight.

The flight causes the dusk no less than the dusk
This awakening of the individual consciousness

cannot but lessen the possibility of achieving the righteous
and free community which the prophets hoped to revitalize.
There is an insoluble antinomy at the bottom of freedom
in history.

The individual form and the global content are

reason, the nearly Jungian sound of his language is no acci
dent; he is interested in a kind of psychic individuation
which liberates from the collective unconscious.
(See espe
cially pp. 9-10.) While it is certain that the Bible is at
odds with the collective unconscious because of its heathen
contents, we cannot share in Eichrodt's thesis, especially
as concerns the prophets of the eighth century. Eichrodt
believes that the result of prophetic ministry— a personal
responsibility of Antigonian proportions— is consonant with
the intent. This conclusion ignores the express political
hope of the prophets, i.e., the restoration of an organic
community of equals responsible both individually and sever
ally before the commanding Presence of Yahweh.
In seeking
an end to individualism, the prophets succeed only in edu
cating it, a partial success. Von Rad also comments on the
novelty of the prophets' display of free, individual personhood, but his commentary likewise fails to consider the an
tagonism between this personhood and the prophetic idea of
salvation, Von Rad's special interest.
See Message of the
Prophets, pp. 56-57, and 146-147.
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locked in mutual opposition.

This would not be the case

were it possible for human society to become Amos or Hosea
or Micah writ large.

If this were a possibility, then in

the same socio-political vessel the total individual arousal
in response to the divine Presence could coexist with the
subsumption of the individual within the wholeness of the
God community.

If this were possible, then the individual

articulation of each, though entirely real, would matter as
little to each as it mattered to these prophets.

None of

this was the case, however, for unlike the prophets, the
bulk of the community were not ecstatics, nor could they be.
To the prophet, whose individual distinction to us perceivers is his most immediate mark, this individuality is
opaque, for he is taken by his God.

(One must contemplate

Isaiah's nakedness, month after month, on the streets of
Jerusalem, or Hosea the cuckold, redeeming his wife, obliv
ious to the gaze of the village folk.)
ecy is different from the prophet.

The hearer of proph

The message stirs him,

not first in his affective depth, but in his cognitive
height.

He synthesizes an "external situation."

For this bewildering array of prophetic accusations
against the familiar present to be taken seriously, it must
first be understood; reflection must learn to separate in
tention from the act in which it is couched, and then to
weigh each against the prophetic precept of righteousness.
Only upon this accomplishment can the affective powers of
accusation and repentance become productive unto a turning.
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One of the sadnesses of existence is that the free individ
ual must also be in some measure an intellectual individual,
standing at some critical remove from the spontaneous pulse
of life's events.

This is not what the prophets hoped for,

but this is the better kind of creature whom the prophets
gave to Europe.

It is this harmonization of mind and heart

that has made history tolerable.^®
The third event in the unfolding of free individuality
as part of the prophetic effort has to do specifically with
the character and work of Isaiah.

With the other prophets

of the eighth century, the ecstatic seizure has a sudden,
volcanic quality.

It is to be assumed, for example, that

when his message had been delivered, Amos crossed back over
the border and resumed herding at Tekoa.

With Isaiah, how

ever, free, canonical prophecy became a lifetime career no
less than false, court prophecy.

As the ecstatic moment be

came elongated, the prophet's presence became almost an in
stitution, resented, but also feared by the established au
thorities.

It is a "loyal opposition" of a curious sort,

for it remains loyal and non-violent despite its disagree
ment with the authorities over the very terms of the consti
tution.

In this respect, Isaianic prophecy is like a gov

ernment in exile; it is loyal to homeland and people while
C O

It is universally recognized (excepting fundamental
ism) that the Deuteronomist movement is the first attempt at
political implementation of a program inspired by prophetic
protest. This is prototypical of the limited, intellectual
appropriation of an initially ecstatic and infinite project.
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it looks upon the present leadership as a corrupting, lep
rous influence.
The institutional nature of Isaiah's tenure as prophet
was finalized when Isaiah assembled around himself a group
of disciples.

59

Lods regarded Isaiah's formation of a school

as one of the great events of Old Testament history.

He be

lieved that this event "marks the religious emancipation of
the individual, whose destiny no longer coincided entirely
with that of the group."®®

Again we must complain that this

statement, although entirely true in the descriptive sense,
is insensitive to the tragedy which underlies Isaiah's per
ceived need to gather disciples.

The establishment of a

group of individuals in on-going opposition to monarchial
authority is the foremost emblem of the prophet's reckoning
of his own failure.

The constitution would not be amended

in Isaiah's lifetime, and thus he must not permit his true
inspiration to be darkened in a world shot through with fol
ly.

He must "emancipate" a certain number of individuals

who will comprise a permanent opposition.

This group will

carry the true past into the uncertain future:

"Bind up the

testimony, seal the teaching among my disciples."
This communication of the teaching to an intimate group
did indeed amount to an emancipation of individuals.

Lods

spoke of this as a "religious" emancipation, and so it be®®See Isaiah 8.2 and 8.16.
6®Lods, Prophets and the Rise of Judaism, p. 102.
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came.

If one believes that the rise of Judaism is a great

event in history, then such a religious emancipation was an
event of positive value.

It is certain that the rise of

Judaism— or any other religion— could stir no enthusiasm in
the early prophetic consciousness.

These prophets were op^

posed to religion, for when the rise of religion occurs (the
dedicatory speech of Solomon marks such an event) life has
admitted the separability of the sacred from the secular.
Then piety, the propitiatory act, is offered in faulty com
pensation for the absence of divine influence in all the af
fairs of human life.®'5' That the prophets, God's represen
tatives, should deprecate religion may seem strange in a
world whose highest self-articulation occurs in the disci
plinary fragmentation of theology, economics, politics, his
tory, and so on.

This schematization of the world in

thought is the consequence of social pluralism, and it is
the advent of such a pluralism which admits the working of
the detached conscience whose appearance Lods heralds.
6X

But

The prophetic opposition to religion is the source of
Jesus' disagreement with the established Judaism of his
time. One of the misfortunes of history is that the Phar
isees were not insensitive to the hazards of cleaving life
into divine and secular domains which have no connection.
Jesus and his followers believed however that they had
failed to accomplish their own intended goal of integration
because their means to its accomplishment were essentially
formal and thus bereft of real, divine content. These means
amounted to a religion. Paul's letter to Philemon is in
structive concerning the tension between religion and whole
godliness in Christianity. His expectation that Philemon
would heed his counsel concerning Onesimus is evidence that
in the church at Colossae, religion had been extensively
overcome. This overcoming was the hope of the prophets be
fore Paul.
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pluralism was not the goal of the prophetic guest; the pro
phetic imagination is "totalitarian."

For the writing

prophets human life ought to unfold as an undivided totality
within the total vessel of Yahweh's holy, righteous, faith
ful Presence.
The individual freedom of Isaiah and his followers is
an accomodation of form— a pragmatic concession to the world
of power politics— accepted so as to preserve the content of
a vision whose full realization would accomplish the trans
figuration of the form itself.

Indeed, such a transfigura

tion was the consequence of the young Isaiah's vision of
Yahweh in the temple.

To say that Isaiah became transfig

ured does not mean that he became a "holy man" in the sense
of one who is able to suppress sensible reality or bodily
function and thus attenuate the illusion of temporal exis
tence.

It means instead that Isaiah the son of Amoz was

lost to him; when he left the temple he could no longer com
municate with that former particular self, a personal entity
with habits and tropisms which in sum constituted a singular
human identity.

To understand the prophet then as a tower

ing individual opposed to the king, another individual, is
utterly wrong.

The real format for such encounters is the

being of God in ministry against the non-being of man.

The

wholeness of divinity, not conspicuous human particularity,
is the unseen content of the prophet's visible freedom.
Wherever in history the free individual has appeared, the
ultimate intention of his quest is the dissolution of his
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own formal identity, and that of all the world, into the
wholeness that is being itself.

We end where we began.
of the Isaianic movement.

Deutero Isaiah is the product
His prophecy of redemptive lib

eration is given at the time of the great Persian expansion
in the Eastern Mediterranean which swept away the decentral
ized parochialism of mid-antiquity.

At the time of the

Persian conquest, the remnant of Israel, and the second
Isaiah with them, were captive in Babylon.

The Persian tri

umph over Babylon will end the unrighteous rule of the idol
aters, and thus Deutero Isaiah perceives Cyrus as the in
strument of Yahweh's lordship over history.

The prophet's

glad shout of redemption is equally a liberative declaration
with the "Let my people go, that they may serve me" of the
Exodus.

The Yahweh of this tiny, exiled people is revealed

in his fulness as the holy creator of the universe and the
commanding lord of all history.

All gods beside him are

idols, enformate fantasies of the human unconscious.

62

There is a strain of decadence in this great prophet's
writing, for the high spire is the emblem of completion, the
end of the dirty peasant toil which builds.
62

There is a

Buber says that Deutero Isaiah's God is transcendent
in the sense that his being becomes manifest beyond the lim
its of the human psyche; he is not a psychological produc
tion like the idols. Thus, human apprehension of his being
is essentially different from acquaintance with the great
idols. See Prophetic Faith, pp. 209 passim.

240
spiritualization of meanings, common to the later, reflecttive passage of antiquity, in which the immediate and con
crete sources of joy or sorrow are poured into a synthetic
term which dissolves the immediate circumstance within the
i

mediate condition of its occurrence.

No longer is bondage,

exile, servitude the prominent configuration of existential
negativity; instead it is the sin which has worked bondage.
The identification of sin as the condition of bondage neces
sitates that redemption must first come as relief from sin.
In this understanding, Deutero Isaiah anticipates the Fourth
Evangelist's teaching that "liberation" is primarily the
surcease of sin, a defective condition of being before God
upon which existential misfortune is consequent.

In context

then, the terms "redemption" and "liberation" mean essen
tially the same.

Both ascent and decay are present in equal

measure in the discovery of this kind of association wherein
the spiritual subsumes the practical.

Decay because man has

lost his direct and simplistic association with the world;
ascent because man has come to have knowledge about the in
terior side of things.
Deutero Isaiah's subsumption of the material unfreedom
of his people within their sin is no mere mental fabrication
put forward in service to a religious end.

Instead, it is

an induction about the nature of historical process itself,
an induction valid for all history:

Calamity, disgrace,

bondage are the inevitable consequences of sin, for sin is
nothing besides the refusal to be free.

It is the personal
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and political refusal to will and to do the righteousness
which is the sufficient condition of freedom and its abso
lute content.

The very mundane consequence of this refusal

is national catastrophe, exile and bondage.

Corollary to

this induction about the cause of unfreedom in history is
the foundation principle of historical theism, i.e., that
\

liberation and rectification are divine.

In respect of this

basic understanding, there is absolutely no "development"
from J and E to Deutero Isaiah.
The moment of impetus in the structure of freedom is
the divine avowal of existential misfortune, an avowal which
is uttered with an intent toward the negation of misfortune.
Passages which are built upon the structure of freedom are
rife in Deutero Isaiah.

The following is exemplary because

it incorporates the major symbols which are prominent in
this prophet's representation of reality.

We recall that

the prophecy begins with divine recognition of sorrow and a
promise of comfort

out of sorrow.

The concrete meaningof

this comfort is redemption and return, negation

andposi

tion.
Remember these things, 0 Jacob, and Israel, for
you are my servant;
I formed you, you are my servant;
0 Israel, you will not be forgotten by me.
I have swept away your transgressions like a cloud,
and your sins like mist; return to me, for I have
redeemed y o u . 63
The call to return is no longer an injunction; it is an in
vitation, the acceptance of which has been made possible by
63Isaiah 44.21-22.
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the clearing away of the impediments of a guilty past.
We need finally to inquire concerning the conditions of
the return.

The prophecy of Deutero Isaiah is eschatolog-

ical, and it displays the variety which is proper to that
genre.

The symbolism of the following passage places the

expected event in the context of the recent historical mem
ory of Israel.
Get you up to a high mountain, 0 Zion, herald of
good tidings; lift up your voice with strength,
0 Jerusalem, herald of good tidings, lift it up
and fear not; say to the cities of Judah,
"Behold your G o d ! "64
But suddenly in the next verse, the urban imagery disap
pears, revealing the old strata of memory, the fundamental
form of the prophetic vision of life in completion.
Behold, the Lord God comes with might, and his arm
rules for him; behold his reward is with him, and his
recompense before him.
He will feed his flock like a shepherd, he will
gather the lambs in his arms, he will carry them in
his bosom and gently lead those that are with y o u n g . ^5
It is the symbolism of Exodus and sojourn, might and gentle
ness, liberation and election.
Presence of God.

64Isaiah 40.9.
65Isaiah 40.10-11.

Human life made whole in the

V.

GREECE:

THE BIRTH OF FREEDOM FROM

THE SPIRIT OF JUSTICE
1.

The Freedom of Human Intermediacy

"Freedom" is a word which does not easily lend itself
to precise definition because of the emotive value which
clings to it.

Freedom is a sourde of exultation for those

who have it, and an object of desire for those who live
without it.

For children, "Ambrica is a free country" is

often the earliest proposition about the political order of
their native land, and to the extent that that order influ
ences their lives, it is the most salient of all their un
derstandings about their country.

Athens is the ancestor of

the free European peoples of the modern age, the world's
first conscious claimant of freedom.

The awareness of free

dom as the definitive trait of Athens is articulated in a
series of contrasts.

Relative to Persia, Greece generally

and Athens particularly is free; later, Athens is free rel
ative to Sparta.

But the claim that one's country is free

does nothing to illumine the character of the freedom which
is claimed.
We must break freedom down and render it in its sepa
rate moments if we are to understand the meaning of the
Athenian claim to freedom.

The task of definition was not

incumbent upon this project as it dealt with the Exodus of
Israel, for the Bible's own analytical standard, the struc-
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ture of freedom in the Fourth Gospel undertook this concep
tualization for us.

It will become clear that this struc

ture of freedom is likewise relevant to the Athenian exper
ience of freedom, but by itself it is not sufficient to ex
plain that experience.

In Athenian experience, the concep

tual schematics of the free life are seldom symbolized in
any manner abstract from that life experience.

Therefore

the task of schematization falls the lot of this project.
From the variety of freedoms which we behold in Greece, we
infer the presence of typical patterns— moments— which make
experiential freedom intelligible to us.
Athens enlarges and complicates the experience of free
dom which has its origin in Israel.

The structure of free

dom which articulates the inner meaning of the Israelite ex
perience of divine liberation establishes the outer bound
aries of freedom.

Athenian experience and self-articulation

are likewise conversant with these outer boundaries, but in
a sense the freedom of Athens improves upon the Biblical de
velopment of the issue, for Athens fills in the mid spaces
which in the Exodus and the prophets are left blank.

The

life of Israel within the immediate Presence of the supraworldly deity is a life lived in the realm of ultimacy; in
such a life there is little or no middle ground, no reserva
tion set apart for the random development of the strictly
human impulses and abilities.

With early Israel it is the

divine element within man— as an aggregate universal— that
is called into the Presence of Yahweh, and the lesser ele-
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ments of the human constitution, the forces which work to
ward individuation, are consigned to inconsequentiality.
Athens is quite different, for in that country it was man
who was immediate.

Man is immediate in the symbolic record

of Greece because the Homeric pantheon is at once plural and
thoroughly anthropomorphic.1

The basal layer of the Greek

religious consciousness recognized and celebrated in the
gods the same virtues and weaknesses which are frequent
amongst mortals.

To infer from this that the Greeks were

irreligious is mistaken.

It is true however that the impu

tation of ethics to the Olympian pantheon is a secondary,
"subversive" development in Greek religion whose end result
for Greece was the destruction of the Homeric pantheon in
2
the period of enlightenment.
But in the archaic period,
for every Hesiod, steeped in devotion to righteous Zeus,
10f this phenomenon which explains the essential dif
ference between Israel and Greece, Voegelin writes, "The
universal validity of transcendent truth, the universality
of the one God over the one mankind, could be more easily
disengaged from an individual's discovery of the existence
of his psyche under the gods than from the Sinaitic revela
tion of a people's existence under God."
(Order and His
tory, II, 169.) The human psyche, as a power detached from
the greater cosmos, is the proper arena of Greek freedom.
Because of this detachment it was necessary for Solon the
liberator to puzzle out the ways of Zeus. In Israel the
case was opposite: Yahweh sought out Moses and made him
liberator.
^The major thesis of Nilsson's study of Greek religion
is that the anthropomorphism of the popular Homeric reli
gion destined that religion to destruction once the urgen
cies of urban civilization made it necessary for the gods to
become supporters of ethics. The later Greeks were asked to
believe that the same gods who had practised deceitfulness,
partisanship, and sexual promiscuity in the Homeric liter
ature were now the upholders of rdctitude and order. The
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there must have been thousands like his brother Perses who
could live quite successfully on an exclusively human plane,
participating in cultic celebrations of the protective ancestor-gods, unconcerned about truly divine norms or sanc
tions.

It is in this middle space occupied by Hesiod's

brother Perses that freedom as a human way of life could
first develop.

Because of Athenian freedom's development in

this middling, unsteady human zone, the thought leaders who
articulated the life of Athens found it necessary to point
beyond the merely human realm of existence toward a vision
in which human life became endowed with an ennobled freedom,
a freedom imbued with the divine.spirit of Dike, of Justice.
In Athens, four moments can be discerned in the life of
freedom as a moral and political constellation.

These are

hierarchical, ascending from freedom of a lower type to
freedom of the highest order.

These are:

1. freedom from

slavery, 2. freedom to live as one desires, 3. freedom of
the self to decide amongst alternatives of varying moral
magnitudes, 4. freedom to live in righteousness.

The first

and the last of these conform to the polarity within the
Biblical structure of freedom.

The two intermediate mo-

contrary strains could not bear examination when rationality
was applied to religion.
See Martin P. Nilsson, A History
of Greek Religion, tr. F. J. Fielden (New York: W. W.
Norton and Co., 1964), pp. 130 f., 152-157.
•^The following models show the difference between the
schematization of freedom for Israel and that for Greece:
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ments of freedom are the specifically human contribution of
Greek experience, for they partake of neither the mute, less
than human existence of the slave, nor of the divine,
greater than human life of the wholly righteous.

They are

truly intermediate, for the middle range of freedom, in both
its individual and political manifestations, constitutes a
platform from which human existence may move toward the
lower inclinations of tyranny and slavery or toward the
higher destiny of divine completion.
Freedom from slavery is negative freedom, for it is
freedom which negates a negative condition of existence in
which life is sealed off from public objectification in
speeches and works.

Similar to freedom from slavery is

freedom from tyranny, for the former consists in an economic
relationship and the latter in a political relationship.
The consequences of enslavement and tyranny are much the

Israel
positive
negative

4. whole righteousness
3.
2.
1. freedom from slavery
Greece

positive
negative

4.
3.
2.
1.

whole righteousness
freedom of moral decision
freedom to gratify desire
freedom from slavery

As the text will explain, the fourth moment is present in
Greek awareness, but there is no expectation that it will
be fully manifested in history.

248
same, moreover, since both of these conditions deny the
autonomy of those who occupy the subordinate position.

Lib

eration from slave bondage or tyrannical bondage inevitably
establishes— within politically defined limits— the "right”
of the principal to his life and its produce.

It is for

this reason that in concrete history and in the conceptual
schematization which obtains from that history, freedom from
slavery is the primary moment in the experience of freedom.
If freedom is to happen, then somehow the understanding must
occur that it is "right" for some persons to exist in a con
dition of non-bondage.

The negation of the negative circum

stances of the slave people Israel was the efficient circum
stance of the formation of Israel as a theopolity.
is true of Athens.

The same

The foundation of Athens as the mother

of political communities was coincidental with the negation
of the slave condition of the Athenians.

Pursuant upon

this negation, Athens became the city which Europe remembers
as the ancestor of constitutional government and popular
liberty.
In historical and conceptual terms the moment of free
dom which follows upon the existential fact of not living in
bondage is freedom to live as one pleases.

It is natural

that this broad condition of randomness should follow upon
the initial moment of freedom from slavery or tyranny.

This

is the freedom of societies which are resident in the lib
eral zone of moral accomplishment, and if the "freedom" of
this moment is for the better part specious, it is nonethe
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less exuberant.

Herodotus wrote:

Thus did the Athenians increase in strength. And
it is plain enough, not from this instance only, but
from many everywhere, that freedom is an excellent
thing; since even the Athenians, who, while they con
tinued under the rule of tyrants, were not a whit more
valiant than any of their neighbors, no sooner shook
off the yoke than they became decidedly the first of
all. These things show that, while undergoing oppres
sion, they let themselves be beaten, since then they
worked for a master; but so soon as they got their
freedom, each man was eager to do the best he could for
himself. So it fared now with the Athenians.4
This random freedom is intermediate; it occurs as man recog
nizes that he— not some other whom he serves— is himself
fully human.

This moment of freedom is preponderantly neg

ative, for it springs from the circumstance of lacking ex
ternal restraint; that is why so often it finds its terminus
in a re-enslavement of human life.

It was of a society im

bued with the practise of this second moment in the career
of freedom that Plato was thinking when he discussed the
constitutional form, democracy:
All sorts and conditions,of men, then, would arise
in this polity more than in any other?
Of course.
Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of
polities; as a garment of many colors, embroidered with
all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with
every type of character, would appear the most beauti
ful, like boys and women when they see bright-colored
things.5
Specifically, Plato is describing Athens.

As is well known,

his prognosis for the liberal society is gloomy.

Liberty

^Persian Wars, V, 78, tr. George Rawlinson (New York:
The Modern Library, 1942) .
^Republic, 557c, tr. Paul Shorey.
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leads to license, and eventually the licentious society
opens onto tyranny, for Plato the rule of the devil upon the
earth.

It was this pessimistic faith, compounded by per

sonal experience, that led Plato to look upon the random
life as a cancer to be excised at a high cost.

In his writ

ing, Plato seems to have deliberately suppressed the obvious
circumstance which coupled his life and work with that of
Solon, Aeschylus and Socrates:
Athens.

all of them were free men of

If random freedom for the many amounted to gratifi

cation of appetite at the expense of public order, it was no
less an historical truth that for a portion of the community
that same human freedom became teleological.
The random freedom of the second moment is mainly an
affair of desire, of channelling the simpler inclinations
and appetites in a manner which is pleasant to the self,
without regard for measure and consequence amongst the be
haviors which implement desire.

The freedom of the second

moment then exhibits no permanent contact with that fixture
in man which is most divine, with the mind.

It is for this

reason that life in free countries tends to fixate at the
generally negative second moment of freedom; the great bulk
of mankind is not such that mind looms large as the dominant
influence in behavior.

All this is simply to say that left

to its own devices, humanity will do as it pleases more usu
ally than it will do what is right.

The institutions of

free countries encourage people to do as they please; they
accomodate "interest" and facilitate "interest articulation."
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Thus, as Aristotle understood, in a bi-polar society it is
the interest of the rich to exploit the poor and the inter
est of the poor to expropriate the rich.

Hence the alter

native evils of oligarchy and democracy become tyranny.

The

random freedom of the second moment,; as it occurs in both
the individual and society, can be fully justified only on
an hedonic basis.

There is yet a further possibility for

its justification, albeit a partial one.

This is that a

society which tolerates unimpeded exercise of preference
amongst pre-rational, pre-moral desires is also a society
which will countenance the deployment of the human person
ality as a moral arbiter.

It is as if the former were an

unimposing platform upon which the latter edifice may be
built.

To permit a discretionary range for nutritive im

pulse is likewise to give free play to the exertion of up
right reason as a guiding light for the person, and in times
of good fortune, for the polity as well.
This then is the third moment in the occurrence of
freedom within Athens, and within later history as well.
grows from the second.

It

The self which takes up the burden

of true freedom is the self which orients its life in a di
rection of ontic positivity.

This self is a minority fig

ure amongst men, for it is the self in which the noetic
mind is more fully awakened than in the general run of man
kind.

The self which is a moral arbiter is not untroubled,

as is the primarily appetitive self, for it dwells in in
cessant awareness of the reality that right is, and to be a

252
recipient of this understanding entails a condition of in
ternal warfare.

For when the reality of the moral imper

ative has become apparent, then the ongoingness of the pre
moral, desiderative self becomes problematic to the self
which strives to present itself as an integrated moral unity.
The self-knowledge of the self as a power having free choice
becomes fully manifest only at that instant when it has
been grasped that the will is extensively a slave character,
bent to its path by factors which lie beyond the powers of
the volitional self.

Curiously, it is Paul who conveys most

lucidly this ultimate paradox of Greek knowledge of self and
world.

We return to this central passage from the

which we first considered in contrast to the Stoic

Romans
view.

Now if I do what I do not want, I agree that the law is
good. So then it is no longer I that do it, but sin
which dwells within me. For I know that nothing good
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh. I can will
what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the
good I want,
but the evil
I do not want is what Ido.
Now if I do
what I do not
want, it is no longer Ithat
do it, but sin which dwells within me.
So I find it to be a law that when
I
want to do
right, evil
lies close at
hand. For I delight inthe
law of God,in my inmost self, but I see in my members
another law at war with the law of my mind [noos] and
making me captive to the law of sin which dwells in my
members.6
Paul's statement of the issue was intelligible to the Hellenized Jews whom this epistle addresses, for there are two
"Greek" themes in this passage, in addition to the Jewish
concern for the law with which they are synthesized.

First

is the avowal that the inmost self, the "I" of the "mind" is
^Romans 7.16-23.
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free, that its volition is to rectitude.

Second is the in

escapable reality of existence, that the total person is unfree, unrighteous, a doer of evil, despite contrary voli
tion.

This is the counter "self" of the sin which dwells in

bodily members, the passions of appetite.

It is important

though that Paul does not quit the issue at this vulgar,
Orphic stage of analysis.

The epistle continues:

For those who live according to the flesh set their
minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live
according to the Spirit set their minds on the things
of the Spirit. To set the mind on the flesh is death,
but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.'
The slave existence of the self is not, in the final analy
sis of the matter, an affair which derives from man's con
dition of having body.

Body is but the matrix from which

the slave self may make its presence known.

The unfreedom

of man— like his freedom— has its final locus in the core of
the self— in the set of the mind, in the disposition of the
heart.

The anthropology of man as free/man as slave in

Romans 7 and 8 repeats in direct prose the same meaning of
Plato whose picture stories of the composition of the soul
first overcame the simplistic Orphic presentation of the
matter.®
In this third moment then the random freedom of the
second is brought low, for its speciousness is unmasked.
7

It

Romans 8.5-6.

®This seemingly arcane problem is of great importance
to a consideration of freedom, for if the Orphic-Gnostic un
derstanding of evil is tolerated, then human freedom must be
understood as escape from life as we know it in historical
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is a free existence only in the most physical sense; its
practitioners are not the chattels of another.

But in the

ontic range which has become transparent for reason, the
freedom of the second moment is a bitter sham; its freedom
is external and corrupt.

Men who imagine themselves to be

free are in fact driven by taskmasters whose influence they
do not even perceive.

The political consequences of the

eruption of the third moment in freedom are momentous, for
they extend the warfare within the self beyond the self.
is enlarged as conflict within the polity.

It

The self which

has become privy to the moral range of possibility can no
longer live in peace amongst those who, though imagining

existence. This, briefly, is the Orphic myth: Dionysos,
the son of Zeus, was slain by the Titan monsters who de
voured his limbs. Zeus managed to retrieve his heart, and
then struck the Titans with lightning, burning them to pow
der. From their ashes mankind was formed. The material
(bodily) part of man was evil because of its Titan content,
yet because the Titans had eaten Dionysos, the soul was
good. This contrived myth which lacks true archaic stand
ing is the Greek source of the soul-body dualism which has
plagued the Western imagination. The early Plato of the
Phaedo period was heavily influenced by Orphism, and hence
the optimism of Socrates as he drinks the hemlock which will
separate soul from body and speed the former to its blessed
afterlife. The orthodox tradition in Western letters— be
ginning with the mature Plato— has spurned this understand
ing of man and his experience of evil. In Republic, 439c440a, and Phaedrus, 253c-254e, Plato moves the propensity to
evil within the soul proper, along with the propensity to
good. This has the advantage of making man, as man (not as
animal), responsible for evil. Likewise it rescues the
body, and with it material existence in history, from dis
grace and desuetude. The implications to freedom are ob
vious .
C f . Augustine, City of God, XI, 23, and Kant, On the
Radical Evil in Human Nature, III. Concerning Orphism, see
Nilsson, History of Greek Religion, pp. 215-222, and
Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, part II, chapter IV.
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themselves to be free, are in fact the victims of a bondage
too subtle for them to detect.

Once this realization occurs,

the free self must act, and it must act politically.

The

free person must attempt through persuasion to heighten the
vision of his fellow men, and, that failing, he may employ
harsher means to save them from their own slavishness.

The

former alternative was the course of Solon and Aeschylus,
and the latter was the hard portion of Plato who attempted
to annul freedom as a fixture of life and thought.
The freedom of the third moment is resident in a dynamic
tension, a conscious suspension between slavery and righ
teousness in which the self strives to manifest itself as a
positive and worthy being.

This freedom then exhibits the

higher intermediacy through which man's humanity attempts to
bridge the baser aspect of humanity itself, and so to termi
nate this very intermediacy which is the most salient fact of
human life.

It is this aspiration unto the terminus of the

intermediate suspension that was known to the Greeks and to
the New Testament as Hope.

Hope is open to the ultimate,

open to life as wholeness in being, and that hoped for con
dition of beatific completion is the fourth and final moment
in freedom.
In the Bible, wh^n Yahweh declares, "Israel is my son,"
when the Son declares, "You are my disciples," the predicate
indicates that for at least some of the human characters in
the Bible, the consummate moment of freedom has been attained
through a dispensation of divine grace.

In the symbolic ex

256
perience of Athens, the fourth moment of human aspiration is
seldom if ever realized in temporal existence, for there is
nothing in the experience of Greece which is fully parallel
to the grace of God as it occurs in the Bible.

Rather, for

Athens, the completion of freedom in a total positivity of
living in the divine presence remains a goal of life which
is apprehended and experienced across a paradigmatic dis
tance.

This is to say that freedom in the ultimate and pos

itive sense is a characteristic which is fully developed
only in the gods; man remains intermediate.

Asechylus exQ

pressed this perfectly:

"For only Zeus is free."

It is

for this reason that the ways of the gods are objects of
hope and concern among those men who partake of the higher
intermediacy and so aspire to a freedom by agency of which
human will is drawn nearer to the divine will.

If the hu

manity of the human will were to collapse utterly, then the
intermediacy of man would end and the residual volition
would be either wholly demonic or wholly divine.

It is the

divine gradient of this possibility which is the fourth and
^Prometheus Bound, 50. To employ this passage in this
fashion may appear to be facile, since in its context the
passage is obviously ironic. In the Prometheus Bound an im
portant theme is that Zeus is governed in some degree by ne
cessity, so even his freedom is incomplete. But beyond its
immediate, ironic application, the passage does express the
true and direct thinking of Aeschylus, since the final play
of the trilogy (it is almost universally believed) contains
not only the liberation of Prometheus from his torment but
also of Zeus from that fate which would produce his over
throw. Concomitant with this end to the threat to his rule
is the accession of Zeus to the realm of pure divinity which
wills that whole righteousness whose consequence is freedom.

257
final moment of freedom.
In its ultimate character then, freedom is transfigured
so as to forfeit the arbitrary aspect of intent and struggle
which has marked its earlier moments.

In the fourth moment,

there is no further need for arbitration in the selection of
alternative courses, for there are no longer alternatives.
The pastoral vision of Micah has shown us this much.

The

leadership of Yahweh is perceived to be sufficient; a human
decision is no longer required.

This resembles the condi

tion known to modern understanding as "absolute uncondi
tional freedom," i.e., a freedom in which self and world are
so integrated that the struggle within the soul or within
the polity occurs no longer.

Greece did not share the ide

alist opinion that the absolute moment of freedom lay within
the range of mortal experience.

Indeed— save for the clue

given by Aeschylus— this ultimate freedom was not known by
the name "freedom."

In the symbolic vocabulary of Greece,

the condition of moral completion.is understood to fall
within the range of Dike.

Dike is the perfect and unequiv

ocal Justice of Zeus, and as such it is the supra-human
freedom to do that which is right.

Thus it is the divine

characteristic which men behold across the distance which
separates their imperfect order from the perfect order of
the gods.

Dike, the ultimate and divine freedom, is a model

for mortal men; it is a guide which enriches the intermedi
ate condition of man, advising and warning the arbiter who
dwells within the free, intermediate soul.
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In Athens then, "freedom," as the noun is commonly em
ployed, is not the consummate value.

Dike, the complete

righteousness of Zeus, is the foundation upon which the im
perishable values of humanity rest.
man with his freedom.

Dike is the tutor of

We need now to examine the utterances

which articulate the experience of freedom and justice, and
shape the dialectic of the two.
2. The Dike of Hesiod
Hesiod is one of that very small number of men who gave
to Europe its historical identity.

Hesiod was a free Boetian

peasant of the eighth century who wrote not much more than a
generation after Homer.

The world of Hesiod however is not

really the same world as that of Homer, for while Homer
wrote of the heroic, Mycennaean past as it was known to him,
Hesiod addresses himself to the affairs of the present.

The

present for Hesiod is the end of the so-called Dark Age, the
time before which the Dorian invaders had destroyed the old
Mycennaean civilization and supplanted its order with a more
primitive, northern pattern of organization.

Thus Hesiod's

present is as different from that of Achilles and Odysseus
as is the present of Abram from that of Adam, Seth, and Noah.
It is a real present whose concerns are intelligible to us
as creatures of history.

It is not a happy present, for

overpopulation has made life a struggle against starvation.
One can infer much from the change in diet.

The Homeric pop

ulation is accustomed to a diet of roast meat, while the

259
Hesiodian diet consists of vegetable products.10
world then of dissatisfaction and unrest.

This is a

Hesiod's own fa-

t

ther had been an immigrant to Boetia, who, after failing at
a maritime enterprise, had taken up farming on the stony
soil of the mainland peninsula.

It is in this world of ex

istential precariousness that the light of divine justice
begins to beam as the guiding beacon for human conduct.
To say that Hesiod is the father of justice is not to
overstate the case, for the view of the world as an order
which is in some way productive of right or just relation
ships is derivative from the inspiration of Hesiod.

This is

not to suggest that the theme of justice appears first in
Hesiod; rather, Hesiod gives it its moral urgency.

Jaeger

explains of the Homeric justice relative to that of Hesiod,
. . . a vast distance separates these occasional traces
of an ethical conception of the gods, and even the
faith which governs the Odyssey, from the religious
passion of Hesiod, the herald of justice. . . He bor
rows from Homer the content of his ideal of justice,
and even some characteristic phrases to describe it.
But the reformer1s zeal with which he experiences its
compelling force, and its predominant position in his
conception of the rule of heaven and the meaning of
man's life, these mark him out as the prophet of a new
age, in which men are to build a better society,
founded upon justice.11
^Concerning the widespread misery at the end of the
Dark Age and the early archaic period see the following:
Andrew Robert Burn, The World of Hesiod: A Study of the
Greek Middle Ages, c. 900-700 B.C. (New York: Benjamin
Blom, 1966), chapter II. Gustave Glotz, Ancient Greece at
Work: An Economic History of Greece from the Homeric Period
to the Roman Conquest (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.,
1965), part II, chapters 1 and 2. C. E. Van Sickle, A Poli
tical and Cultural History of the Ancient World (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1970), I, chapters 11 and 12.
11Jaeger, Paideia, I, 67.
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Jaeger's comment that Hesiod "borrows from Homer the
content of his ideal of justice" requires some examination,
for the Homeric understanding of all normative affairs is
adapted to the heroic, aristocratic societies of which he
writes.

Certain aspects of the Homeric view are tributaries

to the new synthesis of Hesiod.

Zeus is at the apex of the

pantheon, and while he does not save the world from selfdestruction in the Iliad, he alone amongst the gods remains
neutral.

It is this Zeus who becomes capable of true, im

partial justice in the vision of Hesiod.

Similarly in

Homer, justice is understood to involve the correct treat
ment of others? above all else it is the opposite of out
rageous and savage behavior.12

Thus the Cyclops, who are

violent, lawless, inhospitable to strangers, and utterly
without political institutions, are absolutely offensive to
Homer, and Odysseus' blinding of the Cyclops is understood
13
to be an act consistent with the vengeance of Zeus.
Per
haps the easiest way to express the qualitative difference
which lies between Homer and Hesiod is to state that in
Hesiod, unlike Homer, the fantastic does not command atten
tion in and of itself.

If monstrous beings, monstrous oc

currences appear in Hesiod, the purpose is either proto-scientific or else to amplify some meaning which pertains di
rectly to the moral sphere.

Homer loves adventure and thus

12See especially Odyssey, VI, 120.
13Odyssey, IX, 478.
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he finds the Cyclops intrinsically interesting; that a di
dactic lesson obtains from the episode is of secondary im
portance.

For Hesiod, justice is a divine concern which

applies directly to mankind in its historical existence.
Thus, Homer can be exercised about the outrage of suitors
who roost for twenty years in the house of Telemachos,
courting a queen who may or may hot be a widow, while
Hesiod, like Amos and Micah, is fearful of the outrage of
the bribed judge who will deprive an honest man of his prop
erty.

To say then, as Jaeger did, that the content of the

Hesiodian justice is borrowed from Homer, is not entirely
satisfactory.

The content is the same inasmuch as in both

just action is correct, but there is a kind of correctness
which is proper to each.
clarify this.

Professor Forrest does much to

He writes that the adjective dikaios has an

earlier and a later meaning.

The opposite of the earlier

use of the term is "wild" or "uncivilised," while the oppo
site of the later meaning is "unjust" or "impious."'1'4

In

this distinction drawn according to opposites can be seen
the great advance of Hesiod over Homer.

The misbehavior of

the suitors is at bottom an aesthetic impropriety; they have
unpardonably bad manners.

The misbehavior of a bribed judge

however is a moral offense against God himself.

This real

ization, not the former, is the source of historical order
as we know it.
14W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy, 800400 B.C. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), p. 111.

Hesiod's vision is set forth in two great poems, the
Theogony and the Works and Days.

The Theogony offers

Hesiod's account of the generations of the gods.

It is not

an "impartial history" however, for Hesiod writes from a
biased point of view.

He is a partisan who celebrates the

triumph of the late, Olympian deities— Zeus and his genera
tion— gods who are not culpable for the doing of "shameful
things."

The Theogony thus accounts for the separation of

the demonic and the divine aspects of reality.

Hesiod is

the first Greek to whom Zeus is revealed as a fully moral
god, and his ascendancy amongst the gods establishes for
Hesiod the tenor of life as it ought to be conducted by men.
The Theogony is Hesiod's statement on the reality of the di
vine, and the Works and Days extends Hesiod's analysis and
exhortation into the province of mortal existence.

It is

with this domain that we are primarily concerned.
Scholarly study of the Works and Days is of course pre
eminently interested in understanding Hesiod's thought cate
gories and their ramifications in later writing.

To follow

this approach at first however is to miss the symbolic rich
ness of the existential situation which prompts the utter
ance of this peasant rhapsode.

The first reality of the

Works and Days— its instigator— is a base fellow with the
name Perses.

Perses is Hesiod's brother and the poem is ad

dressed to him.

Hesiod's address tells us a good deal about

Perses early in the poem.
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Perses, lay up these things in your heart [thumos],
and do not let that Strife who delights in mischief
hold your heart back from work, while you peep and peer
and listen to the wrangles of the court-house. Little
concern has he with quarrels and courts who has not a
year's victuals laid up betimes, even that which the
earth bears, Demeter's grain. When you have got plenty
of that, you can raise disputes and strive to get an
other's goods. But you shall have no second chance to
deal so again; nay, let us settle our dispute here with
true judgment which is of Zeus and is perfect. For we
had already divided our inheritance, but you seized the
greater share and carried if off, greatly swelling the
glory of our bribe-swallowing lords [basileas] who love
to judge such a cause as this. Fools! They know not
how much more the half is than the whole, nor what
great advantage there is in mallow and asphodel.15
Hesiod addresses himself to a defect in Perses' heart,
and in so doing, he identifies the heart as the arbiter of
the self.

Centuries later Plato will clarify this mediatory

capacity of the Hesiodian heart (thumos) when he casts it as
the third, spirited power within the soul which decides be*1 £
tween the competing inclinations of reason and desire.
The difficulty which stems from the disposition of Perses'
heart is this:

Rather than do honest work to ensure his

livelihood, Perses has intrigued with the local barons so as
to defraud Hesiod of his fair share of their father's estate.
Now, after a period of profligate living, Perses is in need,
and he threatens to go to court again so as to take that
portion which had earlier gone to Hesiod.

This aspect of

the difficulty introduces the political motif in the Works
15The Works and Days, 27-41, in Hesiod: The Homeric
Hymns and Homerica, tr. Hugh C. Evelyn-White (London:
William Heinemann, 1914) .
Re public, 439e.
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and Days, a theme that will undergo continual development in
the political philosophy of Athens.

"For we had already di

vided our inheritance, but you seized the greater share and
carried it off, greatly swelling the glory of our bribeswallowing lords . . . "

The picture is familiar.

While it is easy to recognize that Hesiod, as the fa
ther of justice, is

the first of a type

man— it should not escape our
wise the first of a type.

attention

To be sure,

the first unjust man, but it is rather
first of one type of "free man."

of

man— thejust

that Persesis like

Perses can hardly be
likely that he

is the

The picture that Hesiod

draws with Perses at its center is familiar to u s .
the annals of mankind, Perses is proto-typical.

But in

Here, after

all, is "ancient man"; or should one say, here at last is
ancient man?

In order to elucidate this novel aspect of

Perses1 character, let us observe what

Perses is not.

Perses desires fortune, but in order to get it, he does not
appear before us as

a hero or a demigod

at

war with others

of this same sort.

Nor is he a mortal who enjoys the spe

cial tutelage of some deity who uses tricks and charms to
outwit some counter deity who has established a protectorate
over his brother Hesiod.

Nor does Perses seek out sorcerers

who might by spell and incantation silence Hesiod, and so
despoil him of his inheritance.

Instead, Perses does what

we would do if we were avariciously inclined; he schemes
with corrupt officials.

In a sense then, Perses is like

Abram, and thus like us as well.

He is an ordinary man in
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historical existence.

The prehistoric blessedness of human

ity in union with divinity is opaque to him.

To say that

Perses is the instigator of the Works and Days is to say
that Hesiod's great work was produced in response to the ap
pearance of man in history.

It cannot be put more simply.

Perses knows that he is a man, only a man.

He has come to

terms with the fact of his human mediocrity, and in accept
ing this, he has put away all which appears to him to be
pretense; for Perses there are no beautiful speeches, no
weighty deeds, but only a graceless covetousness which if
successful will assure comfort until the time of his death.
This same Perses would be a coward in battle, and quite prob
ably he is conventionally religious, making due propitiation
to the gods to ensure their neutrality.

But of the divine

realm, he cares for nothing more than to avoid its disfavor.
To Hesiod, the appearance of man in the world is a
source of emergency.
be educated.

If man is here to stay, then he must

The disposition of his heart must have direc

tion, else calamity impends.

The appearance of Perses as

the representative type of man in history prompts Hesiod to
articulate the etiology of the evil condition of man which
he beholds about him in the world.

Thus, in the text of the

Works and Days, the exhortation to Perses is followed imme
diately by two myths of the fall of man.

The first of these

is the story of Prometheus' theft of fire, his gift of it to
man, and of Zeus's retaliation through the creation of Pan
dora and her jar.

The second is the account of the five
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consecutive races of men.

In respect of our interest in

Perses, we shall examine only the last two of the five ages
in the anthropogony.

The first three races of men, in or

der, are the gold, silver and bronze.
race is of iron.

The fifth and present

The race of iron is preceded immediately

by the fourth, the heroic race.

The heroic race encompasses

the mankind of the Homeric epics.

Of this epoch, Hesiod

says that the heroes are "noble, righteous, god-like, un
touched by sorrow, h a p p y . W h a t

is most significant about

this list is that it is not offset by any counter-inventory
of negative traits or circumstances.

Clearly the heroic

mankind bears only a remote connection to the mankind with
which Hesiod is familiar.

Its value to Hesiod obtains

solely in that it affords a standard of contrast for his
analysis of life in the world of familiar experience.
The existence with which Hesiod is familiar is the of
tentimes hateful existence of the Iron Age.

Of this age he

reports:
Thereafter, would that I were not among the men of
the fifth generation, but either had died before or
been born afterwards. For now truly is a race of iron,
and men never rest from labor and sorrow by day, and
from perishing by night; and the gods shall lay sore
trouble upon them. But, notwithstanding, even these
shall have some good mingled with their evils. And
Zeus will destroy this race of mortal men also when
they come to have grey hair on
the temples at their
birth.18
A list of specific evils of both a private and a public na17Works and Days, 156-169b.
18works and Days, 174-182.
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ture follows here.

Then Hesiod concludes:

And then Aidos and Nemesis, with their sweet forms
wrapped in white robes, will go from the wide-pathed
earth and forsake mankind to join the company of the
deathless gods: and bitter sorrows will be left for
mortal men, and there will be no help against evil.19
This description and prognosis for the humanity of
Hesiod's acquaintance is probably the most notable instance
of the Hesiodian pessimism; one must add though that it is a
moderate pessimism.

The evidence that Hesiod's pessimism is

not total consists in two aspects of his writing.

The first

is that with the triumph of Zeus in the Theogony the affairs
of the gods are at last set aright.

Surely this must sug

gest some possibility for improvement within the condition
of mortals.

The second is that the Works and Days is itself

an exhortatory address.
Israel is obvious:

The parallel with the prophets of

Children will be born aged; Aidos (Shame)

and Nemesis (Indignation) will depart; Zeus will destroy this
race, unless it changes the disposition of its heart!

Like

the fiber-thin thread of promise which runs through the en
venomed words of Amos, this latter condition is the barely
stated premise of the Works and Days.

Its deliverance is

the purpose of the whole address.
In his assessment of the generation to which he belongs,
Hesiod posits a range of negative attributes which contrast
with those of the earlier race of heroes.

Labor is as nec

essary as it is onerous; domestic strife abounds; worthy men

^ Works and Days, 195-201.
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are victimized by perjurers and violent usurpers; at last
men are defenseless against evil.

Again, however, Hesiod's

view is moderated when he allows that "even these shall have
some good mingled with their evils."

The negative aspect,

to be sure, is preponderant, but life is not completely be
reft of positive content.

In brief, Hesiod's picture of hu

man existence in his world (and ours) is accurate.

If we

are to appreciate the authenticity of the Hesiodian iron
race as a typical vision of historical existence, it is nec
essary that we refrain from imagining that we are not in the
broadest sense participants in the same historical world as
the inhabitants of eighth century Boetia.

Amongst us, abuse,

injustice, perjury, toilsome and unrewarding labor, though
recessive, are enduring conditions of existence.

Hesiod

tells the truth of historical existence and ventilates the
distress of the righteous soul in a timeless utterance.
Hesiod's expression of the negativity of present exis
tence exhibits a formal correspondence to a similar attesta
tion in the ExoduS:

"Then the Lord [YHWH] said, 'I have

seen the affliction of my people who are in Egypt, and have
heard their cry because of their taskmasters; I know their
sufferings . . .'"20

The case is not fully the same however,

for the miserable lot of Israel is the result of an external
hegemony which has ensnared the people from without.

Hesiod

is grappling with an internal malady which has external con20Exodus 3.7 J.
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sequences— with the intermediacy of a man whose heart turns
to wickedness more readily than to righteousness.
not Israel, nor is Zeus Yahweh.

Greece is

The old Yahwist creed un

derstood that Yahweh saved Israel through the performance of
"signs and wonders," but it seems clear in Hesiod's writing
that the salvation of Zeus occurs only inasmuch as mortals
will to regard him as paradigm.

That the heart come to feel

the paradigmatic immediacy of the Olympians is the intent of
Hesiod's address.

The primary audience of the poem is the

unjust Perses, the intermediate figure for whose conversion
Hesiod is concerned.

Inasmuch as the poem exhibits the be

lief that man can be converted to the divine path, the Works
and Days is an appeal to man in his freedom.
As was the case with Israel, we are looking at Greek
culture at a time before the idea of freedom had been spoken
aloud.

Symbolic expression of values is tied to experience

which in itself is valued, and is derivative from that ex
perience.

For this reason it is important that Jaeger con

cludes that the Boetia which Hesiod describes to us can be
called a free society.

The nobles monopolize political

power, but the peasants have a life of their own, with ex
tensive latitude in matters of personal conduct and economy.
There is extensive freedom of speech, and there is nothing
akin to serfdom or to helotry of the Laconian pattern.21

In

addition to these considerations, it is most important that
Jaeger, Paideia, I, 56.
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in Hesiod's Boetia— in sharp contrast to Attica— land could
be bought and sold easily.22

This means that there was

real, commonplace individual freedom of a quite modern sort,
for from this right to transfer property, the historian in
fers that the extended family has little power over the in
dividual.

Where the extended family is strong, land is not

permitted to leave the family.2^

By and large then, the

pattern of Hesiod's existence is one which is recognizable
as a free one to us whose vocabulary is familiar with the
concept of freedom.
In Hesiod's portrait of Perses, we behold the first
free man of whom there is record in Greece, and in that one
sense at least, the first Greek.

But does not freedom come

to more than the biography of this empty Perses?
but not necessarily.

Perhaps,

One meaning of the claim to be a free

man in a free country must always be that one can undertake
to do outrageous things without certainty of being appre
hended and punished.

Perses is a choice specimen, for he

embodies no more of freedom than that which we have desig
nated as the second moment of freedom; he is free from ex
ternal restraint, free to live a life of utter randomness.
The arbiter within has arrested his selective range at the
quantitative level of appetite; Perses is a man who wants
more.

Hesiod's picture of Perses cannot be far from Plato's
22E.g., see the advice in Works and Days, 335-340.

2^See Burn, The World of Hesiod, pp. 111-114. Not all
scholars accept the idea that land could be sold anywhere in
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mind when in Republic IV he models the tripartite composi
tion of the soul with desire (epithumia) as its lowest struc
ture.

In Plato— as in Hesiod before him— the spectre of de

sire as the basal leaning of the human self issues into a
comment on the political order as a potential curb to the
rampant satisfaction of the guests of the quantitative self.
For Hesiod though, the political aspect is less clearly pro
nounced than in Plato, for Hesiod has no concrete program
for reform.

His primary avenue of approach to the problem

of human baseness is his appeal to the human heart, for in
that central mediator of the self, he hopes to awaken a dor
mant receptivity to his "true words."

Hesiod's approach

then presupposes freedom as elemental to the human self and
to the greater political community.

Otherwise the exhorta

tion would be without purpose.
The vital question concerns which kind of freedom that
the self will display.

Will it continue as the specious and

deceptive freedom of quantitative inclination, or can it be
heightened and broadened?

Professor Solmsen, whose study

looks ahead to Aeschylus, understandably comprehends the
problem which Perses poses for thought in Aeschylean terms,
i.e., in terms of freedom.

Most significantly Solmsen con

nects the issue of human freedom in Hesiod to the beatific

eighth century Greece. The fact is however that virtually
the only evidence about life in the eighth century is that
contained in the Works and Days. It assumes that land can
be sold, and in numerous respects suggests a weak family
structure.
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vision of the Golden Age:
Man has a choice. Perses is free to choose between one
course and the opposite. So are the judges who may ei
ther accept bribes from Perses or bring the lawsuit
which is pending between him and Hesiod to a satisfac
tory end by handing down a just verdict. The road of
hybris is open to man, but so is that of dike and if he
chooses the honest course he will experience a happi
ness not quite identical with, but not much inferior
to, that enjoyed by the men of the Golden Age.24
Solmsen wisely couples freedom and justice to happiness in
his reading of Hesiod; eudaemonism is never missing from the
Greek political consciousness, and Hesiod more than Homer is
author of the principle.

In Hesiod, the prediction that

righteous conduct in the individual self and in the public
domain will lead to happiness is a proposition that has
freedom as its animus.

But as we have seen, there are

greater and lesser species of freedom.

In his exhortation

and prediction, Hesiod is in effect beseeching Perses and
the judges to become free as he is free.

And the freedom of

Hesiod is of an elevated sort; it is truly the freedom of
choice, the third moment in freedom.

Basic to the Hesiodian

faith is the belief that the freedom of the higher interme
diacy is common to all mankind; within the hearts of some,
it is a latent capacity, a potential being whose presence is
not yet visible.

In Hesiod though that which in others is

latent is fully manifest.

It is this maturity of the abil

ity for free choice which qualifies Hesiod to speak while
the others are qualified only to listen.
24Friederich Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1949), pp. 86-87.
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Like Perses, Hesiod also is in a sense the first Greek,
albeit in a firmer and more permanent respect.

For Hesiod

is the first of his type of man of whom we have record.
Both brothers share in the human primacy which occurs for
Israel in the account of Abram.

While Perses corresponds to

Abram in his doubt, Hesiod represents that trusting Abram
who dwells obediently in the command and promise of his God.
Both are human— both exhibit the human property of interme
diacy.

The man Perses is more nearly animal, Hesiod more

nearly divine.

Hesiod is a man who wills to live righ

teously, knowing full well that he could do otherwise if
only he chose.

The historical dichotomy of Perses and

Hesiod, and the types whom they represent, passes through
the centuries of Greek experience and reflection.

Aristotle

explains most concisely the possibilities inherent in this
dichotomy.
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but
when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of
all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and
he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by
intelligence and virtue, he is the most unholy and the
most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and
gluttony.25
Hesiod's own decision to live by justice is the content of
his freedom.

Above all others in Greece, Athens is the re

cipient of Hesiodian culture, and in that state it is men
who exhibit the moral freedom of this third moment whom Eu
rope recognizes as direct ancestors of its own free insti
tutions .
2^Politics, 1253a, 30.
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To say that Hesiod, in respect of his power to choose
righteousness, is free is to suggest that his character has
become individuated and that he has thus made claim to an
ethical detachment which enables him to speak to others from
a superior stance.

In following this inference, we meet

difficulty in Voegelin's interpretation of Hesiod, for
Voegelin advances a developmental thesis which denies Hesiod
individuation, and by consequence, freedom as well.

The

difficulty derives from the following desperate utterance:
"now, therefore, may neither I myself be righteous among
men, nor my son— for then it is a bad thing to be righteous
— if indeed the unrighteous shall have the greater right.
But I think that all-wise Zeus will not yet bring that to
p a s s .

"26

Voegelin comments:

This fear cannot yet be met by the resistance of a soul
that has become conscious of its own life. The soul
still is inextricably interwoven with the fabric of
social and cosmic order; when the order becomes unrigh
teous, the soul must become unrighteous too, because
life has no meaning beyond life within the order.
Strictly speaking, the soul does not yet exist. The
self-conscious resistance of a Xenophanes or Heraclitus
was out of the question; and it took several centuries
before the soul was sufficiently formed to become a
source of order in opposition to society, as it did in
the life and work of Plato.27
In our effort to resolve this difficulty, we are with
out certain final information which would be decisive.

We

do not know if Hesiod's exhortations were successful; and if
they were unsuccessful, we do not know if Hesiod and his son
26works and Days, 270-273.
270rder and History, II, 157.
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became unrighteous.
as it stands.

Thus we have only to draw on the text

In a technical sense, Voegelin cannot be

gainsaid, for in Hesiod, there is no independent soul (psy
che) as a discrete structure uniting man's intellectual and
moral powers.

But our study has shown that the reality of

freedom is manifest before the symbol, eleutheria, comes
forth to give the reality a name.

Much the same seems to be

the case with the "soul" of Hesiod.

On another matter

Voegelin overstates the case, for it is not until late that
the living soul becomes completely extricated from the fab
ric of cosmic order.

To speak of the fabric of social and

cosmic order in the same breath is misleading, for Plato's
claim to legitimacy rests on the understanding that his own
soul bears the imprint of the cosmos, and that it is thereby
funded with the power of resistance to unsatisfactory social
circumstances.

In this respect then, Plato is not fundamen

tally different from Hesiod; the centuries do not alter— or
even "develop"— the most vital content of the self under
standing.

As the soul of Plato is inextricable from the

mathematical cosmos, so the heart of Hesiod is inextricable
from the order of the Olympians.

The developmental question

then is not one of the "growth" of independent resistance to
social injustice? rather it is one of rationalization and
clarification of the nature of a resistance which is robust
in its youth.

That which is great begins great.

The affec

tive rebellion of the heart in Hesiod opens ultimately into
the articulation of the fully matured soul as the bearer of
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rational resistance borne of the vision of true order.

A

Plato was impossible before the sophistic exploration of
the possibilities of intellection and discourse.
unlike Plato, was dependent on none before him.

But Hesiod,
The true

giants of culture are the peasants who, with handmade wooden
plow, cut the first furrow straight and deep.

No less than

the eighth century prophets in their struggle against the
compromised monarchy, the vision of Hesiod in his reproof of
a predatory aristocracy is the cause of the first instance
of moral freedom for which there is record in Europe.
Can we believe that Hesiod really intends to abandon
righteousness if his exhortation goes unheeded?

Is integra

tion within the social fabric of irresistible importance to
one who alone has discovered the true nature of Zeus, and
who through his discovery has become free?
likely.
peasant.

This seems un

The mandarin has difficulty in feeling with the
The true sense of Hesiod's utterance is only this:

"For all my righteousness I am but a man, and I can be
crushed by abuse."

There is no developmental problem here;

instead there is an existential dilemma.

Hesiod is a peas

ant, and if the courts deprive him of his property he will
be without a livelihood.

Hesiod tells us of no disciples

whose aid might relieve him in penury.

Nor is he an Elijah;

though he knows the ways of Zeus, he has no direct contact
with the god so as to receive comfort from the source of his
allegiance.

Hesiod indeed is free, but as we recognized

in the discussion of those contemporaries of Hesiod, the
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prophets of Israel, economic freedom is the primary freedom,
itself supportive of the more spiritually laden freedom to
choose righteousness.

If Hesiod loses his farm, will he

remain free to follow the way of justice, or will the exi
gencies of survival necessitate that he become a brigand?
This is the question whose answer Hesiod cannot know.

Though

free, Hesiod is but a man, not an immortal deity, and his
candor is such that he admits the fear that his righteousness
might be destroyed, and with it, the person who he knows
himself to be.

Hesiod concludes the desperate utterance with

a vocation of faith:

"But I think that all-wise Zeus will

not yet bring that to pass."

This exalted Zeus, infinitely

more divine than the Zeus of Homer, is the guardian of
Hesiod's remaining the kind of man who he is, a kind whom
we know as free man.
As consciousness of freedom grew in Greece, personal and
social freedom could not be maintained without a regulative
ideal which lent measure and substance to free life, and so
made its continuance possible.

This ideal is the fourth

moment of freedom, the divine measure itself.
it is the complete dike of Zeus.

His hold on dike enabled

Hesiod to become a teacher of men.

The implicit exhortation

within all teaching is the invitation:
I am better than you."

For Hesiod,

"Heed my words, for

And the source of this betterness is

the content of teaching, the benefaction bestowed upon those
whose business it is to learn.

In Hesiod this content is

Dike, daughter of Zeus, and the influence of divine Dike
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upon the freedom of Athens is so decisive that we need to
examine the major provisions of Hesiod's articulation of the
term.28
With regard to the Hesiodian understanding of "just" or
"right," it is necessary to distinguish three characteris
tics.

First is its place in the world, second is its place

in the universe, and third is the nature of its consequences.
By way of approach to these characteristics, we should con
sider that although Hesiod is the major progenitor of
Athenian political philosophy, there is not yet in Hesiod's
own writing a sharp delineation between the personal and
political spheres; there is no "ethics," nor is there a
"politics."

The reason for this non-distribution is that in

the time and place of Hesiod, the realm of the political has
not yet become clearly visible.

In the absence of open and

public deliberation, the authoritative allocation of values
is performed by a ruling nobility.

Hence the plea for gov

ernmental justice is generically identical with the plea that
Perses become just, for it is a plea to the person of the
28In the Works and Days and also in the Theogony, Hesiod
personifies a number of important forces in the world, both
normative and physical, which were not personified in Homer,
and which never achieved the anthropomorphic development of
the Homeric, Olympian pantheon. One of these forces is dike.
When the term appears in this study as Dike, the reference is
to Hesiod's specific understanding about this common Greek
word. Hesiod's audience was at best unsophisticated.
(Two
and a half centuries later, in Attica, Peisistratus dressed
up a country girl as Athena, and when he brought her into
Athens, the people knelt in worship.) For such an audience
the representation of Dik§ as a living deity must have helped
Hesiod to communicate the enlarged meaning which he had dis
covered for this word.
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ruler.

To say that there is little suggestion of a "politi

cal philosophy" in Hesiod is to say then that Hesiod does
not call into question the structure of government or the
constitution of the community as more or less suitable ves
sels for the performance of right.

His interest is only that

the established order behave as it should, by right, behave.
This simplistic approach is consistent with Hesiod's address
to the heart.
Political philosophy is unmistakably incipient in
Hesiod however, for while the Works and Days shrinks from
any suggestion of constitutional reform, the Theogony deals
with that very topic as it pertains to the divine realm.

The

Theogony details at length the proper structure of relation
ships amongst the gods, with righteous Zeus in clear command
of the divine realm.

With this accomplishment of Hesiod, it

is but a short step to Athenian political philosophy, which,
beginning with Solon, assays the proper structure for human
relationships.

In addition to the reform and purification

of the pantheon, there is a further clue in Hesiod that a
political philosophy is nigh.

Burn calls attention to the

uniqueness of the following in eighth century thought:
Alike with him who does wrong to a suppliant or a guest,
or who goes up to his brother's bed and commits unnat
ural sin in lying with his wife, or who infatuately
offends against fatherless children, or who abuses his
old father at the cheerless threshold of old age and
attacks him with harsh words, truly Zeus himself is
angry, and at the last lays on him a heavy requittal for
his evil d o i n g . 2 9
29Works and Days, 327-334.
p. 77.

See Burn, World of Hesiod,
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As Burn explains, what is arrestirig about this thought is
that is places wrongs done to suppliants and orphans on a
plane equal to wrongs against members of one's family.

The

significance of this claim is that the universal justice of
Zeus has overtaken the pre-moral piety of the family to its
particular gods.

Zeus will punish both types of wrong, with

out greater interest in either.

In a peculiar Greek fashion,

this understanding of Hesiod runs parallel to the universalism of the prophets.

Zeus, like Yahweh, is the judge of all,

and his justice is non-partisan.

While this is not in itself

political philosophy, it is a realization which was necessary
for the beginning of overt political reflection.

Most cer

tainly Cleisthenes' radical reform of the family structure
in Attica in the late sixth century would have been impos
sible had this awareness not taken hold at some earlier time.
The place of right in the world is in man's humanity.
But you, Perses, lay up these things within your
heart and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to
think of violence. For the son of Cronos has ordained
this law for men, that fishes and beasts and winged
fowls should devour one another, for right is not in
them; but to mankind he gave right which proves far
the best. For whoever knows the right and is ready to
speak it, far-seeing Zeus gives him prosperity; but
whoever deliberately lies in his witness and forswears
himself, is left obscure thereafter. But the generation
of man who swears truly is better thenceforward.30
The contents of this passage upon which we will concentrate
•^Works and Days, 274-285. Cf. Politics, 1253a, 10,
Aristotle*s identification of speech as the specifically
human power to assay the expedient and the just. Boetian
poetry instructs Athenian philosophy.
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are the listening, the thinking, the two opposed uses of
speech, and the relation of all these to justice.

In the

evil times in which Hesiod lived, it became necessary to
explain that which to later generations has been obvious,
i.e., that there is at the least a latent qualitative dif
ference between men and beasts.

Men differ from the latter

in that they are able in thought to mold the world as it
ought to be, and then to communicate their knowledge of the
world as it ought to be in speech so that their fellows may
know right as well.

Hesiod is the first to articulate the

anthropology of man as a being who can discover right in
thought and then make it understood in speech.

It had become

necessary to point up the obvious— that there is a difference
in kind between men and predatory beasts— because the pre
vailing conditions of existence worked so as to conceal that
difference in being.

We are able to understand this circum

stance as the meonic misuse of freedom.

Free men, Perses

and the magistrates, attempt to get the goods of life by
behaving as predators.
In these circumstances the assertion of the obvious—
that justice, and knowledge and speech of it, is the core
power of human life— is itself a demonstration of the verac
ity of the claim, for the claim would not be rendered if
circumstances did not contradict it.

To inject this truth

into the unjust circumstances which were Hesiod's lot is to
set the divine vection of humanity against the bestial.
who does this brings danger upon himself by attacking the

One
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legitimacy of the established unjust deployment of powers.
This is the position of Hesiod; while it might be more pru
dent for him to remain silent, or at any rate to confine his
reprimand to Perses and leave the princes alone, Hesiod risks
himself in defense of the obvious.

The princes are like a

savage beast.
And now I will tell a fable for princes who themselves
understand. Thus said the hawk to the nightingale with
speckled neck, while he carried her high up among the
clouds, gripped fast in his talons, and she, pierced by
his crooked talons, cried pitifully. To her he spoke
disdainfully:
"Miserable thing, why do you cry out?
One far stronger than you now holds you fast, and you
must go wherever I take you, songstress as you are.
And if I please I will make my meal of you, or let you
go. He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger,
for he does not get the mastery and suffers pain besides
his shame." So said the swiftly flying hawk, the long
winged bird.31
Surely the princes were unhappy with this revealing compar
ison; surely its utterance brought danger to Hesiod and his
family.

For Hesiod the risk of himself is worth the hazard,

for as we have seen, he considers himself lost at any rate
if right does not prevail.

In these comments on the powers

of humanity to know and speak justice, this great maker of
culture appears with a nobility which surpasses even that of
the prophets, for the prophets respond to the direct commis
sion of Yahweh; for this, they are not alone.
free Greek person par excellence.
been "taken."

Hesiod is the

He has not, like Amos,

Instead, it is his own tropism to the divine

which instructs his allegiance to the justice of Zeus and
his brave rebuke to the unjust rulers.
33-works and Days, 201-212.
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The place of right in the world is in man's humanity,
and the content of right appears in the correct discharge of
inter-human relationships and in work.

But in Hesiod, there

is little of the much celebrated "Greek humanism," for right
in the life of mankind obtains only by virtue of the per
manent residence of Right in a supra-human domain.

"And

there is virgin Justice [Dike], the daughter of Zeus, who is
honoured and reverenced among the gods who dwell on
OO

Olympus . .

Hesiod's location of Justice near the

summit of the Olympian pantheon is possibly the earliest
exercise in the realist ontology of morals, for Right, the
beloved daughter of Zeus, is herself the permanent and uni
versal ground who by her cosmic stature as Right lends sub
stantiality to all particular instances of right among men
in historical existence.

Only if men were themselves gods

would the situation be otherwise.

Only if men were immortal,

never prone to error, would they be entities capable of gen
erating within themselves the universal power which lends
being to existence.

Since man is not this character, since

instead his character is particular and intermediate, ontologically suspended between the polarity of justice and in
justice, and anthropologically enmeshed within both, he
cannot be for himself the author of that most exalted human
content which lies within him.
ticipant.

Man is not author but par

The Fourth Evangelist does not bid men to be the

3^Works and Days, 256-257.
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logos, but to continue in it; nor does Hesiod expect Perses
and the nobles to be Right, but to open their hearts to her
and so become capable to do right.

The substantive capacity

of divinity to be Right is the ultimate, the ontic condition
of freedom, and the participatory capacity of man to appre
hend this right and to act accordingly is the penultimate
moment in freedom— human intermediacy at its highest plane.
The complete Right of the gods serves to instruct man in his
freedom, making it a freedom which approaches ontic comple
tion, rather than a freedom whose movement is pointless and
bestial.
It is necessary to recite these elementary consider
ations because they are elemental in the writing of Hesiod.
They make their first appearance in the world with his
vision.

In the experience of Athens as a free country, and

as a model to later mankind, Hesiod's poetry is the anchor
of the idea of human freedom which is instructed by divine
righteousness.

That idea is the crux of Solon and Aeschylus.

The Hesiodian foundation of freedom with justice entails
that human life is finite and intermediate.

For this reason,

Hesiod does not demand of Perses and the nobles that they
become what they cannot be, to wit, the ontic structure for
their own lives.

More than any other period, the eighth

century of Hesiod and Amos is the time of truth.

The time

of truth is the hypostatic moment in the definition of his
torical humanity, for it is the moment in which man begins
as man, distinct from chthonian spirits, heroes, demigods.
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At the time of truth, man understands himself simply as man;
he is conscious of himself as a character undergoing birth,
career, death.

When this consciousness appears, then with

it comes the truth of man as intermediate between heaven and
earth, bearing the seed for justice and injustice, discover
ing the template for both within the self and the ultimate
being of both in realms beyond the self.

The "beyondness"

of these capacities is the necessary condition which under
lies the freedom of man, for he must exercise discretion as
he attempts to objectify himself according to these patterns
which are ultimately beyond him.

This is the substance of

Hesiod's understanding of self and world.

Hesiod's true

words attempt to obtain for man the best settlement possible,
given the limits inherent in human historical existence.

To

attempt more, to make of man the source of his own justice,
is to seek after a suspension of humanity itself.

Hesiod's

true words do not attempt to overcome man, but to guide him
by grounding human justice within the perfect fabric of di
vine Justice.
The most comprehensively symbolic of Hesiod's several
visions is the apocalypse of the two cities, the one devoted
to justice and the other given in injustice.

This is

Hesiod's own version of the prophetic understanding that man
must consciously choose between life and death.
former city we learn, " . . .

Of the

they who give straight judg

ments to strangers and to the men of the land, and go not
aside from what is just, their city flourishes and the
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people prosper in it.”

This city has peace instead of war,

food instead of famine, fecundity instead of barrenness.
the unjust city, " . . .

Of

for those who practise violence and

cruel deeds far-seeing Zeus, the son of Cronos, ordains a
punishment.

Often even a whole city suffers for a bad man

who sins and devises presumptuous deeds."

33

In order that

this vision be understood for what it is, it is necessary to
explain first that Hesiod is not— as may seem to be the case
— promulgating a doctrine of Zeus as a god who intervenes in
history on behalf of the righteous.

In this passage, it is

Zeus who brings good fortune, or ill, for the simple reason
that the Greeks before the age of *enlightenment attributed
all important happenings to the gods.

In accepting this

customary view, Hesiod is not essentially different from
Homer, except inasmuch as Zeus is the only god about whom
Hesiod cares.

It is important that this be understood, for

the meaning which Hesiod intends here is almost mechanistic,
not greatly different from Deutero Isaiah's understanding of
sin as the comprehensive term which explains self-destruc
tion in history.

Hesiod's meaning here presages the prin

ciple of historical causality which will appear in Solon in
wholly secular form:

The city which lives righteously, ser

iously trying to do justice to all, makes its own happiness.
The city which has no scruple about violence (hybris, the
human outrage which accepts no moderating curbs) poisons its
33Works and Days, 225 ff.

287
own future and goes to destruction by its own hand.
The apocalypse of the two cities is the opportune point
for this study to move from Hesiod to Solon.

The vision of

the two cities is prophetic, for it predicts the nature of
the "Greek complaint" in the ensuing centuries.

The horribly

murderous class struggles of the poleis in the historical
period came as a consequence of the organization of cities
according to the second, unjust pattern.

This did not hap

pen in Athens because there arose in that city a statesman
who gave "straight judgments to strangers and to the men of
the land."
3. The Solonic Liberation
In the invocation to the Theogony, Hesiod establishes
in the symbolic imagination of Greece the transcultural
analogue of the good prince to the good god.
Whomsoever of heaven-nourished princes the daughters of
great Zeus honor, and behold him at his birth, they
pour sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his lips flow
gracious words. All the people look towards him while
he settles causes with true judgments; and he, speaking
surely, would soon make wise end even of a great quar
rel; for therefore are there princes wise in heart, be
cause when the people are being misguided in their
assembly, they set right the matter again with ease,
persuading them with gentle words.
For it is through the Muses and far-shooting Apollo
that there are singers and harpers upon the earth; but
princes are of Zeus.34
The prince who is the mortal analogue of Zeus is given the
capacity for "gracious words," "true judgments," with which

34Theogony, 81-90, 94-95.
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to settle causes; this prince is "wise in heart," "persuad
ing them with gentle words."
In this imagery of the good prince, we behold the seed
of a concept which would flower some four centuries later in
Plato's construction of the philosopher-ruler.

But the late

Platonic figure who has become a paradigm for the ruler
would have been impossible had not the divinely endowed
prince of Hesiod's vision become flesh at some point in his
tory.

Plato was an Athenian, and to be an Athenian involved

the understanding that one's identity as an Athenian was
derivative in the first instance from the life and work of
Theseus in legend and of Solon in history.

For all intents

and purposes, Solon was the first Athenian, and he was like
wise the sort of ruler whom Hesiod described in the invoca
tion to the Theogony.
In the strictest sense, Solon was not a prince
(basileus); rather, he was an archon, or first citizen, thus
indicating a selective rather than hereditary basis for
rulership.

But the incipient difference between monarchial

and republican forms in the Athenian sixth century makes
little difference where the content of Solon's person and
action is concerned.

In all respects he conforms to Hesiod's

picture of the divinely blessed prince.

Indeed, it is

through the statesmanship of Solon that Hesiod's "true words"
receive their political induction, and so become the spir
itual constitution of Athens.

Our direct knowledge of Solon

is through fragments of his poems that have been preserved
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as quotations in various later Greek texts.

Solmsen com

ments on the relationship of these fragments of Solon to the
writing of Hesiod:

"The relationship which Hesiod had estab»

lished between hybris, wealth, the punishment of Zeus, and
Ate had become canonical."

35

To say that the Hesiodian

ethos had become canonical is to say that it was a living
corpus of ideas which could be put to use as a guide for
action.

That, indeed, was the character of Solon's work.

The history of Athens as a moral entity in history has
its beginning in circumstances similar to those under which
Israel began.

That is, Athens before Solon was an unhappy

country, ridden by social strife, beset with the enslavement
of its own people.

The history of Attica before Solon is

extremely dim, for relative to Corinth or the Ionic Greek
poleis it was an "underdeveloped country" which left little
record.

Less even is known about this country and its people

than is known about Israel in Goshen.

The absence of infor

mation serves only to goad on the historian's detective
lust, and to sharpen his artistry.

Of the historical recon

structions of the Attican situation at the time of Solon,
the most ambitious and most complete is Woodhouse's study.
For the purposes of our own interest in the symbols of lib
eration, we need go no farther with Woodhouse than to agree
that the accounts of both Aristotle and Plutarch are con
fused due to inadequate information, and to learn that

35Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 109.
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Aristotle's account safely warrants the following conclu
sions:
1. There was a dependent agricultural class called
Hektemores.
2. The name had something to do with the conditions of
service.
3. They were extremely bitter toward the rich, on whom
they were dependent.
4. The primitive law of debt was operative, with de
fault causing distraint of the person, his family
and his possessions.
We will suppose also that Aristotle was wrong in identifying
the Hektemores with the debtors sold into slavery, since the
former were giving a share of their produce to the landlord,
and thus would not have been sold by him to someone else.
Whether the Hektemore gave one sixth or five sixths of his
produce to the landlord, we do not know; the extremity of
the bitterness to which all sources are witness commends the
latter figure.

We suppose that the Horoi, or ward stones,

were emblematic of the erstwhile free family holdings which
were at last under perpetual lien to a noble, and that the
families which occupied these holdings were the Hektemore
serfs.

Whatever the exact truth may be about the Hektemores

and the debtors, Glotz's inference about the general pattern
36See W. J. Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator: A Study of
the Agrarian Problem in Attika in the Seventh Century (New
York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1965), p. 23. See also Glotz,
Ancient Greece at Work, part II, chapter 2, Victor Ehrenberg,
From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization Dur
ing the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C. (London: Methuen and
Co., Ltd., 1968), chapter 3, Forrest, The Emergence of Greek
Democracy, chapter 6, Kathleen Freeman, The Work and Life of
Solon (London: Oxford University Press, 1926) , part I.
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of events is certain.

The time in which Solon appeared was

a time which demanded a decision; would Athens be another
Sparta, with the productive element in society a permanently
servile caste, or would Athens be different?3^

Solon decided

for his country, against helotry, for freedom.
The history of Athens begins with Solon's accession to
the archonship.
ishes.

After that, the need for supposition van

We know that Solon abolished Hektemorage for all

time, and that this was executed with such thoroughness that
archaeology has never retrieved so much as one of the hated
Horoi.

It is possible that they were punished by burial at

sea, just as a stone which falls upon a man and kills him
would be punished under the primitive law of homicide.

We

know that Solon cancelled all debts that were outstanding
when he took the archonship, thus sundering the usurious web
through which the aristocrats held the people in fear and
hunger.

We know that Solon's law broke with custom and for-

3^Glotz, Ancient Greece at Work, p. 84. See also
Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, pp. 56-57 and 160-161. Al
though in a general sense the association of hektemorage
with helotry is legitimate, it should be qualified. While
Sparta is one of the permanent scandals of Europe because of
its inhuman institutions, it is also Europe's first consti
tutional state. Thus, no Spartan would agree with this
association because in Laconia, the inferior caste was (be
lieved to be) non-Dorian, and thus, non-Greek. No such dis
tinction existed in Attica. The Spartiates were themselves
Equals, and had become such through the constitutional pro
gram of a ruler whom they called Lycurgus. The Lycurgan re
form in the seventh century paralleled the Solonic reform of
the sixth century in that both attenuated the voraciousness
of a ruling aristocracy. But, characteristically, the
Spartan reform resulted from a military innovation, the ad
vent of Hoplite infantry, while the Athenian reform was in
equal proportions pragmatic and moral. See Forrest, Emer
gence of Greek Democracy, pp. 138. ff.
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bade the making of loans secured upon the person.

Unlike

many other of the reforms, this was copied throughout
38
Greece.
We know also that Solon's liberation went beyond
the range of economic freedom, for his popular court of ap
peals is the earliest of the famous Athenian participatory
political bodies.

Solon's performance as archon is one of

the great miracles of history, for Solon understood what
Greeks all the way to the Hellenistic period often failed to
understand, i.e., that there must be unity within plurality
for life to continue.

The guiding term of Solonic unity is

divine justice, and its consequence for Athens was freedom.
Several centuries later we hear the familiar boast of
Pericles, "In this land of ours there have always been the
same people living from generation to generation up till
now, and they, by their courage and their virtues, have
handed it on to us, a free c o u n t r y . T h e claim that
Athens is a free country was made good at a definite place
and time.

The setting was one in which civil war impended

as* a certainty.

The early skirmishes had already been

fought.
No one tells the story of Solon's career in Athens
better than Solon himself.
to the fragments.

Thus, we have frequent recourse

Here Solon tells of the negativity of

existence in the polis for which he has become archon.
88Westerman, Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiq
uity, pp. 4-5.
88Thucydides, Peloponnesian W a r , II, 4, tr. Rex Warner
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954).
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Lo, even now there cometh upon the whole city a plague
which none may escape. The people have come quickly
into degrading bondage; bondage rouseth from their
sleep war and civil strife; and war destroyeth many in
the beauty of their youth. As if she were the prey of
foreign foes, our beloved city is rapidly wasted and
consumed in those secret conspiracies which are the
delight of dishonest men.
These are the evils which stalk at home. Mean
while the poor and needy in great numbers are loaded
with shameful bonds and sold into slavery in foreign
lands . .. Thus public calamity
cometh to the house
of every
individual, and a man is no longer safe within
the gates of his own court, which refuse him their pro
tection. It leapeth over the garden-wall, however high
it be, and surely findeth him out, though he run and
hide himself in the inmost corner of his chamber.4®
The negativity of existence to which Solon bears witness
here is a more complex matter than the slavery of Israel in
Egypt.

Israel is simply a subject people— an inferior caste

— in a foreign land.

Complexity enters the Israelite liber

ation drama only through the struggle of the transcendent
God, Yahweh, against the god-king, the Pharaoh.

The Athenian

situation which Solon laments is the classic malady of the
polis.

The country has become bi-polar, the rich oppressing

the poor, the

poor resentful of the rich.

Solon

consis

tently blames

the unhappy condition on the rich, and so dis

sociates himself from the aristocratic ethos of his own
origin, for it is aristocratic greed which has led the
country to the brink of civil war.

In Solon's description

of Athens, it seems as if the type of man whom Hesiod had
40Pragment XII, 17-29, in Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the
Athenian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919).
Unfortunately there is no consistent international notation
for the fragments of Solon. This study follows the notation
of the Linforth text and translation.
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recognized in his brother Perses had finally become ascendant
in all affairs, making injustice the norm for all life.

The

aristocrats had practised a systematic form of theft, and
now the poor were prepared to repay theft with murder.
The negative circumstances which Solon describes are at
once a function of inequitable economic organization and
human callousness.

This set of conditions is not unfamiliar

to the twentieth century.

In parts of the world the peasant

lives from one generation to the next, in the shadow of the
money lender.

Work as he will, he never gets out of debt,

and his life is not really his own.

The lesson which

Herodotus drew so starkly is not hopelessly overdrawn; Greece
was not Asia, and the institution of debt slavery came to be
viewed in Athens as a perversion of right order.

Slavery

and starvation-level serfdom in Athens then were not the
simple matter that slavery for Israel had been in Egypt, for
in Athens enslavement of the people came as the last step in
a series of movements that were considered to be intrinsi
cally u n j u s t . S o l o n was the veritable mind of Athens, and
41If Homer is the spokesman for the most basic layer of
Greek imagination, then there was something decidedly unGreek afoot in both Hesiod's Boetia and in pre-Solonic
Athens. Odysseus, a chieftain, exerts a rule which is hardly
constitutional, nor can his subjects be called free in an
exact sense. Yet his rule is wholly paternalistic, and the
swineherd Eumaios is bound to the master by a bond of true
love. Odysseus would never wilfully despoil a subject for
any act short of disloyalty. Thus, while dike in Homer
would not apply to a relationship so banal as that between
lord and tenant, there is an unspoken understanding that the
great man will deal fairly with inferiors, and further, that
he will protect and sustain them in time of trouble.
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to him the free condition of man— even if that condition
were as yet unarticulated— is the normal condition of man,
and any design which served to undo it is seen as malady, as
"public calamity."

Solon's symbol of an ill which leaps

over the wall of one's courtyard and finds even the one who
hides from it likens the moral condition of Athens to the
physical condition of a city which is beset by the plague.
This symbol is particularly telling, for only the rich cred
itor will have a high courtyard wall; the plague of injus
tice for which the oppressor is responsible will consume him
as surely as

it will the oppressed.

The movement as Solon

describes it is from greed to servitude to public ruin.
This is the pattern of negativity in Athens.
In Athens as in Israel, the movement from slavery to
freedom has its beginning in the articulation of the nega
tivity of present existence.

The present condition— the

slave condition— is a fallen estate, a domain of misery
which has been wrought by injustice.

The opposite condition

then will be a condition of positivity, of happiness, of
freedom, and it will be the accomplishment of a righteous
disposition.

Liberation from slavery, according to the prin

ciple of right, is thus the beginning of Athens as a free
moral order in history, just as was the case in Israel.

In

Athens the human bearer of this right is Solon, who was
called to the leadership in an effort to avoid civil war.
Solon is for Athens the same character as Moses for Israel.
He is liberator, law giver, savior, and ancestor.
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The comprehensive name for Solon's program is
Seisachtheia, the shaking-off-of-burdens.

Below is Solon's

description of the several achievements of this program.
I removed the stones of her bondage which had been
planted everywhere, and she who was slave before is now
free. I brought back to their own divinely founded
home many Athenians who justly or unjustly had been
sold into slavery in foreign lands, and I brought back
those whom destitution had driven into exile, and who,
through wandering long abroad, no longer spoke the
Attic tongue; and I restored to liberty those who had
been degraded to slavery here in their own land and
trembled at their masters' whims. These things I ac
complished through arbitrary action, bringing force to
the support of the dictates of justice, and I followed
through to the end the course which I promised. On the
other hand, I drafted laws, which show equal consider
ation for the upper and lower classes, and provide a
fair administration of justice for every individual.42
Before the full significance of this statement can be clear,
it is necessary to pause and consider the avenues of histor
ical inquiry which have led us to this statement.
42

IX, 5-20. Two phrases here require explanation.
(1) " . . . she who was slave before is now free" refers to
the land. The antecedent of "she" is Ge melaina, Black
Earth. Since Attic law forbade that land leave the family,
the aristocrats had "enslaved" the land of the demos through
the legal ruse of Hektemorage. Thus they had its perpetual
use without legal title to it. This liberation of the land
is no less important than the liberation of the people be
cause— as we have urged elsewhere— economic freedom is the
primary, concrete freedom that the archaic witness identi
fies.
(2) In the passage, " . . . many Athenians who justly
or unjustly had been sold into slavery . . .", the meaning
is legal, not moral. That is, some had been sold according
to the provisions of the old customary law, or perhaps ac
cording to the code of Dracon. Others had been sold ille
gally, possibly through kidnap or piracy. The distinction
between legal or illegal passage into slavery is somewhat
ambiguous, since the laws— until the time of Dracon in the
generation before Solon— had been unwritten, and the magis
trates were always aristocrats. Thus Solon's reform of the
system of justice was intended to replace the aristocratic
monopoly with a system which involved both classes in the
administration of moderate written laws.
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We began our historical search for symbols on the sug
gestion of the Fourth Evangelist that the abidance of the
free son in the house complements the meaning of participa
tory continuance in the unifying logos.

Thus, in chronolog

ical progression we have moved forward from the Yahwist's
narrative of Abram and Exodus which incorporates materials
from the second millenium.

In the Abram narrative the dis

tinction between the two sons showed that the son of the
free mother is nearer to the positive range than is the son
of the slave; in the Exodus narrative, we recognized a bur
geoning spirit of divine righteousness in creative and liberative opposition to pharaonic oppression.

In the eighth

century, with the writing prophets and with Hesiod, we have
seen that the human apprehension of divine righteousness is
given explicit articulation in the Hebrew term tsedaqah and
the Greek term dik§.

In both, the righteousness of God has

a liberative character through its opposition to all manner
of human exploitation.

Now, in the early sixth century with

Solon's description of the Disburdenment, we behold at last
the fire which has been making the smoke.

In this passage

is the earliest articulation of the connection of freedom
with justice, and it confirms the thesis which we have ad
vanced.

Freedom is derivative from justice.

11. . . 1 re

stored to liberty those who had been degraded to slav
ery . . . bringing force to the support of the dictates of
j u s t i c e . " 4 **

indeed, when one draws near to the pulse of

43In the Greek text the association of freedom with
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this issue as it throbs in the symbols of antiquity, it is
almost too much to say that freedom is "derivative," for
that construction assigns some independent importance to
freedom.

It is more true to say that in the primal litera

ture of freedom, freedom is a modality of justice, never be
coming fully separate from its parent force.

That is why we

wait so many centuries to hear the connection spoken aloud.
When at last we do hear it, it is a practical administrator,
not a poet or prophet, who makes explicit the implications
of the justice which binds the community in peace as one, by
freeing each to make a decent living and to enjoy the esteem
which is the property of the free man.

The beginning of

Athenian history with Solon is also the beginning of freedom
as an explicit concern of political order.
The Solonic liberation is the Greek parallel to the
much earlier liberation of the Hebrews from the grasp of the
Pharaoh.

The former event, the Exodus, is like the acorn,

the latter like the oak.

The Exodus narrative bears com

pactly the imprint for justice and its consequence, freedom,
while the Solonic reform displays visibly the inner inten
tion of the earlier movement.

While it is necessary to rec

ognize the parallelism of occurrences at the beginning of
both Athens and Israel, it is likewise necessary to point up
the broad differences in the formative experiences of both

justice is verbally closer than in our translation, with
"freedom" in line fifteen and "justice" in line sixteen.

societies.

Both are societies arrested in a condition of

negativity; both are blemished because of slavery.

For

both, the liberation— the negation of negativity— is the
beginning of a historical movement toward moral and politi
cal completion.

The crucial difference concerns the nature

of the impetus toward liberation and the manner of its com
pletion.

Voegelin has identified the generic difference be

tween revelation and philosophy.

At base, this means that

for Israel, liberation, redemption, salvation obtains as the
transcendent God reveals himself and becomes a powerful
presence in the life of man.

The historical stature of

Moses derives from the fact of his being a vessel for the
command of Yahweh.

It is this underlying condition of the

life of Israel which, as we have explained, tends to eclipse
the mediatory aspect of man's humanity; for Israel, God is
the mediator for man.

This is seen best in the pastoral

vision of Micah; Yahweh will lead Israel as a shepherd leads
the flock.

In Athens there was no such understanding, and

thus the humanity of men could and did develop.

Although

Hesiod, in the invocation to the Theogony, claims inspira
tion by the Muses, and so exhibits a formal resemblance to
Moses in Midian, the development of man as a mediatory self
is apparent in the Works and Days.

In the fragments of

Solon, it is the dominant theme which shows through the text
repeatedly.

Solon is neither oracle nor bard; he is a phi

losopher— a loving friend of wisdom.44

And that is to say

44Plato calls Solon philosopher in Phaedrus, 278c.
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that Solon is man looking at once within and beyond himself
in order to discover a sure orient for political action by
which he may mediate the human misery which confronts him.
This is not humanism.

Humanism is the heterodox mode of

Greek intellection, and its termihus is sophism, the denial
of the possibility of real transcendence.

Solon indeed is

one of the fathers of the orthodox position.

That God has

not addressed Solon directly does not mean that the divine
will is irrelevant to Solon.

Quite the contrary.

It means

that in the absence of revelation, Solon is left with phi
losophy— with love of the wisdom which in its most elevated
nature is divine.

The discovery of wisdom, and with it, the

correct measure, is the hard business of philosophy, and the
strenuous discipline which this requires brings to maturity
the human soul and accents the divine element within it.
One brief fragment quoted by Clement of Alexandria reveals
Solon's own struggle to learn of the divine plan for the
world.

"Difficult indeed is it to conceive the inscrutable

measure of his wisdom, within which alone abideth the power
to bring all things to fulfillment."^

This difficult task

is philosophy itself.
Moses, the prophet, conveys the word of Yahweh to the
Pharaoh, but Yahweh himself, through signs and wonders,
works the liberation of Israel.

Cf. Plutarch, Solon, II, 2.
4 5XXXI.

Solon assays the situation

301
from the vantage point of a human whose loyalty is to Zeus,
and he determines that present existence is unjust.

Upon

this conclusion he deliberates the proper course which will
rectify the civic misery which he beholds.

Deliberation is

followed by legislation, a course of action put forth in
speech as public policy.

The content of the legislation is

basic in its rectificatory thrust.

Debts are abolished;

those who were enslaved are freed; exiles are recovered.
The beginning of free political life in Athens is a good
deal less dramatic than the foundation of the Israelite theopolity through divine liberation.

Thus, there are commen

tators who admonish us that Solon was a "practical man," not
a philosopher or idealist, even that he was a party politic
ian.4^

These are spurious distinctions, for praxis is that

activity in history which builds unto permanence, and in so
building, couples the reality of being to the mortal exis
tence of necessity and survival.
this enduring practicality.

Philosophy is the tutor of

The Solonic liberation estab

lishes the polis as a moral entity whose permanent business
is to guarantee social peace under conditions of justice
with freedom.

There is no "milk and honey" in or about

Solonic Athens, but there is legislation forbidding the ex
port of cereals so that the hungry may have bread.

The

proverb, "philosophy bakes no bread" has no support in the
biography of Solon, for in his reform the ideal— "the inscru4®Woodhouse, Solon the Liberator, pp. 167-168.
Emergence of Greek Democracy, pp. 160-161.

Forrest,
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table measure of his wisdom”— is understood to address such
unphilosophic matters as hunger and exile.

The Mosaic and

Solonic episodes show that revelation and philosophy share
a common interest in these concrete consequences of injus
tice.
It is clear in the fragments of Solon that the freedom
of the people, though an indispensable condition of life in
the well-ordered society, is not the primary goal of public
life.

Freedom emerges as more a means to the ends of peace,

justice, and order.

Solon is the statesman who oversees a

variegated community . ^

In such a community the harmonious

balance of forces requires that freedom be present so that
the several forces might contribute their due.

But the ends

for which freedom serves as the means are likewise the limit
ing conditions of freedom.

For freedom to have positive im

port in the affairs of life, it cannot be random; it must
have scope.
Aristotle quotes Solon;
"To the common people I have given such a measure
of privilege as sufficeth them, neither robbing them of
the rights they had, nor holding out the hope of greater
ones; and I have taken equal thought for those who were
possessed of power and who were looked up to because of
their wealth, careful that they, too, should suffer no
indignity. I have taken a stand which enables me to
hold a stout shield over both groups, and I have allowed
neither to triumph unjustly over the other."
In another passage he explains what he believes to
be the right way of dealing with the people;
"The populace will follow its leaders best if it
^ S e e Solon's description of the variety of endeavors
and rewards, XL, 43-62.
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is neither left too free nor subjected to too much
restraint. For excess giveth birth to arrogance, when
great prosperity attendeth upon men whose minds lack
sober judgment."48
In these dicta, Solon at least begins to approach the
schematic elegance of the Fourth Evangelist's structure of
freedom.

If freedom in Solonic Athens does not culminate in

conscious participation of all in Peace, Justice, Order (who
in Hesiod are divine personages), and in the measure which
is resident within this trinity, political life is nonethe
less conducted with their presence in view.^®

In the time

of Solon these divine powers are present in the heart of
Solon, and Solon is present in Athens as the legislator
By the time of Aeschylus, they have become distributed in
society and the political community is ennobled as a result
of the extension of the Solonic virtues.

The content of

Solon's soul is the beginning of Athens as it was to be for
European history.

In Athens at the time of Solon freedom is

predominantly negative— freedom from bondage; freedom from
abuse.

Only in Solon himself has freedom become positive,

opening the self to conscious participation in the correct
measure.
^®VI and VII.

Constitution of Athens, XII.

49Solon's commitment to justice and order (eunomia) is
stated in his great political elegy (Linforth, XII, 14 and
33). In adding peace (eir§ne) to this list apropos of Solon,
we follow Solmsen (Hesiod and Aeschylus, p. 123). Solmsen's
inference is sound, for Solon's whole project is undertaken
so as to avoid civil war— hence to secure peace.
50

See XII, 30. Solon's exhortation from the heart
recalls Hesiod's exhortation to the heart.
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From the work of Solon in Athens the conclusion follows
that in any society which is not in that condition of divi
sive misery which spoils public and private life at oncef
the divine virtues of peace, justice, and order are at work,
guiding human freedom.

Their presence is hidden from the

"hard nosed realist" who is a frequent commentator on polit
ical affairs.

He sees only the rough and hard form in which

the power behind public policy is bartered and dispensed,
perceiving not the restraining excellences which prevent the
self-destruction of the community.

The frequent opacity of

the redeeming virtues makes Solon doubly valuable to polit
ical science, for in his character and work, the otherwise
indiscernible presences which save the community are preem
inently visible.
At the time of Solon, Athens is not yet the free and

'

excellent polity which is celebrated in the classical state
ment of Pericles.

Solon is in microcosm the Athens which is

to be; he is truly a seminal figure.

Just as the excellen

ces of peace, justice, and order are present in the soul of
Solon, so also is the positive freedom which was to become
the characteristic trait of the great Athenian age.

As we

have argued before, the content of the truth which is the
guiding ethos of Greek life is already fully drawn in the
prophetic utterances of Hesiod.

Later development occurs in

terms of the increasing sophistication of the form in which
the truth is presented.

In Hesiod, the truth about the life

of the person and the community is rendered in a poetic— a
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pre-intellectual— manner.

By the time of Solon it has taken

the vestments of philosophy, and that is to say that the
truth has become a concern of the working intellect.
freedom of Solon is an Anselmian affair.

The

Solon believes in

the righteousness of Zeus so that he might have sure ground
ing for his intellectual scrutiny of the ways of mortals.
The Solonic breakthrough in the realm of the intellect
is the discovery of causality in the course of human affairs.
This discovery of Solon makes him the founder of the science
of politics.

The insight is given in the following state

ments :
The ruin of our state will never come by the doom
of Zeus or through the will of the blessed and immortal
gods; for Pallas Athena, valiant daughter of a valiant
sire, is our stout-hearted guardian, and she holdeth
over us her protective arms. It is the townsfolk them
selves and their false-hearted leaders who would fain
destroy our great city through wantonness and love of
money. But they are destined to suffer sorely for their
outrageous behavior. They know not how to hold in check
their full-fed lust, or, content with the merriment the
banquet affords, to take their pleasure soberly and in
order.
These things my heart prompteth me to teach the
Athenians, and to make them understand that lawlessness
worketh more harm to the state than any other cause.
But a law-abiding spirit createth order and harmony, and
at the same time putteth chains upon evil-doers.
If ye have suffered the melancholy consequences of
your own incompetence, do not attribute this evil for
tune to the gods. Ye have yourselves raised these men
to power over you, and have reduced yourselves by this
course to a wretched state of servitude.51
XII, 1-8, 30-33. XIV, 1-4. These passages are from
the later period of Solon's life, after he had left the
archonship and the tyranny of Peisistratus had come to power
with popular support. Solon's gloomy reaction to the sus
pension of constitutional government is understandable, but
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Solon's advance over Hesiod occurs in two respects.

First

is his move to correct injustice by coupling a reform of the
constitutional structure of the community with the Hesiodian
type of appeal to the heart.

Second is the maturation in

understanding of the consequences of injustice.

As we have

observed, Hesiod announces the destructive consequences of
unrighteous conduct for the whole city, but he maintains the
archaic conception of divine agency as the efficient cause
of the destruction.

The Zeus of Solon however is acquitted

of even the most meagre responsibility for political evil.
For Solon the reward for injustice has become immanent; in
justice upsets the fragile balance amongst men, and so con
tains within itself the poison which will soon afflict its
practitioners.
Jaeger's comments on the parallel between Solon's ob
servations and the development of Ionian physics do much to
explain the importance of the innovation.

Jaeger notes the

understanding of Thales and Anaximander that there is lawful
process in the natural universe.
Solon, like them, was impelled to demonstrate the exis
tence of an immanent order in the course of nature and
human life, and with it an inherent meaning and an
essential norm in reality. He is clearly presupposing
a law connecting cause and effect in nature, and ex
pressly setting forth as a parallel to it the rule of
law in the social order, when he says elsewhere "From
the clouds come snow and hail, thunder follows the
lightning, and by powerful men the city is brought low,

his worst fears did not materialize. Pesistratus is usually
included amongst the great statesmen of Athens, a man not un
like some of the better dictators in the developing world
today.
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and the demos in its ignorance comes into the power of
a despot."52
Jaeger goes on to speculate that Solon coupled his
understanding of causal law, derived from physics, with his
torical observation, and through this process, became able to
stay the otherwise inevitable doom.

This assumption is en

tirely reasonable, since Attica was a backward country, and
in the preceding century the cycle of exploitation of the
poor, civil war, popular tyranny, violent and lawless rule
had run its course in several Greek poleis in Europe and
Asia.

Thus, Solon's understanding of the causal process and

his move to foil its progress is relevant to our concern
with freedom.

For Solon, the political science of causes

issues into a policy science of remedies.

If rampant ava

rice in the polis is seen to cause injustice, and injustice
to cause civil war, then legislative remedies must be forth
coming which will curb avarice and its effects.

If there is

a political law that selfishness leads to destruction, then
by implication there is a counter law that adherence to un
selfish constitutional principle will cause peace and happi
ness.

Solon discovered both causal processes, and he chose

to follow the creative, life-enhancing pattern, and to reject
the other.
This course of thought points us to Solon the statesman
as the new paradigm for the free man.

We saw that Hesiod

exhibited the higher intermediacy of which human freedom is
52Jaeger, Paideia, I, 140.
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capable in his address from a superior heart to those of
baser heart.

In this, Hesiod exhibited freedom to forego

injustice in favor of divinely countenanced conduct; this
may be called spiritual freedom.

In keeping with the gen

eral shift in mode which occurs between Hesiod and Solon, we
may identify the higher intermediacy as it manifests itself
in Solon as intellectual freedom.

The world of Hesiod is a

picture world in which principle is embedded in concrete
representative types, both immortal and mortal.

The world

of Solon is one which is well on the way toward breaking
with mythic representation; it is becoming a discursive
world in which thought assumes its prosaic form.

The world

of Aeschylus will show yet a further formal development, as
the old picture teaching is taken up and manipulated by con
sciousness so as to render both meaning and lesson.

In each

of these formal developments, the freedom of man's higher
intermediacy occurs in a novel form.

In Solon it is freedom

of thought.
For freedom to become political, it must be an intel
lectual freedom, for without employment of the deliberative
resources of the mind, it would be impossible to reckon the
course of action for political society.

The intellectual

freedom which Solon displays is at once a negative and a
positive freedom.

It is negative in that it indicates a

detachment of the intellect and a disengagement of the ego
from the routine circumstances which are the milieu for self.
It is positive in that it requires action which participates
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in a higher order of reality than the former routine.

The

record of Solon's career illumines the concrete meaning of
these concepts.

Solon was widely considered by his contem

poraries to be a fool because he was free from the tyrant's
ambition.

He was free from that ambition because he embraced

the ambition of the true statesman.

Solon's self-extrication

from the damning sequence of historical causes is a capital
event in the history of political order, for it is the first
event of this type.

Solon is able to become political savior

for the country by freeing himself from the selfish and ulti
mately destructive ambition that was pervasive in his class.
To be sure, Solon's intellectual freedom does not consist in
the discovery of an Archimedean point? he is in the world—
he is even "of" the world— but the world to which he has had
recourse is the real world wherein lies the power to correct
and reverse the mindless course of sensual reality when it
is left to the mercy of material inclination.

The real

world is the free world wherein justice is the cord which
binds all together in harmony.

Solon's original breakthrough

then is his ability to negate his routine circumstances
through an effort of mind.

This same mind which could negate

the fallen world of present existence could likewise posit
the new world of the future.

The attachment to the future

explains Solon's effort to constitutionalize the reform.
Aristotle tells us that Solon was chosen as archon by
both parties after he had written an elegy "in which he does
battle on behalf of each party against the other and acts as
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mediator, and after this exhorts them jointly to stop the
quarrel that prevailed between them."

53

Solon's contempo

raries— themselves partisans— recognized in Solon a quality
which they found absent in themselves, a power to bring
peace, justice, order.

It is this positive power to make

the world of experience better by deliberate imposition of
divine form upon recalcitrant matter that we have identified
as Solon's intellectual freedom.

Solon's deliberation is

followed by a constitutional revision, and that action estab
lishes the political character of Solon's positive freedom.
In Solon the apperception of divine order inspires a
concrete political program which serves to elevate the qual
ity of life in the polis.

In this aspect of Solon's charac

ter and work, there is a positive gain over the human inter
mediacy as it appears in Hesiod.

When freedom has become

mental and political in the practical sense, the form of
humanity itself has become enlarged.

When this development

has occurred, mankind has become reasonable.

In Hesiod there

is freely chosen righteousness without noetic reason, for
arbitration is the work of the heart.

As we have seen, the

arbitration of the heart does not disappear in Solon; rather,
it is supplemented by a mental capacity which apprehends the
correct measure, and makes that divine measure a political
standard.

In developmental terms this accretion represents

a great gain over the Hesiodian form of righteousness, for
when the correct measure has ceased to be a concern which is
^Constitution of Athens, V.
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resident only in the sphere of feeling, it has become a more
stable and more generally available fixture than before.
With the appearance of mental freedom, the correct measure
can be political; it can be public property, a boon for all,
including those many who by themselves could never have par
taken of the true measure without the guidance of political
leadership.

This implication of the political freedom of

Solon becomes manifest in the drama of Aeschylus.

As the

content of Hesiod has become canonical for Solon, Solon has
imposed upon that content the form of the working mind, of
reason.
The Solonic synthesis of the heart's affective longing
for righteousness with the mind which deliberates the con
stitutional measures necessary to attain right order results
in the appearance of a new type of man, the statesman.
Solon is the proto-typical statesman, and in his conduct we
behold the fruition of a freedom which in Hesiod was sug
gested but not settled.

This is positive freedom, expressed

as positive resistance to evil.

Hesiod, as we have seen,

feared that the unrighteous setting for his life might cor
rupt him and his son, requiring that they choose unrighteous
ness in order to survive.

In Solon there is no such doubt

to dilute an otherwise steadfast commitment to righteousness.
There seem to be two reasons for this.

One is that Solon,

unlike Hesiod, has become a creature of reason as well as
devotion; as a self, he is thus better equipped to do battle
with the forces of unrighteousness.

The other, more powerful
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reason is that unlike Hesiod, Solon has come to head the
polity; as a person in the world his position is one of mas
tery.

Hesiod is at the mercy of those who give judgments;

in the instance of Solon, the tables have been turned.

The

reversal of roles which distinguishes the position of Solon
from that of Hesiod is important, for it conditions the pos
sibilities for injustice which inhere in each role.

Injus

tice for Hesiod would have meant becoming as his brother
Perses, a petty swindler; for Solon injustice would involve
becoming a tyrant, a usurper on a grand scale, who employs a
public trust in the service of his own fortune.

The freedom

to resist injustice is always primarily the power to resist
the injustice which emanates from self.

Power does not al

ways corrupt; Plutarch wrote:
When he turned his back on the tyranny, many people rid
iculed him in language whose tone he has preserved in
the following lines, which he puts into the mouth of one
of his critics:
"Solon is not gifted with wisdom and sagacity. God
put good things into his hands, but he failed to grasp
them. He cast his net and caught his fish, but, in his
wonder and delight, he did not draw it in: both his
courage and his wit were unequal to the occasion. If I
could seize the power, acquire vast wealth, and be lord
of Athens for but a single day, I would give my body to
be flayed for a wineskin and consent to the annihilation
of my race."54
This speech is the utterance of composite mankind in its
fallen state of negative, random freedom.

It is the secret

confession of the many who, without power to forego unrigh
teousness, seek after positions of public trust.
54XXII, Plutarch, Solon, XIV, 5.
VIII and XI.

The appear-

See also Linforth,
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ance of a Solon is unsettling to this sort of political crea
ture; in his consciousness the presence of the Solonic
statesman signals a world-reversal, a great absurdity.
In the fourth century we hear the echo of the speech
which Solon has attributed to his detractors.

This is the

speech of Callicles, another aspiring politico.
Callicles: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest
or joking?
Chaerephon: In my opinion, Callicles, he is in deadly
earnest, but there is nothing like asking him.
Callicles: By heaven, that is just what I am anxious
to do. Tell me, Socrates, are we to consider you ser
ious now or jesting? For if you are serious and what
you say is true, then surely the life of us mortals
must be turned upside down and apparently we are every
where doing the opposite of what we s h o u l d . 55
The political leader who exhibits the free righteousness of
heart and mind appears as a jester, or as a turner upside
down of life, to those who are without this positive free
dom.

The latter appearance is the more accurate, for this

Solonic freedom to do right does involve world reversal; the
opponents of Solon are participants in a negative and fallen
a * 1— -

world of theft and murder, while Solon and his issue are
participants in a world that has been politically restored.
As Plato has shown with the portrait of Callicles, there is
little possibility for communication between the free and
the unfree.

The latter can be driven to silence because

their position is philosophically untenable, but they cannot
be persuaded.

Their self-centered rapaciousness exceeds

their concern for the permanent and universal realities of
^ Gorgias, 481b, tr. W. D. Woodhead.
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life.

Although he builds upon the Solonic base, Plato goes

beyond the received Greek rubric.

The problems which Plato

ventilates in the Callicles encounter lead him to construct
a saviour polis which is permeated with the fourth moment of
freedom, i.e., with wholly achieved righteousness.

This

Platonic "freedom" is not a recognizably human freedom be
cause it has, like the freedom of the prophets, eclipsed the
dynamic suspension of man as the intermediate character.
But the Platonic course is not the course of Solon.
Solon is at once a lover of God and man.

His great

prayer begins with a plea, not for wisdom, or even for righ
teousness, but for prosperity gotten righteously.5®

There

is nothing in Solon of the later, paradoxical understanding
of freedom which we have seen in the Stoic corruption of
classical thought.

Solon is the consummately practical

philosopher; his vision is no less concrete than heavenly.
He gives advice as to the interests and pursuits which are
proper to man at the several stages of life.

The common

place joys and concerns of life are for him, like Hesiod,
matters of importance.

Solon believed that "holy Justice"

is near to the world, observing, rewarding, punishing through
the means of the causal arrangement that is immanent in
nature and in history.
For Solon, the human search for possession, power and
worth is a legitimate quest, and he showed by his example
that when the human enterprise has debauched itself through
56x l , 1-13.

theft, abuse, vanity, that the good leader of men can set
life again on the proper path.

With Solon as with Hesiod,

the exhortation to man to seek the correct measure as a
guide to conduct is an attempt to ennoble human freedom, and
thus to make it a positive freedom which looks beyond the
self.

Solon admonishes the rich,
Calm the eager tumult of your hearts. You have forced
your way forward to a surfeit of good things. Confine
your swelling thoughts within reasonable bounds. For
we shall not comply with your present disposition, and
you yourselves will not find it meet for your own in
terests. 57

This suggests a society in which all will be free.

The many

will be free because authority will check the immoderate
ambition of the rich, and the rich will themselves remain
free because authority— through curbing them— protects their
own permanent interests.
In such a society, political authority must balance the
competing forces.

The job of the balancer is done more com

pletely if the balance of the parties can rest upon a more
basic internal balance within the personal and trans-personal
constituents of the society.

Thus, "calm your hearts,"

"moderate your thoughts" mean "Learn; order your lives and
vocations as I have ordered the polis."

In relation to the

issue of freedom, this Solonic advice suggests contrary
visions of the nature of the free society.

Will the free

society be a contractual convenience in which freedom happens
as a sort of muted anarchy, as in the old liberal view; or
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will it be a diversified community in which different inter
ests are pursued in organic subordination to a permanent
commitment to right conduct and social justice?
alternative is the solution of Solon.

The latter

We must remember that

for Solon, justice is substantive and freedom is derivative.
For this reason, Solon is more than a broker who balances
the freedom of one interest agairlst that of a competing
interest.

Solon's work shows us that balancing of this sort

is basic to the statesman's craft, but it is only basic.
The historical fact is that Athens did not erupt again in
wholesale butchery until the Thirty— pupils not of Solon but
of the sophists— took power with Spartan assistance.

In the

intervening two centuries, internal peace, justice, and ex
tensive personal and political freedom were generally ascen
dant.

The reason for this is hardly that Solon balanced the

competing forces so masterfully that they stayed balanced
until military disaster struck; indeed, the Solonic balance
was undone during Solon's lifetime.

Instead, the Solonic

balance was no more than a protective shield which permitted
the new spirit of constitutional justice to take hold in the
hearts and minds of the Athenians.
In the lifetime of Solon, the new spirit of justice
with freedom was but a fledgling force in the total mix of
Athenian events.

The new order was at first dependent upon

the person of its author, in much the same way that the
United States Constitution was dependent upon the person of
Washington for popular legitimacy.

The proof of the success
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of Solon's attempt to constitutionalize the Hesiodian vision
is not then to be found in the time of Solon.

The testator

of this success is god-like Aeschylus, of all Athenians most
perfect, who related to his forebears in much the same way
that Deutero Isaiah related to his predecessors.

In his

drama we witness the completion of the search for freedom
with justice and the vision of its permanence.

For a study

which seeks to understand the origins of freedom in Mediter
ranean antiquity, Aeschylus is the end of the beginning.

VI.

AESCHYLUS:

A CONCLUSION

There is a twofold tie between Solon and Aeschylus.
Not only does the content of the Aeschylean drama incorpo
rate and enlarge the symbolic heritage of Hesiod and Solon,
but that same drama is in a sense a memorial to the person
of Solon.

Along with the great mythical personages, the

historical Solon is a prototype of the tragic hero.1

Solon

was called to power because he composed and acted out mini
dramas which addressed the public evil; when in power he
strove mightily to lead the polis to the high plane of con
stitutional order; he died an ostensible failure during the
Peisistratid suspension of the constitution.

Solon thus

provides both form and content for the tragic.figures, espe
cially for such a figure as King Pelasgus of the Suppliants.
In the record left by Solon, we behold a freedom which is
preponderantly negative, the freedom of liberation from
bondage.

Aeschylus is witness to.the ultimate success of

this liberative program, for in the extant plays he shows us
twice a whole community which is freely given in the spirit
of positive justice.

It was the understanding of Aeschylus

that the example of Solon had become generalized throughout
the citizen body.
■^See Gerald F. Else, The Origin and Early Form of Greek
Tragedy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 67
68. Else speculates that Thespis, the first tragedian and
predecessor of Aeschylus, chose Solon as the model for the
tragic hero.
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The position of Aeschylus in Greece is equivalent to
that of Deutero Isaiah in Israel as regards the emergent
reality of freedom from justice.

The uses of '‘free" in

Aeschylus generally parallel in meaning the uses of "redeem"
in Deutero Isaiah.

Thus, with Aeschylus freedom is made

permanent as the implication of divine justice.

For both

writers this understanding obtains as the result of a
greater inquiry into the historical process and its known
consequence of suffering, despair, and death.

Despite the

very significant differences between Israelite and Greek
symbolism, there is a remarkable similarity between the un
derstanding of history of Deutero Isaiah and that of
2
Aeschylus.
For both, received history has been the arena
of death due to the unwillingness (Deutero Isaiah) or in
ability (Aeschylus) of mankind to turn away from injustice,
The major difference in symbolism lies in the diver
gent symbolizations of history itself. We have not consid
ered this issue in the text, for a discussion there would
tend to detract from the parallelism which the study demon
strates between Israel and Greece regarding the emergence of
human freedom from the apperception of divine justice.
Among others, Hadas has commented on the most telling lin
guistic difference between Hebrew and Greek. Hebrew has but
two tenses, past and future, and thus, the whole structure
of the Israelite imagination is inevitably historical. Greek
has a complicated grammar with many tenses, but the aorist
is the most salient expression of the Greek imagination.
The aorist translates into English as simple past, and in
daily communication it had that meaning. In literature how
ever it conveys a sense of timeless present. The greater
meaning of the sentence, "Xerxes' outrage destroyed him,"
is that Xerxes' outrage is always destroying him. Consider
the contrast with "Abram believed Yahweh." While it is cer
tain that J was able to recognize Abram as a universal type,
the believer, his primary meaning here is that Abram was the
ancestor who at a point in history entered into the covenant.
Hadas writes, "The Greeks seem almost to have lacked a sense
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division, bondage and murder to that justice which brings
reunion and life.

For both, there is conviction that human

of history; everything, whenever it happened, is conceived
of as present."
(Hellenistic Culture, p. 55.) This unhistorical mentality has not troubled us with Hesiod (whose
Theogony does show a decided sense of history of an almost
Israelite sort) or with Solon. But with Aeschylus it does
present a problem of interpretation. Xerxes was a vivid
memory to every adult Athenian, but only eight years after
his defeat, Aeschylus cast him as a timeless figure, no dif
ferent in any respect from the characters he took from leg
end. In the Prometheia we can conclude with most commenta
tors that Zeus was bad then; he is good now? he will be good
in the future; of dike we can conclude that it meant retri
bution and now it means justice. These conclusions are
right, but there is more to the matter, for Aeschylus never
makes things that simple.
Aeschylus seems to imply that the new was present all
along in the old, and that the old still lingers and threat
ens beneath the new. For example, in Eumenides (927 ff.) we
are told that the name and even the disposition of the
Furies has been changed, but Aeschylus makes it abundantly
clear that distribution of rewards— often in the form of
punishment— will continue to be proper to the nature of the
Eumenides. Are they much different from the Odysseus about
whom Auerbach observes that he returned home after twenty
eventful years "exactly the same as he was when he left"?
Aristotle's metaphysics, with its identification of formal
cause and final cause is probably the clearest expression of
this way of thinking, and the Zeus of Aeschylus sometimes
seems like the God of Aristotle, i.e., not as an active
will, but as grand superintendent of a fixed process. This
same phenomenon makes political interpretation difficult;
hence the views of accomplished scholars conflict starkly.
Does Aeschylus take a position on specific historical events
such as the reform of the Areopagus, or does the Areopagus
appear only to represent some universal reality in a time
less present? The commentator must decide according to his
own informed judgment, and regrettably, his own prejudices.
We believe that a comprehensive study of this problem by one
who is qualified to do it would show that Aeschylus believed
in the possibility of real change which makes the past a
definite past, but that the confines of received mental cul
ture made it impossible for him to express this meaning un
equivocally. We suspect further that these conflicting ten
dencies can be traced back to the influences of Hesiod and
Homer respectively. See Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Rep
resentation of Reality in Western Literature, tr. Willard
Trask (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), pp. 1420 .
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devices alone will not alter the course of the existential
project.

Thus, in both, we observe the liberative interven

tion of divinity in the historical course of division and
strife, and in both there is the promise of a future which
will be better than the past.
It is appropriate for this study to end its search for
the origins of freedom with Aeschylus, for that author con
firms, more fully than any other, the thesis which was advo
cated in the beginning.

We advanced the idea that history,

unmediated, is the fallen domain of human existence; it is
the domain of polarity, strife and bondage.

We argued that

freedom is concomitant with the penetration into that realm
i

of the divine-human unity which lies before history or be
yond history."*

The political name of this unity is justice,

and those who are participants in justice are free.

This

understanding is the core of the Aeschylean teaching.

For

Aeschylus, as for Deutero Isaiah, history has become trans
parent unto liberation.
Our discussion of the Aeschylean treatment of history
is divided into two ranges of analysis, the immediate and
the mediate.

This is to say, the seven remaining plays of

Aeschylus address both the immediate historical circum^In the extant plays, Aeschylus does not use the cate
gory "before history" which is implicit in Hesiod's Golden
Age or in Plato's Age of Cronos. Rather, Aeschylus' ground
of the divine justice which liberates is Zeus who begins as
a partisan, historical character, but who through suffering
and learning rises beyond historical strife. This mature
Zeus is transcendent divinity which holds the power to stop
the curse, to recreate and restore.
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stances of the century to which the generation of Aeschylus
is the direct heir as well as the mediate, symbolic history
of the legends.

In the tragedies, these two types of his

tory are necessarily juxtaposed, the immediate upon the medi
ate, but we find it helpful to distinguish between these
factual and symbolic, immediate and mediate levels of his
torical concern.
1. Tyranny
Justice is productive unto the overcoming of division
and cruelty in history.

For Hesiod and Solon, the concrete

terms of this division were the strife between aristocracy
and commons within the polis.

As we have seen, Solon legis

lated justly and so liberated the people from the economic
outrage of unjust masters.

By the time that Aeschylus

wrote, the terms of historical division had changed.

The

unjust division against which Aeschylus inveighs is the po
litical polarity between tyrant and polis.

In three plays

we observe Aeschylus1 understanding of the pattern of tyr
anny.

These are the Prometheus Bound, the Persians, and the

Libation Bearers.

It is necessary to caution that Aeschylean

symbolism is extremely dense at times, and that we look to
these symbols only as they enlighten us as to Aeschylus'
understanding of the immediate historical problem, tyranny.**
4

Podlecki comments that the Peisistratid tyranny ended
when Aeschylus was a youth, and thus that Aeschylus' per
sonal experience embraced the transition from tyranny to
constitutional democracy.
(Podlecki refers to the demise of
Hippias, the evil son of Peisistratus, who had been a good
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For the purposes indicated here, the Prometheus Bound
is considered as an allegory which describes how a tyranny
is formed and what happens after a tyrant comes to power.
It is based on the Hesiodian story of the conflict between
Zeus and Prometheus.
as tyrant.5

Early in the play, Zeus is identified

This is a serious charge.

Tyrannis is an Asian

word which appears in Greek in the mid-seventh century, re
ferring at first to Gyges, the Lydian courtier who murdered
the king and then took as his own both kingdom and queen.
By the time of Aeschylus the term is decidedly pejorative;
its use connotes an accusation that the ruler has come to
g

power by violent and outrageous means.

Zeus had taken

power by subjugating his father, relegating him to Tartarus
where he could no longer threaten.

Prometheus had sided

with Zeus in the struggle for power, but when Zeus gained
power he had Prometheus chained to a rock in a distant place
because, "This is a sickness rooted and inherent in the
nature of a tyranny:

that he who holds it does not trust

ruler.) Podlecki observes also that the Prometheus Bound is
the first document which brings together in one text the sev
eral complaints about tyranny that were current in other
fifth century sources. He further notes that many of the
characteristics of tyranny which were treated systematically
in Aristotle's Politics V are traits which were first col
lated in Prometheus Bound. See Anthony J. Podlecki, The
Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy (Ann Arbor: Uni
versity of Michigan Press, 1968), pp. 118-122.
5220-230.
g

See Forrest, Emergence of Greek Democracy, pp. 78-83.
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his friends."

7

In this play Prometheus is a sympathetic

character, and when he claims that he is made to suffer un
justly (ekdika), we can believe that this is the position of
Aeschylus regarding all who are subject to tyrants.8

The

link of injustice to unfreedom, and conversely, of justice
to freedom, first made explicit in Solon, is a prominent
feature of Aeschylean thought.

Prometheus is in bondage be

cause of the tyrant's sentence, and the chorus hopes that
he may be freed.9

Still, the bondage of Prometheus is not

slavery; that distinction is reserved for those who serve
the tyrant obediently and in whom the tyrant places trust.
Prometheus identifies his own lot as misfortune, but Hermes,
faithful messenger of Zeus, is a slave (latris)

I

n

sum

mary then, the Prometheus Bound illustrates that in a tyr
anny, the ruler comes to power by irregular means, that he
rules unjustly, and that in consequence of his injustice,
all who inhabit the domain are in one way or another unfree.
In another play, the Persians, Aeschylus examines the
character of the tyrant and the consequences of his. rule.
Technically, Xerxes is not a tyrant; he is the legitimate
king of Persia who acceded to the throne upon his father's
^224-225, tr. David Grene. All Aeschylus quotations
are from David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, eds., The Com
plete Greek Tragedies, I (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1959).
8See 1093.
9260-340.
10966-967.
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natural death.

But except for this, his barbarian vanity

shows the nature of his rule to be tyrannical.

Xerxes, a

man, is worshipped as a god, a practise as repellent to the
Greeks as to the Israelites.11

The subjects of Xerxes are

no different from draft animals; they can be harnessed and
driven at the will of the king.

Xerxes' most prominent

trait is his arrogance which leads to outrage, his total
lack of forbearance.

12

This outrageous mien of Xerxes ex

tends beyond the range of mortal affairs into crime against
nature.

He sought "To check the sacred waters of the

Hellespont by chains, just as if it were a slave."

13

This

wholly immoderate disposition of person which inspired the
construction of the pontoon bridge is also the same force
which will lead eventually to the tyrant's downfall.14
Darius credits his son's defeat to the will of the gods, but
it is plain that this analysis borrows upon the Solonic un
derstanding of causality.

One who is governed by outrage

strains his resources and abilities, and in time the project
born of such a strain is destined to collapse.
are guarantors of the causal order.

The gods here

Finally the Persians

documents what no Athenian needed to be told:

Xerxes' out

rageous ambition resulted in death for many thousands of his
countrymen and allies.

From this play then we intuit a

1;LSee 150-160.
12808.
12745-746, tr. Seth G. Benardete.
14739-752.
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tacit recognition of the identity of slavery with death and
of freedom with life.
The third drama which addresses the immediate histori
cal issue of the tyrant is the Libation Bearers.

In this

play Aeschylus examines one pragmatic solution to the prob
lem posed by the tyrant.
usurper Aegisthus.

The tyrant here is the violent

The chorus, even the tyrant's niece,

proclaim themselves to be slave (doulos) because of the tyr
a n n y .

There is much talk of right throughout this play,

including prayers to Zeus pleading that right be done.

The

conviction of all is that blood for blood is r i g h t . A t
last the hero Orestes appears and slays the tyrant along with
his mother, the tyrant's murderous female consort.

After

the tyrannicide the following exchange occurs:
Orestes:
To all men of Argos in the time to come I say
they shall be witness, how these evil things were done.
I go, an outcast wanderer from this land, and leave
behind, in life, in death, the name of what I did.
Chorus:
No, what you did was well done. Do not therefore bind
your mouth to foul speech. Keep no evil on your lips.
You liberated all the Argive city when
you lopped the heads of these two snakes with one clean
stroke.
As far as this chorus can see, the end of the tyrant is the
end of the trouble.

This is a purely negative liberation

1577 and 135.
16355 passim.
171040-1047, tr. Richmond Lattimore.

however, a matter which the short sighted chorus cannot com
prehend.

The negativity of Orestes' act is complete, and it

will not open onto a repositioning of life because it in
volved the commission of a particularly offensive kind of
murder, a matricide.

Even as the chorus absolves Orestes of

guilt the Furies descend upon the matricide to meet out hor
rible retribution.

The chorus cannot see the Furies, and it

imagines that Orestes is simply over-wrought with anxiety
about the recent events, but again, imperfect vision is the
source of their misunderstanding.
nation is wrong.

Their psychological expla

To Orestes, and to Aeschylus his mover,

the Furies are the entirely real consequence of Orestes' act,
and their presence belies the notion that true right or justice can obtain from an exchange of blood for blood.

18

The

chorus' claim that Orestes' killing of the tyrants is right
springs from a conventional and partisan understanding of
right.

But for Aeschylus, the discoverer of the whole righ

teousness of God, the view of the chorus is inadequate and
ultimately false.
With the appearance of the Furies, our analysis must
quit the domain of immediate history with its pragmatic mea
sures aimed at mollification of the human predicament.

Their

arrival at the moment of triumph over the tyrant displays
the Aeschylean conviction that the true solutions do not lie
■^Our understanding that Orestes is really guilty, even
though he acts in obedience to Apollo, finds support in
Jaeger, Paidiea, I, 257-258. Jaeger views Orestes as the
point of collision between two opposed efforts to uphold
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within the pragmatic range of thought and deed.

The Furies,

along with the Persuasion which will ultimately tame them,
are resident in the mediate history whose elucidation is the
guiding aim of Aeschylean tragedy.
2.

The Liberative Suspension of Fate

The symbols of mediate history with which Aeschylus
deals are the various fate stories which appear in Homer and
in the lesser collections.

We observed earlier that the

Iliad presents a picture of humanity that is lost in history.
Polarity and strife have eclipsed the light of human unity
and of the virtues which proceed from that sacred and per
fect condition of life.
pattern of the Iliad.

Death, not life, is the inexorable
This same Greek pessimism is venti

lated in two legends which appear in the Odyssey; it is not
too much to say that they symbolize the orthodox Greek view
of man in history, an orthodoxy against which Hesiod is the
first rebel.

These are the stories of the accursed houses

of Laius and Atreus.

Even more than the story of the Trojan

war, these are historical legends because their courses em
brace more than one generation.

Aeschylus dealt with these

cycles respectively in the trilogy of which the Seven
Against Thebes is the survivor and in the Oresteian trilogy.
We recall in Hesiod the apocalypse of the two cities, the
one just and happy, the other unjust and doomed.

A similar

divine justice. With his absolution these opposed understandings are reconciled.
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but diachronous contrast obtains when we set the Seven
against the Oresteia.

The Seven is a story of history which

is unmediated by the spirit of divine Justice, while the
Oresteia is a story about divine liberation from the help
lessness of historical division and destruction.
The Seven Against Thebes is the last play in a trilogy
dealing with the Oedipus cycle.

The play itself contains

only a part of the whole story, i.e., the assault of the
seven champions from Argos, the defeat of the invaders, the
death of Eteocles and Polyneices, and the refusal of Antigone
to obey the law of the city.

19

To appreciate the full meaning of Aeschylus' handling
of this material, it is necessary that we consider what has
happened before the beginning of the extant drama.

Laius,

king of Thebes, laments his childlessness and consults the
Delphic oracle about the matter.

He is told that any child

born to him through his wife, Jocaste, would be his murderer.
Despite the oracle's warning, Laius begat a child.

Upon the

birth of Oedipus, Laius exposed the child, hoping to avert
fulfilment of the prophecy.

Oedipus was rescued however,

and was adopted by the royal couple of Corinth.

When he had

grown up, the oracle told him that he was fated to murder his
father and marry his mother.

In the hope of avoiding this,

Oedipus quit Corinth forever and journeyed toward Thebes.
On the way, he met King Laius, argued with him, and killed
•^This final encounter which introduces Antigone and
Ismene is a later interpolation into the text.
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him.

On reaching Thebes, he rid the city of the Sphinx, and

for this he was made king.

He married the widowed queen,

Jocaste, who bore him Eteocles, Polyneices, Ismene, and
Antigone.

While he was king, famine struck the land.

Delphi

revealed that the famine would end only if the murderer of
Laius were exiled.

Oedipus, who did not know that the man

he had killed was Laius, placed a curse upon the unknown
homicide, and decreed his exile.

Also, the two sons of

Oedipus behaved toward their father with extreme insolence,
so he placed a curse on them.
the whole truth about Oedipus.

In time, Tiresias revealed
Upon this Jocaste committed

suicide and Oedipus blinded himself and went into exile.
Thus the two accursed sons became heir to the kingship.
They agreed to rule the land in alternate years, with
Eteocles to rule for the first year, while Polyneices re
sided in Argos.

At the end of the year, Eteocles repudiated

the agreement, and thus Polyneices marched on Thebes in
alliance with the seven Argive champions.

20

2®This agreement between Eteocles and Polyneices to
share the kingship is basic to this study's treatment of the
Seven. We must observe however that since the two earlier
plays in the trilogy are lost, our understanding that
Aeschylus subscribed to this tradition is speculative. Our
assumption is warranted by the fact that the agreement be
tween the brothers is part of the dominant tradition of the
Oedipus story.
(See Robert Graves, The Greek Myths, II, 1516.) There is a lesser tradition that Polyneices agreed to
give up his claim to the kingship, and later reneged and
made war in an attempt to become king. Gilbert Murray be
lieved that Aeschylus subscribed to the dominant tradition
because in the Seven Aeschylus permits Polyneices to claim
dike, while Eteocles makes no such explicit claim. See
Gilbert Murray, Aeschylus; The Creator of Tragedy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1940), p. 132.
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The pattern thus is one of historical division and sub
sequent strife and injustice.

The division of male against

female opens onto the generational division of son against
father in the case of Oedipus and Laius, and of father
against son in the case of Oedipus and his heirs.

The curse

upon the royal house of Thebes reverberates down through the
history of that land, eventually endangering the country
itself in the fratricidal war of Eteocles and Polyneices.
The curse is emblematic of the unfreedom of the members of
the royal household, and both the king and the citizen body
fear that the consequences of the curse will involve slavery
for the country.21
history.

This treatment of the legend is mediate

That is to say, it is poetically heightened common

sense, expressing the meaning that whenever the political
leadership is itself unable to act freely due to human limi
tation so hardened as to constitute a curse, then the common
future becomes fraught with injustice and bondage.

It may

be true that the country is spared the fate of slavery to
Argive conquerors because Eteocles bows heroically to the
dictate of the curse and so saves the city by engaging in
combat with his brother so that both are killed.

22

This

2169-129.
22
This is the view of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, "Seven
Against Thebes: The Tragedy of War," Aeschylus; A Collec
tion of Critical Essays, ed. Marsh H. McCall, Jr. (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), pp. 57-59. Kitto re
jected this interpretation of the play, arguing that the
significance of Eteocles is exhausted in "Man's relation to
God, fate, the Universe."
(See H. D. F. Kitto, Greek Trag
edy: A Literary Study, 3rd ed. [New York: Barnes and
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exercise in soteriology however tells more about the con
fines of the Laius legend in which the death or exile of the
king saves Thebes than about the true understanding of
Aeschylus, for the discussion which precedes the death of
Eteocles suggests a saving alternative course which Eteocles
refuses to explore.
But what then is the cause of the trouble in king and
city?

To conclude that it is the curse is not the ultimate

solution of Aeschylus.

Tragedy was a device for public edu

cation, and Aeschylus attempted to teach his fellow citizens
what it means to be accursed.

The curse in the drama of

Aeschylus is like sin in Deutero Isaiah; it is the refusal
to be free.

It is persistence in the partial, one-sided,

self-centered apperception of reality which causes the self
to field a project that proceeds without regard to the uni
versal measure whose power it is to bring harmony to all
things.

In the Seven this becomes clear when we examine the

brothers' respective positions relative to complete justice,
and the attitude of Eteocles to the curse.
Much of the play is devoted to description of the dec
orations on the shields of the seven champions.

Most are

decorated with fearsome monsters, and their purpose is to
arouse terror in the enemy.

The seventh champion, Polyneices

Noble, Inc., 1961], pp. 45, 49-50.)
It seems that if
Aeschylus had intended the death of Eteocles to be under
stood as a saving sacrifice for the city, the chorus would
say something to that effect in its lament.
It does not.
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himself, bears a shield which is wholly different from the
others.
He bears a new-made, rounded shield
and a twofold device contrived thereon;
a woman leading modestly a man
conducts him, pictured as a warrior,
wrought all in gold. She claims she is Justice,
and the inscription reads: I will bring him home
and he shall have his city and shall walk
in his ancestral house.23
After hearing this Eteocles responds that the cause of
Polyneices is bereft of justice, implying thus that his own
position is completely just.

We know, as did the Athenian

audience, that neither aspirant to the throne has a legiti
mate claim to a monopoly of justice, for each is given in
some way to injustice.

The cause of Polyneices is just be

cause he is an heir to the kingship and has agreed with his
joint heir, Eteocles, to share that position.

But his cause

is unjust because it is clear that if he defeats Eteocles,
his government will be overshadowed— probably dominated— by
his Argive ally, King Adrastus.
will be reduced to bondage.

In this event the country

Contrariwise the cause of

Eteocles is patently unjust because he has broken his agree
ment with his brother, and in his disregard for this con
tract, he displays something of the tyrant.

But since he

protects the city from the almost barbaric designs of the
invaders with whom Polyneices is in league, Eteocles is a
participant in justice.

The full situation shows then that

each brother has a partial claim to justice, but that the
23642-648, tr. David Grene.
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cause of each is darkened by the refusal to reckon with its
own companion injustice.

Were the two brothers to think and

act in true respect for justice, even at this late stage a
reconciliation might be possible.

This does not happen.

When he learns of Polyneices1 assault on the seventh
gate, Eteocles changes from king to hero.
he invites the curse to run its course.

He accepts— nay—
The dialogue of

Eteocles with the chorus in lines 672-719 is the thematic
heart of this drama, for they ventilate the opposition of
the old, fated, unfree view of history with the newer, moral
view for which divinity has become a positive force in the
rectification of conflict and in the erasure of accursed
fate.

The chorus urges Eteocles to avoid direct combat with

Polyneices, explaining to him that his resolve to do so is
the result of a terrible passion.

To Eteocles however, that

fratricidal— suicidal— passion is itself the product of the
gods' demand that the curse be fulfilled.

The following

exchange capsulizes the impasse between the two positions:
Chorus:
Bitter-biting indeed
is the passion that urges you
to accomplish manslaying,
bitter in fruit, where the blood to be shed is unlawful.
Eteocles:
Yes, for the hateful black
curse of my father loved
sits on my dry and tearless eyes
and tells me first of gain and then of death.
Chorus:
Resist its urging:

coward

335
you shall not be called
if you rule your life well.
Forth from your house the black-robed Fury
shall go, when from your hands
the Gods shall receive a sacrifice.
Eteocles:
We are already past the care of Gods.
For them our death is the admirable offering.
Why then delay, fawning upon our doom?24
The hero's great moment is the moment of doom, and for this
the whole vocabulary of which freedom is a part is incompre
hensible to him.

If freedom is affiliated with life and

bondage with death, then the sort of character whom this
obdurate Eteocles personifies is more a bondman than free
man.
There is a mystery about the Seven Against Thebes.

At

first it seems that this drama is poorly organized, that its
contrary thematic positions are unresolved.
order however lies the play's true virtue.

In this dis
We must under

stand that its author did not know himself as an exponent of
"Greek culture," that instead he recognized himself as the
teacher of Athens.

If Athens were to persist in the Solonic

way of justice and freedom, then the old, heroic mentality
must be tempered with the newer truth of divine Justice which
is able to relieve mortal existence in history of its accursed character.

25

It is for this reason that Aeschylus

24693-704.
25Solmsen understands these contrary strains to be an
expression of Aeschylus' belief that the developed city of
the fifth century was able to withstand the curse, but the
family was still prone to hereditary evil.
(See Hesiod and
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exposes the hero Eteocles as one who is victim to a passion
which makes it impossible for him to rule his life well.
The refusal of Eteocles to remove himself from the power of
the curse is, for Aeschylus, the substance of the curse it
self.

The author bows to tradition in making the salvation

of the country coincidental with the hero's resignation to
the curse, but that which has gone before must have left the
careful observer with the impression that the country might
have stood in no need of salvation had its two kings chosen
to act differently.
The paradigm of mediate history then which emerges from
the Seven is accursed history, wherein each succeeding gen
eration is helpless to forsake the foibles of its predeces
sor.

The ignorance and malaise which are proper to this

mediate pattern are the underlying cause of the immediate
political evil, in Aeschylus' time the outrage of the tyrant.
Nine years after the Seven, with the production of the
Oresteia, Aeschylus dramatized a new paradigm for mediate
history which broke entirely from the solution of salvation

Aeschylus, pp. 218-219). This is so because urban life per
mits a higher degree of individuation than does the life of
the extended family in the countryside. If the children of
Atreus can be distinguished in thought as beings separate
from Atreus himself, why then should one whom Atreus has
wronged put a curse on innocent children? Hadas also be
lieves that Aeschylus attempts to teach individual responsi
bility, and he cites a prophetic parallel. Jeremiah 32.29
says, "In those days they shall say no more, the fathers
have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on
edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every
man that eateth the sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on
edge." See Hadas, Hellenistic Culture, p. 132.
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through heroic doom.

The Oresteia approaches as nearly as

could a gentile symbolism the tidings of Deutero Isaiah,
"Comfort, comfort my people, says your God."

In the

Oresteia, Aeschylus banishes accursed history to an irre
trievable past, and teaches his audience to look to the
future and to life.

The symbolism of this trilogy amounts

to the spiritual charter for a free people.
As we have recognized, the immediate problem of the
tyrant is the central issue of the Libation Bearers.
drama is the middle work in the Oresteian trilogy.

That

It is

preceded by the Agamemnon and it is followed by the
Eumenides.

With regard to the mediate history to which

Aeschylus is narrator, the tyranny of Aegisthus and
Clytemnestra and the descent of the Furies upon Orestes are
all the consequences of a curse similar to the curse upon
the house of Laius.

The accursed' ancestor in this cycle is

Atreus, and the curse upon his house is complete, bathing
each member so deeply in an historically rooted guilt as to
deny any claim to right or to free conduct.

The tradition

is that the ancient Mycenaean king Pelops had two sons,
Atreus and Thyestes.

The brothers quarreled over the throne,

and Atreus succeeded in expelling Thyestes.

Later, Thyestes

returned to the court of Atreus with his children, all of
them suppliants.

Atreus pretended to forgive Thyestes and

prepared a feast in his honor.

The main dish at this feast

was made from the flesh of Thyestes1 children.

When Thyestes

discovered what he had been eating he cursed the house of
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Atreus and fled with his surviving son, Aegisthus.

Atreus

had two sons, Agamemnon, who married Clytemnestra, and
Menelaus, who married Helen.
Electra, and Orestes.

Clytemnestra bore Iphigenia,

Upon the violation of Helen, Agamem

non sought to make war against Troy, but the winds were such
that the fleet could not sail.

To remedy this, Agamemnon

sacrificed Iphigenia to Artemis and then set sail for the
protracted war with Troy.
The Agamemnon begins shortly before the return of
Agamemnon from Troy.

The main event in the play is the mur

der of Agamemnon by his wife, Clytemnestra, with the collab
oration of Agamemnon's hereditary enemy, Aegisthus.

Cly

temnestra 's excuse for slaying her husband is that he had
sacrificed their daughter.26

We can believe that this—

along with hatred, lust, and ambition— was her motive, the
"efficient cause" of the king's murder, but the larger sig
nificance of the event is not lost on Aegisthus.
Now I can say once more that the high gods look down
on mortal crimes to vindicate the right at last,
now that I see this man— sweet sight— before me here
sprawled in the tangling nets of fury,* to atone
the calculated evil of his father's h a n d . 2 ?
The death of Agamemnon has fulfilled the will of those ex
alted gods whose function it is to enforce curses, the
261521-1529.
271578-1582, tr. Richmond Lattimore.
*"nets of fury"
= peplois Erinyon; the translation misleads here. Aeschylus
is identifying which of the high gods he means. A direct
translation is, "nets of the Furies."
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Furies.28

When, after Orestes of the next generation has

slain this couple of murderous tyrants, no mortals remain in
the household who might act as efficient instruments of the
curse in striking Orestes, himself the grandson of Atreus.
The Furies must descend and deal with the accursed directly.
With the Eumenides, the final play of the trilogy, the
action is at a point parallel to that of the Seven Against
Thebes.

It is the time of the third generation, and by the

received laws of mediate history, Orestes should be made to
bear the consequences of the curse.

In this drama Aeschylus

has shifted the setting to Athens so that he may abolish the
curse upon the house of Atreus through founding the consti
tutional machinery of Athens.

This is to say then that with

the same effort the author of the Eumenides resolves both
the immediate historical problem of the tyrant and the medi
ate historical evil of helplessness before the curse.

The

mediate evil is ended through divine intervention in his
tory; the curse is cancelled.

It is not cancelled simply by

heavenly fiat, but by a practical, constitutional assembly,
guided by divine right, which has both will and authority to
2®Both individual volition and the fated pattern of
curse figure integrally in the murderous cycle of the
Oresteia, and it is impossible to say which of the two is
preponderant. Each has its own standing. One commentator
explains this by citing a New Testament parallel. The be
trayal of Jesus by Judas, as well as the denial by Peter are
both foretold, and both are essential to the pattern of
events. Yet the gospels hold Judas and Peter fully respon
sible for their conduct. Likewise Aeschylus holds the chil
dren of Pelops responsible. See N. G. L. Hammond, "Personal
Freedom and Its Limitations in the Oresteia,11 in McCall,
Aeschylus, pp. 92-94.
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mediate the human experience of evil in history.
stitutional court is created by divine decree.

This con
The meaning

of Aeschylus thus is that true government is divine; it
raises human history above the gradient of strife, curse and
doom, and guides it to justice and to life.
In the Eumenides there are three matters which require
closer observation.

These are the presence of Athena, the

transformation of the Furies, and the charge to the Athenian
council.
Athena is the commanding deity in the Eumenides, but
she is not the only one.

Actually there are two genuses of

deity in the play, and we believe that we are able to dis
cern within one of these a further division as to species.
The deities in the Eumenides are the Furies, Apollo, and
Athena.

The Furies belong to the old— one should say, the

oldest— generation of deity.
proper.

They are not even Titans, gods

They are the daughters of Night who is herself

sprung direct from the primal Chaos.29

That is to say they

are among the most elemental forces of nature, representa
tives of natural law in its most primitive dress.

We shall

have occasion shortly to observe how Gilbert Murray applied
the Anaximander fragment to the events of the Eumenides.
The Furies, goddesses of retribution, are the personification
of the basic natural reality with which the fragment deals.
We should imagine the food chain of the wild in which the
hare takes the life of the grass, the young wolf the life of
29Theogony, 120 ff.
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the hare, and the opossum and vulture await the end of the
old wolf who lies in the grass, rattling with pneumonia.
The Furies are attendant upon each transaction in this pro
cess.

Each pays retribution in time for his own prior vora

ciousness, and in this there is the obvious justice of reap
ing where one has sown.

When this nutritive pattern of bal

ance becomes the governing law in human affairs, then each
act of justice carries with itself, in dialectical fashion,
its antithesis, opening the way for new vengeance.

This is

because of its partial character; justice for one amounts to
injustice to another, and injustice cries out for retribu
tion.

The Furies personify the cosmic force which propels

all life— humanity included— to this pattern of predation.
Next come the Olympians, Apollo and Athena.
for

Z e u s .

30

Both are figurations of Zeus.

Both speak

Apollo resembles

the young Zeus, the Zeus of old, the intractable tyrant
about whom Aeschylus informs us in the Prometheus Bound.
Athena represents the maturity of the Father.

She is the

truly divine Zeus who had learned and restored in the Unbind
ing of Prometheus.
This tri-level schema of divinity in the Eumenides is
coupled with a dual meaning of the term dike.

In the ear

lier portions of this study, our attention was to the Hesiodian concept of dikS, whose meaning corresponds generally to
the prophetic tsedaqah.

30614 f. and 735 f.

This meaning is present in
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Aeschylus; indeed, it is ascendant.

But dike, in various

forms, is also one of the commonest terms of the Oresteia.
In the mouth of most speakers, it has a conventional, nonHesiodian-Platonic meaning.

It means not the whole righ

teousness which rectifies and cures the human evil, but the
simple and unpromising rectification of blood for blood.
The justice of the predator fallen to the scavenger is the
commonplace justice, both for Apollo, who orders the tyran
nicide and matricide, and for the Furies, .who attempt to
punish it.

One suspects that it is also the notion of

justice to which many of Aeschylus' fellow Athenians sub
scribed.

Opposed to this is the righteousness of divine

Zeus whose daughter Athena brings the murder cycle to its
end and persuades the Furies to accept the new, divine un
derstanding of dike.^
31

. .
Kitto has carefully documented the complicity of
Zeus in each fateful act of Agamemnon which leads the king
at last to his death in retribution for the killing of
Iphigenia and also for the horrible bloodshed at Troy.
(Greek Tragedy, III, 1.) No different from Zeus's complic
ity in Agamemnon's retribution for the violation of Helen
is Apollo's guidance of Orestes in his retribution for the
murder of his father. That the act will bring down the
Furies upon his client seems to be of less concern to Apollo
than his interest in vengeance. Both young Zeus who takes
retribution against wicked Cronos and Apollo who orders ret
ribution against tyrant Aegisthus are in accord with the
Furies' understanding of dike. In function, they are furies
in these pursuits. Solmsen also has recognized the close
connection of Zeus, Apollo, and the Furies in the Oresteia.
He reports:
"In some passages the Erinyes are actually
thought of as included in the dispensation of Zeus."
(Hesiod and Aeschylus, pp. 186-187.)
32we may model these relationships as follows:
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For a discussion which is concerned with Aeschylus'
teaching about the mediate, symbolic history of Greece, the
transformation of the Furies which occurs in the Eumenides
is so momentous that if this play had been lost, we would
know almost nothing about the hope which prompted Aeschylus
to instruct his countrymen.

The Furies' job is to wreak

Generation:

Deity:

Dike:

pre-Olympian

Furies

retributive

justice

Olympian

Zeus-Apollo

retributive

justice

Olympian

Zeus-Athena

civic righteousness

We believe that in this play Athena represents the
higher, Hesiodian-Solonic understanding of dike. Yet the
vocabulary which Aeschylus gives to Athena is strangely bare
of dike. Athena asks rhetorically if anyone who fears noth
ing can be righteous (699); since she is advising that citi
zens be fearful, this seems to be a fear which will produce
political justice. Elsewhere, in her exhortation to the
Furies (881 f.) adherence to Persuasion is coupled to con
siderations about dike. In this passage, dike does seem to
mean positive righteousness which overcomes particular in
terests. But on the other hand, the higher conception of
dike is not at work in Athena's reasons for her stand in
favor of Orestes (734 f.). She accepts completely Apollo's
utterly partisan, anti-feminist defense of Orestes. After
this, however, Apollo seems to slip out through the back
door; whatever he has stood for in this play is not even
worth a polite farewell.
Kitto comments on line 461 of the Libation Bearers:
"'Ares (Violence) will confront Ares; Dike will confront
Dike.' But if Dike conflicts with Dike (as presently Olym
pians conflict with Erinyes), the universe is chaotic, and
Dike cannot yet be 'Justice.'"
(Greek Tragedy, p. 82).
This conflict of opposing views of right is what Athena ends
in the Eumenides, and thus, the whole justice which restores
life is present more by example than by word in her pains
taking effort to halt the curse, to calm and transform the
Furies, to reconcile them with Olympians and the Athenian
mortals who entertain a vision of justice which supersedes
mindless retribution. This is manifestly the case if we
decide to see in the encounter an attempt to persuade the
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punishment upon evildoers, especially those who are guilty
of blood crime.

They are the enforcers of curses.

In this

play they are intent on visiting the curse upon Orestes be
cause he is heir of Atreus and because he has slain his
mother.

In the Eumenides, Athena presides over the court

which tries Orestes.
defended by Apollo.

He is prosecuted by the Furies and
The jury is made up of Athenian mortals

and they divide evenly on the question of whether Orestes
should be punished.

Athena, here representing Zeus, breaks

the tie in favor of Orestes.
It seems most important that nowhere in the drama is
Orestes actually acquitted of the matricide, as a known
killer who pleads self-defense might be acquitted by a jury.
Rather, it is decided that Orestes will not be punished.
The outcome is more like a full pardon than an acquittal.33
The court, with Athena's supervision, simply agrees to stop
the curse; it will go no farther.

Athena announces:

man before us has escaped the charge of blood."

"The

Literally:

"The man has escaped blood justice (aimatos diken)."34

old families of Athens to accept the new, democratic order
without recourse to violence.
33jflurray also understood the verdict on Orestes to be
a pardon sent from Zeus. He related this to the greater
problem of theodicy posed in the Prometheus Bound. That
play, in which Zeus is tyrant, suggested the theology of the
evil god which became so prominent in the gnostic movements
of later antiquity.
But unlike the gnostics, Aeschylus did
not propose escape from the world as it is experienced.
Rather, the God, Zeus himself, learned through suffering,
and in so learning, became Savior to the world.
See Gilbert
Murray, Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy, chapter III.
34752.
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This language does not mean that he is acquitted of crime.
It means instead that Orestes will not be made to pay the
penalty for murder.

In keeping with the spirit of the play,

the jury's function here is more political than narrowly
judicial.

The court decides, as might an American governor

in similar circumstances, that the greater cause of justice
will not be served by enforcing the law.

Thus, the guilty

is pardoned; his guilt is ignored, not repudiated.

Aeschylus

underlines the seriousness of Orestes' act by having an even
half of the members of the court vote for conviction.

Coin

cidental with the pardon of Orestes is Athena's successful
persuasion of the terrible Furies.

They will no longer be

Furies, but Good Spirits, Eumenides, to the Athenian polis.
In these events, Aeschylus teaches his Athenian audi
ence a double lesson about mediate history.

Orestes, as

mortal, represents guilty Atreus, and the Furies represent
the whole pre-Olympian pantheon of shame and cruelty whose
doings Hesiod witnessed.

Both Atrean mankind and hostile

deity are put into an impotent past.

Aeschylus has decreed

a radical division in the mediate history of Greece which
affects both men and gods.

With Athena's establishment of

the machinery of constitutional justice, the process of his
tory has changed.

No longer are curse and blind fate to

dominate the destiny of man.
longer dictate the future.

Guilt is cancelled and can no
The understanding of Aeschylus

in these matters is equivalent to commensurate teachings of
Deutero Isaiah and of Paul.

For Paul, the law convicts and
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leads to death, but the new, good tidings open the future
to life and freedom.

Thus Murray writes, "Not Aigisthos,

not Clytemnestra, not Orestes; but the Law, however we
phrase it, by whatever instrument it works, is the true and
inevitable slayer."

And what is the Law?

Murray found its

adequate expression in the Anaximander fragment:

"All

things pay atonement to one another for their injustice according to the rule of time."

35

This use of the Anaximander

fragment is most perspicacious, for it, better than any
other statement, encompasses the whole range of thought,
word, and deed against which Aeschylus and his predecessors
asserted the creative and restorative nature of Zeus.

Upon

the Aeschylean pardon of Orestes and the transformation of
the Furies, it is possible to say of Athens as well as Jeru
salem "that her warfare is ended, that her iniquity is par
doned," that she has received "double for all her sins."36
35Murray, Aeschylus, p. 199. Much the same lesson ob
tains from Podlecki's examination of the immediate political
implications of the Oresteia. In the Agamemnon there is a
dialectic between dike in the higher sense and the same
term's plural forms which connote legal justice. Of the
cause of the Trojan war, Podlecki writes, "Agamemnon and his
brother are the prosecutors, the 'extractors of justice.'
But this is justice of a very primitive kind, the mere sat
isfaction of claims for what is due, raw retribution at its
lowest level. In general, it can be said that the princi
pals in the drama never rise above this minimal conception."
The Eumenides, by contrast, teaches that the way to life and
freedom follows from the divine, supra-legal orientation to
righteousness which puts into the background the bloody
spiral which is provoked by the application of mere law.
See Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy,
chapter V. The above quotation is from page 70.
3^isaiah 40.2.
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The judgment of the court upon Orestes— like the
straight judgments which the prophets of Israel demanded and
which Solon in Athens dispensed— is begotten of a devotion
to justice which is at once liberative and merciful.3?

in

the Eumenides then, Aeschylus has in fact provided a founda
tion in the reflective, mediate symbolism from which Greece
drew instruction for the earlier rectification and libera
tion performed by Solon.
Aeschylean theory.

Solonic practise is parent to

Royal Orestes/ no less than the meanest

hektemore, has been victim of a miserable domination whose
alteration is quite beyond his power.

That he is absolved

of matricide, and indeed, of all the guilt of which Atreus
was author, is a merciful disburdenment.

In this Aeschylean

symbolism mercy and the negative moment of freedom can be
seen as one and the same event.

The spirit of justice in

spires the merciful attitude from which liberation follows
as the practical consequence.

The liberation of Orestes

gains potency in the repositioning of life unto a future
which is distinct from the tyrannical and guilty past.

This

•^This understanding of the condition of Orestes before
the court's pardon as one of bondage is supported well by
the text. Early in the text, before they leave Delphi, the
Furies declare:
"Let him hide under the ground, he shall
never go free./ Cursed suppliant, he shall feel against his
head/ another murderer rising out of the same seed."
(174177) To be accursed is to be unfree. Aeschylus is the ear
liest author of whom this writer is aware to use the vocab
ulary of freedom in the metaphorical sense of moral achieve
ment and moral failure.
(See also 225 and 340.) This met
aphor has been most meaningful to the European imagination,
but it is likewise hazardous since it is the embryo of the
paradoxical understanding of freedom which estranges real
meaning from material reality.
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repositioning will occur according to practical, constitu
tional devices which permanently embody the spirit of divine
justice.
In the Eumenides, the positive future is alive and at
work in the present resolution of the plight of Orestes.
Aeschylus chooses for his constitutional tribunal a fabulous
version of the Areopagus.

He chooses the Areopagus because

it has the force of antiquity, but in the Eumenides it is a
modernized council in which membership has become possible
for all citizens, not only for th6 old families.38

The con-

38interpretations of the Areopagus passage are wonder
ful in their variety, ranging from "Aeschylus was conserva
tive" to "Aeschylus was radical." These opinions are based
on educated guesses, and sometimes show the political sym
pathies of their advocates. Our own opinion is that Aeschy
lus did not use his productions to deliver coded propaganda
messages in favor of any particular party. We believe rather
that Aeschylus continued the work of Solon, attempting to get
the competing parties to subordinate their particular inter
ests to the higher Justice.
If this assumption is correct,
then the primary significance of the Areopagus is that it
symbolizes constitutional justice as corrective against the
justice of the feud. This primary significance does not ex
haust other possibilities.
Not long before the production of the Oresteia, the
radical (democratic) group had reduced the powers of the
Areopagus, an aristocratic body, leaving it jurisdiction in
homicide and blasphemy cases. Besides this, Ephialtes, the
radical leader, had been murdered.
It seems to us that in
the Eumenides, Aeschylus' emphasis on the remaining homicide
jurisdiction serves to shore up the status of this oldest
Athenian body.
It seems also that Aeschylus is presenting a
democratized picture of the Areopagus, but of this we cannot
be certain. Athena says (487) , "I will pick the finest [ta
beltata = the best] of my citizens." The lexicon is of some
help here, but it is not decisive. The term in question is
the superlative of agathos, the standard word for "good."
The question is, does this term mean "best" in the aristo
cratic sense of a class that is able to define its culture
as best, or does it mean "best" in the sense of moral sensi
tivity and practical achievement? We believe that it means
the latter. It has a clearly aristocratic meaning only in
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stitutional tribunal is a gift to the Athenians from the
patron goddess Athena.

Her dedicatory address contains this

advice:
No anarchy, no rule of a single master. Thus
I advise my citizens to govern and to grace,
and not to cast fear utterly from your city. What
man who fears nothing at all is ever righteous? Such
be your just terrors, and you may deserve and have
salvation for your citadel, your land's defence,
such as is nowhere else found among men, neither
among the Scythians, nor the land that Pelops held.
I establish this tribunal.
It shall be untouched
by money-making, grave but quick to wrath, watchful
to protect those who sleep, a sentry on the land.
These words I have unreeled are for my citizens,
advice into the future. All must stand upright now,
take each man his ballot in his hand, think on
his oath, and make his j u d g m e n t . 39
The contrast between the land of Pelops and Athens sets
the tenor of Athena's counsel.

It is from the land of

Pelops that the difficulty which is the theme of the Oresteia
derives.

There, King Atreus acted without fear, and we be

hold the consequences.

"Fear" here is a form of deima which

conveys the idea of great terror.

Atreus in the land of

Xenophon, long after Aeschylus. Before Aeschylus, it ap
pears only in Homer, and there, only in the comparative.
In
Suppliants, 1054, it means best in a pragmatic sense, and
in Agamemnon, 378, a difficult passage, it appears in a con
text which is moral, threatening the dike of punishment
against those who ignore the Dike of moderation. Aeschylus
puts into his Areopagus the best people who can be found,
and these of course will be the ones who heed most stead
fastly Athena's injunction. The radical leaning of this
support for open government, based on merit, is balanced
however by the command against venality (7 04-705). It is
hard to see this as anything but a complaint against the
innovation of paid juries. See entry under belteros in Henry
George Lindell and Robert Scotts, A Greek-English Lexicon
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968).
39696-710.
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Pelops differed from Solon in the land of Athens in that he
had no fear.

He had no fearful respect for the gods to whom

homicide is offensive, but more importantly, he had no ter
ror about the consequences of his own conduct.
petrated both murder and cannibalism.

Thus he per

The comparison of

Solon to Atreus is apt here, for Solon conducted his career
in daily terror of the consequences of the shedding of
Athenian blood.

The lesson of Aeschylus is that a country

which would avoid the curse must live in abiding terror of
accursed, outrageous behavior.

It is this terror which sen

sitizes the person and the greater polity to the life-assur
ing authority of transcendent justice:
nothing at all is ever righteous?"

"What man who fears

In a country which prac

tises this fear which is productive of justice, there will
be, in the modern phrase, "ordered liberty."
no rule of single master [despotes]."

"No anarchy,

In such a country it

will be possible for the citizenry to stand upright and to
make the kinds of decisions that are necessary to assure sal
vation from the accursed current of historical guilt.
3. Conclusion
The Oresteian trilogy is Aeschylus' surviving master
piece.

It is the story of the political mediation of the

evils of tyranny and helplessness.

The ascendant power of

this liberative mediation is divine justice.

When it is

appropriated for human guidance man obtains release from
fated tyranny and tyrannical fate.

We conclude this study

of the origins of freedom with the discussion of Aeschylean
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freedom because in the Eumenides, and more completely in the
Suppliants, appear all of the meanings, save one, which we
have identified as being integral to freedom as it first
appeared in Mediterranean antiquity.

These meanings are:

(1) Freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood
theoretically as logos and practically as justice.

(2) Free

dom appears within a structured reality, involving negation
and position relative to the principle of unity.
pristine showing, freedom is antinomian.
primarily economic.
meaning.)

(3) In its

(4) Freedom is

(Aeschylean drama does not include this

(5) Freedom is complete only when there is uni

versal participation in political authority.

With the ap

pearance at last of this understanding the period of origins
has reached completion in the writing of Aeschylus.

Politi

cal freedom is the great oak to which the liberation of the
slave is seed.
We shall offer concluding observations about each of
these meanings presently, but before that, it is necessary
to summarize the contents of the Suppliants.
is simple in plot and generally undramatic.

The Suppliants
The fifty

daughters of Danaeus have fled, with their father, from
Egypt to Argos, where they appear as suppliants seeking pro
tection.

They have fled from an ill-mannered group of

cousins who want to marry them.

Under Egyptian law, the

claims of the cousins are valid, and the maidens should have
accepted the projected marriages.

The daughters fasten

themselves at Argos to the statues of the gods and refuse to
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move.

This presents a great difficulty for King Pelasgus

and his countrymen.

The cousins are in pursuit, and if the

city accepts the Danaeds as suppliants, it places itself in
danger of attack.

For the city of accept the Danaeds more

over makes it an accomplice to the lawlessness of the maid
ens' refusal.

But to turn them over to their hated cousins

would involve injustice to strangers (who are of Argive de
scent) and sacrilege against the gods, since the maidens
cling to the statues and threaten to hang themselves from
those same statues if the city refuses protection.

Obvi

ously there is no neat solution to the difficulty, for nei
ther side of the dispute is wholly right.

The cousins are

violent and loathsome, and the Danaeds are lawless and im
moderate in their contempt for marriage.

At length, king

and citizen decide to offer asylum to the maidens.

After

this, a herald from the cousins arrives and behaves menac
ingly.

Pelasgus rebuffs him and the play ends shortly.

latter two components of this trilogy are lost.

The

Their con

tents are known in part, but are unimportant here.

What

commends this rather inert production for our summary treat
ment of freedom in its time of origin is not the action, of
which there is little, but the more subtle materials within
it.

It is a drama about how a king and his subjects make a

difficult decision.

The king, in announcing the decision to

the Egyptian herald, refers to himself as the "tongue of
freedom's voice.
4 0 948.
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Our first conclusion about the meaning of freedom is
that freedom is a modality of divine-human unity, understood
theoretically as logos and practically as justice.

Corol

lary to this is the observation that justice or right is
authoritative, and this authority mandates unity.

In the

Eumenides Athena is justice personified and her counsel is
an authoritative force in the lifting of the curse.

Her

character in this drama emphasizes the divine and creative
aspect that is present in all true statesmanship.

Her ana

logue in Israel is the prophet who bears the authority of
the nation's God.

In the Suppliants, Aeschylus' figure of

King Pelasgus brings this meaning nearer to direct human
experience.

The central passage in this entire drama is

that employing the famous metaphor of the diver.
We need profound, preserving care, that plunges
Like a diver deep in troubled seas,
Keen and unblurred his eye, to make the end
Without disaster for us and for the.city . . .41
The king is the diver who descends into the fear-inspiring
nature of Zeus, and by this descent becomes vested with de
cisive authority.

But how is freedom involved in this?

By

the most commonplace understanding, both Athena and Pelasgus,
as just authorities, are free.

But Aeschylus understands

freedom to be resident in both the gradients of leadership
and response.

In the Eumenides and again in the Suppliants,

the key term is "persuasion."
structive in this regard.

The Suppliants is most in

Even in the hour of grave public

^■*•407-410, tr. Seth G. Benardete.
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danger, the king explicitly refuses to dictate to the people;
instead he persuades them to do that which is right.42

Con

sent to the sovereign's rightful advice makes all partici
pants in sovereignty and thus in freedom.
Consent to rightful authority has a unifying effect.
It unites humanity with divinity by reconciling human im
pulse with the divine will.

It unites man with man by re

placing pragmatic severality with the pure practicality of
purpose which transcends particular ambition.

In these two

Aeschylean dramas there are two symbols of this unity.

In

the Suppliants the vision of Aeschylus approaches the monis
tic organicism of Micah's vision of Yahweh's pastoral lead
ership.

The people's vote to protect the maidens was swift

and unanimous.42

It seems that there was no discussion, but

that all were moved spontaneously by the king's persuasion.
The corresponding picture in the Eumenides suggests the
more complicated "Athenian" pattern of unity which Pericles
would celebrate.

There the vote on Orestes' guilt was tied,

but there is nonetheless a theme here of human unity which
is stronger than diversity.

The diversity on the issue at

hand is mitigated by the underlying unity which is symbol
ized by public allegiance to the common forum, an allegiance
which makes it possible for dissenting groups to accept un
welcome decisions without recourse to violence.

It is this

second, pluralistic pattern of underlying unity which has
42365-401 and 615.
43605-624 and 940.
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become the mode of free European nations in the modern per
iod.
The second meaning of freedom, i.e., that it is a
structured reality involving negation and position, follows
closely upon the former understanding about freedom and
authority.

We recognized this structure of freedom first in

the Fourth Evangelist's freedom pericope and we have seen
its underlying presence in all of the archaic materials to
which that teaching points.

In Aeschylus the structure of

freedom is most explicit in the story of Orestes in the
Eumenides.

Orestes is a victim of negative circumstances,

the curse upon the Atreid family.

At the advice of Apollo

he flies to Athens where Athena and the court negate the
curse.

Upon this liberative negation, the life of Orestes

takes a new position.
will be

k i n g .
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He returns to his homeland where he

with the end of the murderous curse Orestes

and the family which he represents are positioned unto life.
In respect of the structure of freedom a second inference
may be drawn from the Eumenides.

This is that the negative

moment of freedom which pervaded the work of Solon had by
the time of Aeschylus been productive of a free and positive
commitment to justice which was shared throughout the polis.
We must remember that the Athens about which Aeschylus wrote
was the country which had stood with iron determination
against the vast might of Persia.

It is impossible that

Athens could have done this at the time when Solon became
44754-761.
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archon.

The persuasive authority of Solon and the tragedians

had taught the Athenians how to be free.
The third meaning attaching to freedom is that in its
pristine showing, freedom is antinomian.

The inaccessibility

of law to freedom was proclaimed explicitly in Paul's letter
to the Galatians, and was exemplified in the earlier pro
phetic opposition to the kings who were law incarnate.

The

connection of freedom with lawful conduct is a later event
which is born of the belief that the laws are an ample em
bodiment of the divine will.

Aeschylus, who is still in

the period of origins, refuses to embrace this mistaken
accomodation.

In both the Eumenides and the Suppliants, the

liberative activity is conducted in response to a right
which is at odds with law.

In the Suppliants the Danaeds

are in violation of the established law of their native land,
but Pelasgus and his subjects join the Danaeds in viewing
that law as an instrument of bondage.

The antinomian strain

is even more prominent in the Eumertides.

Orestes is a matri

cide, and one symbolic meaning of the Furies is that they
are representative of the legal penalty for such a crime.
The law is suspended, however, not because Athena and the
court do not take blood crime seriously, but because in this
instance the greater cause of justice is better served by
suspension of the law.

The fundamentally antinomian char

acter of justice and freedom survives in the modern age in
such activities as nonviolent civil disobedience, and perhaps
even in certain lawless acts of governmental officials.

The
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obvious danger posed by lawlessness provokes the attempt to
identify freedom with lawfulness, but this idea is at odds
with the ancient witness.
The fourth meaning of freedom is that freedom is pri
marily an economic affair, with moral and political freedom
as secondary devolutions.

We began our search for the ori

gins of freedom with attention to the statements from the
Hellenistic and early Roman periods of late antiquity.
Although the Stoic and New Testament materials all exhibited
a strongly spiritual understanding of freedom, we found in
the Fourth Gospel, with its comment about the son who does
not continue in the house forever a double clue as to where
we should begin our inquiry into the ancient materials and
as to what we should attend in this search.

From the house

hold of Abram to the polis of Solon, it has been clear that
the primary experience of unfreedom consists in an economic
relationship in which one person is bound in service to an
other.

The Exodus narratives, the prophets, Hesiod, and

Solon have indicated that economic measures which serve to
despoil those who are vulnerable to arbitrary authority con
stitute an unrighteousness which is offensive to God himself.
It follows that freedom is primarily the right of a person
to his own body and its produce.

That is to say, it is pri

marily an economic affair.
It seems strange that Aeschylus, who in other respects
gathers together the early meanings of freedom, is completely
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silent about this most basic reality of freedom.

It is pos

sible that this aspect of freedqm received treatment in the
Aeschylean plays which did not survive.

This is not very

likely, however, for with regard to this economic aspect of
freedom, the historical reality of Aeschylus and the writer's
own consciousness were beyond the period of origins.

The

reforms of Solon, Peisistratus, and Cleisthenes, as well as
the rapid expansion of manufacture and trade in Athens, had
taken the sharp edge off the economic issue.

For the Athen

ian majority, economic freedom had been achieved due to the
thought and action of earlier generations of liberators.

It

is for this reason that we find in Aeschylus an understand
ing which is almost completely absent from his predecessors,
i.e., that freedom should be explicitly political.
Aeschylus ends our search for the origins of freedom
because those origins are complete when the political impli
cation of liberation and the repositioning of life is made
explicit.

Thus, from Aeschylus we learn the fifth and

final meaning of freedom, that freedom is complete only when
there is universal participation in political authority.
The political possibility of freedom is implicit in the four
prior meanings,

and

bythe time of Aeschylus, Athenian polit

ical experience

has

begun to manifestthis universal involve

ment of free citizens.
this subject is

not

on extant reality.

Thus, what we find in Aeschylus on
anoriginal idea,but rather reflection

Corollary to the appearance of political
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freedom is the understanding that "free" may be predicated
on the deciding person, for participatory political insti
tutions presuppose the power of moral arbitration and prag
matic reckoning in the constituent body.
In both the Suppliants and the Eumenides, we find that
important decisions are made by the citizen body.

In nei

ther drama is the primarily economic nature of political
decisions acknowledged; Aeschylus does not tell us that
political freedom and participatory institutions are a means
of protecting the economic freedom of the commons.

Instead,

Aeschylus shuns the pragmatic in favor of the practical.
Economic pragmatism in politics simply balances one finite
historical force against another; pure practicality looks
beyond the evanescent possibilities available in history.
The moral commitment of the polis to justice will enhance
the destiny of the community more certainly than the resolu
tion of particular issues of partisan interest.

It seems

certain that Aeschylus drew this lesson about moral commit
ment and civic survival from the Athenian determination not
to bow to Persia at any cost.

That determination was in

structed by a universal, "profound, preserving care, that
plunges like a diver deep in troubled seas."

Both of the

dramas which show us free political participation are set in
crisis situations.
Commitment to divine justice as the measure for human
existence in history began with one man, with Hesiod.
Aeschylus believed that in his time

and country, that commit
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ment had become general.

But neither the Athenians nor

Aeschylus were "idealist," in the sense in which that term
is often employed.

Rather, the ideal of justice was resi

dent in the Athenian populace; thus they were capable of
freedom in determining the course of public action.

In his

attention to the political freedom of the popular assemblies
in the Suppliants and the Eumenides, Aeschylus highlights
two characteristics of this freedom which are of commanding
importance.

First is that the people respond positively to

leadership, a matter which we have discussed earlier.
Aeschylus equates popular freedom with democracy, but it is
certain that Aeschylean democracy is essentially different
from the degenerate democracy of which we learn in Plato
and Aristotle.

4 *5

Aeschylean democracy consists in careful

response to careful guidance.

It is government by popular

consent, not the frenzied autism in which freedom loops back
upon itself.

The second characteristic of universal politi

cal freedom which Aeschylus emphasizes is the heavy and per^^See especially Suppliants, 698-699:
"May the people
who strengthen [kratunei] the city protect its dignity as
well." This word usage, as well as the insistence on popu
lar consultation in decision making, gives the Suppliants
its reputation as a democratic production. A considerable
body of scholarly opinion understands this drama as Aeschy
lus' expression of gratitude and praise to democratic Argos
for its receiving Themistocles as suppliant after his ostra
cism from Athens, since Argos incurred the enmity of Sparta
by this act. Beyond this is the implication that democratic
and just Argos should be the peninsular ally of Athens
rather than aristocratic Sparta. Since the early 1950's it
has been generally accepted that the Suppliants was produced
in 463. Athens formed an alliance with Argos in 461. It is
possible that Aeschylus influenced this important shift
which cemented its democratic institutions. The evidence
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ilous burden that this freedom imposes upon the citizenry.
They are responsible for their joint destiny in a dangerous
and uncertain world, and the saving alternative is that they
decide justly.

In the Suppliants the decision to protect

the Danaeds is a decision which the populace makes, knowing
full well that the Egyptian cousins will make war against
the country while the Danaeds cannot.

For the Argive assem

bly, fear of Zeus is more compelling than fear of violent
barbarians.

In the Eumenides the Athenian court decides in

favor of Orestes before Athena has persuaded the Furies to
become Eumenides.

Apollo, the advocate of Orestes, has made

no threats against the country should the court rule against
his client, but the Furies have promised dire punishment if
the court refuses to convict.

Despite the inauspicious

circumstances, Aeschylus seems to tell us that at least half
of the people of his native land will choose the right alter
native, and that those who so choose may count on the bless
ing of God to see the project through.
In the letter to Philemon, the promise to Abram, the
leadership of Moses, the injunction of the prophets, the
true words of Hesiod, the legislation of Solon, and the drama
of Aeschylus we have seen the reality of freedom.

It is a

reality which unites the spiritual and material provinces of
human existence, imparting to concrete human existence in

supporting this hypothesis is presented in lucid detail in
Podlecki, Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy^, chap
ter IV.
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history a share in life eternal.

The reality of freedom

cannot be present in an atmosphere corrupted with injustice;
in that circumstance, only the name will persist.

We con

sider again the comment of Philo on the passage from Euripi
des, for it bespeaks a danger which is no less relevant to
our own time than to Hellenistic Alexandria.
The name of freedom is worth all the world;
If one has little, let him think that much.
I saw the whole audience so carried away by enthusiasm
that they stood upright to their full height, and rais
ing their voices above the actors, burst into shout
after shout of applause combining praise of the maxim
with praise of the poet, who glorifies not only freedom
for what it does, but even its name.46
Aeschylus and the other early sources show us something
essentially different from this enthusiasm.

They show a

steady, unyielding faith in divine justice that is produc
tive unto redemption and repair.

Only after centuries of

exploration of the nature of divine justice is the commit
ment in its favor given a name which embraces both the com
mitment and its consequences.

That name is freedom.

4 6see chapter II, section 2.
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